Chris Wilson: Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Baathists?
[Chris Wilson is an associate editor at Slate in Washington, D.C. Follow him on Twitter.]
Saleh al-Mutlaq had been a member of Iraq's Baath Party since it first attempted to seize power in 1963, when he was 14 years old. Though the Baathists were quickly expelled that year, they returned in force in 1968, and Mutlaq rose in prominence in the party. In less than a decade, he became involved in a research foundation directly connected to Saddam Hussein, who was then Iraq's vice president but was largely calling the shots. It was then, at age 30, that Mutlaq arrived at a moral crisis.
It was 1977, and the Iraqi leadership had just provoked a violent uprising among Shiites in the south. Police forces had attacked pilgrims heading to the holy city of Karbala. Riots ensued, and Saddam ordered the execution of eight Shiite men. Mutlaq, a Sunni, argued that the men should receive a fair trial; this led to his expulsion from the party.
Three decades later, Mutlaq is again in the crosshairs of controversy in Iraq over his career in a party that would become synonymous with Saddam's brutality. Shortly before the high-stakes general election in March, a commission charged with rooting out remnants of the Baath Party disqualified Mutlaq from running for parliament. His brother Ibrahim ran in his place, only to be disqualified after he won a seat.
It's a testament to Saddam's shrewd talent for dictatorship that, seven years after his capture and three and a half years after his death, he can still cause so much trouble in Iraq. Almost three months after the election, de-Baathification continues to sunder Iraqi politics. But these days, the party doesn't really have much to do with Saddam. As close observers of Iraqi politics will tell you, the policy is a thinly veiled effort by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and other prominent Shiite politicians, including Ahmad Chalabi, to stay in power. (Chalabi co-chairs the commission in charge of de-Baathification.) The lion's share of candidates with Baathist connections ran on the secular Iraqiya ticket, headed by Ayad Allawi, which won a narrow plurality of seats in the initial tally—a major setback for Maliki. Invoking Saddam is both a politically expedient way to tarnish Iraqiya candidates and a legal way to kick them out of government. The Obama administration supports the de-Baathification commission.
It's difficult for any of us who didn't live under Saddam's rule to imagine how bloody and creative his brutality was, and it would be naive to suggest the country should just forget about the Baathists and move on. But the Baath Party should at least be decoupled from his legacy...
Read entire article at Slate
Saleh al-Mutlaq had been a member of Iraq's Baath Party since it first attempted to seize power in 1963, when he was 14 years old. Though the Baathists were quickly expelled that year, they returned in force in 1968, and Mutlaq rose in prominence in the party. In less than a decade, he became involved in a research foundation directly connected to Saddam Hussein, who was then Iraq's vice president but was largely calling the shots. It was then, at age 30, that Mutlaq arrived at a moral crisis.
It was 1977, and the Iraqi leadership had just provoked a violent uprising among Shiites in the south. Police forces had attacked pilgrims heading to the holy city of Karbala. Riots ensued, and Saddam ordered the execution of eight Shiite men. Mutlaq, a Sunni, argued that the men should receive a fair trial; this led to his expulsion from the party.
Three decades later, Mutlaq is again in the crosshairs of controversy in Iraq over his career in a party that would become synonymous with Saddam's brutality. Shortly before the high-stakes general election in March, a commission charged with rooting out remnants of the Baath Party disqualified Mutlaq from running for parliament. His brother Ibrahim ran in his place, only to be disqualified after he won a seat.
It's a testament to Saddam's shrewd talent for dictatorship that, seven years after his capture and three and a half years after his death, he can still cause so much trouble in Iraq. Almost three months after the election, de-Baathification continues to sunder Iraqi politics. But these days, the party doesn't really have much to do with Saddam. As close observers of Iraqi politics will tell you, the policy is a thinly veiled effort by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and other prominent Shiite politicians, including Ahmad Chalabi, to stay in power. (Chalabi co-chairs the commission in charge of de-Baathification.) The lion's share of candidates with Baathist connections ran on the secular Iraqiya ticket, headed by Ayad Allawi, which won a narrow plurality of seats in the initial tally—a major setback for Maliki. Invoking Saddam is both a politically expedient way to tarnish Iraqiya candidates and a legal way to kick them out of government. The Obama administration supports the de-Baathification commission.
It's difficult for any of us who didn't live under Saddam's rule to imagine how bloody and creative his brutality was, and it would be naive to suggest the country should just forget about the Baathists and move on. But the Baath Party should at least be decoupled from his legacy...