John Bolton: The new British government and Afghanistan
[John Bolton is the former US Ambassador to the United Nations.]
William Hague’s quick trip to Washington on Friday was timely indeed. Just after assuming office, the new Foreign Secretary had stressed that "it is our most urgent priority… to make sure we get a grip on what is going on in Afghanistan". Arriving right on the heels of the Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Mr Hague came at a critical moment for planning both political and military aspects of the long war against the Taleban and al-Qaeda.
While there was much for Mr Hague and Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, to discuss, particularly the menace of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, Afghanistan and the closely intertwined issue of Pakistan (hence "AfPak") reportedly predominated. This was entirely appropriate given the critical decisions Nato faces in the year ahead.
Failure in Afghanistan, bad enough, would dramatically increase the chances of destabilising Pakistan — and its substantial nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of Taleban or other extremists. Moreover, Nato itself is at risk in Afghanistan, as complaints mount in Canada and America that some European allies are not pulling their fair share of difficult combat missions. These disputes threaten to poison its first out-of-area operation, perhaps the alliance itself.
Nato’s central challenge is not so much the current Afghan military situation as to avoid losing its will and staying power. As with the global war on terror generally, this war will be protracted, to which Nato must either be steeled or, sooner or later, face inevitable negative consequences.
The most grievous problem is the self-inflicted wound that President Obama administered: his vow to begin withdrawing in summer, 2011. This pledge, heard and well understood by Taleban, undoubtedly reflected Mr Obama’s own ambivalence about the Afghan war, as well as the Democratic Party’s deep-seated weakness on national security.
Unfortunately, another key problem is that both the Obama Administration and the new British Government have misdefined the objective. General Stanley McChrystal recently said, for example, that while the Taleban’s momentum had been stopped, winning depended on the Afghan people having faith in their future. Mr Hague said something quite similar about Britain’s objective: "For Afghans to be able to provide for their own security and livelihood without presenting a danger to the rest of the world."
Faith in the future and security are certainly benefits of Nato’s military campaign, but our objective is not to remake Afghanistan. That is the Afghans’ job. If Kabul eliminated corruption, conducted free and fair elections, and greatly increased its military reliability and capabilities, that would help to eliminate the Taleban.
But we cannot withdraw from the conflict just because the Afghans may not be meeting our standards. Leaving due to Afghan government failures, of which there are and will be many, would jeopardise our strategic objectives, frustrating the very reasons for intervening after 9/11 in the first place...
Read entire article at Times (UK)
William Hague’s quick trip to Washington on Friday was timely indeed. Just after assuming office, the new Foreign Secretary had stressed that "it is our most urgent priority… to make sure we get a grip on what is going on in Afghanistan". Arriving right on the heels of the Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Mr Hague came at a critical moment for planning both political and military aspects of the long war against the Taleban and al-Qaeda.
While there was much for Mr Hague and Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, to discuss, particularly the menace of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, Afghanistan and the closely intertwined issue of Pakistan (hence "AfPak") reportedly predominated. This was entirely appropriate given the critical decisions Nato faces in the year ahead.
Failure in Afghanistan, bad enough, would dramatically increase the chances of destabilising Pakistan — and its substantial nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of Taleban or other extremists. Moreover, Nato itself is at risk in Afghanistan, as complaints mount in Canada and America that some European allies are not pulling their fair share of difficult combat missions. These disputes threaten to poison its first out-of-area operation, perhaps the alliance itself.
Nato’s central challenge is not so much the current Afghan military situation as to avoid losing its will and staying power. As with the global war on terror generally, this war will be protracted, to which Nato must either be steeled or, sooner or later, face inevitable negative consequences.
The most grievous problem is the self-inflicted wound that President Obama administered: his vow to begin withdrawing in summer, 2011. This pledge, heard and well understood by Taleban, undoubtedly reflected Mr Obama’s own ambivalence about the Afghan war, as well as the Democratic Party’s deep-seated weakness on national security.
Unfortunately, another key problem is that both the Obama Administration and the new British Government have misdefined the objective. General Stanley McChrystal recently said, for example, that while the Taleban’s momentum had been stopped, winning depended on the Afghan people having faith in their future. Mr Hague said something quite similar about Britain’s objective: "For Afghans to be able to provide for their own security and livelihood without presenting a danger to the rest of the world."
Faith in the future and security are certainly benefits of Nato’s military campaign, but our objective is not to remake Afghanistan. That is the Afghans’ job. If Kabul eliminated corruption, conducted free and fair elections, and greatly increased its military reliability and capabilities, that would help to eliminate the Taleban.
But we cannot withdraw from the conflict just because the Afghans may not be meeting our standards. Leaving due to Afghan government failures, of which there are and will be many, would jeopardise our strategic objectives, frustrating the very reasons for intervening after 9/11 in the first place...