Brian Bow: Canada Can’t Return to Its Special Relationship with the United States
[Brian Bow is an associate professor of political science at Dalhousie University, and is currently a Fulbright Visiting Research Chair at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington.]
A few weeks ago, we were treated to a bit of classic Canadian political theatre. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went out of her way to highlight differences between Canadian and American government positions on the Arctic, Afghanistan and abortion. The comments themselves were not particularly novel or provocative, but they gave Canadians another opportunity to clash over whether the two countries share a “special relationship,” and what that means for our foreign-policy priorities.
Canadians have always expected a certain special consideration from the United States. No one was ever naive enough to think that Washington would put Canadian interests ahead of American ones, but there was an expectation that Canada would always get a fair hearing, and that the United States would exercise restraint in dealings with Canada. Yet we are growing accustomed to U.S. officials criticizing Canadian decisions, and – more often – undertaking new policies without taking Canadian interests into consideration. We hope our government can revive the old special relationship, but we worry they might get too cozy, and we still reward them for the occasional show of defiance.
There are good reasons to be nostalgic about the way the bilateral relationship worked in the early Cold War years. There were frictions, but the two governments consistently thought in terms of common interests and followed tacit “rules of the game,” which usually worked to Canada’s advantage. Both still have an interest in sustaining the symbolism of the special relationship. But things have changed, and we can’t go back to the way things were.
The turning point wasn’t the free-trade agreement, the end of the Cold War or 9/11. These events shook up the bilateral relationship, but the pivotal moment was really the early 1970s, when the Vietnam War and Watergate smashed the “imperial presidency” and fragmented control over U.S. foreign policy. America’s ability to recognize and adhere to postwar diplomatic culture was irretrievably lost, and the relationship became more confrontational, complicated and unpredictable. Thus it has become harder for Canadian governments to build up goodwill and convert it into concrete diplomatic concessions. Yet some new opportunities have also been created for negotiators to “play” the more fragmented American system, and thereby influence foreign and domestic policies. The recent wrangling over the Buy American legislation highlighted both the limits on what the executive branch can deliver for Canada, and the value of plugging into the U.S. system at multiple points....
Read entire article at Globe and Mail
A few weeks ago, we were treated to a bit of classic Canadian political theatre. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went out of her way to highlight differences between Canadian and American government positions on the Arctic, Afghanistan and abortion. The comments themselves were not particularly novel or provocative, but they gave Canadians another opportunity to clash over whether the two countries share a “special relationship,” and what that means for our foreign-policy priorities.
Canadians have always expected a certain special consideration from the United States. No one was ever naive enough to think that Washington would put Canadian interests ahead of American ones, but there was an expectation that Canada would always get a fair hearing, and that the United States would exercise restraint in dealings with Canada. Yet we are growing accustomed to U.S. officials criticizing Canadian decisions, and – more often – undertaking new policies without taking Canadian interests into consideration. We hope our government can revive the old special relationship, but we worry they might get too cozy, and we still reward them for the occasional show of defiance.
There are good reasons to be nostalgic about the way the bilateral relationship worked in the early Cold War years. There were frictions, but the two governments consistently thought in terms of common interests and followed tacit “rules of the game,” which usually worked to Canada’s advantage. Both still have an interest in sustaining the symbolism of the special relationship. But things have changed, and we can’t go back to the way things were.
The turning point wasn’t the free-trade agreement, the end of the Cold War or 9/11. These events shook up the bilateral relationship, but the pivotal moment was really the early 1970s, when the Vietnam War and Watergate smashed the “imperial presidency” and fragmented control over U.S. foreign policy. America’s ability to recognize and adhere to postwar diplomatic culture was irretrievably lost, and the relationship became more confrontational, complicated and unpredictable. Thus it has become harder for Canadian governments to build up goodwill and convert it into concrete diplomatic concessions. Yet some new opportunities have also been created for negotiators to “play” the more fragmented American system, and thereby influence foreign and domestic policies. The recent wrangling over the Buy American legislation highlighted both the limits on what the executive branch can deliver for Canada, and the value of plugging into the U.S. system at multiple points....