Ranj Alaaldin: Iraq's Democracy is Messy but Genuine
[Ranj Alaaldin is a Middle East political and security risk analyst based at the London School of Economics and Political Science.]
As post-election events unfold in Iraq, the usual prejudicial arguments will also make their way back into the wider debate on Iraq's democratic process: it is a failure, sectarianism dominates and Iraq will self-destruct (see Fawaz Gerges's article on Cif, Iraq's delayed democracy ). But this is the template argument that has plagued Iraq as much as violence and terror attacks have, and it is often disconnected from the reality on the ground.
Iraq has left the darker times that followed 2003. Foreign jihadists, the principal perpetrators of the atrocities of those days have more or less been eliminated in the country, owing greatly to the exceptional efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom special forces (see Mark Urban's Task Force Black for a riveting insight).
Nor should we expect the Sunnis to revert back to insurgency mode. The contest is now being fought at the ballot poll and not on the battlefield and, looking at the strong showing of Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National Movement (INM) – who will either win or come second by a marginal number of seats – it seems to be paying dividends too; for the Sunnis now have some form of a viable representative and have proven themselves to be able to coalesce around a coalition or candidate.
Allawi's strong showing, falling either just behind or just ahead of Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law (SoL) coalition means that the eventual winner will have only a marginal lead. Such is the level of competition between the two that in the end it might make little difference who wins; what therefore really matters is who can garner a coalition that puts them into power.
Democratically, it reads as a success. Politically, however, it could present problems as the coalition-building process picks up speed. The constitution provides that the largest bloc should form a government, though it is not clear whether the bloc referred to in the constitution has to be a pre-election or post-election bloc, an ambiguity that might be a sticking point over the next few weeks.
Assuming it is the latter, the simple scenario would involve some form of a Maliki-led coalition that includes the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Sadrist dominated Iraqi National Alliance (INA), along with the Kurds, which, in essence, marginalises the INM. Chances of a Maliki and Allawi partnership are almost impossible; both seek the premiership, have personal differences, and will not be content with playing second-fiddle to the other.
But like most things in Iraqi politics, nothing is simple. Sidelining as significant a coalition like the INM would prove controversial and in essence seem like a marginalisation of the Sunni community. What, therefore, comes into question is whether the Kurds and the INA prefer a Maliki government or an Allawi one...
Read entire article at Guardian (UK)
As post-election events unfold in Iraq, the usual prejudicial arguments will also make their way back into the wider debate on Iraq's democratic process: it is a failure, sectarianism dominates and Iraq will self-destruct (see Fawaz Gerges's article on Cif, Iraq's delayed democracy ). But this is the template argument that has plagued Iraq as much as violence and terror attacks have, and it is often disconnected from the reality on the ground.
Iraq has left the darker times that followed 2003. Foreign jihadists, the principal perpetrators of the atrocities of those days have more or less been eliminated in the country, owing greatly to the exceptional efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom special forces (see Mark Urban's Task Force Black for a riveting insight).
Nor should we expect the Sunnis to revert back to insurgency mode. The contest is now being fought at the ballot poll and not on the battlefield and, looking at the strong showing of Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National Movement (INM) – who will either win or come second by a marginal number of seats – it seems to be paying dividends too; for the Sunnis now have some form of a viable representative and have proven themselves to be able to coalesce around a coalition or candidate.
Allawi's strong showing, falling either just behind or just ahead of Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law (SoL) coalition means that the eventual winner will have only a marginal lead. Such is the level of competition between the two that in the end it might make little difference who wins; what therefore really matters is who can garner a coalition that puts them into power.
Democratically, it reads as a success. Politically, however, it could present problems as the coalition-building process picks up speed. The constitution provides that the largest bloc should form a government, though it is not clear whether the bloc referred to in the constitution has to be a pre-election or post-election bloc, an ambiguity that might be a sticking point over the next few weeks.
Assuming it is the latter, the simple scenario would involve some form of a Maliki-led coalition that includes the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Sadrist dominated Iraqi National Alliance (INA), along with the Kurds, which, in essence, marginalises the INM. Chances of a Maliki and Allawi partnership are almost impossible; both seek the premiership, have personal differences, and will not be content with playing second-fiddle to the other.
But like most things in Iraqi politics, nothing is simple. Sidelining as significant a coalition like the INM would prove controversial and in essence seem like a marginalisation of the Sunni community. What, therefore, comes into question is whether the Kurds and the INA prefer a Maliki government or an Allawi one...