James Joyner: Are Nuclear Weapons Obsolete?
[James Joyner is managing editor of the Atlantic Council.]
Do all sane people agree that a nuclear weapons-free world would be best? Are nuclear weapons militarily obsolete, desirable only for political posturing? That seems to be the consensus of an influential group of European leaders making the rounds in Washington this week.
Earlier this week, the Atlantic Council hosted a delegation from the Pugwash Conferences and the Top Level Group for a working lunch on the future of the U.S. nuclear posture in Europe. It was a lively and frank exchange of men and women who hold or have held very senior defense and foreign policy-making positions on both sides of the Atlantic and are therefore very steeped in the issues at hand. The discussion was not-for-attribution but the major takeaways are fair game.
Nuclear Weapons Obsolete? There appears to be a growing sentiment in Europe that nuclear weapons are obsolete, kept around only for symbolic value. Their use is considered so morally reprehensible, the argument goes, that no political leader would dare authorize their use and be forever a pariah. And, if there are no circumstances under which they might be used by Western leaders, then the deterrence argument goes out the window.
The problem with that theory is that desperation changes the utility equation. No sane Japanese government would have provoked war with the United States in 1941. But, facing even worse alternatives, they threw a Hail Mary with the Pearl Harbor bombing and hoped for the best.
Could China or Russia be backed into a corner and become so desperate that they'd launch a nuclear first strike? It's pretty hard to imagine. Then again, the mere fact that they have that theoretical option makes it less likely that they'll be backed into a corner.
It's a little easier to come up with a scenario under which North Korea's Kim Jong Il or a nuclear-empowered Iranian ayatollah might see nuclear weapons as a plausible option. Or, goodness knows, India and Pakistan. More likely, though, the sense of security that comes with being a nuclear possessor will prevent conflicts that might otherwise have been tenable.
Clausewitz taught us that war and politics are inextricably linked. So, the distinction between the "political" and "military" viability of nuclear weapons is one without meaning. The bottom line is that deterrence theory still works, at least amongst state actors. After all, no nuclear power has ever been attacked by another state. The same can't be said about attacks by nuclear powers against non-nuclear states.
Indeed, this argument was laid out quite nicely three years ago by Des Browne, the UK's then-Secretary of State for Defense, in a speech to King's College:
"Why do we need a nuclear deterrent? The answer is because it works. Our deterrent has been a central plank of our national security strategy for fifty years. And the fact is that over this fifty years, neither our nor any other country’s nuclear weapons have ever been used, nor has there been a single significant conflict between the world’s major powers. We believe our nuclear deterrent, as part of NATO, helped make this happen."
In the same speech, he asked, "Are we prepared to tolerate a world in which countries who care about morality lay down their nuclear weapons, leaving others to threaten the rest of the world or hold it to ransom?" Quite obviously, the answer is No...
Read entire article at Atlantic Council
Do all sane people agree that a nuclear weapons-free world would be best? Are nuclear weapons militarily obsolete, desirable only for political posturing? That seems to be the consensus of an influential group of European leaders making the rounds in Washington this week.
Earlier this week, the Atlantic Council hosted a delegation from the Pugwash Conferences and the Top Level Group for a working lunch on the future of the U.S. nuclear posture in Europe. It was a lively and frank exchange of men and women who hold or have held very senior defense and foreign policy-making positions on both sides of the Atlantic and are therefore very steeped in the issues at hand. The discussion was not-for-attribution but the major takeaways are fair game.
Nuclear Weapons Obsolete? There appears to be a growing sentiment in Europe that nuclear weapons are obsolete, kept around only for symbolic value. Their use is considered so morally reprehensible, the argument goes, that no political leader would dare authorize their use and be forever a pariah. And, if there are no circumstances under which they might be used by Western leaders, then the deterrence argument goes out the window.
The problem with that theory is that desperation changes the utility equation. No sane Japanese government would have provoked war with the United States in 1941. But, facing even worse alternatives, they threw a Hail Mary with the Pearl Harbor bombing and hoped for the best.
Could China or Russia be backed into a corner and become so desperate that they'd launch a nuclear first strike? It's pretty hard to imagine. Then again, the mere fact that they have that theoretical option makes it less likely that they'll be backed into a corner.
It's a little easier to come up with a scenario under which North Korea's Kim Jong Il or a nuclear-empowered Iranian ayatollah might see nuclear weapons as a plausible option. Or, goodness knows, India and Pakistan. More likely, though, the sense of security that comes with being a nuclear possessor will prevent conflicts that might otherwise have been tenable.
Clausewitz taught us that war and politics are inextricably linked. So, the distinction between the "political" and "military" viability of nuclear weapons is one without meaning. The bottom line is that deterrence theory still works, at least amongst state actors. After all, no nuclear power has ever been attacked by another state. The same can't be said about attacks by nuclear powers against non-nuclear states.
Indeed, this argument was laid out quite nicely three years ago by Des Browne, the UK's then-Secretary of State for Defense, in a speech to King's College:
"Why do we need a nuclear deterrent? The answer is because it works. Our deterrent has been a central plank of our national security strategy for fifty years. And the fact is that over this fifty years, neither our nor any other country’s nuclear weapons have ever been used, nor has there been a single significant conflict between the world’s major powers. We believe our nuclear deterrent, as part of NATO, helped make this happen."
In the same speech, he asked, "Are we prepared to tolerate a world in which countries who care about morality lay down their nuclear weapons, leaving others to threaten the rest of the world or hold it to ransom?" Quite obviously, the answer is No...