John Nagl and Mitchell Reiss: Iraq lessons can guide Afghan surge
[John Nagl is president of the Center for a New American Security and a retired Army officer who helped write the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Mitchell Reiss is diplomat-in-residence at the College of William & Mary and author of the forthcoming Negotiating with Evil.]
As US forces fight to clear Taliban militia from the town of Marjah in Afghanistan’s Helmand province, commanders need to look again at what we learnt in Iraq. A key cause of success in that country came when Sunni tribes flipped and decided to fight against hardcore al-Qaeda militants. Afghanistan is not Iraq, but the US and its allies would be foolish to ignore the lessons of the “Sunni Awakening” that took place in Iraq’s al-Anbar province in 2006 and 2007. Properly applied, these lessons could help us use the increased military resources of the Afghan surge to accelerate a political victory in Afghanistan.
First, the US must fight the insurgency from the bottom up. Well into 2006, US efforts to engage tribal factions in Iraq were primarily top-down: military commanders and diplomats tried to negotiate grand bargains with high-profile (but not always influential) sheikhs to get their tribes to stop fighting as insurgents. Unfortunately, this strategy did not work. Al-Qaeda attacked these tribes with impunity, deterring others from rising up and seeking US assistance.
In Afghanistan, local commanders and civilians are working with low-level Afghan tribal leaders to flip the Taliban, but their efforts are being hampered by the requirement that all tribal engagement be cleared with the Karzai government. Given the disenchantment of most Pashtun tribes with Kabul, these preconditions are killing fledgling successes before they can gather momentum.
We need a unified policy that encourages local commanders to engage the tribes in their respective areas and to take advantage of fleeting opportunities to separate them from the insurgents. Flipping Afghan tribes will begin with a series of localised arrangements supported by the centre, not a centralised solution executed at the periphery.
Second, US forces must be better strategic communicators. Until 2007, the US sent mixed messages to the Iraqi tribes about its willingness to engage. American forces worked with the tribes before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom and created an expectation of co-operation in the future governance of the country. The Coalition Provisional Authority established in May 2003 abruptly reversed course, thereby cementing tribal opposition to the American presence.
Later, mixed messages were sent as US diplomats and military officers selectively reached out to certain tribal leaders while insisting that negotiations could not take place with those who had American blood on their hands. At the same time, tactical-level military units were constantly devising their own approaches to engaging tribes and local power-brokers, with no co-ordination from higher command. Only in 2007 did the coalition adopt a clear, consistent position that it was willing to support any tribes and factions that rejected al-Qaeda in Iraq, a stance that helped the Anbar Awakening spread and turn the tide.
The coalition has repeated this mistake in Afghanistan, sending mixed signals about their willingness to engage with the tribes. We must be willing to engage with any and all tribes that reject militant extremists...
Read entire article at Financial Times (UK)
As US forces fight to clear Taliban militia from the town of Marjah in Afghanistan’s Helmand province, commanders need to look again at what we learnt in Iraq. A key cause of success in that country came when Sunni tribes flipped and decided to fight against hardcore al-Qaeda militants. Afghanistan is not Iraq, but the US and its allies would be foolish to ignore the lessons of the “Sunni Awakening” that took place in Iraq’s al-Anbar province in 2006 and 2007. Properly applied, these lessons could help us use the increased military resources of the Afghan surge to accelerate a political victory in Afghanistan.
First, the US must fight the insurgency from the bottom up. Well into 2006, US efforts to engage tribal factions in Iraq were primarily top-down: military commanders and diplomats tried to negotiate grand bargains with high-profile (but not always influential) sheikhs to get their tribes to stop fighting as insurgents. Unfortunately, this strategy did not work. Al-Qaeda attacked these tribes with impunity, deterring others from rising up and seeking US assistance.
In Afghanistan, local commanders and civilians are working with low-level Afghan tribal leaders to flip the Taliban, but their efforts are being hampered by the requirement that all tribal engagement be cleared with the Karzai government. Given the disenchantment of most Pashtun tribes with Kabul, these preconditions are killing fledgling successes before they can gather momentum.
We need a unified policy that encourages local commanders to engage the tribes in their respective areas and to take advantage of fleeting opportunities to separate them from the insurgents. Flipping Afghan tribes will begin with a series of localised arrangements supported by the centre, not a centralised solution executed at the periphery.
Second, US forces must be better strategic communicators. Until 2007, the US sent mixed messages to the Iraqi tribes about its willingness to engage. American forces worked with the tribes before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom and created an expectation of co-operation in the future governance of the country. The Coalition Provisional Authority established in May 2003 abruptly reversed course, thereby cementing tribal opposition to the American presence.
Later, mixed messages were sent as US diplomats and military officers selectively reached out to certain tribal leaders while insisting that negotiations could not take place with those who had American blood on their hands. At the same time, tactical-level military units were constantly devising their own approaches to engaging tribes and local power-brokers, with no co-ordination from higher command. Only in 2007 did the coalition adopt a clear, consistent position that it was willing to support any tribes and factions that rejected al-Qaeda in Iraq, a stance that helped the Anbar Awakening spread and turn the tide.
The coalition has repeated this mistake in Afghanistan, sending mixed signals about their willingness to engage with the tribes. We must be willing to engage with any and all tribes that reject militant extremists...