Richard N. Haass: Only one force can stop Iran now ... its people
[Richard N. Haass is president of the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of War of Necessity, War of Choice: a Memoir of Two Iraq Wars.]
In Iran the clock is ticking. In fact, three clocks are ticking simultaneously — in the country’s nuclear laboratories, at the negotiating table and on the streets. Its future depends on which clock ticks fastest.
Demonstrations filled the streets yesterday, accompanied by the clear sound of a political crackdown as the regime’s supporters and opponents squared up. But for all the sound and fury the two sides were like boxers circling in the ring. It was not a decisive moment. The political clock is still ticking.
On the nuclear front matters appear to be moving faster. Iran now has thousands of centrifuges enriching uranium 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The uranium has certainly been enriched to a concentration (approximately 4 per cent) suitable for producing electricity. But yesterday, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed Iran had produced uranium enriched to a concentration of 20 per cent, only days after announcing that as an ambition. Is this just bluster? We cannot be sure. What we do know is that from there it is only a short step to the 90 per cent concentration required to produce fuel for nuclear weapons. Iran appears to have encountered technical problems enriching large amounts of uranium, but it could still generate significant quantities of weapons-grade fuel in one to three years, if not sooner.
It is not yet clear whether Iran intends to go so far as to produce, test and field nuclear weapons. Iranian officials might decide to halt their programme just short of that, calculating that Iran could garner most of the benefits of being perceived as a nuclear weapons state without incurring most of the costs. Either outcome — Iran as an actual nuclear weapons state or a “threshold” one — would have profoundly destabilising consequences for the region and the world.
Not that the current situation is stable. Iran could provoke an Israeli or American preventive military strike against its nuclear facilities even before that line is crossed — something sure to prompt Iranian retaliation throughout the region. Oil supplies could well be disrupted at a time when world economic recovery remains fragile. An Iranian nuclear weapon would almost certainly lead several of Iran’s neighbours to develop or acquire nuclear weapons of their own, leaving the Middle East perched uneasily on a nuclear precipice. In terms of global risk, Iran is now centre stage.
Around the negotiating table the clock is ticking more slowly. Talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — the US, Great Britain, France, Russia and China — plus Germany have failed to produce an accord, even though the precondition that Iran suspend all enrichment has been dropped. What they want is for Iran to halt its independent enrichment programme, and place all its uranium and associated technology and facilities under international supervision. In exchange, Iran could expect the relaxation of existing economic sanctions, access to nuclear power and any number of political and strategic benefits.
That argument is rational, but the incentives don’t appear to be working. It is time to get tougher. Many in Washington back additional sanctions that target the Revolutionary Guard, the elite force of about 100,000 that increasingly dominates Iran’s politics, security policy and economy. Indeed, 31 years after the Islamic revolution that established an unprecedented fusion of clerical and political rule, Iran increasingly resembles a traditional authoritarian state where security forces dominate most aspects of public life...
Read entire article at Times (UK)
In Iran the clock is ticking. In fact, three clocks are ticking simultaneously — in the country’s nuclear laboratories, at the negotiating table and on the streets. Its future depends on which clock ticks fastest.
Demonstrations filled the streets yesterday, accompanied by the clear sound of a political crackdown as the regime’s supporters and opponents squared up. But for all the sound and fury the two sides were like boxers circling in the ring. It was not a decisive moment. The political clock is still ticking.
On the nuclear front matters appear to be moving faster. Iran now has thousands of centrifuges enriching uranium 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The uranium has certainly been enriched to a concentration (approximately 4 per cent) suitable for producing electricity. But yesterday, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed Iran had produced uranium enriched to a concentration of 20 per cent, only days after announcing that as an ambition. Is this just bluster? We cannot be sure. What we do know is that from there it is only a short step to the 90 per cent concentration required to produce fuel for nuclear weapons. Iran appears to have encountered technical problems enriching large amounts of uranium, but it could still generate significant quantities of weapons-grade fuel in one to three years, if not sooner.
It is not yet clear whether Iran intends to go so far as to produce, test and field nuclear weapons. Iranian officials might decide to halt their programme just short of that, calculating that Iran could garner most of the benefits of being perceived as a nuclear weapons state without incurring most of the costs. Either outcome — Iran as an actual nuclear weapons state or a “threshold” one — would have profoundly destabilising consequences for the region and the world.
Not that the current situation is stable. Iran could provoke an Israeli or American preventive military strike against its nuclear facilities even before that line is crossed — something sure to prompt Iranian retaliation throughout the region. Oil supplies could well be disrupted at a time when world economic recovery remains fragile. An Iranian nuclear weapon would almost certainly lead several of Iran’s neighbours to develop or acquire nuclear weapons of their own, leaving the Middle East perched uneasily on a nuclear precipice. In terms of global risk, Iran is now centre stage.
Around the negotiating table the clock is ticking more slowly. Talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council — the US, Great Britain, France, Russia and China — plus Germany have failed to produce an accord, even though the precondition that Iran suspend all enrichment has been dropped. What they want is for Iran to halt its independent enrichment programme, and place all its uranium and associated technology and facilities under international supervision. In exchange, Iran could expect the relaxation of existing economic sanctions, access to nuclear power and any number of political and strategic benefits.
That argument is rational, but the incentives don’t appear to be working. It is time to get tougher. Many in Washington back additional sanctions that target the Revolutionary Guard, the elite force of about 100,000 that increasingly dominates Iran’s politics, security policy and economy. Indeed, 31 years after the Islamic revolution that established an unprecedented fusion of clerical and political rule, Iran increasingly resembles a traditional authoritarian state where security forces dominate most aspects of public life...