Nikolas K. Gvosdev: The Realist Prism ... Barack W. Obama Revisited
[Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College.]
A year ago, Christian Brose penned a provocative article for Foreign Policy entitled "George W. Obama." In it, the former speechwriter for Condoleezza Rice asserted that "Obama ran against a caricature of Bush's first term" during the 2008 election, rather than the Bush foreign policy of the second term. Moreover, of the latter, he predicted that Obama would "largely continue it." In large measure, Brose has turned out to be right. Despite the rhetoric of "change we can believe in," there has been a high degree of continuity between the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations.
Take the most significant legacy of the Bush years, the Iraq war. In 2008, candidate Obama promised, "I will bring this war to a close. In 2009, I will bring our troops home." Since taking office, however, President Obama has hewed largely to the plans laid down by his predecessor and enshrined in the 2008 "Status of Forces" agreement: U.S. forces out of Iraqi cities by summer 2010, with at least 50,000 troops to remain in Iraq until 2011 -- and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has hinted there could be a small "residual force" left even after that date.
It is true that sometimes there has been a shift in emphasis. The Obama team placed a greater weight on trying to directly engage the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for instance. But as 2010 dawns, the situation is back to where it was when the Bush administration left office -- with the current administration seeking a renewed international effort to impose punitive sanctions on Tehran. The "reset" with Russia made for good rhetoric, but most of the same elements of the Bush policy that rankled Moscow have been continued, with two key examples being support for the eastward expansion of NATO -- including membership for Georgia and Ukraine -- and continued efforts to diminish Russia's stranglehold on European energy markets. Policy toward China remains largely framed by Robert Zoellick's efforts to encourage Beijing to become a "responsible stakeholder."
Obama used the tactic of "policy reviews" to give himself some breathing room in 2009, but as these reviews came in, they often recommended continuing Bush-era policies or altering them, as opposed to reversing them. So the Sudan policy review has led to, in large measure, a continuation of the Bush policy of trying to engage the regime in Khartoum, with no prospect of greater American involvement -- such as through the use of military force -- to compel the government to end its campaign in Darfur. While there is some confusion as to whether the landmine review is officially completed or not, the current stance of the Obama administration is to continue the Bush policy. Other policy reviews have ended "excesses" of the Bush administration but have not necessarily reversed what was done during the previous eight years -- as we have seen when it comes to issues like secrecy and executive power.
Yes, the Obama team has been better tuned to global public opinion, articulating a more activist line on climate change and attending the landmine treaty review conference in Cartagena as observers. But until the administration decides to put political capital behind the necessary enabling legislation and treaty ratifications in Congress, the U.S. position on many issues tends to default to the Bush-era position.
This is not to say that there have been no changes. In September 2009, in what the New York Times called "one of the biggest national security reversals of his young presidency," Obama announced the cancellation of the Bush plan to deploy a missile-defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. But Congress had already refused to fund construction of the sites (because neither Warsaw nor Prague had ratified the agreements), and the General Accounting Office had released a report raising serious concerns about cost and workability. Significantly, Obama has not rejected the premise of missile defense, as some of his liberal supporters had hoped for, nor has he made any moves to touch better-established programs already in existence in California and Alaska.
Other areas of divergence include a reluctance to move forward with a series of Bush-negotiated free trade pacts, especially with Colombia, and a tendency to distance the Obama administration from those foreign leaders most identified with Bush's "Freedom Agenda" -- Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia and the March 17 coalition in Lebanon. When Lebanon's elections were held over the summer, for instance, Obama's focus was on the democratic process rather than on the victory of specific, pro-American politicians.
But all of this, while important, does not represent the radical break with the previous administration that many voters in 2008 thought they were getting. What accounts for this high degree of continuity, especially given the rhetoric of the 2008 campaign?..
Read entire article at World Politics Review
A year ago, Christian Brose penned a provocative article for Foreign Policy entitled "George W. Obama." In it, the former speechwriter for Condoleezza Rice asserted that "Obama ran against a caricature of Bush's first term" during the 2008 election, rather than the Bush foreign policy of the second term. Moreover, of the latter, he predicted that Obama would "largely continue it." In large measure, Brose has turned out to be right. Despite the rhetoric of "change we can believe in," there has been a high degree of continuity between the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations.
Take the most significant legacy of the Bush years, the Iraq war. In 2008, candidate Obama promised, "I will bring this war to a close. In 2009, I will bring our troops home." Since taking office, however, President Obama has hewed largely to the plans laid down by his predecessor and enshrined in the 2008 "Status of Forces" agreement: U.S. forces out of Iraqi cities by summer 2010, with at least 50,000 troops to remain in Iraq until 2011 -- and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has hinted there could be a small "residual force" left even after that date.
It is true that sometimes there has been a shift in emphasis. The Obama team placed a greater weight on trying to directly engage the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for instance. But as 2010 dawns, the situation is back to where it was when the Bush administration left office -- with the current administration seeking a renewed international effort to impose punitive sanctions on Tehran. The "reset" with Russia made for good rhetoric, but most of the same elements of the Bush policy that rankled Moscow have been continued, with two key examples being support for the eastward expansion of NATO -- including membership for Georgia and Ukraine -- and continued efforts to diminish Russia's stranglehold on European energy markets. Policy toward China remains largely framed by Robert Zoellick's efforts to encourage Beijing to become a "responsible stakeholder."
Obama used the tactic of "policy reviews" to give himself some breathing room in 2009, but as these reviews came in, they often recommended continuing Bush-era policies or altering them, as opposed to reversing them. So the Sudan policy review has led to, in large measure, a continuation of the Bush policy of trying to engage the regime in Khartoum, with no prospect of greater American involvement -- such as through the use of military force -- to compel the government to end its campaign in Darfur. While there is some confusion as to whether the landmine review is officially completed or not, the current stance of the Obama administration is to continue the Bush policy. Other policy reviews have ended "excesses" of the Bush administration but have not necessarily reversed what was done during the previous eight years -- as we have seen when it comes to issues like secrecy and executive power.
Yes, the Obama team has been better tuned to global public opinion, articulating a more activist line on climate change and attending the landmine treaty review conference in Cartagena as observers. But until the administration decides to put political capital behind the necessary enabling legislation and treaty ratifications in Congress, the U.S. position on many issues tends to default to the Bush-era position.
This is not to say that there have been no changes. In September 2009, in what the New York Times called "one of the biggest national security reversals of his young presidency," Obama announced the cancellation of the Bush plan to deploy a missile-defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. But Congress had already refused to fund construction of the sites (because neither Warsaw nor Prague had ratified the agreements), and the General Accounting Office had released a report raising serious concerns about cost and workability. Significantly, Obama has not rejected the premise of missile defense, as some of his liberal supporters had hoped for, nor has he made any moves to touch better-established programs already in existence in California and Alaska.
Other areas of divergence include a reluctance to move forward with a series of Bush-negotiated free trade pacts, especially with Colombia, and a tendency to distance the Obama administration from those foreign leaders most identified with Bush's "Freedom Agenda" -- Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia and the March 17 coalition in Lebanon. When Lebanon's elections were held over the summer, for instance, Obama's focus was on the democratic process rather than on the victory of specific, pro-American politicians.
But all of this, while important, does not represent the radical break with the previous administration that many voters in 2008 thought they were getting. What accounts for this high degree of continuity, especially given the rhetoric of the 2008 campaign?..