Walter Shapiro: Obama's Afghanistan Decision and the Art of the Tick-Tock
[Walter Shapiro, a PoliticsDaily.com columnist, has covered the last eight presidential campaigns as a columnist and political reporter. Along the way, he has worked for two newspapers (USA Today and the Washington Post), two news weeklies (Time and Newsweek), two monthlies (Esquire and the Washington Monthly) and two online magazines (Salon and Slate).]
No group can possibly be as smug as presidential advisers after a major national security decision has been announced.
Anyone who was ever allowed into the inner sanctum of the White House Situation Room, even if only to attend a deputies meeting, can bask in collective pride over the president's handiwork. At moments like this, it is easy for these insiders to believe that every option was parsed, that every grumpy dissent was respectfully heard and that not since the launch of the Marshall Plan has there been a more inspired team of American wise men and women....
... The goal not to be trapped by the rigidities of unchallenged assumptions is laudable. But a close reading of all three newspaper articles suggests how conventional most of the debates in the White House Sit Room actually were. No one appears to have questioned whether it is necessary to fight al Qaeda around the globe in order to protect America against a major attack. Nor apparently was there a serious debate about abandoning Afghanistan to its fate. Early in the deliberations, according to the Times, Obama said flatly,"I just want to say right now, I want to take off the table that we're leaving Afghanistan."
Obama's Afghan decision may prove to be the best of the flawed options available. But it is hard to argue that there was anything inherently bold about Obama opting to rush 30,000 men and women to Afghanistan (plus NATO reinforcements) rather than the 40,000 troops originally requested by General Stanley McChrystal. Kennedy, Johnson and their best and brightest advisers routinely declared that leaving Vietnam was not an option. Obama did exactly the same thing with Afghanistan, but, of course, this president was profoundly influenced by the lasting lessons of Vietnam.
That may be why Obama's advisers have to stretch to portray the stuff of greatness in the president's Afghan decision-making. As the Los Angeles Times first reported and the New York Times honored as its lead anecdote, Obama's breakthrough moment came when he pointed to a chart outlining a gradual escalation of troop levels in Afghanistan and dramatically declared,"I want this pushed to the left." Even if you go with the LA Times version,"I want to move this to the left," the Obama line calling for faster deployment desperately needs a script doctor. Somehow"I want this pushed to the left" lacks the emotional grandeur of, say,"We shall fight on the beaches; we shall fight on the landing grounds. . . . We shall never surrender."
The recurring problem with high-stakes presidential decision-making is not that the White House discussions lack dissenters, but that the dissent becomes ritualized and marginalized. During the Vietnam War, George Ball, the undersecretary of State, played the predictable role of the in-house dove whose objections were regularly over-ruled. Secretary of State Colin Powell was always in the room ineffectually talking about diplomacy during the run-up to the Iraq War...
Read entire article at Politics Daily
No group can possibly be as smug as presidential advisers after a major national security decision has been announced.
Anyone who was ever allowed into the inner sanctum of the White House Situation Room, even if only to attend a deputies meeting, can bask in collective pride over the president's handiwork. At moments like this, it is easy for these insiders to believe that every option was parsed, that every grumpy dissent was respectfully heard and that not since the launch of the Marshall Plan has there been a more inspired team of American wise men and women....
... The goal not to be trapped by the rigidities of unchallenged assumptions is laudable. But a close reading of all three newspaper articles suggests how conventional most of the debates in the White House Sit Room actually were. No one appears to have questioned whether it is necessary to fight al Qaeda around the globe in order to protect America against a major attack. Nor apparently was there a serious debate about abandoning Afghanistan to its fate. Early in the deliberations, according to the Times, Obama said flatly,"I just want to say right now, I want to take off the table that we're leaving Afghanistan."
Obama's Afghan decision may prove to be the best of the flawed options available. But it is hard to argue that there was anything inherently bold about Obama opting to rush 30,000 men and women to Afghanistan (plus NATO reinforcements) rather than the 40,000 troops originally requested by General Stanley McChrystal. Kennedy, Johnson and their best and brightest advisers routinely declared that leaving Vietnam was not an option. Obama did exactly the same thing with Afghanistan, but, of course, this president was profoundly influenced by the lasting lessons of Vietnam.
That may be why Obama's advisers have to stretch to portray the stuff of greatness in the president's Afghan decision-making. As the Los Angeles Times first reported and the New York Times honored as its lead anecdote, Obama's breakthrough moment came when he pointed to a chart outlining a gradual escalation of troop levels in Afghanistan and dramatically declared,"I want this pushed to the left." Even if you go with the LA Times version,"I want to move this to the left," the Obama line calling for faster deployment desperately needs a script doctor. Somehow"I want this pushed to the left" lacks the emotional grandeur of, say,"We shall fight on the beaches; we shall fight on the landing grounds. . . . We shall never surrender."
The recurring problem with high-stakes presidential decision-making is not that the White House discussions lack dissenters, but that the dissent becomes ritualized and marginalized. During the Vietnam War, George Ball, the undersecretary of State, played the predictable role of the in-house dove whose objections were regularly over-ruled. Secretary of State Colin Powell was always in the room ineffectually talking about diplomacy during the run-up to the Iraq War...