Larry Beinhart: Why Should We Get Out of Afghanistan? Because Imperialism Is a Fool's Game
[ Larry Beinhart is the author of "Wag the Dog," "The Librarian," and "Fog Facts: Searching for Truth in the Land of Spin." His latest book is Salvation Boulevard. Responses can be sent to beinhart@earthlink.net.]
Should we get out of Afghanistan?
Yes. Here’s why.
Imperialism, in general, is a tough business.
Influence, dominate, manipulate, sure. But an occupation is a different story. It can only succeed in a state that is contiguous, as Chechnya is to Russia and Tibet is to China. Success demands utter ruthlessness: secret police, assassinations, the murder of civilians, and leveling neighborhoods and sometimes entire cities. Open societies like ours find that hard to tolerate.
Good intentions – reform, rebuild, bring democracy, modernize, civilize, liberate, pick up the white man’s burden – don’t turn the trick.
There is a classic sequence. A rebel group commits violent acts. The occupying power reacts with force. This alienates the population. If it doesn’t, the rebels push until they get the reaction they need. The rebellion grows.
Imperial occupations have become geometrically more difficult since the Second World War. The more ethnically, religiously, and culturally different the occupiers are from the locals, the worse it gets. It doesn’t matter if the foreign power is there "by invitation," as the Russians were in Afghanistan and the United States was in Vietnam.
Afghanistan, in particular, is a tough place to run an occupation.
Alexander the Great conquered the Persian Empire in six months. Then it took him three years to conquer Afghanistan. He only settled things by taking an Afghan bride, then moving on.
In the 19th century, at the height of its imperial power, Great Britain fought two wars against the Afghans. The first time, the Afghans destroyed an entire British army. The second time, the English attained a limited victory. They put a puppet on the throne, who gave them control of Afghanistan’s foreign policy (to keep the Russians out), but otherwise withdrew from the country.
In 1978 an indigenous Marxist group took power in Afghanistan. Its goal was to modernize: liberate women, change marriage customs, abolish usury and cancel farmers’ debts. These things upset many of the Afghan people and an insurgency began.
Early in 1979, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan asked the Soviet Union for help. The Russians were obligated by a treaty, and with some reluctance, sent advisers. The situation deteriorated, and at the end of the year, Soviet troops entered the country.
The Russians were tough. The Russians were ruthless. They carpet-bombed, bulldozed, and planted land mines. Over 1,000,000 Afghans died, 1,200,000 were disabled, 3,000,000 were maimed or wounded, and 5,000,000 fled the country.
Six hundred and twenty thousand Soviet troops served in the Afghan War, 80,000-104,000 at any give time. Fourteen thousand died, 496,685 were wounded or contracted serious illnesses, including 115,308 cases of infectious hepatitis.
Read entire article at AlterNet
Should we get out of Afghanistan?
Yes. Here’s why.
Imperialism, in general, is a tough business.
Influence, dominate, manipulate, sure. But an occupation is a different story. It can only succeed in a state that is contiguous, as Chechnya is to Russia and Tibet is to China. Success demands utter ruthlessness: secret police, assassinations, the murder of civilians, and leveling neighborhoods and sometimes entire cities. Open societies like ours find that hard to tolerate.
Good intentions – reform, rebuild, bring democracy, modernize, civilize, liberate, pick up the white man’s burden – don’t turn the trick.
There is a classic sequence. A rebel group commits violent acts. The occupying power reacts with force. This alienates the population. If it doesn’t, the rebels push until they get the reaction they need. The rebellion grows.
Imperial occupations have become geometrically more difficult since the Second World War. The more ethnically, religiously, and culturally different the occupiers are from the locals, the worse it gets. It doesn’t matter if the foreign power is there "by invitation," as the Russians were in Afghanistan and the United States was in Vietnam.
Afghanistan, in particular, is a tough place to run an occupation.
Alexander the Great conquered the Persian Empire in six months. Then it took him three years to conquer Afghanistan. He only settled things by taking an Afghan bride, then moving on.
In the 19th century, at the height of its imperial power, Great Britain fought two wars against the Afghans. The first time, the Afghans destroyed an entire British army. The second time, the English attained a limited victory. They put a puppet on the throne, who gave them control of Afghanistan’s foreign policy (to keep the Russians out), but otherwise withdrew from the country.
In 1978 an indigenous Marxist group took power in Afghanistan. Its goal was to modernize: liberate women, change marriage customs, abolish usury and cancel farmers’ debts. These things upset many of the Afghan people and an insurgency began.
Early in 1979, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan asked the Soviet Union for help. The Russians were obligated by a treaty, and with some reluctance, sent advisers. The situation deteriorated, and at the end of the year, Soviet troops entered the country.
The Russians were tough. The Russians were ruthless. They carpet-bombed, bulldozed, and planted land mines. Over 1,000,000 Afghans died, 1,200,000 were disabled, 3,000,000 were maimed or wounded, and 5,000,000 fled the country.
Six hundred and twenty thousand Soviet troops served in the Afghan War, 80,000-104,000 at any give time. Fourteen thousand died, 496,685 were wounded or contracted serious illnesses, including 115,308 cases of infectious hepatitis.