Jean MacKenzie: Karzai's Fall
[Jean MacKenzie is the director of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting in Afghanistan and reports for GlobalPost News.]
The president beamed, the guests applauded. As Hamid Karzai was sworn in for his second term in office amid a throng of 800 international and domestic dignitaries on November 18, one could almost forget that his presidency is under a cloud, his international support hanging by a thread, and his domestic standing lower than ever. It was a stark difference from his first inauguration, in December 2004. Then, the U.S. vice president and defense secretary were both in attendance; the capital throbbed with hope; and, for just a little while, it seemed that Karzai was riding a wave of national and international approbation that nothing could stop. How did a man once hailed as the savior of Afghanistan become its scourge?
Karzai was not an obvious choice to be leader of the new state in 2001. He had little standing within the country, having been out of Afghanistan since an unfortunate clash with the mujaheddin government in 1994. He had also dabbled with the Taliban, briefly considering becoming their envoy to the United Nations. But he was stylish and urbane, an ethnic Pashtun who spoke English, and strongly supported by Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. envoy to the 2001 Bonn conference tasked with mapping out Afghanistan’s future. The Afghan-born Khalilzad, later to become ambassador to Kabul, enjoyed the full backing of the all-powerful U.S. Defense department, and his will was all but determinative in Bonn.
According to popular legend, Karzai, who had gone almost alone into Afghanistan to battle the Taliban in late 2001, was in Tirin Kot, capital of Uruzgan province, when he learned that the Bonn conference had appointed him as leader of the interim government. He had just narrowly escaped death by a stray U.S. bomb, and was bleeding from cuts to his face when BBC journalist Lyse Doucet called him with the news. As one disgruntled Kabul resident out it, “The international community plucked him from a mountaintop in Uruzgan and sat him on the throne.”
UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi, who oversaw the Bonn conference, had a different view. According to him, Karzai was the ultimate compromise candidate. Karzai had spent much of 2001 trying to put together a coalition to battle the Taliban, and had amassed some political capital among the various groups competing for a share in Afghanistan’s future. He was acceptable both to the Northern Alliance and to the Pashtun tribal leaders, had been active in international circles under the mujaheddin government, and had managed to maintain good relations with all. “I think that Hamid Karzai was the obvious choice,” he told PBS’s ‘Frontline’ in an interview in May 2002. “And the reason is the following: He was the only man that was mentioned as a possible leader by many Afghans, including Pashtuns, the Northern Alliance, the Pakistanis and the Iranians.… Everybody had a list of a people, but the only name that you found on (every) list was Hamid Karzai.”
Once installed--first as interim head, then, in 2004, as elected president--Karzai was the darling of the West, especially the United States. He had bi-weekly conference calls with the White house, took frequent trips to Washington, and was heaped with praise wherever he went. “Under President Karzai's leadership, the Afghan people have made remarkable changes over the past two-and-a-half years,” said Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, welcoming Karzai to Washington in 2004. “Just a few years ago, Afghanistan was … in effect, a police state that banned basic freedoms, treated women in inhuman ways, served as a haven for Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network. Today, Afghanistan is a member of the community of free nations.”...
Read entire article at The New Republic
The president beamed, the guests applauded. As Hamid Karzai was sworn in for his second term in office amid a throng of 800 international and domestic dignitaries on November 18, one could almost forget that his presidency is under a cloud, his international support hanging by a thread, and his domestic standing lower than ever. It was a stark difference from his first inauguration, in December 2004. Then, the U.S. vice president and defense secretary were both in attendance; the capital throbbed with hope; and, for just a little while, it seemed that Karzai was riding a wave of national and international approbation that nothing could stop. How did a man once hailed as the savior of Afghanistan become its scourge?
Karzai was not an obvious choice to be leader of the new state in 2001. He had little standing within the country, having been out of Afghanistan since an unfortunate clash with the mujaheddin government in 1994. He had also dabbled with the Taliban, briefly considering becoming their envoy to the United Nations. But he was stylish and urbane, an ethnic Pashtun who spoke English, and strongly supported by Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. envoy to the 2001 Bonn conference tasked with mapping out Afghanistan’s future. The Afghan-born Khalilzad, later to become ambassador to Kabul, enjoyed the full backing of the all-powerful U.S. Defense department, and his will was all but determinative in Bonn.
According to popular legend, Karzai, who had gone almost alone into Afghanistan to battle the Taliban in late 2001, was in Tirin Kot, capital of Uruzgan province, when he learned that the Bonn conference had appointed him as leader of the interim government. He had just narrowly escaped death by a stray U.S. bomb, and was bleeding from cuts to his face when BBC journalist Lyse Doucet called him with the news. As one disgruntled Kabul resident out it, “The international community plucked him from a mountaintop in Uruzgan and sat him on the throne.”
UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi, who oversaw the Bonn conference, had a different view. According to him, Karzai was the ultimate compromise candidate. Karzai had spent much of 2001 trying to put together a coalition to battle the Taliban, and had amassed some political capital among the various groups competing for a share in Afghanistan’s future. He was acceptable both to the Northern Alliance and to the Pashtun tribal leaders, had been active in international circles under the mujaheddin government, and had managed to maintain good relations with all. “I think that Hamid Karzai was the obvious choice,” he told PBS’s ‘Frontline’ in an interview in May 2002. “And the reason is the following: He was the only man that was mentioned as a possible leader by many Afghans, including Pashtuns, the Northern Alliance, the Pakistanis and the Iranians.… Everybody had a list of a people, but the only name that you found on (every) list was Hamid Karzai.”
Once installed--first as interim head, then, in 2004, as elected president--Karzai was the darling of the West, especially the United States. He had bi-weekly conference calls with the White house, took frequent trips to Washington, and was heaped with praise wherever he went. “Under President Karzai's leadership, the Afghan people have made remarkable changes over the past two-and-a-half years,” said Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, welcoming Karzai to Washington in 2004. “Just a few years ago, Afghanistan was … in effect, a police state that banned basic freedoms, treated women in inhuman ways, served as a haven for Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network. Today, Afghanistan is a member of the community of free nations.”...