Brett H. McGurk: A surge to sovereignty in Afghanistan
[Brett H. McGurk, who served on the National Security Council staffs of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, is a fellow at Harvard’s Institute of Politics.]
THE AIM in any successful counterinsurgency is to support and strengthen a sovereign and friendly government. The inherent paradox is that use of US military power, or even US diplomatic leverage, to achieve that aim undercuts the perceived legitimacy and sovereignty of the government it seeks to support. Enemies exploit this paradox to their benefit, labeling US troops as occupiers and governments allied with us as puppets, undeserving of support from their own people.
From Vietnam to Pakistan to Iraq and now Afghanistan, this is a lesson the United States continues to get wrong - making short-term decisions with unintended long-term consequences.
In 1963, the United States supported a coup against the corrupt but allied president of South Vietnam, without asking what might come next.
For 30 years the United States has whipsawed Pakistan from close ally to sanctioned adversary and now, to something in between: a partner, but under unilaterally imposed conditions that may sound nice in Washington, but weaken the very government we seek to help.
In Iraq, from 2004-2008, the government failed to take root with the Iraqi people, despite electoral legitimacy or broad-based coalitions. The US military, under a broad mandate from the United Nations, was authorized to take any action it deemed necessary to contribute to the stability of Iraq, often against the wishes of Iraq’s elected leadership. The result was constant tension with the government we sought to support, and a continued nationalist-based justification by extremist groups to fight US and Iraqi forces.
Two events finally changed this dynamic: the surge of US forces in 2007 and the negotiation of a security agreement, approved by the Iraqi Parliament, to govern the forces’ longer-term presence and ultimate withdrawal. These events were part of the same strategy, focused on the ultimate aim of supporting a stable government in Baghdad. The surge was necessary to boost the capability and capacity of Iraqi forces, so they could hold the line as our forces began to withdraw. The security agreement was necessary to firmly anchor our presence in Iraq on the basis of Iraqi consent - a legitimization that had been lacking since 2003...
Read entire article at Boston.com
THE AIM in any successful counterinsurgency is to support and strengthen a sovereign and friendly government. The inherent paradox is that use of US military power, or even US diplomatic leverage, to achieve that aim undercuts the perceived legitimacy and sovereignty of the government it seeks to support. Enemies exploit this paradox to their benefit, labeling US troops as occupiers and governments allied with us as puppets, undeserving of support from their own people.
From Vietnam to Pakistan to Iraq and now Afghanistan, this is a lesson the United States continues to get wrong - making short-term decisions with unintended long-term consequences.
In 1963, the United States supported a coup against the corrupt but allied president of South Vietnam, without asking what might come next.
For 30 years the United States has whipsawed Pakistan from close ally to sanctioned adversary and now, to something in between: a partner, but under unilaterally imposed conditions that may sound nice in Washington, but weaken the very government we seek to help.
In Iraq, from 2004-2008, the government failed to take root with the Iraqi people, despite electoral legitimacy or broad-based coalitions. The US military, under a broad mandate from the United Nations, was authorized to take any action it deemed necessary to contribute to the stability of Iraq, often against the wishes of Iraq’s elected leadership. The result was constant tension with the government we sought to support, and a continued nationalist-based justification by extremist groups to fight US and Iraqi forces.
Two events finally changed this dynamic: the surge of US forces in 2007 and the negotiation of a security agreement, approved by the Iraqi Parliament, to govern the forces’ longer-term presence and ultimate withdrawal. These events were part of the same strategy, focused on the ultimate aim of supporting a stable government in Baghdad. The surge was necessary to boost the capability and capacity of Iraqi forces, so they could hold the line as our forces began to withdraw. The security agreement was necessary to firmly anchor our presence in Iraq on the basis of Iraqi consent - a legitimization that had been lacking since 2003...