Nassrine Azimi: Japan-U.S. Relations: Let There Be Discord
[Nassrine Azimi is senior adviser at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research.]
HIROSHIMA — In February 1960, one month after its signature in Washington, the U.S.-Japan treaty of mutual cooperation and security was submitted to the Japanese Parliament for ratification. It unleashed a storm of unprecedented furor across Japan.
Massive and at times violent demonstrations erupted in major cities. Fights broke out in the lower house of Parliament, where police had to intervene to arrest opposition members.
A planned visit by then U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower was cancelled. Finally, even though the treaty was ratified (by default) in June, it cost then Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, the man most Japanese saw as its main architect, his job.
All this is to say how surprising it is to see, as the 50th anniversary of the pact approaches, American policy-makers and commentators so rattled by voices in Japan questioning the treaty — and more specifically its burden on Okinawa.
The worry-mongers tend to ignore not only the treaty’s historical significance, but also the cataclysmic changes that have occurred in Japan since the elections in August.
They err mostly, however, by considering the treaty as the only link between the two Pacific rim partners, overlooking the range and depth of a far more complex friendship binding Tokyo and Washington.
First the treaty itself: For the United States it is but one among similar important bilateral security alliances. For Japan, however, it has deep psychological and moral ramifications, touching upon a myriad of issues, from national pride and self-esteem to a collective sense of guilt towards Okinawa.
As long as Japan remains under America’s protective umbrella — what historian John Dower calls its “subordinate independence” — it shall be hard pressed to exercise on the international stage a leadership role fully commensurate with its economical status or peace credentials, even in the nuclear arena, despite its moral authority as the only atomic-bombed nation in history.
The Japanese may ultimately conclude that their security pact with the United States is indeed in their own best strategic interest, or at least unavoidable for the time being. But the new government is right to want a national conversation around the alliance’s full implications...
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HIROSHIMA — In February 1960, one month after its signature in Washington, the U.S.-Japan treaty of mutual cooperation and security was submitted to the Japanese Parliament for ratification. It unleashed a storm of unprecedented furor across Japan.
Massive and at times violent demonstrations erupted in major cities. Fights broke out in the lower house of Parliament, where police had to intervene to arrest opposition members.
A planned visit by then U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower was cancelled. Finally, even though the treaty was ratified (by default) in June, it cost then Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, the man most Japanese saw as its main architect, his job.
All this is to say how surprising it is to see, as the 50th anniversary of the pact approaches, American policy-makers and commentators so rattled by voices in Japan questioning the treaty — and more specifically its burden on Okinawa.
The worry-mongers tend to ignore not only the treaty’s historical significance, but also the cataclysmic changes that have occurred in Japan since the elections in August.
They err mostly, however, by considering the treaty as the only link between the two Pacific rim partners, overlooking the range and depth of a far more complex friendship binding Tokyo and Washington.
First the treaty itself: For the United States it is but one among similar important bilateral security alliances. For Japan, however, it has deep psychological and moral ramifications, touching upon a myriad of issues, from national pride and self-esteem to a collective sense of guilt towards Okinawa.
As long as Japan remains under America’s protective umbrella — what historian John Dower calls its “subordinate independence” — it shall be hard pressed to exercise on the international stage a leadership role fully commensurate with its economical status or peace credentials, even in the nuclear arena, despite its moral authority as the only atomic-bombed nation in history.
The Japanese may ultimately conclude that their security pact with the United States is indeed in their own best strategic interest, or at least unavoidable for the time being. But the new government is right to want a national conversation around the alliance’s full implications...