Adrian A. Basora: US-Spain Relations From the Perspective of 2009
[Ambassador Basora is currently a Senior Fellow and Director
of the Project on Democratic Transitions at the Foreign
Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. During his prior
diplomatic career he had several postings in Europe and
Latin America, including an assignment in Madrid in 1986-
1989 as Deputy Chief of Mission and Deputy U.S. Base
Negotiator, and subsequently as Charge‚ d'Affaires. He then
served as Director for European Affairs at the White
House/National Security Council 1989-1991, where his
responsibilities included Spain.]
The advent of the Obama Administration in Washington on
January 20, 2009 was greeted with widespread enthusiasm in
Spain, with many commentators on both sides of the Atlantic
suggesting a new era of closer bilateral relations. Others
have warned, however, that these high expectations could
easily be disappointed, given the asymmetry between U.S.
needs and Spanish inclinations.
Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriquez Zapatero's recent
successful visit to the White House suggests that there is
significant potential for closer relations, even though
there is little chance of establishing the kind of U.S.-U.K
style "special relationship" that the prior Aznar government
had sought with Washington. This might be dismissed as the
natural bias of a former American diplomat who has served
with pleasure in Spain. However, I experienced one of the
more difficult stretches in U.S.-Spanish relations and am
fully aware that harmony in the relationship is by no means
pre-ordained. One has only to recall the recent dramatic low
point in 2004, when Prime Minister Rodriquez Zapatero
abruptly pulled all Spanish troops out of Iraq - to an
extremely frigid reaction in Washington. This action
contrasted sharply with the euphoria of 2003, when Prime
Minister Jose Maria Aznar joined with President Bush and
Prime Minister Blair at the Azores Summit to launch the
"Coalition of the Willing," and Spain dispatched 1,300
peacekeeping troops to Iraq.
These are not the only major oscillations in U.S.-Spain
relations in recent decades. This essay examines the
bilateral relationship not only from the vantage point of
recent history, but also from a longer-term perspective, so
as to assess the potential for growth, or for regression, in
the foreseeable future. We will start with a brief look at a
few of the "legacy issues" that affect relations between
Washington and Madrid-and the two societies more broadly.
DIVERGENT HISTORIES AND A PERIOD OF ENMITY
For many Spaniards, the relationship with what is now the
United States began in 1513 when Juan Ponce de Leon landed
in Florida and claimed the territory for the Spanish crown.
Saint Augustine was founded in 1565, 55 years before the
first British colonial settlement. For most Americans,
however, the first four centuries of the relationship are
part of a distant past that is generally given limited
attention. Few remember that Spain supported the American
colonists in their war of independence. Admittedly, this
support was based on alliance with France and enmity for
Great Britain, rather than any enthusiasm for republican
democracy. Also forgotten is that Spain was among the first
European powers to establish diplomatic relations with the
United States (in 1785), and it facilitated America's
westward expansion by "gracefully" ceding vast territories
west of the Mississippi via the Transcontinental Treaty of
1819.
In contrast, what many Americans do remember from their high
school history is a largely negative image of 19th century
Spain as a declining monarchy and an unwelcome colonial
power. U.S. textbooks highlight the Monroe Doctrine of 1823,
which declared that European powers like Spain were not
welcome in the Western Hemisphere. They also stress Spain's
quick defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898, after the
U.S. press whipped up jingoist sentiment against Spain's
"tyrannical" presence in Cuba and Puerto Rico. During the
first part of the 20th century, most Americans thought of
Spain as a reactionary, not very relevant power in which the
United States no longer had much interest. For Spain,
however, the United States loomed large as the only country
with which it had fought a recent war - a war that stripped
away the last vestiges of a once-glorious Latin American
empire.
The next events of major consequence in shaping American
attitudes towards Spain centered on the Spanish Civil War
and relations with the Franco regime. President Franklin
Roosevelt publicly condemned General Franco's uprising
against the Republican government (1936-39). Despite
official U.S. neutrality, most Americans were inclined
against Franco and what they saw as the anti-democratic
forces he represented. This led to the formation of the
"Lincoln Brigade," in which individual American volunteers
fought on the Republican side. Negative images of Franco's
Spain took hold through the press and contemporary
literature. Books like Farewell to Catalonia and, above all,
Ernest Hemmingway's For Whom the Bell Tolls vividly depicted
the Civil War from a Spanish Republican perspective.
With Hitler's ascendance in Europe and U.S. engagement in
World War II, Franco's de facto tilt towards the Axis powers
further damaged Spain's image. This culminated in 1946 with
the principal victorious powers - the United States, Great
Britain and France - signing the Tripartite Declaration
saying there would be "no full and cordial association [with
Spain] as long as Franco rules."[1] Spain was initially
excluded from the United Nations, just as it was barred from
the Marshall Plan when it was launched in 1948. As of 1950,
the Franco regime was cast into the role of a pariah and
most Americans saw it as a poor, backward country of little
interest or promise.
THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE
During the 1950s and 1960s, these negative American views of
Spain gradually began to change. The Cold War became the
primary prism through which Americans saw the world. Faced
with an increasingly powerful and aggressive Soviet Union,
Washington geared up for a potential military confrontation.
American sea and air power were essential to Western
defenses, and they required secure bases in Europe as far
away as possible from NATO's eastern front. The Spanish base
at Rota was the perfect location from which to project naval
power into the Mediterranean, and the air bases at Moron,
Zaragoza and Torrejon (just outside Madrid) had outstanding
potential as rear-echelon bases and training and staging
facilities for the U.S. Air Force. Spain's potential as a
basing country thus quickly became a dominant consideration
in Washington's relationship with Madrid.
By 1953, negotiations for a U.S.-Spanish basing agreement
had been completed. The "Pact of Madrid," granted American
forces use of these four bases in exchange for significant
economic assistance - and implicit acknowledgement of the
Franco regime's durability. In 1955, the United States
supported Spain's admission to the U.N., despite the
continuing reluctance of the U.K. and France. This warming
of relations between Washington and Madrid culminated in an
official visit by President Dwight Eisenhower to Spain in
1959. For American public opinion, the visit by "Ike"
bestowed Spain with an aura of normalcy, despite its
dictatorial government. But for anti-Franco forces in Spain,
and particularly for the political left, the Eisenhower
visit and the ongoing base agreements became major focal
points for enduring anti-Americanism.
At the same time, however, parallel developments on the
economic front were beginning to draw the two countries
gradually closer. Whereas Madrid had been kept out of the
Marshall Plan in the late 1940s, from 1953 to 1961 Spain
became the third-largest recipient of U.S. economic
assistance, thanks to the base agreements. This assistance,
combined with Spain's gradual economic recovery and the
perception of political stability reinforced by the Madrid
Pact, made Spain an increasingly attractive location for
U.S. business investment. The trend accelerated
significantly after 1959, when Spain adopted a U.S.-backed
IMF economic stabilization and liberalization plan. By 1966,
U.S. firms accounted for 79.5 percent of total Foreign
Direct Investment and had begun to contribute significantly
to Spain's economic recovery and rapidly increasing
exports.[2] More Americans got to know Spain, including tens
of thousands of retirees seeking its sunny climate and low
cost of living. U.S. public opinion thus continued to evolve
in a more positive direction.
THE BUMPY ROAD TO NORMAL RELATIONS
The great majority of Americans welcomed the end of the
Franco regime in 1975 and the rapid consolidation of
democracy that followed. The United States moved promptly
towards establishing normal bilateral working relationships
with Spain's initial post-communist governments, patterned
on those with other democratic European allies. Washington
also helped to ensure that Spain was promptly invited to
join NATO and generally welcomed as a full-fledged member of
the trans-Atlantic community. In 1976, the United States and
Spain signed a Treaty of Friendship, Defense and Cooperation
symbolizing a commitment to a full-fledged bilateral
alliance and further accelerating educational, professional
and cultural exchanges. U.S. investment in Spain also
continued to grow. In sum, by 1980, relations seemed to be
blossoming.
A significant setback occurred in February 1981, however,
when a group of Guardia Civil officers entered the Spanish
parliament in an attempted coup. Rather than coming out
unambiguously in support of Spain's new democracy, the then
U.S. Secretary of State General Alexander Haig initially
called the attempt "an internal matter." Although Washington
subsequently condemned the coup and fully supported
democracy there, Haig's much-publicized gaffe reinforced
pre-existing beliefs on the Spanish left regarding U.S.
intentions. Given that the Socialist party (PSOE) would win
the next year's parliamentary elections, this incident
significantly delayed the full normalization of U.S.-Spanish
relations-perhaps by as much as a decade.
The triumph of the PSOE in 1982 opened a difficult new phase
in bilateral relations. The new Prime Minister, Felipe
Gonzalez, was as a leader, who had been formed politically
during the Franco years, at a time when the U.S. Embassy was
having little to do with the opposition underground. Alfonso
Guerra, initially Gonzalez's second in command, was an
avowed admirer of Che Guevara, with all of the romantic
anti-American symbolism that this implied. Both Gonzalez and
Guerra shared an initial distrust of the United States,
based on suspicion that Washington's interest in Spain's
military bases might override its commitment to their
country's fledgling democracy. Washington, for its part, was
wary of the new government because the PSOE had campaigned
against Spanish membership in NATO and favored a sharp
reduction in U.S. military presence at Spain's bases. The
1982 elections thus ushered in a period of significant
bilateral tensions.
Once in power, however, the Gonzalez government began to see
that its ambition to become an influential member of the
European Union and of other Western "clubs," and to develop
into an advanced industrial economy, would be better served
by Spain's remaining inside NATO. Gonzalez thus called for a
referendum that reversed the previous PSOE position against
NATO membership. However, the political "bargain" through
which Gonzalez won the referendum (with 52.5 percent vs.
39.8 percent of the vote) included an explicit pledge to
drastically reduce the U.S. military presence at Spanish
bases. Politically, these reductions, and particularly the
removal of the F-16 fighter wing at Torrejon right outside
of Madrid, took on critical importance for the Gonzalez
government. For the United States, however, the Cold War was
still unresolved, and Washington was determined not to cede.
The ensuing negotiations for the renewal of U.S. basing
rights in Spain were prolonged and difficult, dragging on
throughout much of 1986-88. Ultimately, Spain's manifest
determination to invoke its sovereign rights - which
included a threat to end the base agreement entirely if
satisfactory terms could not be reached - forced the U.S.
side to give up far more than it had hoped. This included
removing the highly strategic F-16 wing stationed at
Torrejon. The Spanish proposed a face-saving timetable for
this and other withdrawals, which made it easier for the
American side to accept them without severe damage to the
bilateral relationship.
Although the base negotiations were often tense, with
Spanish frustration at times leaking into the press, a
mature dialog did develop at senior levels over time. This
laid the groundwork for the beginnings of better
understanding and trust between top U.S officials on the one
hand, and Prime Minister Gonzalez and his key ministers and
advisers on the other. This increased trust, in turn, set
the stage for important breakthroughs during the years that
followed the historic base agreement.
SPAIN BECOMES A NORMAL ALLY
In 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the entire
context of the relationship began to change. Mikhail
Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika sharply reduced the
threat of military confrontation as well as the Cold War
mentality that it had created. The military aspects of NATO
began to seem less overriding, and Spain and the United
States were in agreement as to the eastward expansion of
what seemed an increasingly political alliance.
In 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and threatened to
annex the northern oil fields of Saudi Arabia. In response,
U.S. President George H.W. Bush declared that the invasion
"would not stand" and secured both a UN mandate and a
European consensus in favor of military action to push
Saddam's armies out of Kuwait. After a series of direct
communications between the White House and the Prime
Minister's office, Gonzalez agreed to grant the U.S.
unprecedented use of the bases in Spain as a transit point
and logistical back-up for the massive movement of American
troops and equipment to the Gulf region in preparation for
war. Spain also contributed forces to the combined military
effort to liberate Kuwait. All of this would have been
unthinkable earlier, given Spain's long-standing policy of
developing close relations with the Arab states and of thus
prohibiting the use of its bases for U.S. military
operations in the Middle East. From the viewpoint of
Washington, Spain was proving to be very much "a friend in
need."
Another important factor bringing Washington and Madrid
closer during this period was the personal chemistry and
open communication between the first President Bush and
Prime Minister Gonzalez. This relationship began with a Bush
invitation for Gonzalez to visit the White House in October
1989, a visit that not only attracted considerable positive
media attention but also proved successful in terms of
personal relations. Thus, when the Persian Gulf crisis
erupted in the summer of 1990, the groundwork had already
been laid for highly productive direct telephone contacts
between the two leaders to discuss an urgent common
response.
At the same time, the Spanish economy was prospering and
providing a hospitable environment for U.S. business
investment; and leading Spanish firms were beginning to
invest in the United States. Also, Spanish was becoming the
predominant foreign language taught in the United States,
thanks partly to heavy Hispanic immigration and to growing
trade with Latin America. With increased travel and other
exchanges, many more Americans were becoming familiar with a
rapidly modernizing democratic Spain. Thus by 1996, at the
end of Felipe Gonzalez' 13 years in office, most Americans
viewed Spain as a "normal" European ally, and this view was
reciprocated from the Spanish perspective.
THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" AND ITS SEEMINGLY ABRUPT ENDING
When Jose Maria Aznar became Prime Minister in 1996, he
quickly set out to build further upon an already strong
relationship. His interest was reciprocated by the Clinton
Administration, which led to a further deepening of
cooperation symbolized by the signing of a "Joint Political
Declaration" in January 2001, one of the last high-profile
actions of the Clinton administration. With the inauguration
of the George W. Bush Administration just a few days later,
Aznar found an even more enthusiastic U.S. partner, who
largely shared his ideological inclinations.
The U.S.-Spain official relationship quickly blossomed into
one of the warmest and most intense that Washington enjoyed
with any European ally- other than the U.K. President Bush
paid Aznar the honor of making Spain the first stop on his
initial trip to Europe in June 2001. When Al Qaeda carried
out its massive terrorist attack on the World Trade Center
on September 11, 2001, Aznar was among the first European
leaders to step forward in active solidarity, and he
translated that solidarity into strong Spanish support for
the U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Throughout
the Aznar-Bush period, cooperation continued to grow on a
wide variety of issues of common concern, including
counterterrorism, anti-narcotics and intelligence sharing.
As of February 2004, a historian looking back at the
previous eight years could credibly have said that the Aznar
government had brought the U.S.-Spain alliance to its
strongest point in history.
Then came the Atocha railway station bombing on March 11,
2004, followed by parliamentary elections three days later.
Prime Minister Rodriquez Zapatero and the PSOE were swept
into office. In keeping with his campaign pledge - and a
Spanish public opinion that was strongly set against the war
- Zapatero abruptly withdrew all Spanish forces from Iraq.
This dealt a severe blow to the Bush administration's
"Coalition of the Willing" and suddenly turned bilateral
relations frigid, at least at the presidential level.
Zapatero became the only major European leader not invited
for an individual visit to the "Bush 43" White House, and
Spain's reputation as a reliable ally was damaged at least
in more hawkish U.S. political circles.
Consequently, the attempt to build a "Special Relationship"
seemed to end with a crash. U.S-Spanish relations had
suddenly reached a low point after decades of progress.
Beyond the headlines and below the presidential level,
however, major portions of the bilateral relationship were
in fact preserved. Foreign Minister Moratinos met regularly
with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who visited Spain
in 2007. Cooperation between other U.S. departments and the
corresponding Spanish ministries continued, as did cultural
and educational exchanges and business investment. Very
importantly, Spanish direct investment in the U.S.
accelerated dramatically, jumping from $5 billion in 2000 to
$26.6 billion in 2007, thus putting Spain well ahead of
Italy and numerous other European allies.
After the reelection of the PSOE in March, 2008 - and well
before the Obama administration's arrival - the Zapatero
government tried to open "a new chapter" in bilateral
relations via a series of high-level visits and other
initiatives. And, since the inauguration of President Obama
in January 2009, Prime Minister Zapatero has made it clear
that he sees considerable common ground with the new U.S.
leader, both personally and ideologically. The question now
is whether the new personalities at the top, combined with
the unprecedented challenges facing both countries, will
lead to a new period of close and fruitful relations.
PROSPECTS FOR THE U.S.-SPAIN RELATIONSHIP
Although U.S.-Spanish bilateral relations have seen
significant pendulum swings even in the recent past, the
extent of this oscillation has been diminishing over the
longer term. The relationship has been moving gradually
towards a positive middle ground that should be eminently
sustainable, assuming capable leadership on both sides.
Spain is committed to continuing to build its role as a
respected and influential member of the trans-Atlantic
community and of other international groupings in which the
United States plays a leading role. In recent decades, Spain
has also carved out an increasingly important economic and
political role in Latin America. Despite the daunting
challenges that it currently faces, the United States will
almost certainly continue to play a major role globally, in
Europe and in Latin America. On the likely assumption that
Spain will continue to pursue a foreign policy along its
current lines, it will have a clear incentive to cultivate a
positive relationship with Washington and with other centers
of political and cultural influence in the United States.
Culturally, the increasing importance of Spanish as a second
language and the fast-growing Hispanic population offer new
opportunities to interest Americans in Spain. There is also
considerable potential for growth on the economic front, as
major Spanish corporations such as Banco Santander and BBVA
have begun to demonstrate in banking, and in the fields of
highway and other infrastructure construction, as well as
renewable energy.[3]
From the viewpoint of U.S. interests, there are strong
reciprocal reasons to continue working to deepen the
relationship. The U.S. economy can only benefit from the
involvement of leading-edge Spanish firms in areas of the
U.S. economy that require new investment and new
technologies. In geopolitical terms, Spain remains
strategically placed as an overall gateway to the
Mediterranean and the Middle East. Even though the specific
military considerations that proved so powerful during the
Cold War have become a less dominant factor, the bases at
Rota and Moron continue to provide invaluable logistical
support for U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan and
elsewhere. Spain is also one of the few countries in the
European Union with a growing population and a dynamic
interest in other regions of the world. U.S. interests in
Europe, in Latin America and globally, therefore, continue
to weigh in favor of building a strong relationship with a
democratic and increasingly outward-looking Spain.
After the aborted Aznar-Bush experiment in attempting to
build something akin to the British-U.S. "special
relationship," it would be imprudent for leaders in either
Washington or Madrid to try to recreate as close an embrace
anytime soon. Any major movement in this direction would
require a considerable change in Spanish public opinion,
which is currently considerably more pacifist and "welfare-
state"-oriented than American opinion. On the other hand,
the negative bilateral issues of the past have long since
been buried, and a solid level of confidence and wide-
ranging interactions have now been established between these
two democracies that face many similar challenges. There is
thus no intrinsic reason why Spain and the United States
should revert to the tensions that have at times
characterized relations in the past.
In sum, with enlightened leadership from the top in both
Washington and Madrid, plus the skilful use of diplomacy at
all levels when inevitable differences do arise, the U.S.-
Spanish relationship should indeed prosper over the coming
decade and beyond.
Notes
[1] Chislett, William. "Spain and the United States: So
Close Yet So Far." Working Paper 23/2006, Sept. 2006. Real
Instituto Elcano. p. 3. The author has drawn heavily on this
excellent work as well as its even more comprehensive
antecedent, "Spain and the United States: the Quest for
Mutual Rediscovery."
[2] Chislett, William. Spain and the United States: The
Quest for Mutual Rediscovery. Real Instituto Elcano, 2005.
p. 27
[3] See the previously cited works by William Chislett for
an extensive discussion of recent trends in Spanish
investment in the United States, and of the participation of
Spanish firms in highway building, renewable energy and
other important areas of U.S. infrastructure development.
of the Project on Democratic Transitions at the Foreign
Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. During his prior
diplomatic career he had several postings in Europe and
Latin America, including an assignment in Madrid in 1986-
1989 as Deputy Chief of Mission and Deputy U.S. Base
Negotiator, and subsequently as Charge‚ d'Affaires. He then
served as Director for European Affairs at the White
House/National Security Council 1989-1991, where his
responsibilities included Spain.]
The advent of the Obama Administration in Washington on
January 20, 2009 was greeted with widespread enthusiasm in
Spain, with many commentators on both sides of the Atlantic
suggesting a new era of closer bilateral relations. Others
have warned, however, that these high expectations could
easily be disappointed, given the asymmetry between U.S.
needs and Spanish inclinations.
Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriquez Zapatero's recent
successful visit to the White House suggests that there is
significant potential for closer relations, even though
there is little chance of establishing the kind of U.S.-U.K
style "special relationship" that the prior Aznar government
had sought with Washington. This might be dismissed as the
natural bias of a former American diplomat who has served
with pleasure in Spain. However, I experienced one of the
more difficult stretches in U.S.-Spanish relations and am
fully aware that harmony in the relationship is by no means
pre-ordained. One has only to recall the recent dramatic low
point in 2004, when Prime Minister Rodriquez Zapatero
abruptly pulled all Spanish troops out of Iraq - to an
extremely frigid reaction in Washington. This action
contrasted sharply with the euphoria of 2003, when Prime
Minister Jose Maria Aznar joined with President Bush and
Prime Minister Blair at the Azores Summit to launch the
"Coalition of the Willing," and Spain dispatched 1,300
peacekeeping troops to Iraq.
These are not the only major oscillations in U.S.-Spain
relations in recent decades. This essay examines the
bilateral relationship not only from the vantage point of
recent history, but also from a longer-term perspective, so
as to assess the potential for growth, or for regression, in
the foreseeable future. We will start with a brief look at a
few of the "legacy issues" that affect relations between
Washington and Madrid-and the two societies more broadly.
DIVERGENT HISTORIES AND A PERIOD OF ENMITY
For many Spaniards, the relationship with what is now the
United States began in 1513 when Juan Ponce de Leon landed
in Florida and claimed the territory for the Spanish crown.
Saint Augustine was founded in 1565, 55 years before the
first British colonial settlement. For most Americans,
however, the first four centuries of the relationship are
part of a distant past that is generally given limited
attention. Few remember that Spain supported the American
colonists in their war of independence. Admittedly, this
support was based on alliance with France and enmity for
Great Britain, rather than any enthusiasm for republican
democracy. Also forgotten is that Spain was among the first
European powers to establish diplomatic relations with the
United States (in 1785), and it facilitated America's
westward expansion by "gracefully" ceding vast territories
west of the Mississippi via the Transcontinental Treaty of
1819.
In contrast, what many Americans do remember from their high
school history is a largely negative image of 19th century
Spain as a declining monarchy and an unwelcome colonial
power. U.S. textbooks highlight the Monroe Doctrine of 1823,
which declared that European powers like Spain were not
welcome in the Western Hemisphere. They also stress Spain's
quick defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898, after the
U.S. press whipped up jingoist sentiment against Spain's
"tyrannical" presence in Cuba and Puerto Rico. During the
first part of the 20th century, most Americans thought of
Spain as a reactionary, not very relevant power in which the
United States no longer had much interest. For Spain,
however, the United States loomed large as the only country
with which it had fought a recent war - a war that stripped
away the last vestiges of a once-glorious Latin American
empire.
The next events of major consequence in shaping American
attitudes towards Spain centered on the Spanish Civil War
and relations with the Franco regime. President Franklin
Roosevelt publicly condemned General Franco's uprising
against the Republican government (1936-39). Despite
official U.S. neutrality, most Americans were inclined
against Franco and what they saw as the anti-democratic
forces he represented. This led to the formation of the
"Lincoln Brigade," in which individual American volunteers
fought on the Republican side. Negative images of Franco's
Spain took hold through the press and contemporary
literature. Books like Farewell to Catalonia and, above all,
Ernest Hemmingway's For Whom the Bell Tolls vividly depicted
the Civil War from a Spanish Republican perspective.
With Hitler's ascendance in Europe and U.S. engagement in
World War II, Franco's de facto tilt towards the Axis powers
further damaged Spain's image. This culminated in 1946 with
the principal victorious powers - the United States, Great
Britain and France - signing the Tripartite Declaration
saying there would be "no full and cordial association [with
Spain] as long as Franco rules."[1] Spain was initially
excluded from the United Nations, just as it was barred from
the Marshall Plan when it was launched in 1948. As of 1950,
the Franco regime was cast into the role of a pariah and
most Americans saw it as a poor, backward country of little
interest or promise.
THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE
During the 1950s and 1960s, these negative American views of
Spain gradually began to change. The Cold War became the
primary prism through which Americans saw the world. Faced
with an increasingly powerful and aggressive Soviet Union,
Washington geared up for a potential military confrontation.
American sea and air power were essential to Western
defenses, and they required secure bases in Europe as far
away as possible from NATO's eastern front. The Spanish base
at Rota was the perfect location from which to project naval
power into the Mediterranean, and the air bases at Moron,
Zaragoza and Torrejon (just outside Madrid) had outstanding
potential as rear-echelon bases and training and staging
facilities for the U.S. Air Force. Spain's potential as a
basing country thus quickly became a dominant consideration
in Washington's relationship with Madrid.
By 1953, negotiations for a U.S.-Spanish basing agreement
had been completed. The "Pact of Madrid," granted American
forces use of these four bases in exchange for significant
economic assistance - and implicit acknowledgement of the
Franco regime's durability. In 1955, the United States
supported Spain's admission to the U.N., despite the
continuing reluctance of the U.K. and France. This warming
of relations between Washington and Madrid culminated in an
official visit by President Dwight Eisenhower to Spain in
1959. For American public opinion, the visit by "Ike"
bestowed Spain with an aura of normalcy, despite its
dictatorial government. But for anti-Franco forces in Spain,
and particularly for the political left, the Eisenhower
visit and the ongoing base agreements became major focal
points for enduring anti-Americanism.
At the same time, however, parallel developments on the
economic front were beginning to draw the two countries
gradually closer. Whereas Madrid had been kept out of the
Marshall Plan in the late 1940s, from 1953 to 1961 Spain
became the third-largest recipient of U.S. economic
assistance, thanks to the base agreements. This assistance,
combined with Spain's gradual economic recovery and the
perception of political stability reinforced by the Madrid
Pact, made Spain an increasingly attractive location for
U.S. business investment. The trend accelerated
significantly after 1959, when Spain adopted a U.S.-backed
IMF economic stabilization and liberalization plan. By 1966,
U.S. firms accounted for 79.5 percent of total Foreign
Direct Investment and had begun to contribute significantly
to Spain's economic recovery and rapidly increasing
exports.[2] More Americans got to know Spain, including tens
of thousands of retirees seeking its sunny climate and low
cost of living. U.S. public opinion thus continued to evolve
in a more positive direction.
THE BUMPY ROAD TO NORMAL RELATIONS
The great majority of Americans welcomed the end of the
Franco regime in 1975 and the rapid consolidation of
democracy that followed. The United States moved promptly
towards establishing normal bilateral working relationships
with Spain's initial post-communist governments, patterned
on those with other democratic European allies. Washington
also helped to ensure that Spain was promptly invited to
join NATO and generally welcomed as a full-fledged member of
the trans-Atlantic community. In 1976, the United States and
Spain signed a Treaty of Friendship, Defense and Cooperation
symbolizing a commitment to a full-fledged bilateral
alliance and further accelerating educational, professional
and cultural exchanges. U.S. investment in Spain also
continued to grow. In sum, by 1980, relations seemed to be
blossoming.
A significant setback occurred in February 1981, however,
when a group of Guardia Civil officers entered the Spanish
parliament in an attempted coup. Rather than coming out
unambiguously in support of Spain's new democracy, the then
U.S. Secretary of State General Alexander Haig initially
called the attempt "an internal matter." Although Washington
subsequently condemned the coup and fully supported
democracy there, Haig's much-publicized gaffe reinforced
pre-existing beliefs on the Spanish left regarding U.S.
intentions. Given that the Socialist party (PSOE) would win
the next year's parliamentary elections, this incident
significantly delayed the full normalization of U.S.-Spanish
relations-perhaps by as much as a decade.
The triumph of the PSOE in 1982 opened a difficult new phase
in bilateral relations. The new Prime Minister, Felipe
Gonzalez, was as a leader, who had been formed politically
during the Franco years, at a time when the U.S. Embassy was
having little to do with the opposition underground. Alfonso
Guerra, initially Gonzalez's second in command, was an
avowed admirer of Che Guevara, with all of the romantic
anti-American symbolism that this implied. Both Gonzalez and
Guerra shared an initial distrust of the United States,
based on suspicion that Washington's interest in Spain's
military bases might override its commitment to their
country's fledgling democracy. Washington, for its part, was
wary of the new government because the PSOE had campaigned
against Spanish membership in NATO and favored a sharp
reduction in U.S. military presence at Spain's bases. The
1982 elections thus ushered in a period of significant
bilateral tensions.
Once in power, however, the Gonzalez government began to see
that its ambition to become an influential member of the
European Union and of other Western "clubs," and to develop
into an advanced industrial economy, would be better served
by Spain's remaining inside NATO. Gonzalez thus called for a
referendum that reversed the previous PSOE position against
NATO membership. However, the political "bargain" through
which Gonzalez won the referendum (with 52.5 percent vs.
39.8 percent of the vote) included an explicit pledge to
drastically reduce the U.S. military presence at Spanish
bases. Politically, these reductions, and particularly the
removal of the F-16 fighter wing at Torrejon right outside
of Madrid, took on critical importance for the Gonzalez
government. For the United States, however, the Cold War was
still unresolved, and Washington was determined not to cede.
The ensuing negotiations for the renewal of U.S. basing
rights in Spain were prolonged and difficult, dragging on
throughout much of 1986-88. Ultimately, Spain's manifest
determination to invoke its sovereign rights - which
included a threat to end the base agreement entirely if
satisfactory terms could not be reached - forced the U.S.
side to give up far more than it had hoped. This included
removing the highly strategic F-16 wing stationed at
Torrejon. The Spanish proposed a face-saving timetable for
this and other withdrawals, which made it easier for the
American side to accept them without severe damage to the
bilateral relationship.
Although the base negotiations were often tense, with
Spanish frustration at times leaking into the press, a
mature dialog did develop at senior levels over time. This
laid the groundwork for the beginnings of better
understanding and trust between top U.S officials on the one
hand, and Prime Minister Gonzalez and his key ministers and
advisers on the other. This increased trust, in turn, set
the stage for important breakthroughs during the years that
followed the historic base agreement.
SPAIN BECOMES A NORMAL ALLY
In 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the entire
context of the relationship began to change. Mikhail
Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika sharply reduced the
threat of military confrontation as well as the Cold War
mentality that it had created. The military aspects of NATO
began to seem less overriding, and Spain and the United
States were in agreement as to the eastward expansion of
what seemed an increasingly political alliance.
In 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and threatened to
annex the northern oil fields of Saudi Arabia. In response,
U.S. President George H.W. Bush declared that the invasion
"would not stand" and secured both a UN mandate and a
European consensus in favor of military action to push
Saddam's armies out of Kuwait. After a series of direct
communications between the White House and the Prime
Minister's office, Gonzalez agreed to grant the U.S.
unprecedented use of the bases in Spain as a transit point
and logistical back-up for the massive movement of American
troops and equipment to the Gulf region in preparation for
war. Spain also contributed forces to the combined military
effort to liberate Kuwait. All of this would have been
unthinkable earlier, given Spain's long-standing policy of
developing close relations with the Arab states and of thus
prohibiting the use of its bases for U.S. military
operations in the Middle East. From the viewpoint of
Washington, Spain was proving to be very much "a friend in
need."
Another important factor bringing Washington and Madrid
closer during this period was the personal chemistry and
open communication between the first President Bush and
Prime Minister Gonzalez. This relationship began with a Bush
invitation for Gonzalez to visit the White House in October
1989, a visit that not only attracted considerable positive
media attention but also proved successful in terms of
personal relations. Thus, when the Persian Gulf crisis
erupted in the summer of 1990, the groundwork had already
been laid for highly productive direct telephone contacts
between the two leaders to discuss an urgent common
response.
At the same time, the Spanish economy was prospering and
providing a hospitable environment for U.S. business
investment; and leading Spanish firms were beginning to
invest in the United States. Also, Spanish was becoming the
predominant foreign language taught in the United States,
thanks partly to heavy Hispanic immigration and to growing
trade with Latin America. With increased travel and other
exchanges, many more Americans were becoming familiar with a
rapidly modernizing democratic Spain. Thus by 1996, at the
end of Felipe Gonzalez' 13 years in office, most Americans
viewed Spain as a "normal" European ally, and this view was
reciprocated from the Spanish perspective.
THE "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" AND ITS SEEMINGLY ABRUPT ENDING
When Jose Maria Aznar became Prime Minister in 1996, he
quickly set out to build further upon an already strong
relationship. His interest was reciprocated by the Clinton
Administration, which led to a further deepening of
cooperation symbolized by the signing of a "Joint Political
Declaration" in January 2001, one of the last high-profile
actions of the Clinton administration. With the inauguration
of the George W. Bush Administration just a few days later,
Aznar found an even more enthusiastic U.S. partner, who
largely shared his ideological inclinations.
The U.S.-Spain official relationship quickly blossomed into
one of the warmest and most intense that Washington enjoyed
with any European ally- other than the U.K. President Bush
paid Aznar the honor of making Spain the first stop on his
initial trip to Europe in June 2001. When Al Qaeda carried
out its massive terrorist attack on the World Trade Center
on September 11, 2001, Aznar was among the first European
leaders to step forward in active solidarity, and he
translated that solidarity into strong Spanish support for
the U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Throughout
the Aznar-Bush period, cooperation continued to grow on a
wide variety of issues of common concern, including
counterterrorism, anti-narcotics and intelligence sharing.
As of February 2004, a historian looking back at the
previous eight years could credibly have said that the Aznar
government had brought the U.S.-Spain alliance to its
strongest point in history.
Then came the Atocha railway station bombing on March 11,
2004, followed by parliamentary elections three days later.
Prime Minister Rodriquez Zapatero and the PSOE were swept
into office. In keeping with his campaign pledge - and a
Spanish public opinion that was strongly set against the war
- Zapatero abruptly withdrew all Spanish forces from Iraq.
This dealt a severe blow to the Bush administration's
"Coalition of the Willing" and suddenly turned bilateral
relations frigid, at least at the presidential level.
Zapatero became the only major European leader not invited
for an individual visit to the "Bush 43" White House, and
Spain's reputation as a reliable ally was damaged at least
in more hawkish U.S. political circles.
Consequently, the attempt to build a "Special Relationship"
seemed to end with a crash. U.S-Spanish relations had
suddenly reached a low point after decades of progress.
Beyond the headlines and below the presidential level,
however, major portions of the bilateral relationship were
in fact preserved. Foreign Minister Moratinos met regularly
with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who visited Spain
in 2007. Cooperation between other U.S. departments and the
corresponding Spanish ministries continued, as did cultural
and educational exchanges and business investment. Very
importantly, Spanish direct investment in the U.S.
accelerated dramatically, jumping from $5 billion in 2000 to
$26.6 billion in 2007, thus putting Spain well ahead of
Italy and numerous other European allies.
After the reelection of the PSOE in March, 2008 - and well
before the Obama administration's arrival - the Zapatero
government tried to open "a new chapter" in bilateral
relations via a series of high-level visits and other
initiatives. And, since the inauguration of President Obama
in January 2009, Prime Minister Zapatero has made it clear
that he sees considerable common ground with the new U.S.
leader, both personally and ideologically. The question now
is whether the new personalities at the top, combined with
the unprecedented challenges facing both countries, will
lead to a new period of close and fruitful relations.
PROSPECTS FOR THE U.S.-SPAIN RELATIONSHIP
Although U.S.-Spanish bilateral relations have seen
significant pendulum swings even in the recent past, the
extent of this oscillation has been diminishing over the
longer term. The relationship has been moving gradually
towards a positive middle ground that should be eminently
sustainable, assuming capable leadership on both sides.
Spain is committed to continuing to build its role as a
respected and influential member of the trans-Atlantic
community and of other international groupings in which the
United States plays a leading role. In recent decades, Spain
has also carved out an increasingly important economic and
political role in Latin America. Despite the daunting
challenges that it currently faces, the United States will
almost certainly continue to play a major role globally, in
Europe and in Latin America. On the likely assumption that
Spain will continue to pursue a foreign policy along its
current lines, it will have a clear incentive to cultivate a
positive relationship with Washington and with other centers
of political and cultural influence in the United States.
Culturally, the increasing importance of Spanish as a second
language and the fast-growing Hispanic population offer new
opportunities to interest Americans in Spain. There is also
considerable potential for growth on the economic front, as
major Spanish corporations such as Banco Santander and BBVA
have begun to demonstrate in banking, and in the fields of
highway and other infrastructure construction, as well as
renewable energy.[3]
From the viewpoint of U.S. interests, there are strong
reciprocal reasons to continue working to deepen the
relationship. The U.S. economy can only benefit from the
involvement of leading-edge Spanish firms in areas of the
U.S. economy that require new investment and new
technologies. In geopolitical terms, Spain remains
strategically placed as an overall gateway to the
Mediterranean and the Middle East. Even though the specific
military considerations that proved so powerful during the
Cold War have become a less dominant factor, the bases at
Rota and Moron continue to provide invaluable logistical
support for U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan and
elsewhere. Spain is also one of the few countries in the
European Union with a growing population and a dynamic
interest in other regions of the world. U.S. interests in
Europe, in Latin America and globally, therefore, continue
to weigh in favor of building a strong relationship with a
democratic and increasingly outward-looking Spain.
After the aborted Aznar-Bush experiment in attempting to
build something akin to the British-U.S. "special
relationship," it would be imprudent for leaders in either
Washington or Madrid to try to recreate as close an embrace
anytime soon. Any major movement in this direction would
require a considerable change in Spanish public opinion,
which is currently considerably more pacifist and "welfare-
state"-oriented than American opinion. On the other hand,
the negative bilateral issues of the past have long since
been buried, and a solid level of confidence and wide-
ranging interactions have now been established between these
two democracies that face many similar challenges. There is
thus no intrinsic reason why Spain and the United States
should revert to the tensions that have at times
characterized relations in the past.
In sum, with enlightened leadership from the top in both
Washington and Madrid, plus the skilful use of diplomacy at
all levels when inevitable differences do arise, the U.S.-
Spanish relationship should indeed prosper over the coming
decade and beyond.
Notes
[1] Chislett, William. "Spain and the United States: So
Close Yet So Far." Working Paper 23/2006, Sept. 2006. Real
Instituto Elcano. p. 3. The author has drawn heavily on this
excellent work as well as its even more comprehensive
antecedent, "Spain and the United States: the Quest for
Mutual Rediscovery."
[2] Chislett, William. Spain and the United States: The
Quest for Mutual Rediscovery. Real Instituto Elcano, 2005.
p. 27
[3] See the previously cited works by William Chislett for
an extensive discussion of recent trends in Spanish
investment in the United States, and of the participation of
Spanish firms in highway building, renewable energy and
other important areas of U.S. infrastructure development.