Seth Robinson: Why Russia won't cooperate on Iranian sanctions
[Seth Robinson, a former staff member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, is a PhD candidate in International Relations at Georgetown University.]
After years of stalemate, negotiations over Iran's controversial nuclear development program seemed to progress last week when an Iranian delegation in Vienna agreed to the export and modification of its low-enriched uranium. The resulting optimism did not last. Officials in Tehran demurred, insisting that they needed more time to study the proposal and could not meet Friday's deadline to ratify the agreement. While Iran's stonewalling came as a disappointment to the United States, it did not come as a surprise. Over the past month, the White House has signaled that it is preparing a new, more severe round of sanctions in case current negotiations fail.
The United States has reached out to many countries for help in implementing its strategy, but none more so than Russia, which has come to play an increasingly central role in the battle over the Iranian nuclear program. In September, President Dmitri Medvedev stirred hopes after he emerged from a meeting with President Barack Obama and hinted that the Kremlin might be open to the idea of new sanctions on Iran. Together with China, Russia has long been considered Tehran's patron at the UN, and many U.S. analysts believe that sincere Russian cooperation may prove to be the key component in bringing the program in line with international strictures...
... Russia's evasiveness is sure to frustrate the Obama administration, which will need Moscow's support if it seeks effective sanctions against Tehran. But any attempt to gain such cooperation must take into account Russia's history with and interests in the Iranian nuclear project. A U.S. plan that underestimates the deep and extensive ties that bind the two countries will leave the United States bereft of Russian support at the negotiating table.
In January 1995, Viktor Mikhailov, the Russian minister of atomic energy, and Reza Amrollahi, the chair of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran, negotiated an $800 million contract to complete a reactor in the Iranian city of Bushehr, which a German firm had abandoned after the 1979 revolution. Construction at the original Bushehr plant had marked Iran's foray into the development of nuclear power. (Previous reactors, supplied primarily by the United States, were dedicated to research.) Russia's decision to revive the reactor infuriated U.S. officials and hindered efforts to thaw relations between the two countries.
Cooperation between Russia and Iran continued relatively smoothly over the following years, and leaders from both sides were quick to redress any emerging problems. When work on Bushehr fell behind schedule in 1998, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov visited Iran and pledged greater involvement of Russian technicians in the project.
Under the stewardship of Vladimir Putin, Russia intensified the nuclear cooperation, even as the United States placed increasing pressure on Moscow to help curtail the program. While President Bill Clinton successfully persuaded Boris Yeltsin to cancel plans to supply Iran with gas-centrifuge uranium technology in the summer of 1995, his administration failed to extract meaningful concessions from Putin. Moscow brushed off accusations in 1998 that Russian firms were transferring missile technology to the Iranians, including designs that could carry nuclear warheads. In 2000, a series of high-level, bilateral meetings that included Vice President Al Gore and Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson failed to convince Russia to curb support for the project...
...If the United States seeks true Russian support, it must find a way to compensate Moscow for the losses it will incur by forsaking Iran. Washington will continue negotiating with both countries, and it remains possible that the parties may agree on a compromise that would give Iran a reprieve from further sanctions. But the Obama administration, wary of Tehran's promises, is likely to continue laying the groundwork for future penalties in the case of Iranian backtracking. As it does so, it is worth remembering that Russia has already supported multiple rounds of UN Security Council sanctions, but only those that have not imperiled its own interests. Efforts to court Russia that do not account for the country's long and profitable investment in the Iranian nuclear program rely on misplaced optimism, and will likely end in diplomatic disappointment.
Read entire article at The New
After years of stalemate, negotiations over Iran's controversial nuclear development program seemed to progress last week when an Iranian delegation in Vienna agreed to the export and modification of its low-enriched uranium. The resulting optimism did not last. Officials in Tehran demurred, insisting that they needed more time to study the proposal and could not meet Friday's deadline to ratify the agreement. While Iran's stonewalling came as a disappointment to the United States, it did not come as a surprise. Over the past month, the White House has signaled that it is preparing a new, more severe round of sanctions in case current negotiations fail.
The United States has reached out to many countries for help in implementing its strategy, but none more so than Russia, which has come to play an increasingly central role in the battle over the Iranian nuclear program. In September, President Dmitri Medvedev stirred hopes after he emerged from a meeting with President Barack Obama and hinted that the Kremlin might be open to the idea of new sanctions on Iran. Together with China, Russia has long been considered Tehran's patron at the UN, and many U.S. analysts believe that sincere Russian cooperation may prove to be the key component in bringing the program in line with international strictures...
... Russia's evasiveness is sure to frustrate the Obama administration, which will need Moscow's support if it seeks effective sanctions against Tehran. But any attempt to gain such cooperation must take into account Russia's history with and interests in the Iranian nuclear project. A U.S. plan that underestimates the deep and extensive ties that bind the two countries will leave the United States bereft of Russian support at the negotiating table.
In January 1995, Viktor Mikhailov, the Russian minister of atomic energy, and Reza Amrollahi, the chair of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran, negotiated an $800 million contract to complete a reactor in the Iranian city of Bushehr, which a German firm had abandoned after the 1979 revolution. Construction at the original Bushehr plant had marked Iran's foray into the development of nuclear power. (Previous reactors, supplied primarily by the United States, were dedicated to research.) Russia's decision to revive the reactor infuriated U.S. officials and hindered efforts to thaw relations between the two countries.
Cooperation between Russia and Iran continued relatively smoothly over the following years, and leaders from both sides were quick to redress any emerging problems. When work on Bushehr fell behind schedule in 1998, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov visited Iran and pledged greater involvement of Russian technicians in the project.
Under the stewardship of Vladimir Putin, Russia intensified the nuclear cooperation, even as the United States placed increasing pressure on Moscow to help curtail the program. While President Bill Clinton successfully persuaded Boris Yeltsin to cancel plans to supply Iran with gas-centrifuge uranium technology in the summer of 1995, his administration failed to extract meaningful concessions from Putin. Moscow brushed off accusations in 1998 that Russian firms were transferring missile technology to the Iranians, including designs that could carry nuclear warheads. In 2000, a series of high-level, bilateral meetings that included Vice President Al Gore and Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson failed to convince Russia to curb support for the project...
...If the United States seeks true Russian support, it must find a way to compensate Moscow for the losses it will incur by forsaking Iran. Washington will continue negotiating with both countries, and it remains possible that the parties may agree on a compromise that would give Iran a reprieve from further sanctions. But the Obama administration, wary of Tehran's promises, is likely to continue laying the groundwork for future penalties in the case of Iranian backtracking. As it does so, it is worth remembering that Russia has already supported multiple rounds of UN Security Council sanctions, but only those that have not imperiled its own interests. Efforts to court Russia that do not account for the country's long and profitable investment in the Iranian nuclear program rely on misplaced optimism, and will likely end in diplomatic disappointment.