Gerald F. Seib: Memories of Vietnam Haunt War, but Scarcely Apply
[Gerald F. Seib is the executive Washington editor of The Wall Street Journal]
The comparisons roll off tongues easily in Washington these days: Vietnam and Afghanistan, both home to far-away, maddeningly intractable struggles. The former became a quagmire that devoured a presidency; might the latter as well?
Every significant foreign conflict since the mid-1970s has, almost inevitably, been compared to Vietnam. In Ronald Reagan's first term, for example, Washington buzzed with speculation that El Salvador might turn out to be "his Vietnam."
There are some surface similarities between the Vietnam War and the conflict in Afghanistan. But the list of differences is far longer, and more profound. Those differences suggest that while it is certainly possible that Afghanistan could consume the Obama presidency as Vietnam did Lyndon Johnson's, that outcome is likely only if there is some massive expansion of the Afghan problem in coming years, and a massive mishandling of it by the Obama administration.
In each place, the U.S. has had the misfortune to pick -- or, more correctly, to have history pick for it -- a confrontation in a land with a long history of beating back foreign forces.
In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, the U.S. has been trying to help allied governments widely seen as weak and corrupt. In both countries, the insurgents the U.S. is trying to quell often have proved adept at both fighting and governing at the grassroots level.
But then the comparison breaks down. The differences start with the rationale for fighting in the first place. There was never an attack on the continental U.S. launched from Vietnam, or by people trying to take over the Vietnamese government. The "domino theory" that Communists would slowly spread influence if Vietnam fell was an abstraction to many Americans.
"In the case of Afghanistan, the memory of 9/11 remains a powerful rationale for most Americans to support the war," says Mark Moyar, a historian at the U.S. Marine Corps University who has written books on both Vietnam and counterinsurgency operations.
The level of American commitment in Vietnam was simply an order of magnitude greater than any commitment either made or contemplated in Afghanistan. At the end of 1968, the height of the American military commitment in Vietnam, the U.S. had about 540,000 troops in the country. Even now, after eight years in Afghanistan, the number of troops there or headed there is about 68,000. Even if President Barack Obama grants the full wish of the American Afghan commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, for more troops, the American contingent in Afghanistan won't reach even a quarter of the level in Vietnam...
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The comparisons roll off tongues easily in Washington these days: Vietnam and Afghanistan, both home to far-away, maddeningly intractable struggles. The former became a quagmire that devoured a presidency; might the latter as well?
Every significant foreign conflict since the mid-1970s has, almost inevitably, been compared to Vietnam. In Ronald Reagan's first term, for example, Washington buzzed with speculation that El Salvador might turn out to be "his Vietnam."
There are some surface similarities between the Vietnam War and the conflict in Afghanistan. But the list of differences is far longer, and more profound. Those differences suggest that while it is certainly possible that Afghanistan could consume the Obama presidency as Vietnam did Lyndon Johnson's, that outcome is likely only if there is some massive expansion of the Afghan problem in coming years, and a massive mishandling of it by the Obama administration.
In each place, the U.S. has had the misfortune to pick -- or, more correctly, to have history pick for it -- a confrontation in a land with a long history of beating back foreign forces.
In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, the U.S. has been trying to help allied governments widely seen as weak and corrupt. In both countries, the insurgents the U.S. is trying to quell often have proved adept at both fighting and governing at the grassroots level.
But then the comparison breaks down. The differences start with the rationale for fighting in the first place. There was never an attack on the continental U.S. launched from Vietnam, or by people trying to take over the Vietnamese government. The "domino theory" that Communists would slowly spread influence if Vietnam fell was an abstraction to many Americans.
"In the case of Afghanistan, the memory of 9/11 remains a powerful rationale for most Americans to support the war," says Mark Moyar, a historian at the U.S. Marine Corps University who has written books on both Vietnam and counterinsurgency operations.
The level of American commitment in Vietnam was simply an order of magnitude greater than any commitment either made or contemplated in Afghanistan. At the end of 1968, the height of the American military commitment in Vietnam, the U.S. had about 540,000 troops in the country. Even now, after eight years in Afghanistan, the number of troops there or headed there is about 68,000. Even if President Barack Obama grants the full wish of the American Afghan commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, for more troops, the American contingent in Afghanistan won't reach even a quarter of the level in Vietnam...