Melvin A. Goodman: The Prospect of Change in US Relations With Russia, Iran and Afghanistan Alarms the Washington Post
[Melvin A. Goodman, Truthout's National Security and Intelligence columnist, is a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and an adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University. His 42-year government career includes service with the CIA, State Department, Defense Department and the US Army. His most recent book is "Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA."]
The Washington Post is running scared these days with its editorial writers having great difficulty coming to terms with the possibility of improved US relations with Russia and Iran. They also can't understand why the Obama administration might decide that additional US military forces in Afghanistan will not solve the political and military problems there. There have been several editorials and op-eds this week that distort developments in each of these situations and predict failure for President Barack Obama. The fact that a "reset" button is needed and may offer the promise of success in our relations with Russia, Iran and even Afghanistan appears to be anathema to the Post.
These policy changes, moreover, presumably led to today's news that President Obama has won the Nobel Peace Prize for his "extraordinary efforts to gain international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples," which must have these writers apoplectic. Only yesterday, Post op-ed writer David Ignatius termed the prospect of any change of policy in Afghanistan as "lawless," and today Post op-ed writer Charles Krauthammer compared the president to a young Hamlet, who "frets, demurs, agonizes."
President Obama's most persistent critic at the Post has been Fred Hiatt, the editor of the editorial page. His column earlier this week perpetuated a number of distortions and errors on the topic of Russia. Hiatt does not comprehend that the Russians are concerned about possible nuclear weapons in Iran or that Russia has genuine concerns about nuclear proliferation. In fact, the Russians do share our concerns on these issues. In the 1960s, Moscow was the major driver for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), because it feared that the United States wanted to give West Germany a role in decision-making in the use of nuclear weapons. The Kremlin adhered carefully to the dictates of the NPT and, until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, carefully monitored the types of technology that were sent to foreign countries. When Moscow's nonproliferation regime broke down in the chaos of the 1990s, during the erratic rule of President Boris Yeltsin, it was actually Vladimir Putin who stepped in and stopped the sale of sensitive technologies to third world countries. This is the same Vladimir Putin, who Hiatt believes will prevent President Dmitry Medvedev from controlling Moscow's nuclear-technology complex; Hiatt believes that Moscow prefers trade with Iran over the prevention of nuclear weapons in Iran.
Hiatt also argues that Russia values its commercial and military exchanges with Iran far too much to work toward a nuclear-free Iran. Again, the facts put the lie to Hiatt's arguments. US-Russian talks about Iran's military programs began in the mid-1990s, when Russia froze military sales to Iran for a five-year period. Even when sales were resumed in 2000, the Russians kept a tight leash on the types of weapons that Iran purchased. Moscow has stopped delivery on the sale of the S-300 surface-to-air missile system and has dragged its heels on the delivery of other weapons systems...
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The Washington Post is running scared these days with its editorial writers having great difficulty coming to terms with the possibility of improved US relations with Russia and Iran. They also can't understand why the Obama administration might decide that additional US military forces in Afghanistan will not solve the political and military problems there. There have been several editorials and op-eds this week that distort developments in each of these situations and predict failure for President Barack Obama. The fact that a "reset" button is needed and may offer the promise of success in our relations with Russia, Iran and even Afghanistan appears to be anathema to the Post.
These policy changes, moreover, presumably led to today's news that President Obama has won the Nobel Peace Prize for his "extraordinary efforts to gain international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples," which must have these writers apoplectic. Only yesterday, Post op-ed writer David Ignatius termed the prospect of any change of policy in Afghanistan as "lawless," and today Post op-ed writer Charles Krauthammer compared the president to a young Hamlet, who "frets, demurs, agonizes."
President Obama's most persistent critic at the Post has been Fred Hiatt, the editor of the editorial page. His column earlier this week perpetuated a number of distortions and errors on the topic of Russia. Hiatt does not comprehend that the Russians are concerned about possible nuclear weapons in Iran or that Russia has genuine concerns about nuclear proliferation. In fact, the Russians do share our concerns on these issues. In the 1960s, Moscow was the major driver for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), because it feared that the United States wanted to give West Germany a role in decision-making in the use of nuclear weapons. The Kremlin adhered carefully to the dictates of the NPT and, until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, carefully monitored the types of technology that were sent to foreign countries. When Moscow's nonproliferation regime broke down in the chaos of the 1990s, during the erratic rule of President Boris Yeltsin, it was actually Vladimir Putin who stepped in and stopped the sale of sensitive technologies to third world countries. This is the same Vladimir Putin, who Hiatt believes will prevent President Dmitry Medvedev from controlling Moscow's nuclear-technology complex; Hiatt believes that Moscow prefers trade with Iran over the prevention of nuclear weapons in Iran.
Hiatt also argues that Russia values its commercial and military exchanges with Iran far too much to work toward a nuclear-free Iran. Again, the facts put the lie to Hiatt's arguments. US-Russian talks about Iran's military programs began in the mid-1990s, when Russia froze military sales to Iran for a five-year period. Even when sales were resumed in 2000, the Russians kept a tight leash on the types of weapons that Iran purchased. Moscow has stopped delivery on the sale of the S-300 surface-to-air missile system and has dragged its heels on the delivery of other weapons systems...