Yossi Alpher: What Is Peace?
[Yossi Alpher, former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, co-edits bitterlemons.org.]
Israelis want peace but don’t believe it’s possible. That is the cumulative finding of a host of opinion polls, and it is critical to any effort by President Barack Obama to create a new momentum toward peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
For many Israelis, the peace with Egypt and Jordan has not appeared sufficiently beneficial, despite the added security it has brought, to pursue peace with the Palestinians or Syrians.
After all, many people note that the Golan frontier with Syria is Israel’s quietest border even though there is no peace agreement with Damascus. And the two existing peace pacts have not brought anything approximating “normalization” — large and important sectors of the Jordanian and Egyptian publics continue to hold strong anti-Israeli views...
... Beyond its immediate neighbors, most Israelis have a similar skepticism about the capacity of Arab states to sustain a real peace. With Saudi Arabia and Egypt failing to pull their traditional leadership weight and many other Arab states in a state of collapse or disarray and threatened or ruled by militant Islamists, some Israelis wonder if even some sort of Israel-Arab alliance against Iran and its proxies — one of the hoped-for payoffs of peace — would really represent an appreciable advantage.
Of course, there is much to be said about Israel’s own contribution to Arab frigidity by invading Lebanon in 1982 when the ink on the peace treaty with Egypt was barely dry; by not making a sustained effort to solve the Palestinian issue; by the proliferation of settlements in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and, until 2005, in Gaza; and by alienating Israel’s internal Palestinian Arab community. When the history of the Israel-Arab conflict is finally written, both sides will undoubtedly be found heavily at fault.
One moment will stand out. In 1977, when President Anwar Sadat of Egypt came to Jerusalem, told the Knesset “we were wrong to reject you” and stated that 70 percent of the problem was psychological, Israelis responded by abandoning their skepticism and embracing a peace that included giving up the entire Sinai peninsula. Mr. Sadat figured us out: Israel will pay a huge price for acceptance and security. Yet no one has followed in his footsteps. Imagine if Bashar al-Assad of Syria were to do so...
In other words, with the right “marketing,” Israelis can be turned on by the prospect of peace even if this means heavy sacrifices. Peace — even cold peace — is so important that, in the absence of Arab initiatives, marketing should begin at home.
Unfortunately, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu does not seem to realize that the demographic thrust of his settlement policies contradicts his insistence that Israel be recognized as a Jewish state. Yet the real problem is not a hypocritical prime minister, but the support he draws from a skeptical Israeli public.
That leaves Barack Obama. To enlist Israelis he has to address us directly. And he has to deliver not only justified demands about settlements but reassurances regarding Israel’s security and integrity in a less than welcoming neighborhood.
Read entire article at NYT
Israelis want peace but don’t believe it’s possible. That is the cumulative finding of a host of opinion polls, and it is critical to any effort by President Barack Obama to create a new momentum toward peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
For many Israelis, the peace with Egypt and Jordan has not appeared sufficiently beneficial, despite the added security it has brought, to pursue peace with the Palestinians or Syrians.
After all, many people note that the Golan frontier with Syria is Israel’s quietest border even though there is no peace agreement with Damascus. And the two existing peace pacts have not brought anything approximating “normalization” — large and important sectors of the Jordanian and Egyptian publics continue to hold strong anti-Israeli views...
... Beyond its immediate neighbors, most Israelis have a similar skepticism about the capacity of Arab states to sustain a real peace. With Saudi Arabia and Egypt failing to pull their traditional leadership weight and many other Arab states in a state of collapse or disarray and threatened or ruled by militant Islamists, some Israelis wonder if even some sort of Israel-Arab alliance against Iran and its proxies — one of the hoped-for payoffs of peace — would really represent an appreciable advantage.
Of course, there is much to be said about Israel’s own contribution to Arab frigidity by invading Lebanon in 1982 when the ink on the peace treaty with Egypt was barely dry; by not making a sustained effort to solve the Palestinian issue; by the proliferation of settlements in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and, until 2005, in Gaza; and by alienating Israel’s internal Palestinian Arab community. When the history of the Israel-Arab conflict is finally written, both sides will undoubtedly be found heavily at fault.
One moment will stand out. In 1977, when President Anwar Sadat of Egypt came to Jerusalem, told the Knesset “we were wrong to reject you” and stated that 70 percent of the problem was psychological, Israelis responded by abandoning their skepticism and embracing a peace that included giving up the entire Sinai peninsula. Mr. Sadat figured us out: Israel will pay a huge price for acceptance and security. Yet no one has followed in his footsteps. Imagine if Bashar al-Assad of Syria were to do so...
In other words, with the right “marketing,” Israelis can be turned on by the prospect of peace even if this means heavy sacrifices. Peace — even cold peace — is so important that, in the absence of Arab initiatives, marketing should begin at home.
Unfortunately, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu does not seem to realize that the demographic thrust of his settlement policies contradicts his insistence that Israel be recognized as a Jewish state. Yet the real problem is not a hypocritical prime minister, but the support he draws from a skeptical Israeli public.
That leaves Barack Obama. To enlist Israelis he has to address us directly. And he has to deliver not only justified demands about settlements but reassurances regarding Israel’s security and integrity in a less than welcoming neighborhood.