Amr Hamzawy and Jeffrey Christiansen: Will Obama Drop Bush's Hamas Plan?
[Amr Hamzawy is a senior associate and Jeffrey Christiansen is a researcher at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut.]
When will President Obama abandon the Bush doctrine of isolating Hamas? During a press conference in Gaza City a few weeks ago, Ismail Haniya, the Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, declared: “If there is a real project that aims at resolving the Palestinian cause on establishing a Palestinian state on 1967 borders, under full Palestinian sovereignty, we will support it.” And in an interview shortly after, Khaled Meshaal, the exiled leader of Hamas’s political bureau, welcomed the “new language towards the region” from President Obama.
Hamas is trying to convey to the US its willingness to accept a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that it is willing to play a productive rather than obstructionist role in the peace process. But is the US listening?
It depends on what the US is listening for. If the US is waiting for Hamas to accept its three demands to renounce violence, honour past agreements and recognise Israel’s right to exist, it will probably be disappointed. To expect your opponent to give up all of its leverage before negotiations actually begin is hardly realistic. Rather, the US should interpret Hamas’s statements with two points in mind.
First, Hamas has two different voices for two different audiences. One voice avows armed resistance against Israel and is directed at its Palestinian and Arab base of support. The other voice expresses an interest in a diplomatic solution to the conflict and is directed at the international community.
Second, Hamas’s diplomatic voice has, over the years, consistently stated its willingness to coexist with Israel. In 2003, Hamas stated that it would renounce violence if “the Israelis are willing to fully withdraw from the 1967 Occupied Territories and present a timetable for doing so”. In 2006, Hamas stated: “We have accepted the principle of accepting a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.” And in 2007, Hamas acknowledged that it is a “reality” that Israel exists and “a matter of fact” that it will continue to exist.
Focusing only on Hamas’s resistance voice would blind anyone to important signals it is trying to send: in practical terms, Hamas has given up pursuing a Palestinian state extending from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, and the group has acknowledged the two-state solution as fundamental to the peace process.
This is not exactly the stuff of intransigence. Hamas may be a violent organisation, and the most powerful potential spoiler in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but its use of violence is tactical rather than ideological and would most likely end in exchange for progress on the ground toward a Palestinian state.
The US should put Hamas’s diplomatic voice to the test. But should the US approach be more indirect or direct, multilateral or bilateral, procedural or substantive, clandestine or public? Domestically, it may be too early for President Obama to pursue direct, bilateral talks in a public forum. Internationally, however, it may be too late for the more a gradual approach of indirect or clandestine talks: President Obama will squander a good deal of his prestige in the Arab world if he doesn’t make a prominent departure from Bush administration policy – and soon...
Read entire article at The National (UAE)
When will President Obama abandon the Bush doctrine of isolating Hamas? During a press conference in Gaza City a few weeks ago, Ismail Haniya, the Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, declared: “If there is a real project that aims at resolving the Palestinian cause on establishing a Palestinian state on 1967 borders, under full Palestinian sovereignty, we will support it.” And in an interview shortly after, Khaled Meshaal, the exiled leader of Hamas’s political bureau, welcomed the “new language towards the region” from President Obama.
Hamas is trying to convey to the US its willingness to accept a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that it is willing to play a productive rather than obstructionist role in the peace process. But is the US listening?
It depends on what the US is listening for. If the US is waiting for Hamas to accept its three demands to renounce violence, honour past agreements and recognise Israel’s right to exist, it will probably be disappointed. To expect your opponent to give up all of its leverage before negotiations actually begin is hardly realistic. Rather, the US should interpret Hamas’s statements with two points in mind.
First, Hamas has two different voices for two different audiences. One voice avows armed resistance against Israel and is directed at its Palestinian and Arab base of support. The other voice expresses an interest in a diplomatic solution to the conflict and is directed at the international community.
Second, Hamas’s diplomatic voice has, over the years, consistently stated its willingness to coexist with Israel. In 2003, Hamas stated that it would renounce violence if “the Israelis are willing to fully withdraw from the 1967 Occupied Territories and present a timetable for doing so”. In 2006, Hamas stated: “We have accepted the principle of accepting a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.” And in 2007, Hamas acknowledged that it is a “reality” that Israel exists and “a matter of fact” that it will continue to exist.
Focusing only on Hamas’s resistance voice would blind anyone to important signals it is trying to send: in practical terms, Hamas has given up pursuing a Palestinian state extending from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, and the group has acknowledged the two-state solution as fundamental to the peace process.
This is not exactly the stuff of intransigence. Hamas may be a violent organisation, and the most powerful potential spoiler in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but its use of violence is tactical rather than ideological and would most likely end in exchange for progress on the ground toward a Palestinian state.
The US should put Hamas’s diplomatic voice to the test. But should the US approach be more indirect or direct, multilateral or bilateral, procedural or substantive, clandestine or public? Domestically, it may be too early for President Obama to pursue direct, bilateral talks in a public forum. Internationally, however, it may be too late for the more a gradual approach of indirect or clandestine talks: President Obama will squander a good deal of his prestige in the Arab world if he doesn’t make a prominent departure from Bush administration policy – and soon...