Ali Reza Eshraghi: Khamenei vs. Khomeini
[Ali Reza Eshraghi, a former newspaper editor in Iran, is a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, Institute of International studies.]
During his August 3 speech formally endorsing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned protesters that "by imitation of Ayatollah Khomeini, they cannot deceive people." Khamenei was mocking the opposition's claim to be to reviving "the values of Ayatollah Khomeini"--the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Khamenei's predecessor as Supreme Leader. Ironically, Khamenei made this statement while seated below a large, framed picture of Khomeini.
This scene provides a stark illustration of the fact that politics in Iran are largely defined by attempts to claim Khomeini's legacy. Staying faithful to his ideology has been the litmus test for all political activity in the Islamic Republic. Reformists fight for women's rights, democracy, and civil-military divide--often under the auspices of Khomeini's pronouncements and writings. And despite the fact that the position of Supreme Leader is supposed to translate into ultimate power in Iran, Khamenei has been severely limited by the traditions and doctrines of his predecessor.
The opposition is thus going straight to the source in their search for legitimacy, accusing Khamenei of disrespecting Khomeini's legacy and claiming Khomeini's mantle for itself. The claim is not baseless: Khomeini had actually supported opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi against Khamenei on several occasions prior to his death. In 1985, when then-President Khamenei was re-elected president for a second term, he was ordered by Khomeini to keep Mousavi as his prime minister. In his inauguration speech, Khamenei alluded to being forced to re-appoint Mousavi against his wishes. (Two days later, Khomeini's son Ahmad shared his father's annoyance at Khamenei's words.) Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a witness to all these events, even noted in his memoir, "I still feel the bitterness of that period in Ayatollah Khamenei's temperament, signs of which appear occasionally."
But as the regime and the opposition both fight to be Khomeini's rightful inheritors, the real deciders are Khomeini's own family members--often referred to as Beit-e-Imam. In Shi'ite tradition, these relatives are considered the guardians and true interpreters of an imam's thoughts. And in Khomeini's case, surprisingly, they are disproportionately supporting Mousavi and the opposition.
Khomeini's son Ahmad was a strong critic of the Iranian regime after his father's death. Six years after Khamenei became supreme leader, Ahmad made a blunt speech expressing his views; a month later, he passed away suspiciously at age 49. (The official position is that Ahmad's death was caused by a heart attack, though independent Iranian journalists claim that he was likely assassinated by the Iranian intelligence service.)
Ahmad's children seem to share his distaste for Khamenei. Hassan, who is the most prominent of Khomeini's grandchildren and is in charge of his grandfather's mausoleum, met personally with Mousavi and supported his call to cancel the election results. Hassan also skipped Khamenei's formal endorsement of Ahmadinejad--widely interpreted as a slight against the Supreme Leader. In February 2008, in an interview with weekly magazine Shahrvand-e-Emrooz (which was later shot down by the government), Hassan spoke out against military interference in politics. Soon after, a publication tied to Ahmadinejad attacked him in an article, "The Secret of Hassan Khomeini's Red Cheeks," accusing him of corruption. According to daily newspaper Kargozaran, this was the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic that a member of Khomeini's Beit was publicly insulted. A few days later, the elderly Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Tavassoli, former head of Khomeini's office and Khomeini's personal secretary, reportedly died of a heart attack while complaining angrily about this insult...
... It is becoming so difficult for the regime to claim Khomeini's mantle that, in what may be the first time in the regime's history, they are trying to legitimize Khamenei's actions even if they run contrary to Khomeini's teachings. In an interview on July 27, Ali Saeedi, Khamenei's representative in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, stated that everyone "should obey the living Supreme Leader. Some people are sticking to Imam Khomeini's ideas; they should know that His Majesty [Ayatollah Khamenei] has run the country for the last 20 years. The situation has changed. Threats and conspiracies against us have changed."
On the 20th anniversary of his reign as Supreme Leader, Khamenei is finally testing the boundaries of Khomeini's influence. It's a risky gamble--but he seems to have little choice, given his dwindling support among Khomeini's descendants. The move away from Khomeini gives the opposition powerful ammunition against him. And pushed to choose between Khomeini and Khamenei, many Iranians will continue to follow the Islamic Republic's founder--and those they see to be his true heirs.
Read entire article at The New Republic
During his August 3 speech formally endorsing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned protesters that "by imitation of Ayatollah Khomeini, they cannot deceive people." Khamenei was mocking the opposition's claim to be to reviving "the values of Ayatollah Khomeini"--the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Khamenei's predecessor as Supreme Leader. Ironically, Khamenei made this statement while seated below a large, framed picture of Khomeini.
This scene provides a stark illustration of the fact that politics in Iran are largely defined by attempts to claim Khomeini's legacy. Staying faithful to his ideology has been the litmus test for all political activity in the Islamic Republic. Reformists fight for women's rights, democracy, and civil-military divide--often under the auspices of Khomeini's pronouncements and writings. And despite the fact that the position of Supreme Leader is supposed to translate into ultimate power in Iran, Khamenei has been severely limited by the traditions and doctrines of his predecessor.
The opposition is thus going straight to the source in their search for legitimacy, accusing Khamenei of disrespecting Khomeini's legacy and claiming Khomeini's mantle for itself. The claim is not baseless: Khomeini had actually supported opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi against Khamenei on several occasions prior to his death. In 1985, when then-President Khamenei was re-elected president for a second term, he was ordered by Khomeini to keep Mousavi as his prime minister. In his inauguration speech, Khamenei alluded to being forced to re-appoint Mousavi against his wishes. (Two days later, Khomeini's son Ahmad shared his father's annoyance at Khamenei's words.) Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a witness to all these events, even noted in his memoir, "I still feel the bitterness of that period in Ayatollah Khamenei's temperament, signs of which appear occasionally."
But as the regime and the opposition both fight to be Khomeini's rightful inheritors, the real deciders are Khomeini's own family members--often referred to as Beit-e-Imam. In Shi'ite tradition, these relatives are considered the guardians and true interpreters of an imam's thoughts. And in Khomeini's case, surprisingly, they are disproportionately supporting Mousavi and the opposition.
Khomeini's son Ahmad was a strong critic of the Iranian regime after his father's death. Six years after Khamenei became supreme leader, Ahmad made a blunt speech expressing his views; a month later, he passed away suspiciously at age 49. (The official position is that Ahmad's death was caused by a heart attack, though independent Iranian journalists claim that he was likely assassinated by the Iranian intelligence service.)
Ahmad's children seem to share his distaste for Khamenei. Hassan, who is the most prominent of Khomeini's grandchildren and is in charge of his grandfather's mausoleum, met personally with Mousavi and supported his call to cancel the election results. Hassan also skipped Khamenei's formal endorsement of Ahmadinejad--widely interpreted as a slight against the Supreme Leader. In February 2008, in an interview with weekly magazine Shahrvand-e-Emrooz (which was later shot down by the government), Hassan spoke out against military interference in politics. Soon after, a publication tied to Ahmadinejad attacked him in an article, "The Secret of Hassan Khomeini's Red Cheeks," accusing him of corruption. According to daily newspaper Kargozaran, this was the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic that a member of Khomeini's Beit was publicly insulted. A few days later, the elderly Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Tavassoli, former head of Khomeini's office and Khomeini's personal secretary, reportedly died of a heart attack while complaining angrily about this insult...
... It is becoming so difficult for the regime to claim Khomeini's mantle that, in what may be the first time in the regime's history, they are trying to legitimize Khamenei's actions even if they run contrary to Khomeini's teachings. In an interview on July 27, Ali Saeedi, Khamenei's representative in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, stated that everyone "should obey the living Supreme Leader. Some people are sticking to Imam Khomeini's ideas; they should know that His Majesty [Ayatollah Khamenei] has run the country for the last 20 years. The situation has changed. Threats and conspiracies against us have changed."
On the 20th anniversary of his reign as Supreme Leader, Khamenei is finally testing the boundaries of Khomeini's influence. It's a risky gamble--but he seems to have little choice, given his dwindling support among Khomeini's descendants. The move away from Khomeini gives the opposition powerful ammunition against him. And pushed to choose between Khomeini and Khamenei, many Iranians will continue to follow the Islamic Republic's founder--and those they see to be his true heirs.