Wesley Clark: Obama must learn from Vietnam
[Wesley Clark is a former supreme commander of NATO, led the alliance of military forces in the Kosovo war (1999) and is a senior fellow at the Ron Burkle Center at UCLA.]
Much has been done in six months to deal with the ongoing war in Afghanistan. We have restated that our aim is to eliminate the threat of Al Qaeda; built a new leadership team, including Special Representative Richard Holbrooke; reinforced our troop strength and adjusted our tactics; and have begun augmenting our force with synchronized diplomatic, political and economic efforts.
But can we explain how all of this adds up to an effective strategy that will sustain American engagement in one of the world's least accessible regions?
The American people are growing increasingly wary. In a new CNN/Opinion research poll, fully 54% of respondents now say they oppose the U.S.-led fight against the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies. Those are striking numbers, and a serious warning to the Obama administration.
The difficulty here lies less in PowerPoint presentations and more in the complexities of the war itself. Our real enemy, Al Qaeda, may now be more entrenched in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. Taking the fight directly into Pakistan with ground forces risks expanding the conflict and undercutting a fragile Pakistani civilian government.
The similarities to Vietnam are ominous. There, too, an insurgency was led and supported from outside the borders of the state in which our troops were fighting. There, too, sanctuaries across international borders stymied U.S. military efforts. There, too, broader political-strategic considerations weighed against military expansion of the conflict and forecast further struggles in the region.
And there, too, American public support slid away over time as our engagement ratcheted up and casualties mounted.
Our Vietnam experiences provide powerful lessons in how to explain strategy and retain public support, so we can ultimately succeed.
First, we must maintain a clear and unwavering purpose - and not overstate our accomplishments. In Vietnam, we seemed to change our objectives whenever they were seriously challenged. At one time or another we fought to halt Communist aggression from the North, to avoid the fall of the"Southeast Asian dominoes," to prevent a slaughter should the Viet Cong take over, and to maintain U.S." credibility." And we kept promising"light at the end of the tunnel," until Tet shattered public expectations and support.
So in Afghanistan, we must avoid confusing Americans by citing too many justifications for our presence...
Read entire article at New York Daily News
Much has been done in six months to deal with the ongoing war in Afghanistan. We have restated that our aim is to eliminate the threat of Al Qaeda; built a new leadership team, including Special Representative Richard Holbrooke; reinforced our troop strength and adjusted our tactics; and have begun augmenting our force with synchronized diplomatic, political and economic efforts.
But can we explain how all of this adds up to an effective strategy that will sustain American engagement in one of the world's least accessible regions?
The American people are growing increasingly wary. In a new CNN/Opinion research poll, fully 54% of respondents now say they oppose the U.S.-led fight against the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies. Those are striking numbers, and a serious warning to the Obama administration.
The difficulty here lies less in PowerPoint presentations and more in the complexities of the war itself. Our real enemy, Al Qaeda, may now be more entrenched in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. Taking the fight directly into Pakistan with ground forces risks expanding the conflict and undercutting a fragile Pakistani civilian government.
The similarities to Vietnam are ominous. There, too, an insurgency was led and supported from outside the borders of the state in which our troops were fighting. There, too, sanctuaries across international borders stymied U.S. military efforts. There, too, broader political-strategic considerations weighed against military expansion of the conflict and forecast further struggles in the region.
And there, too, American public support slid away over time as our engagement ratcheted up and casualties mounted.
Our Vietnam experiences provide powerful lessons in how to explain strategy and retain public support, so we can ultimately succeed.
First, we must maintain a clear and unwavering purpose - and not overstate our accomplishments. In Vietnam, we seemed to change our objectives whenever they were seriously challenged. At one time or another we fought to halt Communist aggression from the North, to avoid the fall of the"Southeast Asian dominoes," to prevent a slaughter should the Viet Cong take over, and to maintain U.S." credibility." And we kept promising"light at the end of the tunnel," until Tet shattered public expectations and support.
So in Afghanistan, we must avoid confusing Americans by citing too many justifications for our presence...