Edward P. Djerejian: Damascus and the Road to Mideast Peace
[Mr. Djerejian, U.S. ambassador to Syria from 1988-91 and to Israel from 1993-94, is the author of “Danger and Opportunity—An American Ambassador’s Journey Through the Middle East” (Simon & Schuster, 2008). He is the founding director of the Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University.]
Though in recent months some have derided the power of dialogue, the truth is that strategic engagement with our enemies remains absolutely essential for our national security. Talking to our adversaries with a clear purpose in mind is not a sign of weakness.
At the same time, diplomacy should never be carried out in a way that indicates a lack of United States resolve. While President Ronald Reagan stigmatized the Soviet Union as the “evil empire,” his administration carried out tough-minded negotiations with the Communist regime and achieved positive results.
The often adversarial relationship between the U.S. and Syria is a case in point. The Syrian regime could undermine security in southern Lebanon, hinder progress in Iraq, and continue to support Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. It also has the potential to play a constructive role in the region—a possibility that has yet to be fully explored. A high-level bilateral dialogue could enhance our national security interests, as demonstrated by U.S. diplomacy in the recent past.
When I was ambassador to Syria (1988-1991), my major task was to implement the policy of strategic engagement established by President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III. Our relationship with Syria in the late 1980s was troubled. But we understood that without Syria we could not help end the civil war in Lebanon, make progress on Arab-Israeli peace talks, curtail certain terrorist groups, control drug trafficking, promote regional security, and advance our human-rights agenda. We sought common ground through serious dialogue.
Despite many obstacles, tangible goals were reached. Our consultations in Damascus facilitated the end of the tragic Lebanese civil war. Syrian President Hafez Assad responded positively to President Bush and Secretary Baker’s direct request for him to lend Syria’s political and military support to Operation Desert Storm. In a major breakthrough, U.S.-Syrian cooperation on Desert Storm helped to lead to Assad’s agreement to enter into face-to-face negotiations with Israel, which in turn led to the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991.
On the human-rights front, we also made progress. Syrian Jews were granted the same right to freely travel abroad as other Syrian citizens. And in close coordination with the Syrian government in Damascus, American hostages in Lebanon began to be released.
While the historic context is different today than in the early 1990s, the basic rationale for promoting U.S. interests by engaging Syria remains valid. Engagement with Syria would promote peace negotiations between Jerusalem and Damascus. It would also distance Syria from its close relationship with Iran—and thereby reduce Iran’s influence in the Levant.
U.S. dialogue with Syria could lead to diminished support for Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah. It would consolidate Lebanon’s sovereignty. And it could secure the Syria-Iraq border...
Read entire article at The Wall Street Journal
Though in recent months some have derided the power of dialogue, the truth is that strategic engagement with our enemies remains absolutely essential for our national security. Talking to our adversaries with a clear purpose in mind is not a sign of weakness.
At the same time, diplomacy should never be carried out in a way that indicates a lack of United States resolve. While President Ronald Reagan stigmatized the Soviet Union as the “evil empire,” his administration carried out tough-minded negotiations with the Communist regime and achieved positive results.
The often adversarial relationship between the U.S. and Syria is a case in point. The Syrian regime could undermine security in southern Lebanon, hinder progress in Iraq, and continue to support Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. It also has the potential to play a constructive role in the region—a possibility that has yet to be fully explored. A high-level bilateral dialogue could enhance our national security interests, as demonstrated by U.S. diplomacy in the recent past.
When I was ambassador to Syria (1988-1991), my major task was to implement the policy of strategic engagement established by President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III. Our relationship with Syria in the late 1980s was troubled. But we understood that without Syria we could not help end the civil war in Lebanon, make progress on Arab-Israeli peace talks, curtail certain terrorist groups, control drug trafficking, promote regional security, and advance our human-rights agenda. We sought common ground through serious dialogue.
Despite many obstacles, tangible goals were reached. Our consultations in Damascus facilitated the end of the tragic Lebanese civil war. Syrian President Hafez Assad responded positively to President Bush and Secretary Baker’s direct request for him to lend Syria’s political and military support to Operation Desert Storm. In a major breakthrough, U.S.-Syrian cooperation on Desert Storm helped to lead to Assad’s agreement to enter into face-to-face negotiations with Israel, which in turn led to the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991.
On the human-rights front, we also made progress. Syrian Jews were granted the same right to freely travel abroad as other Syrian citizens. And in close coordination with the Syrian government in Damascus, American hostages in Lebanon began to be released.
While the historic context is different today than in the early 1990s, the basic rationale for promoting U.S. interests by engaging Syria remains valid. Engagement with Syria would promote peace negotiations between Jerusalem and Damascus. It would also distance Syria from its close relationship with Iran—and thereby reduce Iran’s influence in the Levant.
U.S. dialogue with Syria could lead to diminished support for Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah. It would consolidate Lebanon’s sovereignty. And it could secure the Syria-Iraq border...