Patrick Mercer: British Empire Knew How to Beat the Taliban
[Patrick Mercer served in the Sherwood Foresters before becoming the defence correspondent for the Today programme. His third novel is set in the Second Afghan War of 1878-80.]
The foreign and defence secretaries should take a lesson from history. If they looked into our imperial past they would discover that the first phase of Operation Panther’s Claw was declared complete around the anniversary of the battle of Maiwand — a comprehensive defeat for a British brigade just east of the Helmand river in 1880. The 66th Regiment of Foot took terrible casualties and their successors, the Rifles, are today fighting and dying in their forebears’ footsteps. From that disaster came ultimate success that has many useful parallels for today.
David Miliband’s speech last week about closer engagement with the Taliban sounds superficially daring but such “reconciliation” talks have been under way for some years already. On a visit in 2004, diplomats and soldiers were already voicing their frustrations to me over the direction of such negotiations, for they could see the potential, but also the pitfalls.
Again, there’s nothing new here. In the 1880s, the fanatical Ghazis were peeled away from the more pragmatic tribal leaders by the application of shrewd realpolitik, but then, as now, it was not simple. For instance, exactly with whom do we negotiate today? The Taliban are not one homogenous body and despite his title of supreme leader, Mullah Omar does not speak for the whole movement. His overall aims are far from clear, while a host of rival warlords range across Pakistan’s borders as well as those of Afghanistan, sometimes siding with Hamid Karzai’s government, sometimes not.
And, indeed, what of the president himself? It was his angry intervention that brought secret British talks with the Taliban to a sudden (if temporary) halt in 2007. Karzai plays on a regional and tribal stage that rests as much on the influence of outsiders as it does on his own people.
Fortunately the attitude of the Americans has undergone a revolution. The new commander, General Stanley McChrystal, understands the need to talk to the Taliban and — just like the 1880s — today’s enemy can be tomorrow’s ally. That’s why he is laying such emphasis on the need to avoid civilian casualties; that’s why so many US troops have been poured into Helmand; and that’s why he’s asking for more British soldiers and material to be sent.
And this is the nettle that our foreign and defence secretaries must grasp. The high casualty rate of recent operations has sparked long overdue outrage that has mainly revolved around equipment and aircraft. Certainly, British commanders have been asking for more and better devices to foil IEDs, extra armoured vehicles and helicopters. But while these will help, they are not a cure-all — imagine the reaction when a helicopter with 30 or 40 troops on board is shot down, as happened so many times to the Soviets in the same airspace. No, if the government wishes ultimately to reduce the number of troops in Afghanistan, it must first increase them.
I’ve been in regular contact with men of my former regiment, 2 Mercian, who have been at the heart of the fighting. They talk about having to seize ground and then leave it and of having to retake routes they fought for only days before because there aren’t enough men to hold them. The brigade commander, Tim Radford, has been open about his need for more troops. If this month’s elections are to take place with a minimum of violence, if lasting reconstruction work is to happen, and if local Afghan forces are to be developed (draining the Taliban’s pool of recruits at the same time), then we must have more men.
Again in 1880, against all his instincts, the Liberal prime minister William Gladstone found the situation improved only when he sent extra soldiers across the Helmand river. Ultimately, he was able to withdraw them...
Read entire article at Times (UK)
The foreign and defence secretaries should take a lesson from history. If they looked into our imperial past they would discover that the first phase of Operation Panther’s Claw was declared complete around the anniversary of the battle of Maiwand — a comprehensive defeat for a British brigade just east of the Helmand river in 1880. The 66th Regiment of Foot took terrible casualties and their successors, the Rifles, are today fighting and dying in their forebears’ footsteps. From that disaster came ultimate success that has many useful parallels for today.
David Miliband’s speech last week about closer engagement with the Taliban sounds superficially daring but such “reconciliation” talks have been under way for some years already. On a visit in 2004, diplomats and soldiers were already voicing their frustrations to me over the direction of such negotiations, for they could see the potential, but also the pitfalls.
Again, there’s nothing new here. In the 1880s, the fanatical Ghazis were peeled away from the more pragmatic tribal leaders by the application of shrewd realpolitik, but then, as now, it was not simple. For instance, exactly with whom do we negotiate today? The Taliban are not one homogenous body and despite his title of supreme leader, Mullah Omar does not speak for the whole movement. His overall aims are far from clear, while a host of rival warlords range across Pakistan’s borders as well as those of Afghanistan, sometimes siding with Hamid Karzai’s government, sometimes not.
And, indeed, what of the president himself? It was his angry intervention that brought secret British talks with the Taliban to a sudden (if temporary) halt in 2007. Karzai plays on a regional and tribal stage that rests as much on the influence of outsiders as it does on his own people.
Fortunately the attitude of the Americans has undergone a revolution. The new commander, General Stanley McChrystal, understands the need to talk to the Taliban and — just like the 1880s — today’s enemy can be tomorrow’s ally. That’s why he is laying such emphasis on the need to avoid civilian casualties; that’s why so many US troops have been poured into Helmand; and that’s why he’s asking for more British soldiers and material to be sent.
And this is the nettle that our foreign and defence secretaries must grasp. The high casualty rate of recent operations has sparked long overdue outrage that has mainly revolved around equipment and aircraft. Certainly, British commanders have been asking for more and better devices to foil IEDs, extra armoured vehicles and helicopters. But while these will help, they are not a cure-all — imagine the reaction when a helicopter with 30 or 40 troops on board is shot down, as happened so many times to the Soviets in the same airspace. No, if the government wishes ultimately to reduce the number of troops in Afghanistan, it must first increase them.
I’ve been in regular contact with men of my former regiment, 2 Mercian, who have been at the heart of the fighting. They talk about having to seize ground and then leave it and of having to retake routes they fought for only days before because there aren’t enough men to hold them. The brigade commander, Tim Radford, has been open about his need for more troops. If this month’s elections are to take place with a minimum of violence, if lasting reconstruction work is to happen, and if local Afghan forces are to be developed (draining the Taliban’s pool of recruits at the same time), then we must have more men.
Again in 1880, against all his instincts, the Liberal prime minister William Gladstone found the situation improved only when he sent extra soldiers across the Helmand river. Ultimately, he was able to withdraw them...