Samantha Power Takes the NYT to Task over Its Supposedly Evenhanded Account of the Armenian Massacre
Egregious Examples of Sloppy Thinking Mar Georgia's New History Standards
The Most Important Case Ever Decided by Any Court Began with a Petty Dispute Over a Patronage Job
Historians in Asia Debate the Sino-Japanese War ... But Run into Political Divisions
The Ongoing Whitewash of Israel's Attack on the USS Liberty in 1967
State Department Condemns Israel's Attack on the USS Liberty
Gavin Menzies: What Historians at the AHA Made of His Claim that the Chinese Discovered America
Tempers Flare Over Inquiry on Israeli Attack on U.S. Spy-Ship
Canadian Navy Book to Chronicle Their Role in the War on Terror
How Sherman's March Has Been Used by Southerners to Explain Events
The Modern Western World ... So It Began with the 16th Century Renaissance?
How Major Events of History Can Be Affected by Seemingly Small Decisions
Why The Erection of a Statue to Lincoln in Richmond Caused Such a Storm
Historians in Hong Kong to Debate Role of Catholic Church in the Boxer Rebellion
Never Forgetting What Happened at Wounded Knee December 29, 1890
The Myth of Pavlik Morozov, Stalin's Poster Boy for Patriotism, Unravels
Edward L. Ayers, author of The Presence of Mine Enemies: War in the Heart of America, 1859-1863 and professor of history at the University of Virginia, where he created the Valley of the Shadow Project, writing in Newsday (Jan. 25, 2004):
Unlike any medium before - from books and museums to film and television - the World Wide Web is profoundly changing our relationship to history. Unlike a museum, the Web is open all the time to people everywhere. Unlike a television show, movie or book, it does not tell only one story. Unlike a textbook, it encourages exploration, challenge and dissent.
Most radically, the Web allows every person to be his or her own historian. By giving easy access to a deep set of historical records, people can handle the pieces of the past for themselves. The Web puts diaries, letters, newspapers, censuses, military records, memoirs, photographs and maps into the hands of visitors, letting them go as far into the details of individual lives as they choose.
Everything from the founding of Jamestown to the Civil Rights movement, from the witchcraft trials of Salem to the inventions of Thomas Edison, from the Lewis and Clark Expedition to the history of television news has been opened to this experience. Historians have built large projects on women's lives, on Abraham Lincoln, on Harpers Weekly, on the Mississippi River, on the Great Depression and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, on the histories of Los Angeles and Chicago. Historians constructed an instant archive on the attack of Sept. 11, 2001, chronicling personal responses to tragedy in real time.
In the process, the doors of the historical record are opened. Individuals can wrestle for themselves with some of the great questions of American history, such as what caused the Civil War.
I cite the Civil War not just because that period happens to be my specialty. No part of American history has seen more action on the World Wide Web. Hundreds of sites document every facet of the conflict. The Library of Congress has mounted famous photographs and official documents, while distinctly non-academic sites trumpet their political beliefs under waving flags.
The Valley of the Shadow project, which I originated at the University of Virginia, displays the records of every person in two counties, one in the North and one in the South, throughout the Civil War era. These records cover the lives of blacks as well as whites, females as well as males, deserters as well as heroes. Political, economic and military history is documented alongside the history of emotion, intimacy and death. Thus it is possible for anyone with Internet access to study, for example, what difference slavery made in leading to the Civil War in greater detail and precision than has ever been possible.
This ongoing study is causing us to re-evaluate the conventional story of the war as a conflict between a modern, industrialized North and a backward, agrarian South. This standard interpretation, it turns out, is misleading and evasive.
White Americans found it possible to reconcile slavery with technology, towns, white democracy and profitable business - all considered key aspects of modern life in the mid-19th century. The Civil War was not the inevitable clash of the future against the past, as many of us have been schooled - and might prefer - to believe.
Slaveowners took out insurance policies on the people they claimed as their property. Slaves worked in factories as well as on farms. The Confederacy gathered the confidence to leave the United States, forging a new nation based on slavery, in part because of its network of railroads, newspapers, telegraphs and steamships. The history of the 20th and 21st centuries has shown all too clearly that forms of modern life can easily co-exist with forced labor and racial domination. The American South pioneered in this fusion.
Americans like to think that slavery was merely an accident in our development as a nation, a brief mistake, a wrong turn. But in 1860 slavery already had been established for two centuries. Slavery drove much of the American economy, providing more than half of all the nation's exports. Slavery generated the war against Mexico of 1846-48 and thus the addition of a vast part of our territory. Before the Civil War, slaveholders held the presidency more often than not.
These are uncomfortable facts that contradict our sense of ourselves. But it does no good to ignore them or brush them aside. The point of studying the past is not merely to make us feel good about ourselves, but to let us view ourselves honestly. The Civil War did end up ending slavery, of course. The challenge is to see how that profound good grew out of a war that did not begin with that purpose in mind.
Documents have a way of making that challenge come vividly to life. Already over the past 10 years, we have had millions of hits on the Valley Project Web site - from students in middle and high schools, in community colleges and graduate schools, and from some people who have not been in a classroom for a long time.
Of course, not everyone has the time or the interest to study the primary sources, and the Web does not remove the responsibility of the historian to make sense of the past, any more than government documents on the Web make journalists who interpret them obsolete.
Those who study history carefully have conclusions to make that casual browsers of documents cannot. Historians still need to tell stories that dramatize the most important meanings of the past, as they always have.
Hiroyuki Fuse Yomiuri Shimbun, writing in the Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo) (Jan. 29, 2004):
Through a break in rain clouds, mountains on the Korean Peninsula emerged on the shore. Through my binoculars, I saw a flapping flag placed above the foremast of a large vessel that is sailing along the coast.
Located in the northwest of the Tsushima islands in Nagasaki Prefecture, Mt. Eboshi faces the Korea Strait. From the top of the mountain to the South Korean city of Pusan is only 49.5 kilometers as the crow flies.
Hiroo Takesue, a 59-year-old local historian in Nagasaki Prefecture, said, "I've heard that during the Korean War, the sounds of gunfire could be heard here."
North Korea's nuclear threat increases in realness.
Tsushima, which used to be called Sakimori no Shima (Coast Guards' Island), has had strong links with Russia.
In 1861, shortly before Japan opened to the world, Russian vessels approached Japan demanding territory. A century ago, the Tsushima Strait, located south off the island, became a stage of the decisive Battle of Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).
Sandwiched between the Tsushima Strait and Korea Strait, the location of the Tsushima islands played an important role that Takesue called "a strategic point to protect the nation from foreign enemies coming from the continent."
Julian Corbett (1854-1922), a British naval historian and military theorist in the early 20th century, likened the geopolitical situation in which Japan faced off against the Korean Peninsula to that between Britain on the one hand and the Netherlands and Belgium on the other.
The linkage was mentioned in 1914 in a report that analyzed maritime operations used in the Russo-Japanese War. But the report was publicly unknown until it was published recently in the United States because the British maritime intelligence authorities had treated it as a confidential document.
Corbett said Japan's policy on the Korean Peninsula was similar to British concerns of "securing the control of those intervening waters and particularly with efforts to prevent any great continental power from obtaining a footing on the Dutch or Flemish coasts."
For Japan at that time, "continental power" primarily referred to Russia, Corbett said, describing the war as a battle between Japan, an island nation, and Russia, a continental power.
Corbett also pointed out that "the Korean Peninsula, in the very jaws of the Straits," was difficult to attack with continental operations but easy to defend by maritime action.
An island nation was therefore "an area into which an insular and naval power could expand without...losing the advantages of our insular position," he added.
Further, Corbett argued Japan's advance into the Korean Peninsula was inevitable.
The war was triggered by a struggle for leadership over Korea and Manchuria (presently a northeastern part of China).
Japan feared Russia's southward advance and possible control over the peninsula would threaten its national security.
When Russia launched a forest project on the Yalujiang River, the Japanese government took the initiative in negotiating with the country a year before the outbreak of the war.
Yet Japan opted to wage war as negotiations with Russia came to a deadlock.
Corbett's analysis of the war does not just show that Britain, a partner in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (signed in 1902), had a good understanding of Japan's standpoint. The analysis indicates that geopolitical thinking in which the geographical situation of a nation is linked with security policies was widely accepted among officials of European powers.
Similar thinking was seen among Japanese political leadership.
Shinichi Yamamuro, a professor at Kyoto University, said such a geopolitical idea was presented in a well-known opinion paper --"Gaiko Seinryaku Ron" (A Theory on Diplomatic and Political Tactics) --written in 1890 by Aritomo Yamagata (1838-1922), a statesman and founder of the modern Japanese army. Yamagata is known to have called on Japan to protect not only its sovereignty but also its interests in a bid to assure national security.
According to Yamamuro, the person who first introduced geopolitics systematically to Japan is Manjiro Inagaki, a diplomat who served as an envoy to Spain after studying in Britain.
In his book, "Tohosaku" (Eastern Policy), which was published in about the same period as Yamagata's proposal, Inagaki envisioned for the first time how Japan should develop as a maritime nation and argued the importance of sea lanes connecting north and south, located adjacent to railheads of a rail networt running east and west.
In step with remarkable developments in such areas as transportation, communications, navigation and arms technology, national defense theories were created between the late 19th century and the 20th century. Japanese politicians and military officials held ideas similar to Corbett's maritime strategy and a philosophy of geopolitics derived from the viewpoint of U.S. naval historian Alfred Mahan (1840-1914).
There has been endless dispute over the Russo-Japanese War as some people call it an imperialist war, while others assert it was a defensive war for the homeland.
This year marks the centennial of the outbreak of the war. Taking such an occasion, some people have tried to link the war to the subsequent Pacific War by emphasizing the negative side of Japan's ambition to expand its power into the continent.
But it is rather natural for an island nation like Japan in the early 20th century to have taken a strong interest in securing its national security by expanding its power beyond the straits, fearing the possible influence of a continental power.
The report by Corbett, which was not available to the public for nearly a century, suggests the real picture of the world when such geopolitical thinking was common sense.
To understand how people in Meiji era (1868-1912) overcame national hardship, namely the war with Russia, we have to go back to the spirit of the times.
From a letter to the editor of the NYT:
To the Editor:
"Movie on Armenians Rekindles Flame Over Turkish Past" (Arts pages, Jan. 20) says "Turkish and Armenian historians have given widely differing accounts of what happened in 1915." But that is not a matter of ethnic perspective. The extermination of the Armenians is recognized as genocide by the consensus of scholars of genocide and Holocaust worldwide. The failure to acknowledge this trivializes a human rights crime of enormous magnitude.
The Ottoman Turkish government's meticulously planned extermination of its Christian Armenian citizens took the lives of more than a million Armenians in 1915 and 1916. Another million Armenians survived the death marches but were permanently exiled from their homeland of 2,500 years. It is denigrating to refer to these facts as Armenians being "chased from their ancestral homelands."
It is ironic as well, because in 1915 The New York Times published 145 articles about the Armenian genocide and regularly used the words "systematic," "government planned" and "race extermination."
PETER BALAKIAN
SAMANTHA POWER
Hamilton, N.Y., Jan. 20, 2004
The writers are, respectively, a professor of humanities at Colgate University and a lecturer at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.