Hollywood: We Were Soldiers Once -- But in Which War?





Maurice Isserman is a historian at Hamilton College, and co-author of America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s.

We were soldiers once . . . . but Hollywood isn't sure in which war.

Last Saturday night I went to see a showing of the just-released Vietnam War epic, We Were Soldiers. The film, starring action hero Mel Gibson, and directed and written by"Pearl Harbor" screenwriter Randall Wallace, tells the story of the battle of the Ia Drang Valley, the first significant encounter between American and North Vietnamese soldiers in the Vietnam War. In 48 hours of nearly continuous combat in mid-November 1965 in a rugged border region of South Vietnam, a few hundred Americans managed to hold off an assault by several thousand North Vietnamese. The movie is based on the excellent 1992 memoir/history We Were Soldiers Once and Young, co-authored by retired General Harold G. Moore, who as an army colonel in 1965 commanded the first battalion of the Seventh Cavalry (helicopter-borne or"airmobile" troops) in the battle; his co-author, Joe Galloway, witnessed the bloodshed in the Ia Drang Valley as a young reporter.

For much of the film, the action on screen adheres closely to actual events. The Americans, engaged in a reconnaissance in force that inadvertently stumbled upon a North Vietnamese base camp, defended a helicopter-landing zone about the size of a football field. The fighting was at close quarters, and it was only the determined resistance of the air cavalry troopers, combined with the superior firepower they were able to bring to bear on their attackers, that prevented their small defensive perimeter from being over-run. Director Wallace has said that his motive in making"We Were Soldiers" was to"help heal the wounds" left by the Vietnam War. The courage of the soldiers who fought in the Ia Drang Valley, he declared, would"affirm what's noble and lasting in the human spirit." That is certainly a worthwhile aspiration. Unfortunately, the movie Wallace wound up making turns out to be less about the particularities of the Vietnam War than it is about some idealized, abstracted, and ultimately cynically manipulative fantasy of generic American heroism under fire.

For if the Seventh Cavalry's courage did not falter in fighting the original battle of the Ia Drang Valley, the filmmakers' courage certainly did in retelling that story. In the film's climactic moment, the early morning of the third day of battle, Colonel Moore's men are exhausted, outnumbered and running out of ammunition. It's all too clear that one more determined enemy attack would crack the line. But Colonel Moore/Mel Gibson saves his men and wins the day by ordering the troopers to fix bayonets and charge into the teeth of the coming North Vietnamese assault. As the Americans swept aside their foes and charged to victory and glory, I could feel the elation in the theater.

What kept me from sharing the elation was the knowledge that the events on the screen suddenly had no bearing on the actual historical events they pretended to depict. Automatic weapons and hand grenades rendered massed bayonet assaults in the 20th century about as anachronistic as cavalry charges. The last recorded bayonet assault by American soldiers took place in the Korean War - and even then it was considered a wildly outmoded tactic. And, as anyone who has read Colonel Moore and Joe Galloway's book knows, they make no claim that any such thing took place.

What historical movies are often about is not so much history as other movies. Throughout We Were Soldiers I kept being reminded of the 1993 Turner Entertainment film"Gettysburg." Actor Sam Elliott, who plays a tough and gravelly voiced master sergeant in"We Were Soldiers," had played a tough and gravelly voiced cavalry officer in the earlier film. As a casting choice, Elliot's presence works at a subconscious level, and probably intentionally, to link the two films and the battles they depict in the audience's mind. And, it so happens, the emotional and dramatic center of Turner's movie about the events at Gettysburg, is the bayonet charge led by Union Colonel Joshua Chamberlain that turned back the Confederate assault on Little Round Top on July 2, 1863.

But the Ia Drang Valley was not Little Round Top. Colonel Chamberlain's order to fix bayonets is a legendary moment in American military history, but 102 years later Colonel Moore wisely did not follow Chamberlain's example. Instead, his soldiers did what they were trained to do, which was to hug the terrain and rely upon massed firepower to turn back the enemy. In the Ia Drang battle, the North Vietnamese broke off the assault of their own choice. That was the almost invariable pattern in military engagements that followed in the Vietnam War; the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong chose when, where, and how long to fight. But the filmmakers, finding that historical truth inconvenient, dramatically unsatisfying and insufficiently inspirational, fabricated a new ending.

Does any of this matter? It does, if we want to understand why the Vietnam War turned out as it did. The American commander in South Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, chose to call the encounter in the Ia Drang Valley a great victory. The Americans had indeed racked up an impressive"kill ratio." While the Seventh Cavalry lost 78 men killed, they probably inflicted ten times as many casualties on the enemy. But what the film fails to mention is that the North Vietnamese, having broken off the assault on Colonel Moore's unit, turned around the next day and ambushed a relief column from the second battalion, Seventh Cavalry, killing an additional 155 Americans. It was the ability of the Vietnamese Communists to sustain heavy casualties time and time again, and then return to the attack, that in the end proved far more important in determining the outcome of the war than any supposedly favorable"kill ratio" - or even the undoubted courage displayed by individual American soldiers.

The filmmakers wanted We Were Soldiers to convey the gritty realities of combat in the Vietnam War. But they also wanted to make a commercially viable film. To achieve the latter, they apparently decided to fudge their commitment to the former. Perhaps they felt that audiences needed a rousing scene of Mel Gibson leaping up and charging into the enemy's massed ranks to feel that real heroism was on display. If so, I think they underestimated their audience's intelligence - not the first time that Hollywood has committed that particular sin. If We Were Soldiers was intended to heal some real historical wounds, it is altogether unfortunate that the filmmakers chose to do so by indulging in unreal historical fantasy.

This piece originally appeared in the Utica Observer-Dispatch.



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More Comments:


Tony Howe - 7/31/2006

Don't know if 1st msg. got thru. I've always found it strange that "Joe" would do this! He and I were roommates the last 2-3 weeks of OCS Class 4-65, and I always considered him the most "mild mannered" man I ever knew. Guess the Old Adage you can't judge a Book by it's Cover is true! Wounder what "Mad Mc" would have thought. I always thought of him as more of a "Don Knots" than a "John Wayne". Guess Combat does "Wonderfull things". A much belated Congrats "Joe". Es Roomie Tony


Russell L. Ross - 1/18/2004

In a message dated 1/15/2004 3:23:36 PM Pacific Standard Time,
jgalloway@krwashington.com writes:
like i say russell, if you had anything worth taking i would sue you for libel and slander and take it all. but you don't. only a couple bottles of blue pills which you need to use more regularly.

-----------------
Forwarded Message:
Subj: RE: My web Page is now on the 1st page of Joseph L. GallowayWe Were Soldiers=FICTION
Date: 1/15/2004 3:23:36 PM Pacific Standard Time
From: jgalloway@krwashington.com
To: LZXRAY111765@aol.com
Sent from the Internet (Details)



like i say russell, if you had anything worth taking i would sue you for libel and slander and take it all. but you don't. only a couple bottles of blue pills which you need to use more regularly.

KnightRidder Washington Bureau, Joe Galloway, We Were Soldiers FICTION

KnightRidder's Military Consultant Joe Galloway never served in the Military
In a message dated 1/15/2004 3:23:36 PM Pacific

Standard Time,

jgalloway@krwashington.com writes:
like i say russell, if you had anything worth taking i would sue you for libel and slander and take it all. but you don't. only a couple bottles of blue pills which you need to use more regularly.

Forwarded Message:
Subj: RE: My web Page is now on the 1st page of Joseph L. GallowayWe Were Soldiers=FICTION
Date: 1/15/2004 3:23:36 PM Pacific Standard Time
From: jgalloway@krwashington.com
To: LZXRAY111765@aol.com
Sent from the Internet (Details)



like i say russell, if you had anything worth taking i would sue you for libel and slander and take it all. but you don't. only a couple bottles of blue pills which you need to use more regularly.



Russell L. Ross
1741 Maysong ct
San Jose, CA. 95131-2727
408 926-9336

Below "IF YOU WANT A GOOD FIGHT...." Soldier Of Fortune September 1983 vol.8 no.9 page 22-29.

This is the 2nd Rewrite of We Were Soldiers Once and Young, I,m still looking for the 1st, In the 1st. verson Galloway writes Col. Moore was told to stay out of the mountains. I will pay up to $100.00 or more for that article. It was in Military type Magzine, like Soldier Of Fortune also.
BY JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY KnightRidder's Military Consultant.

JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY, PLAGERIST, LIAR, CONMAN.

JOE GALLOWAY News > Iraq: The Aftermath > Monday, Jan 05, 2004

Joe Galloway






Joe Galloway "Not just Rumsfeld,
but all of his "civilian experts"


Russell L. Ross - 9/24/2003

Wallace "Hal and Joe's landmark book states."

"Hollywood has gotten the story of the Vietnam veteran wrong every damn time, whetting the knives of twisted politics on the bones of our dead brothers."

Wallace "Well this time we mean to get it right."


Wallace "This is not to say that any of us making the film are unconcerned with accuracy."


But Moore, Crandall, Galloway didnt tell the truth, they werent even true to the book,

they Twist the KNIFE in the Back's of the Reinforcements 2/5 2/7 1/5 who were still on X-Ray after the 1/7 lifted out.
LETTER FROM RANDALL WALLACE…….
7 February 2001

To all men who fought in the Ia Drang Valley, November 1965, and their families.

Gentlemen,
As many of you have already heard, we are preparing to make a film version of Hal Moore and Joe Galloway's book WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE...AND YOUNG.

I am the writer of the screenplay for the film, and also the director. Mel Gibson is set to play the lead role as Lt. Col. Moore, and Mel's company, Icon, and mine, The Wheelhouse, are producing the film, in association with Paramount Pictures.

As you can imagine, this is an enormously ambitious undertaking. As the prologue of Hal and Joe's landmark book states, "Hollywood has gotten the story of the Vietnam veteran wrong every damn time, whetting the knives of twisted politics on the bones of our dead brothers."

Well this time we mean to get it right.

Whether we achieve that goal will be judged by many people: a worldwide audience; a collection of film critics; our families and friends; but most of all we will be judged by you whose lives were so personally intertwined with the events of the Ia Drang Valley.

For whatever success we achieve, there will be many people to thank; but blame for however we fall short will rest on my shoulders since I'm the director of the film and the one who first asked Hal and Joe to let me make this movie. I accept this responsibility; I welcome it; I'm deeply proud of their trust, and I hope to earn yours.

Therefore, I want to be up front with all of you. This film is not a documentary. The story of what happened in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965 has been documented in many ways already. What we are making now is a dramatization that sets out to do what those other ways of telling your story could not: to capture the subjective experience of that war. It is not meant to tell the story of each individual, or to capture the same kind of truth a documentary would.

This is not to say that any of us making the film are unconcerned with accuracy. Some of the finest film making talents in the world are involved with this production, and we are going to great length to capture the real experiences of you and your buddies and loved ones. The main difference in our approach and that of other media is that in making feature films, we are out to communicate on an emotional level, to communicate emotional truth. Most stories of Vietnam emphasize tragic dimensions, dimensions which are true. But there is more truth than just the tragedy, and this story celebrates the truth of love, loyalty, and heroism.

To tell the story of all, I must leave out the details of some. The book documents the heroism of many; the movie will focus on a few particular characters, and even those characters will be combinations of traits and actions that existed among many characters.

An example of this is the fact that the movie will focus on LZ X-Ray. The events of LZ Albany, its heroism and its tragedy, are alluded to, but are not the focus of the narrative of this movie. And even within the telling of the events of LZ X-Ray, the heroic acts of so many of you cannot be specifically detailed.

This is not because any of us lack reverence for your courage, or have any desire whatsoever to celebrate some and ignore others. It is simply the only effective way, in my judgment, to make a film that will communicate clearly and most powerfully the greater message that those who fought in Vietnam, and those who fought the emotional wars at home by loving and longing and grieving for those who fought, were heroes.

So that is our goal. From you who have already given so much, I ask more: I ask for your understanding, your faith, and your prayers.

And if you feel over-looked or slighted because your name or your particular acts of heroism are not specifically portrayed in this film, I ask your forgiveness.

But I will take what comes. I am inspired by your example, by you who gave your fullest measure of courage and commitment and have lived by the light of your own example.

I salute you.
Best regards,

Randall Wallace


Russell L. Ross - 9/19/2003

Ural to Moore's After Action Report, No mention of a Bayonet attack.


Medevac Huey's were landing oat X-Ray ont the 14th.

http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/history/aar-xray.pdf

Hollywood: We Were Soldiers Once -- But in Which War?

Subject: Moores's after action rep[ort Dosent say anything about a bayonet charge

Posted By: Russell L. Ross
Date Posted: March 19, 2003, 3:39 AM

This is a PDF file and takes about a minute to load.

Web Page URAL

http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/history/aar-xray.pdf

His FARGO is that of an Infantry Officer using Helicopters as transport, Not that of an AirMobile commander showes he didnt know what he was doing.

Moores after action report

This is a PDF file and takes about a minute to load.

Web Page URAL

http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/history/aar-xray.pdf


http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/7-ff/p040.jpg

Note Moore's uniform, He's not he even dirty after 3 days of fighting
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/7-ff/p038.jpg

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/7-ff/p025.jpg

B company assault the morning of the 16th, Not ever one has Bayonets on the weapone, No enemy present.

Critical information that is missing from Moore's after action report
ural to that web site

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/90-4/chap3.htm


Russell L. Ross - 8/26/2003

MYTH
Lt. Col. Moore received a by-name request from Brig. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnardcommanding general, 11th Air Assault Division (Test), to serve as a battalion commander.

FACT
Col. Moore wrote Kinnard a letter in 1962-63 BEGGING for a Battalion command position in the 11Air Assault ( test ).
Page 16 paperback
Beyond the Ia Drang Valley
November 2002


By Col. Cole C. Kingseed, U.S. Army retired
"The will to win, the will to survive, they endure. They are more important than the events that occasion them." -- Vince Lombardi
In his novel of the Battle of Thermopylae, author Steven Pressfield describes a scene in which Dienekes, a Spartan officer, prepares his men for a battle against a numerically superior army of Persians. Watching Dienekes rally and tend to his men, the narrator identifies the essential role of an officer in combat: to prevent those under his command, at all stages of battle -- before, during and after -- from becoming so overcome by terror or anger that emotion usurps dominion of the mind. "To fire their valor when it flagged and rein in their fury when it threatened to take them out of hand" -- that was Dienekes' job. Two and a half millennia later, a modern Spartan displayed similar attributes of self-restraint and self-composure when Lt. Col. Harold G. (Hal) Moore led the men of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry into the Ia Drang Valley in the Republic of Vietnam in November 1965. Like Dienekes before him, Moore bequeathed a legacy of raw courage and inspirational leadership in war's darkest crucible. By his own admission, Moore is not a hero, but to his men and to a generation of future officers whom he addressed at the U.S. Military Academy, he is the penultimate battle captain. When actor Mel Gibson and his entourage visited West Point in the spring of 2002 to launch the premier of his movie "We Were Soldiers," the greatest applause was reserved not for Gibson, but for Moore, who quietly slipped away unnoticed during the film's battle scenes. Not surprisingly, in a recent survey conducted following one of his visits, the majority of cadets identified Moore as the most inspirational officer in their cadet experience.

To a Long Gray Line accustomed to visits by the Army's most distinguished leaders, why does Moore stand out? The true essence of his popularity within the Corps of Cadets is not limited to his command of American troops in the first pitched battle in the Vietnam War between the U.S. Army and the North Vietnamese Army. Scores of commanders have conducted similar battles and achieved like success. What differentiates Moore from his fellow warriors is his message concerning preparation for battlefield leadership and his own philosophy on the conduct of a leader in battle.

Hal Moore's road to his status as a cadet icon began in the hills of Kentucky in a small town called Bardstown. Born on February 13, 1922, Moore matriculated to West Point by a circuitous path. Unable to secure an appointment before his graduation from high school, Moore left home in February 1940 and traveled to Washington, D.C., where he hoped his chances to secure a congressional appointment would be enhanced. He completed high school at night and attended George Washington University in the evenings for two years. When Congress doubled the size of the Corps of Cadets in 1942 to meet wartime commitments, Moore finally obtained his appointment from a Georgia congressman. The entire process reinforced Moore's belief that the first person you must learn to lead is yourself. Set lofty goals and persist until you achieve them.

Never the best student in the mathematical sciences, Moore struggled, taking refuge in religious activities that further honed his character. His greatest joy in Beast Barracks was firing Expert on the M-1 rifle with the top score in the company. His academic pursuits proved more difficult. In his own words, his first semester at West Point was "an academic trip from hell." Moments of quiet meditation in the Catholic chapel and long hours of study finally paid dividends. As cited in West Point's yearbook, Hal Moore graduated in 1945 under the curtailed curriculum "untouched by the machinations of the T.D. [Tactical Department] and Academic Departments."

Not surprising to anyone who knew him well, Moore selected Infantry as his branch and joined the 187th Airborne Regiment in Sendai, Japan. The summer of 1948 found 1st Lt. Moore at Fort Bragg, N.C., where he jump-tested experimental parachutes and other airborne gear. By his own calculation, he made upwards of 150 test jumps over the course of the next three years. On his first test jump, however, the parachute hung on the tail of a C-46 and Moore was dragged behind the plane, at 110 miles per hour, 1,500 feet above the drop zone before he could cut it off and use his reserve. The ability to take a few seconds to think under such hazardous conditions would become a hallmark of Moore's character for the remainder of his military career. The years at Bragg also marked Moore as a quiet professional unfazed by challenges.

In June 1952, Moore, now a husband and father of two children, deployed to Korea. Over the course of the next 14 months, he commanded a rifle company and heavy mortar company in the 17th Infantry, 7th Infantry Division, seeing action in the battles of attrition on Pork Chop Hill, T-Bone, Alligator Jaws and Charlie Outpost. By now Moore was a battle-tested commander. When the armistice was signed in July 1953, he reported to the U.S. Military Academy to teach infantry tactics to aspiring officers. The post-Korean War army also brought Moore to the Pentagon, where he served with distinction in the Air Mobility Division in the office of the Chief of Research and Development, in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.

Following graduation from the Naval War College in June 1964, Lt. Col. Moore received a by-name request from Brig. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard, commanding general, 11th Air Assault Division (Test), to serve as a battalion commander. Redesignated the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in July 1965, the division deployed to South Vietnam's Central Highlands in response to Lyndon Johnson's escalation of the war. It was in that capacity that Moore's 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry fought the first major pitched battle with the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) at Landing Zone X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965.

Moore's conduct of the battle is well chronicled in his and Joe Galloway's We Were Soldiers Once. . . and Young and needs little elaboration here. Suffice it to say that the success of Moore's soldiers in repelling the attack of a well-disciplined enemy force five times their own size was the result of Moore's battlefield leadership and the indomitable spirit of his men. Moore was first off the lead helicopter and the last soldier to leave the battlefield three days later. Putting everything he had learned at West Point and 20 years of leadership in battle into the action, Moore inflicted over 600 dead on the enemy at a cost of 79 killed and 121 wounded. True to his word, he brought out every one of his troopers. In fact throughout his 32-year career, Hal Moore never abandoned an American soldier on the battlefield.

Following the Ia Drang Battle, Moore was promoted to command the 1st Cavalry Division's 3rd Brigade that saw action on the Bong Son Plain in January 1966. Subsequent tours of duty included service with the International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense; commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division in Korea, and then commanding general of Fort Ord, Calif. Moore ended his career as deputy chief of staff for personnel. When he retired in 1977, he became an executive vice president of the company that developed the ski area at Crested Butte, Colo. Four years later he formed a computer software company. Now in retirement, Moore spends his time with his wife Julie and their family in their homes in Crested Butte, Colo., and Auburn, Ala.

Moore's achievements in a career spanning three decades are legendary. First in his West Point class to be promoted to one, two and three stars, Moore received accelerated promotions on six occasions. Recipient of the Purple Heart and seven awards for battlefield valor, including the Distinguished Service Cross, Moore never lost a man as prisoner or missing in action, which brings us back to West Point and why the Corps of Cadets holds Moore in such high esteem.

On the 25th anniversary of the fall of Saigon, Gen. Moore returned to his alma mater at the invitation of the Department of History to address the Corps of Cadets on battlefield leadership during the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley. Following a brief narration of the battle, Moore got to the main purpose of his visit: the preparation of American soldiers for combat. Cadet time is carefully regimented, but 200 of the 1,000 cadets remained one hour beyond the scheduled lecture to hear the old warrior's remarks. For an additional hour, Moore captivated his audience, dividing his comments between a leader's preparations for battlefield leadership and his own philosophy on the conduct of a leader in battle.

In preparing America's sons and daughters for combat, Gen. Moore directed the cadets to read military history, particularly small unit actions. The personality of a big battle is often formed by a small unit action. During the Ia Drang Battle, for example, much of Moore's efforts were directed at rescuing an isolated platoon of one of his companies. In addition to Steven Pressfield's Gates of Fire, Moore cited Stephen E. Ambrose's Band of Brothers and Ian Knight's books on the defense of Rorke's Drift during the Zulu Wars of 1879. Both books have appeared on the Army Chief of Staff's recommended reading list.

Second, Moore urged cadets to visit historic battlefields with maps, books and narratives from actual participants to understand the intricacies of battles and campaigns. The staff ride concept was pioneered by Capt. Arthur L. Wagner at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., at the turn of the 20th century and emerged as a vital component of officer professional development for more than a hundred years. Today most commanders incorporate some aspect of the staff ride in their training to enhance unit morale and to determine how and why key leaders made their decisions under hazardous conditions. Moore himself recently returned from the Normandy battlefields where he contemplated the decisions by the senior Allied commanders.

Next Moore stressed the necessity of installing the will to win in one's command. He was adamant that commanders should not place any second place trophies in the unit. "Focus on winning, being first," and the soldiers will respond more rapidly. His remarks were reminiscent of former Green Bay Packer coach Vince Lombardi who demanded a commitment to excellence and victory above all else. To Lombardi the greatest joy in life was to give one's last ounce of strength and to lie exhausted in victory.

Fourth, Moore concentrated on building unit discipline and teamwork. When he commanded Fort Ord in 1971, Moore instituted bayonet and pugil stick training, hand-to-hand combat training, confidence and close combat courses, field marches and rappelling to improve morale and prepare his soldiers for combat. Such combat-enhancing courses resulted in a "family of warriors," much the same as his 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry in the Ia Drang Valley. Only by installing "layer after layer after layer of personal discipline on one's troops" will units "stand tall, hang in, and stay alive when the going gets tough."

Fifth, Moore urged the cadets to prepare their commands for their own death and that of their subordinate leaders. Squad leaders must be ready to assume command of a platoon and a company.

To illustrate his point, Moore remembered on the first day of the Ia Drang fight, one of Bravo Company's platoons lost every officer and noncommissioned officer save one. Faced with overwhelming pressure from the North Vietnamese Army, Sgt. Ernie Savage, the fourth man to inherit Lt. Henry Herrick's Lost Platoon, called indirect fire upon his own position. His action saved the remainder of the platoon, which had suffered nine dead and 13 wounded in the first 90 minutes of combat.

Not only must platoon leaders train squad and fire team leaders to adjust artillery and mortar fire, but leaders at all levels must prepare for wounded men yelling for "Medic" or "Mom." In battle, leaders must divorce themselves from the sounds of combat and concentrate on making clear, logical decisions.

Gen. Moore concluded his comments on preparation for battlefield leadership by reminding the cadets that mission accomplishment comes first, then care of their soldiers. The easiest part is responding to the soldiers' personal needs -- food, water, mail and information on what is going on.
The more important steps are developing stressful realistic training, rigorous physical conditioning and "stern, fair and square discipline."

With respect to his own battalion, Moore's pre-combat training inculcated the Spartan qualities of self-denial, discipline and sacrifice into the troopers who deployed to Vietnam in 1965.

Treated right, Moore said, the least PFC is capable of acts of valor and sacrifice that are breathtaking. One only has to return to the Ia Drang to confirm Moore's theory. Two cavalry troopers, Russell Adams and Bill Beck, manned an M-60 machine gun and with another crew, they protected Alpha Company's left flank during the opening stages of the battle. When Adams suffered a debilitating wound, it fell to assistant gunner Beck to maintain a withering fire on the enemy, now within 30 yards of his position. Moore later recalled that when Spc. 4 Beck's company and his country needed him most, Beck rose to the occasion and answered the call.

Gen. Moore summarized his remarks on battlefield preparation by reminding the cadets to "live each of your troop duty days to the fullest." No one ever wrote a book about the joy and delights of being a staff officer, stated Moore, so "spend time with your soldiers. Talk with them. Never ever abuse them by act of omission. They are the secret to successful command on or off the battlefield." Again his words are reminiscent of the Spartan warrior who described his king Leonidas as a monarch "who did not command his men's loyalty through fear nor purchase it with gold, rather he earned their respect by the sweat of his own back and the pains he endured for their sake."

Turning his attention to conduct in battle, Moore next outlined four basic principles to govern ground combat. First, "Three strikes and you are not out!" A commander has two alternatives in battle. He can either contaminate his environment and his unit with his attitude and actions, or inspire confidence. To inspire confidence a leader must be visible on the battlefield and must be in the battle. Moore cautioned cadets to possess and display the will to win by one's actions, one's words, one's tone of voice on the radio, and face to face.

Moreover, a commander must display quiet confidence and display no fear, ignoring "the noise, dust, smoke, thirst, explosions, screams of wounded, the yells, the dead lying around him." Such chaos is normal in battle, not the exception. Battle by its nature is chaotic. Good commanders strive to make battle organized chaos, rather than disorganized carnage. In Ia Drang, Moore's lead helicopter pilot, Maj. Bruce Crandall, remembered Moore as "always making the right decision, always fully aware of the situation."

Second, "There's always one more thing you can do to influence any situation in your favor -- and after that one more thing -- and after that one more thing." Taking a few seconds to separate one's self mentally from the battle, Moore repeatedly asked himself, "What am I doing that I should not be doing? And what am I not doing that I should be doing to influence the situation in my favor?" These quiet seconds of reflection allowed Moore to enter a "zone" in which opportunities rapidly crystallized. By refusing to surrender the tactical initiative to the enemy, Moore dictated the course of the battle to the best of his ability, directing arriving units to the most dangerous portions of the battlefield, often minutes before the enemy attacked.

The third principle is "When there's nothing wrong, there is nothing wrong except there's nothing wrong!" That was exactly when a leader must be most alert. On the morning of the battle's second day, Moore noticed that things were too quiet, not even the birds were singing. Something in his gut told him that something was wrong, so he directed each company to send out patrols. Within minutes these patrols intercepted the enemy as the NVA moved into position to assault Moore's beleaguered troopers. The Americans repelled the attack, inflicting massive casualties on the enemy.

Last, Moore urged the cadets to trust their instincts. In a rapidly developing battle, one's instincts amount to an instant estimate of the situation. There is no time to conduct a detailed commander's estimate by the book and to make a matrix of alternative courses of action. An officer's instincts are the product of education, training, reading, personality and experience according to Moore. Leaders must act fast and impart confidence. Don't second guess decisions. Face up to the facts, deal with them and move on to the next situation. In the Ia Drang's opening minutes, Moore's instincts told him that the enemy commander was likely to strike on his left flank, heading for the clearing that marked the landing zone. As soon as Moore's Charlie Company arrived on the landing zone, he directed them to take position on Alpha Company's left, taking the risk of leaving his own rear unguarded from the north and east. They arrived just as the NVA launched an attack.

Moore concluded his remarks by stressing the bond that exists between a commander and his soldiers. When one cadet inquired about the feeling of comrades in arm, Moore's eyes welled with tears and he said, "When your men die and you don't, you feel guilty. That's all I can say about it." Today 37 years after the Battle in the Ia Drang Valley, Moore makes annual pilgrimages to the cemetery at Fort Benning, Ga., where several of his troopers are interred, and to the Vietnam Veterans War Memorial in Washington, D.C. In the wake of the tragedy of September 11, the old commander, now in his 80th year, paid his respects to Rick Rescorla, a former lieutenant who died in the destruction of the World Trade Center.

How was Moore received by West Point's Corps of Cadets? A random sample of unedited comments tells the story. "The most important part of Gen. Moore's lecture was the advice on how people should lead," noted one cadet. Another said, "The single most noteworthy accomplishment was being able to keep his cool and composure while on the verge of being overrun. ... He inspired me to always remain optimistic, even when things look bad." Yet another remarked, "I was hanging on every word. It was the best lecture I have ever heard at West Point. ... I would have stayed and listened to him all night if that were possible."

Perhaps the most touching comment came from a first class cadet who said Moore's presentation was the "best, most down-to-earth lecture I have ever experienced. It made me feel proud becoming an officer and entering into the Army as a profession. His words are inspirational and his experiences are a model of admiration. I wish I would have gone Infantry."

How many other cadets Moore inspired to select Infantry as a branch is speculative, but the general consensus that April evening was that listening to Hal Moore made these cadets better future commanders. Listening to Moore could make one a better officer and possibly a better person.

One final observation. In the audience the night Moore addressed the Corps was New York Times reporter John Kifver, who asked Moore if his comments were on the record. "All my comments are for the record," Moore replied, "Feel free to publish anything you desire." In the subsequent column that graced the front page of the Times, Kifver described Moore as a "courtly old warrior."

In the final analysis, Moore typifies the finest attributes of the U.S. Army's officer corps and West Point's motto of "Duty, Honor, Country."

His mantra for years has been and continues to be "hate war, love the American warrior." As heroic and inspirational as his battlefield leadership was in countless battles in two foreign wars, however, Moore's greatest legacy remains the preparation of future officers to lead America's finest soldiers into battle. That is why he is cherished by officers and soldiers alike.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

COL. COLE C. KINGSEED, USA Ret., Ph.D., a former professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy, is a writer and consultant.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Copyright © 2003 by The Association of the U.S. Army


Thomas Lee - 8/25/2003

MR. Summers;

I APPRECIATE YOUR CORRECTIONS OF THE MOVIE, ITS PEOPLE LIKE YOU, THAT STEP IN AND TRY TO STRAIGHTEN THE STORY THAT I MISS, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WOULD RATHER BE LIED TO THAT GET THE STORY STRAIGHT! YOU WOULDN'T HAPPEN TO KNOW WHERE I COULD GET A COPY
OF THE BOOK LES GUERRES EN INDOCHINE THAT WAS IN THE MOVIE.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Tommy


Russell L. Ross - 8/12/2003

Galloway and Friend stealing a huey to fly to Plei Me SF Camp. Was under siege by a regiment of North Vietnamese regulars.

Now I know I am among close friends......

I know that old Ray Burns from Ganado, Texas, is here.....

and I have got to tell you a story about me and Ray that goes back to October of 1965.

Plei Me SF Camp was under siege by a regiment of North Vietnamese regulars.

I was trying to get in there.....like a fool......

but after an A1E and a B57 Canberra and one Huey had been shot down

they declared it a No-Fly Zone.

So I was stomping up and down the flight line at Holloway cussing......when I ran across Ray.

He asked what the problem was and I told him.

He allowed as how he had been wanting to get a look at that situation and would give me a ride......

I still have a picture I shot out the open door of Ray's Huey.

We are doing a kind of corkscrew descent and the triangular berms and wire of the camp below fill that doorway.....along with the puffs of smoke from the impacting mortar rounds inside the camp. Hell.....I can scare myself bad just looking at that photo.



Remarks prepared for delivery Monday July 3, 2000, at the Vietnam
Helicopter Pilots Association dinner and reunion in Washington, D.C.

by: Joe Galloway, coauthor of We Were Soldiers Once and Young.



Thank you Goldie for that introduction......and thanks to all of you for giving me the honor to speaking to you. I have got to tell you that looking out across this assemblage I must confess: I haven't seen this many bad boys collected in one location since the last time I visited Leavenworth Prison.

When I first learned that I would be doing this gig I asked an aviator buddy of mine what else I needed to know......and he said, well, most of you would be bringing your wives along.......that half of you were so damn deaf that you couldn't hear a word of what I was saying.....the other half would be so damn drunk you couldn't understand what I was saying.....so I might just as well talk To the ladies......

I have waited years to be able to share this story with so august a group of aviator veterans as this: A few years ago I was at a large official dinner and I was seated next to a nice lady who was the wife of a two-star general. I knew the lady had two college-age daughters and I also knew that one of them had been dating a Cavalry lieutenant.......so I thought to make some polite conversation and I offered her my condolences at her daughter's choice of companionship. "Oh No!" the general's wife said. "He is a fine young man. Nothing wrong with him......and at least he isn't a goddam aviator!"

I just wanted you to know that your successors in the bizness continue to win friends and influence people in high places. Before I go along any further in this thing I need to ask you some questions:

--Is there anyone here who flew with the 1st Cavalry Division? The 229th? The 227th? How about the old 119th out of Holloway? Any Marine pilots who flew them old CH-34 Shuddering Shithouses??? Now I know I am among close friends......I know that old Ray Burns from Ganado, Texas, is here.....and I have got to tell you a story about me and Ray that goes back to October of 1965. Plei Me SF Camp was under siege by a regiment of North Vietnamese regulars. I was trying to get in there.....like a fool......but after an A1E and a B57 Canberra and one Huey had been shot down they declared it a No-Fly Zone. So I was stomping up and down the flight line at Holloway cussing......when I ran across Ray. He asked what the problem was and I told him. He allowed as how he had been wanting to get a look at that situation and would give me a ride......I still have a picture I shot out the open door of Ray's Huey. We are doing a kind of corkscrew descent and the triangular berms and wire of the camp below fill that doorway.....along with the puffs of smoke from the impacting mortar rounds inside the camp. Hell.....I can scare myself bad just looking at that photo.

Well old Ray drops on in and I jump out....and the Yards boil out of the trenches and toss a bunch of wounded in the door and Ray is pulling pitch.....grinning......and giving me the bird. When the noise is gone this sergeant major runs up: Sir, I don't know who you are but Major Beckwith wants to see you right away. I ask which one is the major and I am informed he is the very big guy over there jumping up and down on his hat. I go over slowly. The dialogue goes something like this: Who the hell are you? A reporter. Son, I need everything in the goddam world from food and ammo to water....to medevac......to reinforcements.....and I wouldn't mind a bottle of Jim Beam.......but what I do not need is a goddam reporter. And what has the Army in its wisdom delivered to me? Well....I got news for you.....you ain't a reporter no more; you are my new corner machine gunner."

Ray.....I want to thank you for that ride.......wasn't for you and Chuck Oualline I wouldn't have had half as much fun in Vietnam.

Hell.....every story anyone has about Vietnam starts and ends with a helicopter......you guys were simply fantastic. Thank you all. Thank you for every thing....large and small.

Now I guess I got to get down to bizness. All of you know that I have spent most of the last forty years hanging out with the Infantry.....a choice some folks view as perverse if not totally insane. But there was always method in my madness: With the Infantry things happen close enough that I can see what's happening.....and slowly enough most times that even I can understand what I'm seeing.

There's just this one little downside to my long experience with the Infantry:

During that time I have personally been bombed.....rocketed.....strafed.....and napalmed by the U.S. Air Force.....U.S. Navy......U.S. Marines.....and U.S. Army Aviation......as well as by the air forces of South Vietnam.....Laos......Sri Lanka......India......and Pakistan.

Now I don't consider myself an inconsiderable target.....and wasn't even back when I could fit comfortably behind a palm tree......but here I am....running my mouth.....nothing hurt beyond my dignity. Don't get me wrong; I don't hold any grudges against those gallant winged warriors. But ever since the first time they attacked me and missed.....I have never ever used the words "surgical bombing strike" in any story I ever wrote.

I had the chance to say some good things about all of you at the Memorial Service at The Wall on Sunday. I meant every word of that.....and more. You chopper guys were our heroes in Vietnam. You were our rides....but you were much much more than that. We were always either cussing you for hauling our butts into deep kimchi.....or ready to kiss you for hauling us out of it. I have a feeling that without you and your birds that would have been a much shorter and far more brutish war.

You were our heroes, though, first last and always. You saved us from having to walk to work every day. You brought in our food and ammo and water.....and sometimes even a marmite can full of hot chow. To this day I think the finest meal I ever ate was a canteen cup full of hot split pea soup that a Huey delivered to a hilltop in the dry paddies of the Bong Son Plain in January of 1966. For a moment there I thought if the Army could get a hot meal out to an Infantry company on patrol maybe.....just maybe.....we could win the damn war. Oh well.

I think often of all that you did for us.....all that you meant to us: You came for our wounded. You came to get our dead brothers. You came....when the fight was over.....to give us a ride home from hell. There isn't a former Grunt alive who doesn't freeze for a moment and feel the hair rise on the back of his neck when he hears the whup whup whup of those helicopter blades.

What I want to say now is just between us.....because America still doesn't get it.....still doesn't know the truth, and the truth is: You are the cream of the crop of our generation.....the best and finest of an entire generation of Americans. You are the ones who answered when you were called to serve.....You are the ones who fought bravely and endured a terrible war in a terrible place.

You are the ones for whom the words duty.....honor.....country have real meaning because you have lived those words and the meaning behind those words. You are my brothers in arms....and I am not ashamed to say that I love you. I would not trade one of you for a whole trainload of instant Canadians.....or a whole boatload of Rhodes Scholars bound for England......or a whole campus full of guys who turned up for their draft physicals wearing panty hose.

On behalf of a country that too easily forgets the true cost of war.....and who pays that price....I say Thank you for your service! On behalf of the people of our country who didn't have good sense enough to separate the war they hated from the young warriors they sent to fight that war.....I say we are sorry. We owe you all a very large apology.....and a debt of gratitude that we can never adequately repay. For myself and all my buddies in the Infantry I say:

Thanks for all the rides in and out....especially the rides out.

It is great to see you all gathered here for this reunion. A friend of mine, Mike Norman, a former Marine grunt....wrote a wonderful book called "These Good Men" about his quest to find and reunite with all the survivors of his platoon from Vietnam. He thought long and deep about why we gather as we have done this evening and he explained it thusly:

I now know why men who have been to war yearn to reunite. Not to tell stories or look at old pictures. Not to laugh or weep. Comrades gather because they long to be with the men who once acted their best.....men who suffered and sacrificed.....who were stripped raw......right down to their humanity.

I did not pick these men. They were delivered by fate and the military. But I know them in a way I know no other men. I have never given anyone such trust. They were willing to guard something more precious than my life. They would have carried my reputation.....the memory of me. It was part of the bargain we all made.....the reason we were so willing to die for one another.

As long as I have memory I will think of them all.....every day. I am sure that when I leave this world....my last thought will be of my family and my comrades.......such good men. I'm going to shut up now and let us all get down to the real business of drinking and lying.....er.....telling war stories.

Thank you. I salute you. I remember you. I will teach my sons the stories and legends about you. And I will warn my daughters never ever to go out with aviators......

Good evening. God bless......

postamble();







BILLY M. BROWN - 7/28/2003

This whole obscession of yours with Joe Galloway and Hal Moore seems somewhat bizarre to me. First I am a Veteran of Vietnam, having served in 1968-69. I was not an infantryman. In fact, I was in the rear with the beer.

Movies have always taken liberties, call it literary license. So any comments about what was depicted in the movie will fall on deaf ears. I.E. there is a scene of a helicopter going down and the pilot being killed. I could find no such reference in any of the materials and research I have done. So that was literary license. So anything depicted in the movie is done for sensationalism and for the interest of time. Movies run less than 2 hours, so characters and events are combined. Such a comment is made at the end of the movie in the credits sectin, the so called "disclaimer."

What I have a little difficulty with is that your resume shows that you were a Sp4 at the time of X-ray. That means that you were most likely a rifleman, a 11B20 or a mortarman 11C20. That tells me that you were not in any position of leadership at that time. It all sounds like sour grapes, to me. Apparently there has to be some rife between McDade and Moore, that is obvious. However, Moore apparently either kissed the right ass and alot of it, or he was recognized by his peers for a lot of stuff he did right. He rose to the rank of LtGeneral, no small feat. It is the age old story, you are preaching to the choir. No one will believe a SP/4 over a LTC, especially 38 years later, when that LTC retired with three stars. I am just wondering what is your real gripe. The book told a wonderful story and honored every one. I saw no dishonor in it, anywhere.

I worked around officers the whole time I was in the military and I know the jealousy that prevails among LTC's, it is where you make it or you are told to leave.

I met David Hackworth, in 1968 in Vietnam, then an LTC and already a legend. He was an asshole, yet he was a soldier, first and foremost. Hackworth liked to blow his own horn, then and now. Yet, He has a lot more credibility than me who only reached the rank of SSG and never served in hot combat. So find a cause that gives you honor and not one that makes a layman wonder exactly what are your motives.

When someone made a comment that Rescola was a member of Moore's battalion, for those two or three days, he was. It is called "being attached" and technically Rescola was thus a member of his battalion. So don't get hung up with words, you miss the big picture.


Russell L. Ross - 6/27/2003

Harold G. MOORE and Joseph L. Galloway " THe Book and Movie are

85% historical fact and

15% dramatic embellishment."


Russell L. Ross - 6/27/2003

Subj: GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERSOne lieutenant in Hal’s battalion Rick Rescorla
Date: 6/16/2003 10:04:34 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: john_mccain@mccain.senate.gov

Any time Moore, Galloway or the VFW are ready to Back up their FICTION in a court of Law, Im Ready

Galloway didnt save Jimmy either.

MYTH
One of the lieutenants in Hal’s battalion in Vietnam was a tough British immigrant named Rick Rescorla.

FACT
A photo of Rick is on the cover of the book, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young.
===============
FACT
Rick belonged to the Renforceing Battallion 2/7th Lt.Col. McDade not Lt. Col. Moore's 1/7th.
===============
Moore didnt know who he was till he landed at X=Ray on the 14th.

Moore sits there and takes credit fror training Rick.

MYERS
"What the world witnessed with Rick was what Hal Moore instilled in his people."

MYERS

"One of the lieutenants in Hal’s battalion in Vietnam was a tough British immigrant named Rick Rescorla. A photo of Rick is on the cover of the book, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young."

GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Introduction of Lt. Gen. Harold Moore, U.S. Army (retired)

Recipient of USO Patriot Award

USO of Metropolitan Washington’s 20th Annual Awards Dinner

Ritz-Carlton, Pentagon City, Arlington, VA

April 9, 2003

Thank you very much. It’s been a real privilege. Secretary Principi, other distinguished guests here tonight, ladies and gentlemen and supporters of the USO.

It’s my great honor and pleasure to introduce the recipient of this year’s Patriot Award–Lt. Gen. Hal Moore.

You all know him, although many of you before tonight may have been under the impression that he looked exactly like Mel Gibson. [laughter] The one difference that I understand is true, is that between the two of them, General Moore never wore a kilt into combat. [laughter]

What we do know is that General Hal Moore had an exceptional Army career. He began as a West Point cadet during World War II, and finished in 1977 as the Army’s chief of personnel.

General Moore is also known for his extraordinary book, written with Joe Galloway. In my view, we have no better role model today for "embedded" reporters than the relationship between Hal Moore and Joe Galloway.

Hal’s instructions to Joe and all reporters covering stories involving his battalion and later, his brigade, in Vietnam were simple: "Don’t interfere with operations. And don’t publish anything that would alert the enemy and put our troops at risk." That’s it. Other than that, the story was theirs to tell.

Some have criticized today’s embedded reporters as being too close to the troops to be objective. I, for one, think that they’re calling it as they see it–the reporters, that is. It’s simply that they realize that they’re around some real heroes. [applause]

Hal Moore is one of those heroes. And even before the book, his actions at Ia Drang Valley and his intense preparation before that famous battle were used as a study in leadership–in how selfless dedication serves as an inspiration.

Hal Moore is in fact more than just one of those heroes. He is also the outstanding example of a combat commander. When Hal was a lieutenant, The Infantry Journal published an article that declared: "No man is a leader until his appointment is ratified in the minds and hearts of his men." I can tell you that the troops commanded by Hal Moore ratified him as the best. And his leadership shaped many future leaders–in ways you wouldn’t expect.
=======================

One of the lieutenants in Hal’s battalion in Vietnam was a tough British immigrant named Rick Rescorla. A photo of Rick is on the cover of the book, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young.

Rick went on to become the head of security at Morgan Stanley. It was the largest company in the South Tower of the World Trade Center, with 2,700 employees. On September 11th, 2001, Rick was the calming presence on that chaotic day. He made sure that all but six Morgan Stanley employees made it out. And he wasn’t finished. Rick was last seen alive heading back up the stairs to get more people out.

What the world witnessed with Rick was what Hal Moore instilled in his people.
=========================
Hal will tell you that what he would most like to be remembered for is that during all his years in combat, he never left anyone behind.

Hal’s example inspired Rick Rescorla almost two years ago. It probably also inspired our Special Operations troops, Marines and all the others in the rescue you probably all heard about and saw some of–the rescue of Jessica Lynch.

Once the teams finished rescuing Private First Class Lynch, they also found a shallow grave with bodies in it. So they dug, with their bare hands, through hard-packed desert sand to get the bodies. And with their dirty and bloodied hands, they cradled their comrades in their arms and brought them home.

That’s part of the legacy of General Hal Moore, and that legacy will continue to inspire this nation.

Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming an inspiration to yesterday’s, today’s and tomorrow’s armed forces’ leaders: Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore.

Did any Vietnam Veteran see this part.

.."Oh, it was their country -&- we were invading them"...

...MEL GIBSON, NBC ..''Today''.. 2/25/02.

We Were Soldiers
Posted by Anonymous on 2002-02-26 11:14:52
My Score:

Mel Gibson to Ann Curry TODAY show feb 25

Mel Gibson " IT WAS THEIR COUNTRY, WE INVADED THEM".

ALOHA RONNIE
Has No Life

Joined: 05 Sep 2001 03:26 am
Posts: 638
From: RONNIE GUYER

Posted: 26 Feb 2002 09:42 pm Post subject: nbc today feb 25 Gibson ouote

NEVER FORGET

.."Oh, it was their country -&- we were invading them"...

...MEL GIBSON, NBC ..''Today''.. 2/25/02.

...If it were not for MEL GIBSON and his ..''BRAVEHEART''.. Group... America would NEVER know about the Heroism of Many in the -Valley of Death- that was the IA DRANG-1965.

..''WE WERE SOLDIERS''.. steers pretty clear of Politics and focuses on the Bravehearts of America of long ago as the example they really are for US to now follow in a new -Time of War- in a New Century with an Enemy that is now Within BIG TIME.

...MEL GIBSON is welcome to his own opinion or slip of the tongue thru a process a multitude TV Interviews.

...His Actions speak volumes to US on the Silver Screen ...ALL FOR THE BETTER.

Signed:..ALOHA RONNIE Guyer / Vet-Battle of IA DRANG-1965 / Landing Zone Falcon / http://www.LzXray.com

NEVER FORGET
...Vet/Battle of IA DRANG-1965, U.S. 7th Air Cav S-1 Personnel Clerk, Landing Zone Falcon - Lt. Col. HAL G. MOORE''s Radioman/Dri


Russell L. Ross - 6/19/2003

Subj: More MYTH's of LZ-X-Ray, GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, MOORE TAKES CREDIT
Date: 6/19/2003 2:21:49 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: Secretary@state.gov

Subj: More MYTH's of LZ-X-Ray, GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, MOORE TAKES CREDIT
Date: 6/19/2003 2:19:20 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: president@whitehouse.gov

Moore sits there and takes >credit for training Rick Rescorla


Russell L. Ross - 6/19/2003

Subj: More MYTH's of LZ-X-Ray, GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, MOORE TAKES CREDIT
Date: 6/19/2003 2:21:49 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: Secretary@state.gov

Subj: More MYTH's of LZ-X-Ray, GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, MOORE TAKES CREDIT
Date: 6/19/2003 2:19:20 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: president@whitehouse.gov

Moore sits there and takes >credit for training Rick Rescorla


Russell L. Ross - 6/17/2003

Subj: GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERSOne lieutenant in Hal’s battalion Rick Rescorla
Date: 6/16/2003 10:04:34 PM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: john_mccain@mccain.senate.gov

MYTH
One of the lieutenants in Hal’s battalion in Vietnam was a tough British immigrant named Rick Rescorla. A photo of Rick is on the cover of the book, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young.
===============
FACT
Rick belonged to the Renforceing Battallion, 2/7th Lt.Col. McDade not Lt. Col. Moore's 1/7th.
===============
Myers
"What the world witnessed with Rick was what Hal Moore instilled in his people".


MYERS

"One of the lieutenants in Hal’s battalion in Vietnam was a tough British immigrant named Rick Rescorla. A photo of Rick is on the cover of the book, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young."






GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Introduction of Lt. Gen. Harold Moore, U.S. Army (retired)

Recipient of USO Patriot Award

USO of Metropolitan Washington’s 20th Annual Awards Dinner

Ritz-Carlton, Pentagon City, Arlington, VA

April 9, 2003









Thank you very much. It’s been a real privilege. Secretary Principi, other distinguished guests here tonight, ladies and gentlemen and supporters of the USO.

It’s my great honor and pleasure to introduce the recipient of this year’s Patriot Award–Lt. Gen. Hal Moore.

You all know him, although many of you before tonight may have been under the impression that he looked exactly like Mel Gibson. [laughter] The one difference that I understand is true, is that between the two of them, General Moore never wore a kilt into combat. [laughter]

What we do know is that General Hal Moore had an exceptional Army career. He began as a West Point cadet during World War II, and finished in 1977 as the Army’s chief of personnel.

General Moore is also known for his extraordinary book, written with Joe Galloway. In my view, we have no better role model today for "embedded" reporters than the relationship between Hal Moore and Joe Galloway.

Hal’s instructions to Joe and all reporters covering stories involving his battalion and later, his brigade, in Vietnam were simple: "Don’t interfere with operations. And don’t publish anything that would alert the enemy and put our troops at risk." That’s it. Other than that, the story was theirs to tell.

Some have criticized today’s embedded reporters as being too close to the troops to be objective. I, for one, think that they’re calling it as they see it–the reporters, that is. It’s simply that they realize that they’re around some real heroes. [applause]

Hal Moore is one of those heroes. And even before the book, his actions at Ia Drang Valley and his intense preparation before that famous battle were used as a study in leadership–in how selfless dedication serves as an inspiration.

Hal Moore is in fact more than just one of those heroes. He is also the outstanding example of a combat commander. When Hal was a lieutenant, The Infantry Journal published an article that declared: "No man is a leader until his appointment is ratified in the minds and hearts of his men." I can tell you that the troops commanded by Hal Moore ratified him as the best. And his leadership shaped many future leaders–in ways you wouldn’t expect.

One of the lieutenants in Hal’s battalion in Vietnam was a tough British immigrant named Rick Rescorla. A photo of Rick is on the cover of the book, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young.

Rick went on to become the head of security at Morgan Stanley. It was the largest company in the South Tower of the World Trade Center, with 2,700 employees. On September 11th, 2001, Rick was the calming presence on that chaotic day. He made sure that all but six Morgan Stanley employees made it out. And he wasn’t finished. Rick was last seen alive heading back up the stairs to get more people out.

What the world witnessed with Rick was what Hal Moore instilled in his people.

Hal will tell you that what he would most like to be remembered for is that during all his years in combat, he never left anyone behind.

Hal’s example inspired Rick Rescorla almost two years ago. It probably also inspired our Special Operations troops, Marines and all the others in the rescue you probably all heard about and saw some of–the rescue of Jessica Lynch.

Once the teams finished rescuing Private First Class Lynch, they also found a shallow grave with bodies in it. So they dug, with their bare hands, through hard-packed desert sand to get the bodies. And with their dirty and bloodied hands, they cradled their comrades in their arms and brought them home.

That’s part of the legacy of General Hal Moore, and that legacy will continue to inspire this nation.

Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming an inspiration to yesterday’s, today’s and tomorrow’s armed forces’ leaders: Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore.







END


Russell L. Ross - 6/17/2003

MYTH
One of the lieutenants in Hal’s battalion in Vietnam was a tough British immigrant named Rick Rescorla. A photo of Rick is on the cover of the book, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young.
===============
FACT
Rick belonged to the Renforceing Battallion 2/7th Lt.Col. McDade not Lt. Col. Moore's 1/7th.
===============
What the world witnessed with Rick was what Hal Moore instilled in his people.


MYERS


"One of the lieutenants in Hal’s battalion in Vietnam was a tough British immigrant named Rick Rescorla. A photo of Rick is on the cover of the book, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young."




GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Introduction of Lt. Gen. Harold Moore, U.S. Army (retired)

Recipient of USO Patriot Award

USO of Metropolitan Washington’s 20th Annual Awards Dinner

Ritz-Carlton, Pentagon City, Arlington, VA

April 9, 2003







Thank you very much. It’s been a real privilege. Secretary Principi, other distinguished guests here tonight, ladies and gentlemen and supporters of the USO.

It’s my great honor and pleasure to introduce the recipient of this year’s Patriot Award–Lt. Gen. Hal Moore.

You all know him, although many of you before tonight may have been under the impression that he looked exactly like Mel Gibson. [laughter] The one difference that I understand is true, is that between the two of them, General Moore never wore a kilt into combat. [laughter]

What we do know is that General Hal Moore had an exceptional Army career. He began as a West Point cadet during World War II, and finished in 1977 as the Army’s chief of personnel.

General Moore is also known for his extraordinary book, written with Joe Galloway. In my view, we have no better role model today for "embedded" reporters than the relationship between Hal Moore and Joe Galloway.

Hal’s instructions to Joe and all reporters covering stories involving his battalion and later, his brigade, in Vietnam were simple: "Don’t interfere with operations. And don’t publish anything that would alert the enemy and put our troops at risk." That’s it. Other than that, the story was theirs to tell.

Some have criticized today’s embedded reporters as being too close to the troops to be objective. I, for one, think that they’re calling it as they see it–the reporters, that is. It’s simply that they realize that they’re around some real heroes. [applause]

Hal Moore is one of those heroes. And even before the book, his actions at Ia Drang Valley and his intense preparation before that famous battle were used as a study in leadership–in how selfless dedication serves as an inspiration.

Hal Moore is in fact more than just one of those heroes. He is also the outstanding example of a combat commander. When Hal was a lieutenant, The Infantry Journal published an article that declared: "No man is a leader until his appointment is ratified in the minds and hearts of his men." I can tell you that the troops commanded by Hal Moore ratified him as the best. And his leadership shaped many future leaders–in ways you wouldn’t expect.

One of the lieutenants in Hal’s battalion in Vietnam was a tough British immigrant named Rick Rescorla. A photo of Rick is on the cover of the book, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young.

Rick went on to become the head of security at Morgan Stanley. It was the largest company in the South Tower of the World Trade Center, with 2,700 employees. On September 11th, 2001, Rick was the calming presence on that chaotic day. He made sure that all but six Morgan Stanley employees made it out. And he wasn’t finished. Rick was last seen alive heading back up the stairs to get more people out.

What the world witnessed with Rick was what Hal Moore instilled in his people.

Hal will tell you that what he would most like to be remembered for is that during all his years in combat, he never left anyone behind.

Hal’s example inspired Rick Rescorla almost two years ago. It probably also inspired our Special Operations troops, Marines and all the others in the rescue you probably all heard about and saw some of–the rescue of Jessica Lynch.

Once the teams finished rescuing Private First Class Lynch, they also found a shallow grave with bodies in it. So they dug, with their bare hands, through hard-packed desert sand to get the bodies. And with their dirty and bloodied hands, they cradled their comrades in their arms and brought them home.

That’s part of the legacy of General Hal Moore, and that legacy will continue to inspire this nation.

Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming an inspiration to yesterday’s, today’s and tomorrow’s armed forces’ leaders: Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore.





END


Russell L. Ross - 4/11/2003

Moores after action report

This is a PDF file and takes about a minute to load.

Web Page URAL

http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/history/aar-xray.pdf


http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/7-ff/p040.jpg

Note Moore's uniform, He's not he even dirty after 3 days of fighting
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/7-ff/p038.jpg

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/7-ff/p025.jpg

B company assault the morning of the 16th, Not ever one has Bayonets on the weapone, No enemy present.

Critical information that is missing from Moore's after action report
ural to that web site

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/90-4/chap3.htm


CHAPTER 3
Operations Planning
Section I
ESTIMATE PROCESS



3-1. General.

a. Successful air assault execution is based on a careful analysis of METT-T and detailed, precise reverse planning. Five basic plans that comprise the reverse planning sequence are developed for each air assault operation. They are:


The ground tactical plan.


The landing plan.


The air movement plan.


The loading plan.


The staging plan. These plans should not be developed independently. They are coordinated and developed concurrently by the AATF staff to make best use of available time. The ground tactical plan is normally developed first and is the basis from which the other plans are derived.

b. Planning for air assault operations requires time - time to plan, time to prepare, and time to brief. The AATF uses the sequence of command and staff actions and troop leading procedures common to other combat operations.

c. Planning for air assault operations is as detailed as time permits and should include completion of written orders and plans. Within time constraints, the AATFC must carefully evaluate capabilities and limitations of the total force and develop a plan that ensures a high probability of success.

d. Often, however, the fleeting nature of tactical opportunities does not permit adequate planning time and the development of detailed written plans and orders. If time is limited, planning steps may be compressed or conducted concurrently; detailed written plans and orders may be supplanted by standing operating procedure or lessons learned in previous training. Previous training and the development of SOPs cannot be overemphasized. Units cannot expect to successfully conduct air assault operations, particularly with compressed planning time, without the benefit of previous training.

e. Many routine tasks related to air assault operations are accomplished above the AATF level. The division is the lowest echelon that can allocate assets, assign appropriate missions, gather required data, and analyze capabilities. For this reason, when an air assault mission is assigned by division, or higher level command, that headquarters begins the planning process. The division uses its resources to gather data and provides planning information to lower echelons, or division may complete the planning tasks itself. When the division does these tasks, subordinate commanders can expend their limited time to accomplish other key planning tasks.

f. When an infantry unit is given an air assault mission, the assigning echelon provides the latest extended weather forecast, up-to-date intelligence (with emphasis on known or suspected enemy air defense systems), initial fire planning, and many of the terrain considerations relevant to the operation. Additional information that is not provided may be requested and/or completed by the AATF. All echelons attempt to reduce the planning burden of subordinate units.

g. The battalion is the lowest level that has sufficient personnel to plan, coordinate, and control an air assault operation. When company-size operations are conducted, the bulk of the planning takes place at battalion and higher headquarters.

h. All tactical estimates used in troop leading procedures employ the factors of METT-T. The METT-T provides data that is analyzed using the estimate process and from which a decision is made. Applying the factors helps the commander isolate and address significant considerations that affect the mission. The factors of METT-T are considered in each phase of the estimate.


Maj. Gen. Huong Minh Phuong, told U.S. News in a recent interview that the attack on Plei Me was launched only to bait a trap for the inevitable South Vietnamese relief column.

http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/soldiers/vietnam_901029.htm
Special Report: Cover Story (10/29/90) Vietnam story
The word was the Ia Drang would be a walk. The word was wrong By Joseph L. Galloway Day 1: Walking in Custer's footsteps
Day 2: Holding the thin green line
Day 3: Driving off the enemy
Day 4: Blundering into disaster
Day 5: Counting the cost
Epilogue: Delivering the sad news As the sun rose on Nov. 14, 1965, a clear, hot Sunday, four U.S. Army helicopters flew, as unobtrusively as such machines can, across the rugged Ia Drang Valley in South Vietnam's Central Highlands. Below them was a wild and desolate place that in normal times offered a living only to elephants, tigers and a few Montagnard tribesmen. Lt. Col. Harold G. Moore scanned the terrain intently, scribbling notes and marking his maps. He was about to lead the U.S. 7th Cavalry on its most audacious charge since Lt. Col. George A. Custer led his troopers to the Little Bighorn 89 years earlier. Like Custer, Hal Moore had no use for timidity or half measures. The lean, blond Kentuckian, a 43-year-old graduate of West Point, Class of '45, demanded the best from his men and gave the same in return. Behind his back, the 457 officers and men of the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), sometimes called Moore by Custer's nickname, "Yellow Hair." It was a soldier's compliment, and Moore took it as such. Moore was hunting big game in the tangle of ravines, tall elephant grass and termite hills around the base of Chu Pong Massif, a 2,401-foot mountain whose forests stretched 5 miles into Cambodia. A month earlier, the 2,200-man 33rd People's Army Regiment–part of the first full North Vietnamese Army division to take the field since the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954–had attacked the camp at Plei Me, a vital listening post astride the road to Pleiku, the provincial capital. Saigon and Washington feared that if the North Vietnamese overran Pleiku, Route 19 to Qui Nhon on the coast would be wide open, and South Vietnam could be cut in two. But one of the North Vietnamese commanders, Maj. Gen. Huong Minh Phuong, told U.S. News in a recent interview that the attack on Plei Me was launched only to bait a trap for the inevitable South Vietnamese relief column. The ambush almost certainly would have succeeded but for one new and, for the North Vietnamese, very troubling development.

As for the invented combat action, during the movie's climactic battle sequence Crandall's character is shown using a helicopter gunship to knock out North Vietnamese troops as Gibson's character charges toward them on the ground.

"That's not correct," Crandall said. "That was a surprise to me when it came on — I was John Wayne to the rescue. The truth is, the gunships were another unit."

Also, Crandall said, Gibson's character gets credit for some things that were actually done by others. "He did a lot of shooting and leading and firing," Crandall said. "Some of that was done by infantry company commanders who were leading that stuff."




Sunday, March 03, 2002 - 12:33 a.m. Pacific


DATEBOOK: Movies | Restaurants | Theater | Books | More listings





Movies
He was a soldier, and 'We Were Soldiers' tells his story

By Eli Sanders
Seattle Times staff reporter

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Bruce Crandall finds it hard to watch the new movie "We Were Soldiers," which takes some of the worst days of his life and turns them into a 140-minute Hollywood war film.

It's not that he thinks the movie is bad.

In fact, the 69-year-old Army veteran, who lives in Manchester on the Olympic Peninsula, says he considers "We Were Soldiers" valuable because he expects it will "bring back to the mind of the American people how bad combat really is — and remind the American people that in Vietnam we didn't do it right."

What Crandall finds hard about watching "We Were Soldiers," which stars Mel Gibson and opened Friday, is the stress of being transported back to Nov. 14, 1965, when, during the first major battle of the Vietnam War, he flew a helicopter in and out of the Ia Drang Valley 22 times, attempting to resupply and evacuate troops involved in a furious firefight with North Vietnamese soldiers.

It is this battle that "We Were Soldiers" re-creates, and in the movie, Crandall's role is played by Greg Kinnear ("Nurse Betty," "The Gift"). Gibson plays courageous Lt. Col. Harold Moore, who led American troops in the bloody fight, promising to be the first on the battlefield and to leave no man behind.

The movie is based on the book, "We Were Soldiers Once ... And Young," written by the real-life Moore and former reporter Joseph L. Galloway. Director Randall Wallace, who wrote the screenplay for "Braveheart," wrote this movie.

Crandall served as a consultant to the film, visiting the sets and giving advice on matters such as which Army insignias to use. But, he said, there are still quite a few Hollywood embellishments in "We Were Soldiers." For example, his character gets a slightly glammed-up nickname as well as some combat action that Crandall never actually saw.

In Vietnam, Crandall went by "Snake," he explained during an interview last week as he prepared to head for Washington, D.C., for a screening of the film with President Bush. But, he said, some people involved in making the movie (whom he describes as "humorous characters") decided to have a little fun with his radio call sign, adding an expletive to it in order to create a combination of words that provides the gory action film with one of its few moments of comic relief.

As for the invented combat action, during the movie's climactic battle sequence Crandall's character is shown using a helicopter gunship to knock out North Vietnamese troops as Gibson's character charges toward them on the ground.

"That's not correct," Crandall said. "That was a surprise to me when it came on — I was John Wayne to the rescue. The truth is, the gunships were another unit."

Also, Crandall said, Gibson's character gets credit for some things that were actually done by others. "He did a lot of shooting and leading and firing," Crandall said. "Some of that was done by infantry company commanders who were leading that stuff."

All this stretching of the truth is understandable, Crandall feels — part of what it takes to make a long, complicated battle fit into a relatively short Hollywood film. And generally, he said, the movie is "very realistic. Anyone who sees it is going to see the horrors of war."

Some of the most wrenching scenes in "We Were Soldiers" come when the wounded are shown being loaded onto helicopters that are frantically trying to evacuate them amid waves of hostile fire. Both the wounded and the helicopter crews were targets.

"By the fifth lift in, I had four people shot off my aircraft," Crandall recalled. "They shot my crew chief in the throat on one lift in. They shot my radio operator in the head — I don't think I've ever seen anything more graphic than that. My strongest memory of Vietnam was when we got back to Plei Me with that load."

That moment is recounted in the film, when buckets of water are used to wash bits of brain, blood and other ghastly detritus of war from a helicopter's cargo bay as it is prepared to fly again.

In another horrific moment, a wounded soldier is shown getting out of an evacuation helicopter to help load a more severely wounded man. As the still-mobile wounded soldier is lowering his immobile comrade into the helicopter, he is shot from behind.

"That was a young captain named Metzger," Crandall said. "He was helping the wounded guy get in, he was standing on the skid and they killed him."

Crandall still thinks about Vietnam and the soldiers in the helicopter company he commanded who have not come back.

"I still have a helicopter missing over there," he said. "The four guys who were in that helicopter have not been found. I think of them every day, probably will think about them for the rest of my life. I think of them every time I hear a helicopter. "

If there's a lesson to be learned from the movie, Crandall said, it's the same lesson most Americans associate with Vietnam: Don't send troops to fight an impossible war.

"It was a battle that we could not possibly win, and it just kept going and going and going," Crandall said. "We learned a lesson. And that lesson's in that movie, if people have forgotten it."

Eli Sanders: 206-748-5815 or esanders@seattletimes.com.


Copyright © 2003 The Seattle Times Company

Subj: your wife, Julie, started delivering those telegrams
Date: 4/10/2003 8:45:35 AM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: Lzalbany65









NEWS: I’ve heard that in the movie, Madeleine Stowe, who portrays your wife, Julie, started delivering those telegrams. Did that really happen?

MOORE: No, that’s a bit of Hollywood. When news about this terrible battle hit the newspapers on the next day after the battle began, the army was just not prepared for those numbers of casualties. Julie lived in a little rented house in Columbus, Georgia, with our five small children, and she and about 400 other First Cav Division wives were living in that small town outside of Fort Benning, Georgia.

The town went under a hell of a shock. Back in the early days of the war, the telegrams were delivered by taxicab. And when Julie heard about that first telegram being delivered by a taxicab driver, she went to the Army Post to the commander and told him that she wanted to know immediately which women were going to get the telegrams that day. And she literally followed the taxicab so she could be there when the telegram was delivered. Julie attended the funerals of 13, 14, 15 of my men that were buried in the Fort Benning cemetery. Of course, she never told me anything about this because she didn’t want to worry me.







An Interview with Hal Moore - from the Crested Butte Chronicle and Pilot newspaper:Week of February 22, 2002
We Were Soldiers
An interview with Lt. Gen. Harold (Hal) G. Moore (Ret.) by Aleesha TownesMost Crested Butte residents agree that meeting Lt. Gen. Harold (Hal) Moore (Ret.) is a rare treat. "He’s such a nice man" and "he’s a great guy" are the unanimous responses after talking with the 24-year part-time Crested Butte resident. Through his book, We Were Soldiers Once … And Young, his ability to speak frankly and his warm personality shine through and over the years many locals recognize Moore as a community figure and a person with rare insight. Through the eyes of Hollywood, the country and the world will have the opportunity next week to see a bit of Moore’s story with the opening of the film We Were Soldiers. The movie, starring Mel Gibson, is based on Moore’s experience as a lieutenant colonel in Vietnam. The film will open on March 1 in Crested Butte at the Majestic Theatre with a special screening to benefit the Crested Butte Reel Fest on Thursday, February 28, at 7:30 p.m. Moore and his wife, Julie, have been busy touring the country promoting the new movie in cities like New York and Los Angeles. The News caught up with Moore at his home in Auburn, AL, earlier this week. NEWS: How was your press tour?MOORE: It was nonstop, unbelievably stressful. Four days of being interviewed by television and so forth from all over the world. I think what was most unusual was the first day and the third day. First day was the national media, television reporters, and they each had four minutes on video and they were lined up to talk to me, Joe Galloway, to my wife and to Madeleine Stowe.NEWS: Did you meet some of the stars at the junket?MOORE: Oh, Julie and I have been acquainted with the cast for well over a year. They came to Fort Benning in January last year, which is only 40 miles from our home here in Alabama. And Mel and the director and the set guy and a couple of Mel’s top people and others came to our home for dinner. Actually Julie and Madeleine have become real close friends over the past year, and I as well with Madeleine and her husband, and we visited them at their ranch in Texas last summer. Those people are down-to-earth people, in very successful positions. They travel a lot, and they have very little time with their families. I met Mel in October 2000, actually, at his place out in California. They flew me out there to talk with him, and we went to church together. He’s a Catholic; I’m a Catholic. We went to Catholic mass together at a private chapel… He was a server. And then we talked for two or three hours at a mom-and-pop barbecue joint back in the woods. And Mel is really a fine man. He’s got seven kids, same wife, and him and I share the same attitudes and morals. He’s a treat to be around, very quick-witted and sharp as hell.NEWS: How do you feel about Gibson portraying you?MOORE: Well, why would I not feel great? He’s a very empathetic and perceptive person. As I watched this filming progress—Julie and I saw about 3 or 4 percent of the total 100 percent of the filming. We really didn’t see much of the filming. We’ve seen the movie now four times at various screening places, and Mel comes across to me as an infantry battalion commander in Vietnam. He does not come across to me as a guy who’s playing Hal Moore. He does not come across to me as Mel Gibson. This guy is an infantry battalion commander in Vietnam in one hell of a fight.NEWS: It seems that many men who served in Vietnam don’t want to talk about their experiences, but you have been very open and honest about what you saw there. What made you want to write this book?MOORE: I knew that if I didn’t write this book to tell the world about my brave soldiers and what they did in that far field in Asia many years ago, that nobody would write it and get it right. I knew that I had to do this for my troops. I had this dream in mind ever since the battle, but I was still in the army and I had my duties to perform. After I retired from the army, I worked at the ski area for four years.NEWS: I heard that just recently.MOORE: Well everyone else does, right? I might as well work there too. But anyhow, I quit the job really to write the book. I did about 10 years of research—written, telephone and reunions, and finally we got a contract with Random House. Joe Galloway, he was in the battle with me for a little over half of the fight, he came in the first night. He and I together wrote the book, and it’s done very well; it’s on the New York Times bestseller list. The troopers who have fought in Vietnam in that tragic war over all those years have written to us that it really does capture the experience of being in Vietnam in a tough war with a very tough enemy. I was hoping that someday that it would be made into a film. I was sitting in my house in Crested Butte in about 1984 or ’85 writing a couple of chapters and I thought to myself, "Hey, this is going to make a hell of a movie someday." Now it will be on the streets next week. The reviews we get validate what we wanted to do. We wanted to write a book which was the real Vietnam. The movies on Vietnam depicting ground combat have all been nonsense.NEWS: I was going to ask you what you thought about movies like Platoon and more recently The Thin Red Line?MOORE: I have not seen The Thin Red Line yet, but I was told by one of my sons who has seen it that it was boring and more philosophical than anything. The people who put together the movie Platoon took every bad incident that ever happened in Vietnam and lumped it all into one movie. Officers smoking dope with their troops, sergeants killing one another, burning villages, all that stuff. It was terrible. Apocalypse Now was really not about Vietnam, if you saw that. The only good movie I’ve seen on Vietnam is a comedy called Good Morning Vietnam with Robin Williams. That was fun, but of course it was truly a comedy. But he depicted a real-life guy who was a disc jockey out of Saigon, and I can still remember that guy hollering into the microphone, "Gooooood Morning, Vietnam!"NEWS: How did the production of this movie come about?MOORE: I believe in fate. I believe that fate put Joe Galloway and me together on that battlefield, years and years ago. And I believe that fate had Randall Wallace going through an airport pick up our book because of the title, We Were Soldiers Once … And Young, which is a different type of a grabber title. Randy has told us that he read that book on a couple of flights, and he said that he just had to make a movie on it. So he got a hold of us. We’d been approached by several companies who wanted to make a movie, but we didn’t like any of them. But Randy came across to us as very, very professional, very sincere and very honest. Randy and his wife visited Julie and me in our home in Crested Butte in October three or four years ago. They visited us in our home down here in Alabama for a long weekend, and we got to know each other very well. He was determined to make this movie, but he was tied up with Braveheart. He wrote the screenplay for Braveheart, and he got Mel to do the lead and the directing, and of course it won the Oscar. Then he did Man in the Iron Mask, and then he was involved with a movie called Pearl Harbor for awhile. That took up some time, but then he could put full time into our movie, which he did. He’s just a hell of a nice guy. You should meet him some day. I’m a believer in fate, and I believe that kismet brought us all together, including Mel and Madeleine.NEWS: Do you think that the movie is true to your book?MOORE: The movie is superb. Although I was a consultant, Randall Wallace told me at the offset that "this is not another documentary. This is not the history channel. It’s a movie, and movies are emotional events." I previewed five written screenplays from 1995 on and made suggestions, some of which he accepted. But I was really a bit of a nuisance throughout because I kept drumming on him to emphasize the men down in the ranks, the riflemen, the sergeants, the second lieutenants, the men who win or lose the battles. I insisted that the movie show that men in battle fight and kill and die for each other, not for what a president says on TV, or for the flag or for the country. Men in battle fight for the men beside them. You look right there in Crested Butte. You’ve got Vietnam veterans just like I’m talking about. Like Jerry Heal, he and I were in the same division together in Vietnam—at different times, but he’s a First Cav Vietnam veteran—and Dave Lindsey, the mountain bike guru, those two guys are typical American draftees. They were conscripted during the war, they went to Vietnam and they fought and they made it through. I wanted the movie to clearly show guys like them, and it does. And I also wanted the film to show the respect that I had for the fighting ability for my enemy. I wanted to show the nonstop intensity of that three-day shootout. Another dimension that I wanted to be shown was the heartbreak back in America when those terrible "killed-in-action" telegrams started arriving and that awful knock at the door.NEWS: I’ve heard that in the movie, Madeleine Stowe, who portrays your wife, Julie, started delivering those telegrams. Did that really happen?MOORE: No, that’s a bit of Hollywood. When news about this terrible battle hit the newspapers on the next day after the battle began, the army was just not prepared for those numbers of casualties. Julie lived in a little rented house in Columbus, Georgia, with our five small children, and she and about 400 other First Cav Division wives were living in that small town outside of Fort Benning, Georgia. The town went under a hell of a shock. Back in the early days of the war, the telegrams were delivered by taxicab. And when Julie heard about that first telegram being delivered by a taxicab driver, she went to the Army Post to the commander and told him that she wanted to know immediately which women were going to get the telegrams that day. And she literally followed the taxicab so she could be there when the telegram was delivered. Julie attended the funerals of 13, 14, 15 of my men that were buried in the Fort Benning cemetery. Of course, she never told me anything about this because she didn’t want to worry me.NEWS: What’s something that you’d like audiences to keep in mind as they watch this film?MOORE: The thrust of our book and the movie captures the thrust of the book very well on the screen—I’d like everyone that sees that movie to come out of the theater with this message: Hate war but love the American warrior.NEWS: Are you attending the film’s premiere?MOORE: I’ve seen the film about three or four times at special screenings. The premiere is next week, in Los Angeles. I think it’s on Monday. As far as I know, at this time, my wife and I will be invited to the premiere.NEWS: We’ve talked about Mel Gibson portraying you. How do the other actors, like Sam Elliott, do portraying people that were close to you?MOORE: Sam Elliott … well, Mel Gibson better watch out or Sam is going to steal the show. Sam Elliott is profoundly professional. He is the ultimate sergeant major in this movie. He is absolutely superb. And I’ve become pretty good friends with Sam. We communicate, and he’s a down-to-earth guy and he’s a total pro. The guy takes on a role and he is the ultimate. As you know, he’s a big Western star and he’s waiting now for the Western movies to start coming back, I think. In the meantime, he played Col. Beauford in Gettysburg, and he plays the sergeant major in this movie. When you see this movie, you’re going to love Sam Elliott.NEWS: I already love Sam Elliott.MOORE: I think my wife would run away from home for him.NEWS: Who plays Joe Galloway?MOORE: A guy named Barry Pepper, who played Roger Maris in 61 and he was in The Green Mile and he was the left-handed sniper in Saving Private Ryan. Barry Pepper may well get a Best Supporting Actor nomination, along with Sam Elliott. He was superb. He’s a Canadian. He’s such a nice guy.Last Friday my co-author, Joe Galloway, and I were invited to Fort Hood, Texas, for a screening of the movie for the First Calvary Division, which is the division we were in in Vietnam. And Madeleine was there with her husband and Barry Pepper as well. And I tell you what, the troops just showered them with affection and with gratitude that they would come down and talk with them, and they were there all day long, into the night, with the troops. By the way, the First Cav Division at the premiere is going to have horse platoon. They have an 1870s horse platoon, like in the Indian Wars—calvary uniforms, boots, breeches, horses, Conastoga wagon with a dog on the seat. And they’re going to have the First Cav Division Color Guard flags at the premiere. So that should be rather … showy. A little Hollywoody, probably. But frankly I’ll be glad when it’s all over with so I can get back my life. I should be out there skiing right now! It’s been a very revealing learning experience, and it’s been a lot of fun. I’ve met some wonderful people.NEWS: Are you appearing on talk shows or anything like that?MOORE: The people that I want to see interviewed and get the credit are my troopers, the guys who fought the battle. I will probably be called up and interviewed of course, but I hope that it will be held to a minimum. I personally don’t like being in the spotlight. I just don’t like it. I want my troops to get the credit, not me.XXX



Did any Vietnam Veteran see this part.

.."Oh, it was their country -&- we were invading them"...

...MEL GIBSON, NBC ..''Today''.. 2/25/02.

We Were Soldiers
Posted by Anonymous on 2002-02-26 11:14:52
My Score:

Mel Gibson to Ann Curry TODAY show feb 25

Mel Gibson " IT WAS THEIR COUNTRY, WE INVADED THEM".

ALOHA RONNIE
Has No Life

Joined: 05 Sep 2001 03:26 am
Posts: 638
From: RONNIE GUYER

Posted: 26 Feb 2002 09:42 pm Post subject: nbc today feb 25 Gibson ouote

NEVER FORGET

.."Oh, it was their country -&- we were invading them"...

...MEL GIBSON, NBC ..''Today''.. 2/25/02.

...If it were not for MEL GIBSON and his ..''BRAVEHEART''.. Group... America would NEVER know about the Heroism of Many in the -Valley of Death- that was the IA DRANG-1965.

..''WE WERE SOLDIERS''.. steers pretty clear of Politics and focuses on the Bravehearts of America of long ago as the example they really are for US to now follow in a new -Time of War- in a New Century with an Enemy that is now Within BIG TIME.

...MEL GIBSON is welcome to his own opinion or slip of the tongue thru a process a multitude TV Interviews.

...His Actions speak volumes to US on the Silver Screen ...ALL FOR THE BETTER.

Signed:..ALOHA RONNIE Guyer / Vet-Battle of IA DRANG-1965 / Landing Zone Falcon / http://www.LzXray.com

NEVER FORGET
...Vet/Battle of IA DRANG-1965, U.S. 7th Air Cav S-1 Personnel Clerk, Landing Zone Falcon - Lt. Col. HAL G. MOORE''s Radioman/Driver/Orderly right up to IA DRANG-1965. I will NEVER FORGET typing MOORE''s -Letters of Condolances- to our Hero KIA-WIA Families

alphaco2/8-70/71
Here Often

Joined: 24 Dec 2001 07:28 pm
Posts: 13
From: Phoenix

Posted: 26 Feb 2002 09:57 pm Post subject: nbc today feb 25 Gibson ouote

I agree with you 150% Ronnie - well spoken on your part - OUTSTANDING







Russell L. Ross - 4/11/2003

Moores after action report

This is a PDF file and takes about a minute to load.

Web Page URAL

http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/history/aar-xray.pdf


http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/7-ff/p040.jpg

Note Moore's uniform, He's not he even dirty after 3 days of fighting
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/7-ff/p038.jpg

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/Vietnam/7-ff/p025.jpg

B company assault the morning of the 16th, Not ever one has Bayonets on the weapone, No enemy present.

Critical information that is missing from Moore's after action report
ural to that web site

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/90-4/chap3.htm


CHAPTER 3
Operations Planning
Section I
ESTIMATE PROCESS



3-1. General.

a. Successful air assault execution is based on a careful analysis of METT-T and detailed, precise reverse planning. Five basic plans that comprise the reverse planning sequence are developed for each air assault operation. They are:


The ground tactical plan.


The landing plan.


The air movement plan.


The loading plan.


The staging plan. These plans should not be developed independently. They are coordinated and developed concurrently by the AATF staff to make best use of available time. The ground tactical plan is normally developed first and is the basis from which the other plans are derived.

b. Planning for air assault operations requires time - time to plan, time to prepare, and time to brief. The AATF uses the sequence of command and staff actions and troop leading procedures common to other combat operations.

c. Planning for air assault operations is as detailed as time permits and should include completion of written orders and plans. Within time constraints, the AATFC must carefully evaluate capabilities and limitations of the total force and develop a plan that ensures a high probability of success.

d. Often, however, the fleeting nature of tactical opportunities does not permit adequate planning time and the development of detailed written plans and orders. If time is limited, planning steps may be compressed or conducted concurrently; detailed written plans and orders may be supplanted by standing operating procedure or lessons learned in previous training. Previous training and the development of SOPs cannot be overemphasized. Units cannot expect to successfully conduct air assault operations, particularly with compressed planning time, without the benefit of previous training.

e. Many routine tasks related to air assault operations are accomplished above the AATF level. The division is the lowest echelon that can allocate assets, assign appropriate missions, gather required data, and analyze capabilities. For this reason, when an air assault mission is assigned by division, or higher level command, that headquarters begins the planning process. The division uses its resources to gather data and provides planning information to lower echelons, or division may complete the planning tasks itself. When the division does these tasks, subordinate commanders can expend their limited time to accomplish other key planning tasks.

f. When an infantry unit is given an air assault mission, the assigning echelon provides the latest extended weather forecast, up-to-date intelligence (with emphasis on known or suspected enemy air defense systems), initial fire planning, and many of the terrain considerations relevant to the operation. Additional information that is not provided may be requested and/or completed by the AATF. All echelons attempt to reduce the planning burden of subordinate units.

g. The battalion is the lowest level that has sufficient personnel to plan, coordinate, and control an air assault operation. When company-size operations are conducted, the bulk of the planning takes place at battalion and higher headquarters.

h. All tactical estimates used in troop leading procedures employ the factors of METT-T. The METT-T provides data that is analyzed using the estimate process and from which a decision is made. Applying the factors helps the commander isolate and address significant considerations that affect the mission. The factors of METT-T are considered in each phase of the estimate.


Maj. Gen. Huong Minh Phuong, told U.S. News in a recent interview that the attack on Plei Me was launched only to bait a trap for the inevitable South Vietnamese relief column.

http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/soldiers/vietnam_901029.htm
Special Report: Cover Story (10/29/90) Vietnam story
The word was the Ia Drang would be a walk. The word was wrong By Joseph L. Galloway Day 1: Walking in Custer's footsteps
Day 2: Holding the thin green line
Day 3: Driving off the enemy
Day 4: Blundering into disaster
Day 5: Counting the cost
Epilogue: Delivering the sad news As the sun rose on Nov. 14, 1965, a clear, hot Sunday, four U.S. Army helicopters flew, as unobtrusively as such machines can, across the rugged Ia Drang Valley in South Vietnam's Central Highlands. Below them was a wild and desolate place that in normal times offered a living only to elephants, tigers and a few Montagnard tribesmen. Lt. Col. Harold G. Moore scanned the terrain intently, scribbling notes and marking his maps. He was about to lead the U.S. 7th Cavalry on its most audacious charge since Lt. Col. George A. Custer led his troopers to the Little Bighorn 89 years earlier. Like Custer, Hal Moore had no use for timidity or half measures. The lean, blond Kentuckian, a 43-year-old graduate of West Point, Class of '45, demanded the best from his men and gave the same in return. Behind his back, the 457 officers and men of the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), sometimes called Moore by Custer's nickname, "Yellow Hair." It was a soldier's compliment, and Moore took it as such. Moore was hunting big game in the tangle of ravines, tall elephant grass and termite hills around the base of Chu Pong Massif, a 2,401-foot mountain whose forests stretched 5 miles into Cambodia. A month earlier, the 2,200-man 33rd People's Army Regiment–part of the first full North Vietnamese Army division to take the field since the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954–had attacked the camp at Plei Me, a vital listening post astride the road to Pleiku, the provincial capital. Saigon and Washington feared that if the North Vietnamese overran Pleiku, Route 19 to Qui Nhon on the coast would be wide open, and South Vietnam could be cut in two. But one of the North Vietnamese commanders, Maj. Gen. Huong Minh Phuong, told U.S. News in a recent interview that the attack on Plei Me was launched only to bait a trap for the inevitable South Vietnamese relief column. The ambush almost certainly would have succeeded but for one new and, for the North Vietnamese, very troubling development.

As for the invented combat action, during the movie's climactic battle sequence Crandall's character is shown using a helicopter gunship to knock out North Vietnamese troops as Gibson's character charges toward them on the ground.

"That's not correct," Crandall said. "That was a surprise to me when it came on — I was John Wayne to the rescue. The truth is, the gunships were another unit."

Also, Crandall said, Gibson's character gets credit for some things that were actually done by others. "He did a lot of shooting and leading and firing," Crandall said. "Some of that was done by infantry company commanders who were leading that stuff."




Sunday, March 03, 2002 - 12:33 a.m. Pacific


DATEBOOK: Movies | Restaurants | Theater | Books | More listings





Movies
He was a soldier, and 'We Were Soldiers' tells his story

By Eli Sanders
Seattle Times staff reporter

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Bruce Crandall finds it hard to watch the new movie "We Were Soldiers," which takes some of the worst days of his life and turns them into a 140-minute Hollywood war film.

It's not that he thinks the movie is bad.

In fact, the 69-year-old Army veteran, who lives in Manchester on the Olympic Peninsula, says he considers "We Were Soldiers" valuable because he expects it will "bring back to the mind of the American people how bad combat really is — and remind the American people that in Vietnam we didn't do it right."

What Crandall finds hard about watching "We Were Soldiers," which stars Mel Gibson and opened Friday, is the stress of being transported back to Nov. 14, 1965, when, during the first major battle of the Vietnam War, he flew a helicopter in and out of the Ia Drang Valley 22 times, attempting to resupply and evacuate troops involved in a furious firefight with North Vietnamese soldiers.

It is this battle that "We Were Soldiers" re-creates, and in the movie, Crandall's role is played by Greg Kinnear ("Nurse Betty," "The Gift"). Gibson plays courageous Lt. Col. Harold Moore, who led American troops in the bloody fight, promising to be the first on the battlefield and to leave no man behind.

The movie is based on the book, "We Were Soldiers Once ... And Young," written by the real-life Moore and former reporter Joseph L. Galloway. Director Randall Wallace, who wrote the screenplay for "Braveheart," wrote this movie.

Crandall served as a consultant to the film, visiting the sets and giving advice on matters such as which Army insignias to use. But, he said, there are still quite a few Hollywood embellishments in "We Were Soldiers." For example, his character gets a slightly glammed-up nickname as well as some combat action that Crandall never actually saw.

In Vietnam, Crandall went by "Snake," he explained during an interview last week as he prepared to head for Washington, D.C., for a screening of the film with President Bush. But, he said, some people involved in making the movie (whom he describes as "humorous characters") decided to have a little fun with his radio call sign, adding an expletive to it in order to create a combination of words that provides the gory action film with one of its few moments of comic relief.

As for the invented combat action, during the movie's climactic battle sequence Crandall's character is shown using a helicopter gunship to knock out North Vietnamese troops as Gibson's character charges toward them on the ground.

"That's not correct," Crandall said. "That was a surprise to me when it came on — I was John Wayne to the rescue. The truth is, the gunships were another unit."

Also, Crandall said, Gibson's character gets credit for some things that were actually done by others. "He did a lot of shooting and leading and firing," Crandall said. "Some of that was done by infantry company commanders who were leading that stuff."

All this stretching of the truth is understandable, Crandall feels — part of what it takes to make a long, complicated battle fit into a relatively short Hollywood film. And generally, he said, the movie is "very realistic. Anyone who sees it is going to see the horrors of war."

Some of the most wrenching scenes in "We Were Soldiers" come when the wounded are shown being loaded onto helicopters that are frantically trying to evacuate them amid waves of hostile fire. Both the wounded and the helicopter crews were targets.

"By the fifth lift in, I had four people shot off my aircraft," Crandall recalled. "They shot my crew chief in the throat on one lift in. They shot my radio operator in the head — I don't think I've ever seen anything more graphic than that. My strongest memory of Vietnam was when we got back to Plei Me with that load."

That moment is recounted in the film, when buckets of water are used to wash bits of brain, blood and other ghastly detritus of war from a helicopter's cargo bay as it is prepared to fly again.

In another horrific moment, a wounded soldier is shown getting out of an evacuation helicopter to help load a more severely wounded man. As the still-mobile wounded soldier is lowering his immobile comrade into the helicopter, he is shot from behind.

"That was a young captain named Metzger," Crandall said. "He was helping the wounded guy get in, he was standing on the skid and they killed him."

Crandall still thinks about Vietnam and the soldiers in the helicopter company he commanded who have not come back.

"I still have a helicopter missing over there," he said. "The four guys who were in that helicopter have not been found. I think of them every day, probably will think about them for the rest of my life. I think of them every time I hear a helicopter. "

If there's a lesson to be learned from the movie, Crandall said, it's the same lesson most Americans associate with Vietnam: Don't send troops to fight an impossible war.

"It was a battle that we could not possibly win, and it just kept going and going and going," Crandall said. "We learned a lesson. And that lesson's in that movie, if people have forgotten it."

Eli Sanders: 206-748-5815 or esanders@seattletimes.com.


Copyright © 2003 The Seattle Times Company

Subj: your wife, Julie, started delivering those telegrams
Date: 4/10/2003 8:45:35 AM Pacific Daylight Time
From: Lzalbany65
To: Lzalbany65









NEWS: I’ve heard that in the movie, Madeleine Stowe, who portrays your wife, Julie, started delivering those telegrams. Did that really happen?

MOORE: No, that’s a bit of Hollywood. When news about this terrible battle hit the newspapers on the next day after the battle began, the army was just not prepared for those numbers of casualties. Julie lived in a little rented house in Columbus, Georgia, with our five small children, and she and about 400 other First Cav Division wives were living in that small town outside of Fort Benning, Georgia.

The town went under a hell of a shock. Back in the early days of the war, the telegrams were delivered by taxicab. And when Julie heard about that first telegram being delivered by a taxicab driver, she went to the Army Post to the commander and told him that she wanted to know immediately which women were going to get the telegrams that day. And she literally followed the taxicab so she could be there when the telegram was delivered. Julie attended the funerals of 13, 14, 15 of my men that were buried in the Fort Benning cemetery. Of course, she never told me anything about this because she didn’t want to worry me.







An Interview with Hal Moore - from the Crested Butte Chronicle and Pilot newspaper:Week of February 22, 2002
We Were Soldiers
An interview with Lt. Gen. Harold (Hal) G. Moore (Ret.) by Aleesha TownesMost Crested Butte residents agree that meeting Lt. Gen. Harold (Hal) Moore (Ret.) is a rare treat. "He’s such a nice man" and "he’s a great guy" are the unanimous responses after talking with the 24-year part-time Crested Butte resident. Through his book, We Were Soldiers Once … And Young, his ability to speak frankly and his warm personality shine through and over the years many locals recognize Moore as a community figure and a person with rare insight. Through the eyes of Hollywood, the country and the world will have the opportunity next week to see a bit of Moore’s story with the opening of the film We Were Soldiers. The movie, starring Mel Gibson, is based on Moore’s experience as a lieutenant colonel in Vietnam. The film will open on March 1 in Crested Butte at the Majestic Theatre with a special screening to benefit the Crested Butte Reel Fest on Thursday, February 28, at 7:30 p.m. Moore and his wife, Julie, have been busy touring the country promoting the new movie in cities like New York and Los Angeles. The News caught up with Moore at his home in Auburn, AL, earlier this week. NEWS: How was your press tour?MOORE: It was nonstop, unbelievably stressful. Four days of being interviewed by television and so forth from all over the world. I think what was most unusual was the first day and the third day. First day was the national media, television reporters, and they each had four minutes on video and they were lined up to talk to me, Joe Galloway, to my wife and to Madeleine Stowe.NEWS: Did you meet some of the stars at the junket?MOORE: Oh, Julie and I have been acquainted with the cast for well over a year. They came to Fort Benning in January last year, which is only 40 miles from our home here in Alabama. And Mel and the director and the set guy and a couple of Mel’s top people and others came to our home for dinner. Actually Julie and Madeleine have become real close friends over the past year, and I as well with Madeleine and her husband, and we visited them at their ranch in Texas last summer. Those people are down-to-earth people, in very successful positions. They travel a lot, and they have very little time with their families. I met Mel in October 2000, actually, at his place out in California. They flew me out there to talk with him, and we went to church together. He’s a Catholic; I’m a Catholic. We went to Catholic mass together at a private chapel… He was a server. And then we talked for two or three hours at a mom-and-pop barbecue joint back in the woods. And Mel is really a fine man. He’s got seven kids, same wife, and him and I share the same attitudes and morals. He’s a treat to be around, very quick-witted and sharp as hell.NEWS: How do you feel about Gibson portraying you?MOORE: Well, why would I not feel great? He’s a very empathetic and perceptive person. As I watched this filming progress—Julie and I saw about 3 or 4 percent of the total 100 percent of the filming. We really didn’t see much of the filming. We’ve seen the movie now four times at various screening places, and Mel comes across to me as an infantry battalion commander in Vietnam. He does not come across to me as a guy who’s playing Hal Moore. He does not come across to me as Mel Gibson. This guy is an infantry battalion commander in Vietnam in one hell of a fight.NEWS: It seems that many men who served in Vietnam don’t want to talk about their experiences, but you have been very open and honest about what you saw there. What made you want to write this book?MOORE: I knew that if I didn’t write this book to tell the world about my brave soldiers and what they did in that far field in Asia many years ago, that nobody would write it and get it right. I knew that I had to do this for my troops. I had this dream in mind ever since the battle, but I was still in the army and I had my duties to perform. After I retired from the army, I worked at the ski area for four years.NEWS: I heard that just recently.MOORE: Well everyone else does, right? I might as well work there too. But anyhow, I quit the job really to write the book. I did about 10 years of research—written, telephone and reunions, and finally we got a contract with Random House. Joe Galloway, he was in the battle with me for a little over half of the fight, he came in the first night. He and I together wrote the book, and it’s done very well; it’s on the New York Times bestseller list. The troopers who have fought in Vietnam in that tragic war over all those years have written to us that it really does capture the experience of being in Vietnam in a tough war with a very tough enemy. I was hoping that someday that it would be made into a film. I was sitting in my house in Crested Butte in about 1984 or ’85 writing a couple of chapters and I thought to myself, "Hey, this is going to make a hell of a movie someday." Now it will be on the streets next week. The reviews we get validate what we wanted to do. We wanted to write a book which was the real Vietnam. The movies on Vietnam depicting ground combat have all been nonsense.NEWS: I was going to ask you what you thought about movies like Platoon and more recently The Thin Red Line?MOORE: I have not seen The Thin Red Line yet, but I was told by one of my sons who has seen it that it was boring and more philosophical than anything. The people who put together the movie Platoon took every bad incident that ever happened in Vietnam and lumped it all into one movie. Officers smoking dope with their troops, sergeants killing one another, burning villages, all that stuff. It was terrible. Apocalypse Now was really not about Vietnam, if you saw that. The only good movie I’ve seen on Vietnam is a comedy called Good Morning Vietnam with Robin Williams. That was fun, but of course it was truly a comedy. But he depicted a real-life guy who was a disc jockey out of Saigon, and I can still remember that guy hollering into the microphone, "Gooooood Morning, Vietnam!"NEWS: How did the production of this movie come about?MOORE: I believe in fate. I believe that fate put Joe Galloway and me together on that battlefield, years and years ago. And I believe that fate had Randall Wallace going through an airport pick up our book because of the title, We Were Soldiers Once … And Young, which is a different type of a grabber title. Randy has told us that he read that book on a couple of flights, and he said that he just had to make a movie on it. So he got a hold of us. We’d been approached by several companies who wanted to make a movie, but we didn’t like any of them. But Randy came across to us as very, very professional, very sincere and very honest. Randy and his wife visited Julie and me in our home in Crested Butte in October three or four years ago. They visited us in our home down here in Alabama for a long weekend, and we got to know each other very well. He was determined to make this movie, but he was tied up with Braveheart. He wrote the screenplay for Braveheart, and he got Mel to do the lead and the directing, and of course it won the Oscar. Then he did Man in the Iron Mask, and then he was involved with a movie called Pearl Harbor for awhile. That took up some time, but then he could put full time into our movie, which he did. He’s just a hell of a nice guy. You should meet him some day. I’m a believer in fate, and I believe that kismet brought us all together, including Mel and Madeleine.NEWS: Do you think that the movie is true to your book?MOORE: The movie is superb. Although I was a consultant, Randall Wallace told me at the offset that "this is not another documentary. This is not the history channel. It’s a movie, and movies are emotional events." I previewed five written screenplays from 1995 on and made suggestions, some of which he accepted. But I was really a bit of a nuisance throughout because I kept drumming on him to emphasize the men down in the ranks, the riflemen, the sergeants, the second lieutenants, the men who win or lose the battles. I insisted that the movie show that men in battle fight and kill and die for each other, not for what a president says on TV, or for the flag or for the country. Men in battle fight for the men beside them. You look right there in Crested Butte. You’ve got Vietnam veterans just like I’m talking about. Like Jerry Heal, he and I were in the same division together in Vietnam—at different times, but he’s a First Cav Vietnam veteran—and Dave Lindsey, the mountain bike guru, those two guys are typical American draftees. They were conscripted during the war, they went to Vietnam and they fought and they made it through. I wanted the movie to clearly show guys like them, and it does. And I also wanted the film to show the respect that I had for the fighting ability for my enemy. I wanted to show the nonstop intensity of that three-day shootout. Another dimension that I wanted to be shown was the heartbreak back in America when those terrible "killed-in-action" telegrams started arriving and that awful knock at the door.NEWS: I’ve heard that in the movie, Madeleine Stowe, who portrays your wife, Julie, started delivering those telegrams. Did that really happen?MOORE: No, that’s a bit of Hollywood. When news about this terrible battle hit the newspapers on the next day after the battle began, the army was just not prepared for those numbers of casualties. Julie lived in a little rented house in Columbus, Georgia, with our five small children, and she and about 400 other First Cav Division wives were living in that small town outside of Fort Benning, Georgia. The town went under a hell of a shock. Back in the early days of the war, the telegrams were delivered by taxicab. And when Julie heard about that first telegram being delivered by a taxicab driver, she went to the Army Post to the commander and told him that she wanted to know immediately which women were going to get the telegrams that day. And she literally followed the taxicab so she could be there when the telegram was delivered. Julie attended the funerals of 13, 14, 15 of my men that were buried in the Fort Benning cemetery. Of course, she never told me anything about this because she didn’t want to worry me.NEWS: What’s something that you’d like audiences to keep in mind as they watch this film?MOORE: The thrust of our book and the movie captures the thrust of the book very well on the screen—I’d like everyone that sees that movie to come out of the theater with this message: Hate war but love the American warrior.NEWS: Are you attending the film’s premiere?MOORE: I’ve seen the film about three or four times at special screenings. The premiere is next week, in Los Angeles. I think it’s on Monday. As far as I know, at this time, my wife and I will be invited to the premiere.NEWS: We’ve talked about Mel Gibson portraying you. How do the other actors, like Sam Elliott, do portraying people that were close to you?MOORE: Sam Elliott … well, Mel Gibson better watch out or Sam is going to steal the show. Sam Elliott is profoundly professional. He is the ultimate sergeant major in this movie. He is absolutely superb. And I’ve become pretty good friends with Sam. We communicate, and he’s a down-to-earth guy and he’s a total pro. The guy takes on a role and he is the ultimate. As you know, he’s a big Western star and he’s waiting now for the Western movies to start coming back, I think. In the meantime, he played Col. Beauford in Gettysburg, and he plays the sergeant major in this movie. When you see this movie, you’re going to love Sam Elliott.NEWS: I already love Sam Elliott.MOORE: I think my wife would run away from home for him.NEWS: Who plays Joe Galloway?MOORE: A guy named Barry Pepper, who played Roger Maris in 61 and he was in The Green Mile and he was the left-handed sniper in Saving Private Ryan. Barry Pepper may well get a Best Supporting Actor nomination, along with Sam Elliott. He was superb. He’s a Canadian. He’s such a nice guy.Last Friday my co-author, Joe Galloway, and I were invited to Fort Hood, Texas, for a screening of the movie for the First Calvary Division, which is the division we were in in Vietnam. And Madeleine was there with her husband and Barry Pepper as well. And I tell you what, the troops just showered them with affection and with gratitude that they would come down and talk with them, and they were there all day long, into the night, with the troops. By the way, the First Cav Division at the premiere is going to have horse platoon. They have an 1870s horse platoon, like in the Indian Wars—calvary uniforms, boots, breeches, horses, Conastoga wagon with a dog on the seat. And they’re going to have the First Cav Division Color Guard flags at the premiere. So that should be rather … showy. A little Hollywoody, probably. But frankly I’ll be glad when it’s all over with so I can get back my life. I should be out there skiing right now! It’s been a very revealing learning experience, and it’s been a lot of fun. I’ve met some wonderful people.NEWS: Are you appearing on talk shows or anything like that?MOORE: The people that I want to see interviewed and get the credit are my troopers, the guys who fought the battle. I will probably be called up and interviewed of course, but I hope that it will be held to a minimum. I personally don’t like being in the spotlight. I just don’t like it. I want my troops to get the credit, not me.XXX



Did any Vietnam Veteran see this part.

.."Oh, it was their country -&- we were invading them"...

...MEL GIBSON, NBC ..''Today''.. 2/25/02.

We Were Soldiers
Posted by Anonymous on 2002-02-26 11:14:52
My Score:

Mel Gibson to Ann Curry TODAY show feb 25

Mel Gibson " IT WAS THEIR COUNTRY, WE INVADED THEM".

ALOHA RONNIE
Has No Life

Joined: 05 Sep 2001 03:26 am
Posts: 638
From: RONNIE GUYER

Posted: 26 Feb 2002 09:42 pm Post subject: nbc today feb 25 Gibson ouote

NEVER FORGET

.."Oh, it was their country -&- we were invading them"...

...MEL GIBSON, NBC ..''Today''.. 2/25/02.

...If it were not for MEL GIBSON and his ..''BRAVEHEART''.. Group... America would NEVER know about the Heroism of Many in the -Valley of Death- that was the IA DRANG-1965.

..''WE WERE SOLDIERS''.. steers pretty clear of Politics and focuses on the Bravehearts of America of long ago as the example they really are for US to now follow in a new -Time of War- in a New Century with an Enemy that is now Within BIG TIME.

...MEL GIBSON is welcome to his own opinion or slip of the tongue thru a process a multitude TV Interviews.

...His Actions speak volumes to US on the Silver Screen ...ALL FOR THE BETTER.

Signed:..ALOHA RONNIE Guyer / Vet-Battle of IA DRANG-1965 / Landing Zone Falcon / http://www.LzXray.com

NEVER FORGET
...Vet/Battle of IA DRANG-1965, U.S. 7th Air Cav S-1 Personnel Clerk, Landing Zone Falcon - Lt. Col. HAL G. MOORE''s Radioman/Driver/Orderly right up to IA DRANG-1965. I will NEVER FORGET typing MOORE''s -Letters of Condolances- to our Hero KIA-WIA Families

alphaco2/8-70/71
Here Often

Joined: 24 Dec 2001 07:28 pm
Posts: 13
From: Phoenix

Posted: 26 Feb 2002 09:57 pm Post subject: nbc today feb 25 Gibson ouote

I agree with you 150% Ronnie - well spoken on your part - OUTSTANDING







Russell L. Ross - 4/5/2003

What Moore was suppose to do, check sheet for an AirAssault, note all the critical items missing from Moore's after action report. show's he didnt know what he was doing.

http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/history/aar-xray.pdf


We Were Soldiers=FICTION, MOORE Col. KLINK, Galloway Rambo the Reporter

What Lt. Col. Moore was suppose to do
LACKS IN THE TECHNICAL, INFANTRY, AIR ASSAULT TATICS, LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES

Fiction Part Lt. Col. Harold G. Moore, Joseph L. Galloway ( A Senior writer for the U.S.News and World Report ), Jack P. Smith ( Of ABC NEWS )and Vincent Cantu.

ALL other enlisted men, Officers, 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry, B company 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry, and the rest of the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry, Their stories cannot be desputed.

Lt. Col. Moores duty as the:

AIR ASSAULT TASK FORCE COMMANDER'S

CHECKLIST:

This list is designed to summarize the essential items that should be included in the planning phase of an air assault operation by Air Assault Task Force commanders. The list should be referred to throughout the planning process to ensure that major planning steps are not omitted. If there is doubt as to how to accomplish a particular task or item, refer to the unit SOPs ( or FM 57-35 and FM 7-20 ).

2. ACTION UPON RECEIPT OF ORDERS

a. Analyze mission(s).

b. Determine specified and implied task(s) and objectives.

c. Develop time schedule.

d. Obtain aircraft ACL from Air Mission Commander and/or air liaison officer.

e. Issue warning order.

3. GROUND TACTICAL PLAN

a. Choose, as appropriate, assault objectives.

b. Designate Landing Zone available for use. Consider distances from Landing Zone to objective.

c. Establish D-day and H-hour ( time of assault ).

d. Identify special tasks required to accomplish mission.

e. Means available to accomplish mission include:

(1) Organic troops ( consider distance from present location to Pick-up Zone ),

(2) Aviation resources to include attack helicopter, and Air Force support (establish liaison with Air Mission Commander and/or ALO ) ( initial information, support requirements from ground unit to include forward arming and refueling point ).

(3) Engineers.

(4) Signal to include aerial radio relay.

(5) Medical.

(6) Fire support.

(a) Close tactical air support.

(b) Field artillery within range.

(c) Other indirect fire weapons ( mortar and naval gunfire ).

(d) Preparation fires for Landing Zone ( signals for lifting and/or shifting ) .

(e) Flight corridors.

(f) Air defense suppression.

(7) Control measures needed.

(8) Subsequent operations ( for example, defense linkup, withdrawal ) that may be conducted.

NOTE: Announce concept to tail and subordinate units as soon as possible to facilitete planning.

4. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND REQUIREMENTS

a. Enemy locations to include air defense positions.

b. Commander's aerial recon of objective area ( if practical ).

c. Aerial reconnaissance ( side-looking airborne radar [SLARI aerial photos ).

d. Sensor reports.

e. Terrain study.

f. Weather forecast.

g. Latest intelligence summary (INTSUM).

h. Enemy Priisoner War handling procedures.

i. Civilian control procedures.

5. LANDING

a. Selection of primary and alternate Landing Zone ( capacity ).

b. Landing Zone identification procedures for landing sites include:

(1) Colored smoke.

(2) Panels.

(3) Flares.

(4) Lights.

c. Use of pathfinders.

d. Landing formations.

e. Approach and departure directions.

f. Landing Zone preparation fires to support landing plan and ground tactical plan include:

(1) Use of TACAIR ( close air support, air defense suppression, and air cover ).

(2) Use of indirect fire weapons.

(3) Use of attack helicopters and units.

(4) Use of EW.

g. Other fire support considerations include:

(1) Shifting of fires.

(2) Lifting of fires.

(3) Suppression of enemy air defenses.

6. AIR MOVEMENT

a. Flight routes ( primary-alternate-return ) require the following data:

(1) Release Points; direction and distance to Landing Zone.

(2) Start Point; air control points, Comunication Check Points, and Release Point.

(3) Phase lines ( if used ).

(4) Estimate time en route.

(5) Maneuver areas for attack helicopter.

(6) Laagers, to include location, mission, and security.

(7) Friendly air defense considerations.

(8) Enemy air defense intelligence.

b. Air movement table to implement air movement includes:

(1) Units to be lifted.

(2) Number and type of lift helicopters allocated to each unit.

(3) Aviation units that will support unit.

(4) Lift-off times.

(5) Routes.

(6) Unit Landing Zone.

(7) H-hour ( landing time of initial serial ).

c. Alternate communications plan includes:

(1) FM.

(2) UHF.

(3) VHF.

(4) Visual/audio signals.

(5) Aerial radio relay.

7. LOADING

a. Pick-up Zone assignment by unit ( primary-alternate) (bump and/or straggler contingency plan ).

b. Holding areas.

c. Routes from assembly areas to holding area to Pick-up Zone.

d. Attack helicopter utilization ( overmatch and security ) includes:

(1) En route to Pick-up Zone

(2) While lift aircraft are in Pick-up Zone

(3) En route to Landing Zone

(4) Recon of Landing Zone; marking of Landing Zone

8. SUPPORT PIANS FOR CONDUCT OF AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

a. Alternate plans and procedures due to weather ( H-hour increment to delay operation ).

b. Downed helicopter procedures to include:

(1) Crew and passenger duties.

(2) Aircraft disposition instruction.

c. Rally points.

d. Escape and evasion instructions.

e. Laager sites.

f. Rules of engagement.

g. Deception plans that will be used.

h. Spare aircraft available.

i. Reconnaissance ( air-ground
) that will be conducted.

j. Straggler control procedures.

k. Reporting ( en route, lift-off, touchdown, intelligence, and contact ).

l. Aircraft disposition after assault.

m. Health service support and evacuation procedures.

9. ACTIONS THAT MUST BE COMPLETED

a. Warning orders.

b. Liaison officer ( receive and dispatch ).

c. Attachments and detachments.

d. Issue commander's concept ( time and place ).

e. Briefings ( time and place .

f. Preparation of OPORD.

g. Issue OPORD ( time and place ).

10. LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS

a. Class V resupply.

b. Feeding plan.

c. Water.

d. Medevac ( call sign, frequency, location, and procedures ).

e. Refueling ( location of FARP, ammunition available ).

11. DEBRIEFING

a. Lessons learned:

(1) Ground units.

(2) Aviation units.

b. Actions taken for correction.

Troops available.

a. The Air Assault Task Force should have enough combat power to seize initial objectives and protect the Landing Zone until follow-on echelons arrive in the objective area.

b. Assault ( lift ) helicopter capability is the single most important variable in determining how much combat power can be introduced into the objective area.

c. Aircrew endurance must be considered. For planning purposes, the Air Assault Task Force Commander should consider eight hours a day and four hours of night flying to be a safe limit for aircrews.

If those limits are exceeded during a single period, then degraded aircrew performance can be expected on the following days.

The foundation of a successful air assault operation is the commander's ground tactical plan, around which subsequent planning is based. The ground tactical plan specifies actions in the objective area to ultimately accomplish the mission and address subsequent operations.

Elements of the ground tactical plan.

a. The ground tactical plan for an air assault operation contains essentially the same elements as any other infantry attack but differs in that it is prepared to capitalize on speed and mobility in order to achieve surprise.

Assault echelons are placed on or near the objective and organized so as to be capable of immediate seizure of objectives and rapid consolidation for subsequent operations.

If adequate combat power cannot be introduced quickly into the objective area, then the air assault force must land away from the objective and build up combat power.

The air assault force then assaults like any other infantry unit and the effectiveness of the air assault operation is diminished.

b. The scheme of maneuver may assume a variety of possibilities depending on the commander's evaluation including, in particular, the availability of Landing Zones in the area. The plan should include:

(1) Missions of all task force elements and methods for employment.

(2) Zones of attack, sectors, or areas of operations with graphic control measures.

(3) Task organization to include command relationships.

(4) Location and size of reserves.

(5) Fire support to include graphic control measures.

(6) Combat service support.

NOTE: This plan is prepared by the Air Assault Task Force commander, Staff with input from all task force elements and is in sufficient detail to facilitate understanding by subordinate commanders. It is imperative that all aircrews know this ground tactical plan and the ground commander's intent.
Development of flight routes.

a. Flight routes are developed based on tactical and technical factors. It may be necessary for a route to pass through an adjacent unit's sector. When that is the case, approval from that unit is obtained and coordination is made. Regardless of route direction or location, certain criteria are considered.

b. Seldom are all characteristics present in any one situation; one or more may have to be omitted. Flight routes:

(1) Are as short as possible, consistent with other considerations.

(2) Avoid turns in excess of 45 degrees, when formation flying is required, to facilitate control of the aircraft formation.

(3) Provide terrain masking to deny exposure to enemy observation, direct fire weapons, and radar acquisition, if possible.

(4) Provide cover when terrain permits, placing terrain mass and/or vegetation between the enemy and the aircraft.

(5) Provide for ease of navigation ( day or night ).

(6) Avoid masking friendly fires, particularly supporting artillery.

(7) Avoid known enemy units and air defense positions.

(8) Avoid overflight of built-up areas.

Flight corridor.

a. When there is competition for airspace, it may be necessary to modify the flight route(s) and designate a flight corridors). The corridor reserves airspace around a flight route for Air Assault Task Force use, and prevents artillery, tactical air (TACAIR), and other elements from firing or flying through when it is in use.

b. Authority to establish a flight corridor is obtained from the brigade and/or division commanders. Designated flight corridors are coordinated through airspace management channels. This ensures that airspace within corridors is not violated.

c. The corridor begins as a flight route and is then modified as required. The size of corridors varies. Normally, they extend 200 to 300 meters on either side of the designated flight route, and 500 feet above and below the route flight altitude.

d. Helicopter formations operating at terrain flight ( low ) altitudes do not require minimum altitude corridor designations. The upper air limit of the corridor may vary and would be specified by the headquarters establishing it.

e. If it is necessary to restrict the operational area to only those aircraft directly involved in the air assault operation, a restricted area can be established by the airspace management element.

Flight axis.

a. The flight axis is another variation of the flight route. It is a flight route that has width ( like the corridor ) but does not have airspace reserved to a specific altitude
( as does the corridor ).

b. The flight axis permits deviation laterally along the flight route but does not restrict the employment of other assets. It gives the Air Mobile Commander a choice in selecting en route formations and freedom to alter direction without coordinating a new flight route.

Expedient flight routes.

These routes are established with checkpoints. If time is not available to develop and disseminate Pick-up Zones, Landing Zones, and flight route information, the commander can define an expedient route by reference to checkpoints.
.
Flight route control measures.

a. Control measures assist in navigation and provide control to ensure the Air Assault Task Force arrives in the Landing Zone on time and in sequence.

b. Air control points ( ACP ) designate each point where the flight route changes direction They include readily identifiable topographic features or points marked by electronic navigational aids. A route may have as many ACPs as necessary to control the air movement. The Start Point ( SP )and Relase Point ( RP ) are also air control points

c. An ACP may be further designated as a communication checkpoint ( CCP ). A CCP is a point along the flight route that serial commanders report to the Air Mobile Commander. Radio transmissions are made only when necessary. If a report is required, the transmission is short. This is possible by using codes. For example, the short radio transmission, "One, One King," could mean that the first serial of lift I is crossing CCP King.

Designation of routes.

a. Once tentative flight routes are identified, they are designated for use by each unit. When large groups of aircraft are employed, dispersion is achieved by using multiple routes. However, with large serials it is often necessary to use fewer routes, or even a single route, in order to concentrate available supporting fires. Also, the number of alternate and return routes may be limited.

b. Primary, alternate, and return routes to be used by each subordinate unit are designated. When selecting routes, the following factors are considered:

(1) Interference with ground action. Overflying ground elements may interfere with their supporting fire. Flight routes should be clear of the gun-target line when possible.

(2) Support of landing plan. To reduce vulnerability of the air assault force, flight routes should facilitate rapid approach, landing, and departure from selected Landing Zones.

(3) Enemy ground and air capabilities. Selected flight routes make maximum use of terrain, cover, and concealment to minimize enemy observation and target acquisition.

(4) Available fire support. Flight routes allow support from all available resources.

(5) Available air cover. Flight routes are identified in order to provide air cover for friendly forces en route.

(6) Weather conditions. Flight routes remain usable based on prevailing weather during execution of the air assault operation.

(7) Terrain. Flight routes use terrain to maximum advantage to reduce vulnerability of the aircraft formations.

(8) Time ( distance ) from Pick-up Zone to Landing Zone. Flight routes are as short as possible to reduce flying time.




What Crandall as the Air mission Commander was suppose to do
Major Bruce Crandall duty as the :

AIR MISSION COMMANDER'S OR AIR LIAISON OFFICER'S

CHECKLIST:

This list is designed to summarize the essential items included in the planning phase of an air assault operation by the Air Mobile Commander.

The list is referred to throughout the planning process to ensure that major planning steps are not omitted. If there is doubt as to how to accomplish a particular task or item, refer to the unit SOPs ( or FM 57-35 FM 7-20 ).

2. ACTION PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FOR SUPPORT UNIT

Meet attack helicopter and pathfinder representatives at prearranged site. Obtain briefing from operation's officer to include:

a. Support unit.

(1) Mission.

(2) Location.

(3) Contact officer.

(4) FM frequency.

(5) Call sign.

b. Mission.

(1) Requirements for aerial reconnaissance.

(a) Utility helicopters.

(b) Attack helicopters.

(c) Observation helicopters.

(2) Special mission requests.

(3) Number of aircraft, by type, that are available for the operation ( status of assets ).

(4) Utility, observation, cargo, or scout helicopters.

(5) Attack helicopters.

c. Allowable ( ACL ) for each type of aircraft.

(1) Number of troops ______; pounds of cargo ______ .

(2) Number of pathfinders available and time available.

(3) Pathfinder equipment available.

(4) Specific problem areas or requirements that may affect support of ground unit ( FARP location and time of operation ). ( Estimated refueling time, and refuel-rearm plan. )

(5) Obtain necessary equipment that will be required at or by supported unit.

(a) Aircraft or vehicle.

(b) Maps, overlays, photographs.

(c) Radios, CEOI for exchange.

(d) Personal gear

(e) Additional headsets for reconnaissance, if required.

(6) Check with Air Assault Task Force commander for special instructions.

NOTE: Confirm if supported unit is prepared to receive Liaison Officer.

3. ACTIONS EN ROUTE

a. Establish and maintain communications.

b. Obtain status of fires and permission to enter area of operations.

4. ACTIONS AT SUPPORTED UNIT LOCATION

a. Report to supported commander, S3, or Liaison Officer.

b. Brief supported unit on number and type of aircraft available, Allowable cargo load ( ACL, ) and other essential information.

c. Obtain initial briefing on the following:

(1) Enemy situation.

(2) Friendly situation.

(3) Ground tactical plan ( make map overlays ).

(4) Supported participating aviation units. Coordinate and integrate plans as necessary.

d. Assist supported unit in planning the following:

(1) Movement to Pick-up Zone for ground and aviation unit and control facilities.

(2) Loading.

(a) Location and selection of Pick-up Zone.

(b) Special Pick-up Zone marking procedures.

(c) Aircraft marking procedures.

(d) Landing formation and direction.

(e) Loads: Troops. Cargo.

(f) Communication control procedures.

(g) Pick-up Zone control ( obtain call sign and frequency ).

(h) Manifesting ( completion of airloading table )

(i) Priorities of bump by aircraft.

(j) Pick-up Zone and lift-off times.

e. Air movement.

(1) Flight route. Provide guidance and give technical approval on selection of the following

(a) Start Point ( SP.)

(b) ACPS.

(c) CCPS.

(d) Release Point.( RP )

(2) Alternate and return flight routes.

(3) Formation: select en route formation that gives the most control and is least vulnerable to enemy interference; provide guidance for selection of Pick-up Zone and Landing Zone formations.

(4) Altitude and speed.

(5) Overwatch and security plan for attack and scout helicopters.

(6) Fire support plan en route.

(7) Air movement table ( assist in completing ).

(8) Pathfinder support ( finalize )

f. Landing.

(1) Touchdown time. ( in terms of H-hour ).

(2) Landing Zone designations and locations.

(3) Size and description.

(4) Landing Zone marking and procedures.

(5) Landing directions.

(6) Landing formation.

(7) Traffic pattern for subsequent lifts.

(8) Communications, control procedures, and use of pathfinders.

g. Landing Zone preparatory and suppressive fires.

(1) Combat Air Support ( CAS )( start time, duration, target and type of ordnance, and attack direction ).

(2) Indirect fires ( start time, duration, target and type of fuze, special instructions ).

(3) Plan for attack helicopter unit's scheme of maneuver and plan for overwatch and security ( start time, duration, special instruction, attack direction ).

(4) Firing of lift helicopter weapons ( provide suppressive fires upon landing ).

(5) Fire plan of debarking troops.

(6) Call signs and/or frequency signals for lifting and/or shifting support fires.

h. Refueling requirements.

(1) Location of Foward Arming Refuleing Point(s).( FARP )

(2) Time required.

i. Aircraft maintenance.

(1) Downed aircraft procedures.

(2) Spare aircraft procedures.

5. ACTIONS PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FROM SUPPORTED UNIT

a. Obtain copies of OPORD with overlays and annexes.

b. Confirm all times.

c. Last-minute weather check.

(1) Mission procedures ( delay increments ).

(2) Alert procedures.

d. Debriefing the commander.

6. ACTIONS UPON RETURN TO AVIATION UNIT

a. Inform unit commander.

b. Brief personnel, as appropriate, on all above information.

c. Maintain close liaison with support unit.

EXECUTE MISSION AS PLANNED

MISSION DEBRIEFING FOR AVIATION UNIT

AFTER-ACTION REPORT




Duties of the
Battalion Commander

Technical and Tactical Proficiency.

The commander knows the technical and tactical aspects of all assets
that comprise his battlefield operating systems.

He understands and uses terrain well.

He communicates this knowledge and his professionalism through his
actions and through interactions with other officers and soldiers.

Delegation.

The commander trusts his subordinate leaders and delegates authority to them.
He develops them so the mission can continue when he is gone.
This is leadership in depth throughout the chain of command.

MISSION TACTICS

The purpose of command and control is to allow the commander to
generate and apply combat power at the decisive point on the battlefield.

Mission tactics is a method of directing military operations; subordinates
are encouraged and expected to act alone in executing assigned missions, consistent with the intent of senior commanders.

The commander must--

Assign resources with as few restrictions on employment as possible.
The commander allocates assets and support priorities to subordinates
and specifies only the results he wants achieved.

Allow maximum freedom of action within the scope of his intent. Because
battles often develop in unforeseen directions, leaders often must act with
incomplete information or instructions.

Failure to act quickly can result in a lack of superior combat power at critical
times and places. Taking advantage of opportunities to accomplish the mission
is allowed, encouraged, expected, and sometimes required.

Higher commanders should be informed before action is taken, if feasible.

Structure communication to allow subordinates to command well forward.
The commander must position himself on the battlefield where he can exert
the greatest influence, both through subordinate leaders and directly.

At the same time, he must retain the ability to shift the main effort of the battle.
The commander can be forward with the lead elements in the command group,
or he can be in the main Command Post.

He must be able to command and control all organic and supporting elements
equally from either location.

Subordinate initiative and independence, though encouraged, is limited by the requirements for unity of command, unity of effort, and the commander's intent.

Subordinates who feel they must disobey orders due to a perceived change in
the situation must accept the responsibility for their actions. The commander's
intent must be clearly stated and foremost in the minds of subordinate leaders.

To win, subordinate leaders must display initiative, but their initiative must be
driven by their understanding of the commanders' intent, not by a desire for independent action.

For best results, unit actions are synchronized. If independent action is
required to meet the commander's intent for the operation, the action is
taken--but subordinate leaders must carefully balance the need for
synchronized unit action with the changing tactical situation.

They must look at the big picture. Thus initiative and freedom of action are
more likely used during an exploitation or pursuit; an independent action during
a delay or during a withdrawal under enemy pressure could produce disaster for
the entire force.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER ( XO )

The XO is second in command and the battalion commander's main assistant. As the second in charge, he must be prepared to assume the duties of the commander.

a. The XO, as the coordinator of the battalion staff, establishes staff operating procedures.

He ensures the commander and staff are informed on matters affecting the command. To coordinate and synchronize the plan, the XO assembles and supervises the staff during the decision-making process.

He establishes the required liaison. Unless instructed otherwise by the commander, all staff officers inform the XO of any recommendations or information they give directly to the commander or any instructions they receive directly from the commander.

When required, he represents the commander, ( SUPERVISES THE MAIN COMMAND POST and its Operations, and provides for battalion logistical support.

b. The XO, as the second in command, transmits the commander's decision to staff sections and, in the name of the commander, to subordinate units as needed.

The XO keeps abreast of the situation and future plans and represents the commander during the commander's absence, directing action IAW established policy.

He is considered a combat leader and is prepared to assume command at any time. During combat, he supports the commander by anticipating problems and synchronizing operations at the MAIN COMMAND POST.

ALTHOUGHT THE XO NORMALLY STAYS IN THE MAIN COMMAND POST
( DURING COMBAT,) HE MUST BE READY TO MOVE IF HE IS REQUIRED AT ANOTHER LOCATION.


c. All information flows through the TOC and the XO except when circumstances require otherwise. The exception occurs during fast-paced operations when vital information flows via orders and reports between the command group and the key maneuver elements. In this situation, the XO is a key leader in the TOC, sometimes checking attachments--for example, monitoring the nets and progress of supporting units--monitoring the overall battle, ensuring reports are rendered as necessary, supervising planning of future operations, and providing the commander with situational assessments as needed.

d. The XO assumes responsibility for the diverse elements operating in the TOC during the battle.

Those elements receive and analyze information from a wide variety of sources. The XO analyzes all of this for information that might be immediately useful to the commander.

The commander uses the XO's analysis along with the steady flow of information coming from his subordinate commanders and the advice of the operations officer.

KEY DUTIES

SUPERVISES THE MAIN COMMAND POST AND ITS OPERATIONS, AND PROVIDES FOR BATTALION LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

DURING COMBAT, he supports the commander by anticipating problems and synchronizing operations at the main Command Post.

Although the XO NORMALLY STAYs in the MAIN COMMAND POST DURING COMBAT, he must be ready to move if he is required at another location.


COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

The Command Sergeant Major ( CSM ) is the senior NCO in the unit. He acts in the name of the commander when dealing with other NCOs in the unit and advises the commander concerning the enlisted ranks.

Though he is not an administrator, he must understand the Administrative, Logistical, and operational functions of the unit to which he is assigned.

Since he is normally the most experienced soldier in the unit, his attention should be focused on operations and training and on how well the commander's decisions and policies are being carried out.

He is the senior enlisted trainer in the organization. He works closely with company commanders when reaching and training first sergeants and platoon sergeants. He maintains close contact with subordinate and attached unit NCOs.

The CSM must be Tactically and Technically proficient in Combat operations at Battalion, Company, Platoon, and Squad levels.

The CSM should act as the commander's representative in supervising aspects vital to an operation, as determined by the commander and by himself.

For example, he can help control movement through a breach in a critical obstacle or at a river crossing, or, he can help coordinate a passage of lines.

The CSM can lead the quartering party during a major movement.

He can also help in the CSS effort during the battle; he can perform tasks such as monitoring casualty evacuation.

Leadership Principle 1

Be Technically and Tactically Proficent

To know you job thoroughly, you must posses not only specific knowledge of its details but also a broad general knowledge concerning its area of intrest.

You should be competent in combat operations and training as well as in the technical and admimistrative aspects of your duties.

If you demonstrate deficincies in these functions,your subordinates will lose confidance in you as a leader.

Keep abreast of current military devolopements.

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY:

No one expects the battalion commander to act as a rifleman no
matter how proficient he is.

As he does so,

Who commands his battalion?

Who gives guidance to his Company Commanders.

He is taking responsibility away from his men and not meeting his own.

Leadership Principle 9

Develop a sense of Responsibility in you subordianates

Delegation of authority commensurate with responsibility developes mutual confidenece and respect between senior and subordinates.

It also encourages the subordinate to exercise initiative and to give wholeharted cooperation.

The leader who, By properly delegating authority, Demomstrates faith in his subordinates will increse their desire to accept greater responsibility.

FAILURE TO DELEGATE NECESSARY AUTHORITY IS POOR LEADERSHIP

INTEGRITY

Integerity, the uprightness of character and soundness of moral principles, the quality of absolute truthfulness and honesty, is an indespensable trait od a leader.

On the Armed Forces team the stakes are to hight to place the lives of its members in the hands of men with questionable Integerty. Unless a nan be honest, he cannot be relied upon at all. there is no compromise.

The military proffession does not pernit the slightest deviation fromthe higest standards of personal integerty.

Be accurate and truthful in ALL STATEMENTS, both official and unoffical.


Russell L. Ross - 4/4/2003

Vietnam War Bibliography:

Documentaries and Films

We were Soldiers:

In the film, things are looking desperate on the morning of the third day, with a serious danger the Americans, short of ammunition, may be about to be overrun.

Moore orders a bayonet charge.

This is bullshit, surely inspired by Colonel Chamberlain’s desperate bayonet charge at the end of battle for Little Round Top, on the second day at Gettysburg.

By dawn of the third day at X-Ray, the Americans, reinforced and with plenty of ammunition, were no longer in danger of being overrun.

There was an advance on the morning of the third day, with bayonets fixed, but this was a matter of extending the perimeter at a time when the U.S. force had grown considerably larger than it had been in the early stages of the battle, so it made sense to extend the perimeter.

It was not the act of desperation portrayed in the film.



Return to Table of Contents

Copyright © 1996, 2002, Edwin E. Moïse. This document may be reproduced only if this copyright notice is reproduced with it. Revised October 15, 2002.


We Were Soldiers. 2001. The story of the 1/7 Cavalry and the battle at Landing Zone X-Ray, November 14-16, 1965; this battle was one portion of the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley. Mel Gibson plays Colonel Harold Moore, the battalion commander. The film is based on the book We Were Soldiers, Once . . . And Young, by Harold Moore and Joseph Galloway (page numbers below are from my copy of the 1993 HarperCollins edition; I believe the page numbers were different in the 1992 Random House edition).
    Given the media hype about how realistic this film was, I was startled at how inaccurate it turned out to be, when I finally saw it. It is quite bad on the beginning and end of the battle, though considerably better on the middle.
    The action starts with Col. Moore being informed one day that the enemy had hit the American camp at Plei Me the previous night ("last night"), but had then withdrawn from the attack on Plei Me without having inflicted any casualties. Colonel Moore was shown on a map the location to which the PAVN force had withdrawn; on the map this looked to me like "Chu Prong" and was clearly what is generally known as the Chu Pong Massif. Col. Moore was told to take his battalion, the 1/7 Cavalry, and attack that enemy force; the impression is conveyed that he started transporting troops into Landing Zone X-Ray soon thereafter—either the same day or the following day.
    The attack on Plei Me had not been a matter of a few hours on a single night, it lasted six days, from the evening of October 19, 1965, until the evening of October 25. The attackers had inflicted significant casualties during the battle. Most of the casualties were not American; they were CIDG troops defending the camp, or ARVN troops ambushed while coming to its relief. But at least five U.S. military personnel had been killed in the battle—one on the ground, and four in a helicopter that was shot down while taking off from Plei Me during the battle.
    For several weeks after the Battle of Plei Me, various units of the Air Cavalry hunted the PAVN forces involved in various areas. It was not until November 13 that Moore was told to head for the vicinity of the Chu Pong. The following morning, November 14, he picked Landing Zone X-Ray as the place, and began landing his troops there.
    Col. Moore, in the film, talks in terms of being able to carry sixty men into the landing zone in the first lift. In fact he got almost eighty men in the first lift, and over eighty in the second lift for a combined total of “160-plus” (Moore & Galloway p. 73). The film shows the combat breaking out when only the first lift was on the ground, presumably sixty men according to Moore’s previous statement. In fact, the combat did not begin until after three lifts, probably over 240 men, were on the ground. The pattern of understating the size of the American force continues to the end of the film. Reinforcements are shown coming in by helicopter only, and they appear to be simply reinforcements for Moore’s battalion. One never sees another battalion commander on the ground at X-Ray, and when Moore and his battalion leave, they are shown leaving the landing zone empty. The film totally omits a battalion, the 2/5 Cavalry, that marched in overland, arriving around noon on the second day, and was still there after Moore and his battalion had left.
    Shortly after they landed, Moore's troops captured a prisoner. In the film, the prisoner says the PAVN has 4,000 troops on the mountain overlooking the landing zone. According to Moore's book, the prisoner said the PAVN had three battalions there, which according to Moore would have come to “more than 1,600 men” (Moore & Galloway, p. 73).
    What is startling about these distortions is that they were so gratuitous. Moore really was badly outnumbered when the combat began, enough so a film using the real numbers would have had no trouble presenting an image of heroic American struggle against great odds. Instead of using the real numbers, this film chose to understate the size of Moore’s force at the moment the first shots were fired by a factor of four, while exaggerating the size of the PAVN force in the immediate vicinity by more than a factor of two.
    The PAVN on the mountain overlooking the landing zone have a quite roomy underground tunnel complex in the film, big enough so that infantry units are shown running through tunnels heading for exits to the surface, to attack Moore's force. We do not see how many underground rooms filled with troops there are, we simply see that when the commander (in the actual battle he was Senior Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Huu An, and the rank tabs I saw on the actor in the film seem consistent with this) orders an attack, troops stream through the tunnels and out doorways onto the surface, to go and carry out the attack. The first time we see men running through a tunnel, it is low enough to they have to run with their heads hunched down, and about three feet wide, perhaps a bit more. But the tunnels seem to grow as the movie goes on; toward the end, we once see a Vietnamese running along, with about a foot of clearance between the top of his head and the roof of the tunnel, and about a foot of clearance between each of his elbows and the side walls. There are no fighting bunkers, only an underground command center, underground rooms to hold troops, and tunnels to connect these with one another and with the surface. (I am not deducing the absence of fighting bunkers only from the fact that none are visible; the lack of such fighting bunkers is made clear by a PAVN officer’s comment, late in the film, about the defenselessness of the command center.) While Lt. Col. An did have an underground command center, I doubt he had extensive underground quarters for troops, and I am sure the the tunnels through which men moved would not have been so generous in their dimensions as those shown in the later sections of the film.
    There does not seem to be any significant amount of fixed-wing air support in the first few hours, in the film. Air support does not become copious until a "Broken Arrow" is declared, early on the second day. The “Broken Arrow” is something that Colonel Moore declares after intense inner struggle, and is treated as a matter of desperation; it means his unit is being overrun. In fact significant air support had begun earlier on the first day than the film suggested. A “Broken Arrow” was not as extreme a matter as the film suggested—it meant that an American unit was in danger of being overrun, not that it was actually being overrun—and Colonel Moore didn’t need to declare it because a lower-ranking officer did so, without needing to go through any inner struggle, because a "Broken Arrow" was not a big enough deal to require inner struggle, or to require that he consult the colonel before declaring it (Moore & Galloway 175).



Russell L. Ross - 4/3/2003

URAL to Moore's after action report

http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/history/aar-xray.pdf

sorry about the other goof


Russell l. Ross - 4/3/2003

Moores after action report, No mention of fixing bayonets or Bayonet attack.

http://www.hnn.us/comments/856.html

URAL to Moore's after action report.

This is a PDF file and takes about a minute to load


Russell L. Ross - 4/3/2003

Subj: We Were Soldiers is Fiction lacks in Technical, tatical, airmobile,infantry tatics Date: 2/26/2002 1:06:21 PM Pacific Standard Time

From: Lzalbany65 To: president@whitehouse.gov
Right-click picture(s) to display picture options

Subj: Joseph L. Galloway special consultant to Secretary of State Colin Powell
Date: 2/23/2002 3:14:31 PM Pacific Standard Time

From: Lzalbany65 To: senator@boxer.senate.gov, senator@feinstein.senate.gov, Secretary@state.gov

And you wounder why they KILL the Reporters.

Mr. JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, Training AT ALL.

Who am I? lzalbany65@aol.com Russell L. Ross 1741 Maysong ct. San Jose, Ca 95131-2727 ph 408 926-9336

Sept 1965-66 SP/4 Russell L. Ross RA17630469 D company 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry Recon Platoon ( LoneRanger call sign ) 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile An Khe Vietnam.

1964 B company 1st Battalion 511 Infantry ( Airborne ) 11 Air Assualt ( test ) FT. Benning, Georgia.

1965 B company 1/511 became B company 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry ( Airborne ) 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile FT. Benning, Georgia.

And in July 1965 I was sent to the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile.

JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY ( Rambo The Reporter ) IS NOW SELLING HIS COMBAT PICTURES FROM LANDING ZONE X-RAY. Joseph L. Galloway The Walter Mitty of the war, Rambo the Reporter, A Plagiarist, Fiction writer, and now add fraud.

Galloway brandishes a Swedish K submachinegun at Danang in August 1965. day battle. Joe prior to Xray battle

He is the only civilian to receive a medal from the U.S. Army for valor during the Vietnam War—a Bronze Star with Combat V for rescuing wounded soldiers under fire in the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965.

( Even though Moore didnt see him do this he wrote him up for it .added by me )

A veteran of 42 years in journalism with United Press International and U.S. News & World Report, he is coauthor with retired Army Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore of We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young (New York: Random House, 1992).

Galloway—the award-winning newsman and current special consultant to Secretary of State General Colin Powell spoke recently with Fred L. Schultz at U.S. Naval Institute headquarters. STEVE NORTHUP http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles02/PROgalloway02.htm

Why is Joseph L. Galloway altering his combat pictures of Landing Zone X-Ray?? is it becouse they show the truth and not the lies written by Galloway and Moore in their Book We Were Soldiers Once and Young ( The X-Ray part ).

Joseph L. Galloway is altering some of his combat pictures to match the story line in the book, as he now has the equipement to change them.

!!!!!WARNING!!!!! if you buy these pictures, be warned, some of the pictures you see at this web site isnt the orignal pictures.

The photographs offered are from the personal collection of Joe Galloway ( Rambo the Reporter ) and were taken at LZ X-Ray during and after the action in the Ia Drang Valley, November 14-16, 1965. The images reflect the savagery of the combat, a feel for the emotions of the soldiers involved and a sense for the terrain in which the battle was fought.

The photographs have never before been published and most have been seen only by a handful of participants in the action.

Actually some pictures have been published and seen by over 26 million people.

These images will help put a real face on the people, places and events in the upcoming movie, "We Were Soldiers Once...And Young", starring Mel Gibson. A film based on the book of the same name by Lt. Gen. Hal Mooore and Joe.

Stories Part Fiction Galloway embelished for them. U.S. NEWS and World Report Oct 29,1990 Pg 32 Fatal Victory Pg 36 Vietnam Story.

ARTICLES Galloway Plagarized. U.S. News and World Report Oct 25, 93 Page 45 Step by Step into a Quagmire SOURCE: Stanley Karnows Vietnam a History Pages 479-485.

U.S. News and World Report Feb 4,1991 Page 49 "Who's Afraid of the truth" SOURCE: Soldier of Fortune Dec 84 Pg 104 Press Escorts by Fred Tucker. ( TUCKERS GORRILLAS ).

In the movie Gibson portray Galloway as a Reporter who pick's up a weapon only to protect the wounded.

BUT!!! Galloway was the most heavly armed Reporter in Vietnam.

Page 32
Joseph L. Galloway Had wrangled a ride in to the Plie Me camp while it was under siege, and becouse of the shortages of fighters found him self assigned to a .30 cal light machine gun.

With two other reporters.

After the battle was over Major Charles Beckwith hands Galloway an M-16 rifle,

Galloway told Beckwith, Strictly speaking, under the Geneva Convention he was "A civilian noncombatant."

As you see there is no logic. Galloway has just spent 3 days maning a .30 cal machine gun killing PAVN troops and after the battle is over decides he is a civilian noncombatant?

The question is why didnt Galloway join the service? He was always to busy playing Soldier instead of being a Reporter. He wanted to be at any battle he could get to, to record it, But when he get's there at the battle. He start's to play Soldier. You cant write or record History, While you busy playing soldier.

Of all the reporters in Vietnam, Galloway was the most danegerous to the Americian troops, in His Walter Mitty and Rambo persona. He had no idea what the soldier's job was, He as a reporter and could do what he wanted and go where he wanted to at any time. Joseph L. Galloway( Rambo the Reporter ) ROAMED all over VIETNAM, Killing as he pleased.

Page 35
November 13,1965 Galloway hitched a ride from Pleiku to Catecha the 3 Brigade headquaters Galloway " I dug a foxhole out on the perimeter with B company 1/7, Under one of those $50.00 tea bushes, set out some spare! magazines ( M-16 ).

Galloway playing Soldier, It would have been better if he said I set out some spare film rolls. to record events, his mind set is playing soldier.

Page 32
Galloway writes: " At first lite I pinched of a small piece of C-4 explosive from the emergency supply in my pack and used it to boil up a canteen cup of water for coffee.

Walter Mitty part: If you lit C-4 very carefully you could be drinking hot coffee in maybe 30 secounds. If you were careless it blew your arm off.

If Galloway was so eager to receive the Bronze Star, Then he should be ready to pay the price for violating the UCMJ. Conspiring to take a 4 million dollar Helicopter and receiving Military equipement, 1 M16 Rifle, 1 Carl Gustaf, C-4 explosive

I had to sign for all my equipement as all soldiers did and had to turn it in when I left, Who did Galloway leave the M-16 with, Does he have papers saying he turned it in? The same with the Carl Gustaf, Where did he get it? Did he buy it, Pick it up on the Battlefield? Did he sell it when he left? If he turned it in, Does he have the paper work to show it?

Galloway conspired with a friend ( A Huey Pilot )into flying into Plei Me camp. There were orders for all aircraft to stay out of the area, The friend went AWOL, He and Galloway took the Huey and flew into Plei Me, Beckwith needed, medical, and ammo.

At Plei Me Major Charles Beckwith had put Galloway and 2 other Reporters on a machinegun. and had given Galloway an M-16 Rifle.

MYTH's:
Page 156-157 Vincent Cantu and Galloway meet during fierce attack on D and C company's. Galloway was taking pictures. Vincent Cantu braved the fire and sprinted to where Galloway was.

TRUTH: Soldier of Fortune Sept 83 Page 28 Galloway writes "During a ( LULL!!)." I met Vincent Cantu this was before the(skyhawk) naplmed the Command post.

MYTH's:
Page 35 Galloway The plantation billed the U.S. $50 for each tea bush and $250 for each rubber tree.

TRUTH: Soldier of Fortune Sept 83 Page 25 Galloway They billed U.S.$25 for each tea bush $125 for each rubber tree.

Galloway only left the saftey of the Command Post During " LULL's " in the Battle, As soon as the firing started up, He would headed right back to the Command post, He only took pictures of the dead and wounded. Where are his action pictures?

Fiction We Were Soldiers Once and Young X-Ray part. This dosent include the Reinforcements Bco 2/7, 2/5 Battalion, 2/7 Battalion.

page references are from the hardback.

FICTION: Fabarication applies particulary to a false but carefully invented statement or a series of statements, in which some truth is sometimes interwoven, the whole usually intended to deceive.

The Greatest Hero "People everywhere are smitten- With a tale that is written. Once a hero's deeds are known- They're as good as etched in stone. Every word, folks take to heart- And think this makes them very smart. Amazing how the very wise- Never stop to realize- That what they read may not be true. Groo

Moral: Even when the words are true the may not speak the truth Groo

Can you make Col. Klink ( Moore ) and Rambo the Reporter (Galloway ) into hero's??

Lt. Col. Moore was the Col. Klink of the war? He knew nothing, nothing

Page 17
Moore's new concepts & techniques were written in the 1950's FM 57-35 Army Transport Avation-Combat Operations, 1963 FM 57-35 Airmobile Operations.

By Officers he worked with in 1957.

Moore in 1957 "I was in on the concept of Airmobility with Gavin, Norton, Seneff Williams". With 2 1/2 years writing, 1 1/2 years training in Airmobile tatics in the 11Air Assault Division Test.

For or a total of 4 years and yet he retained nothing about Airmobile tatics.

Page 37
Crandall "Moore wanted Aviation present, to be part of his Staff".

Moore, Crandall or his ALO had to coordinate the flight time from Plei Me to X-Ray, flight routes, fire support, resuppy, Medevac Huey.

Moore couldnt plan the operation with out Crandall ( aviation ) present.

Page 60
As Crandall flared the huey to land at Landing Zone X-Ray Moore & his troops starts firing their weapons.

FM 57-35
There is no firing from the helicopter during flight, landing or any other time.

Pity the troop to their right a face full of hot brass, left ear drums ringing, brass on floor or getting caught in the Huey's controls

Moore who had been listening to the battle of Landing Zone Albany on the radio voluntered for the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to go to Columbus to guard the artillary,

So the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry could go and reinforce ALBANY.

MYTHS of The Ia Drang Valley
Some Officers even Kinnard stated that Moore voluntered to go into ALBANY but he didn’t.

and from Persons in the book That Moore and Galloway write good about give in return and adds to the MYTHS about the 1/7 and Moore.

One Reporter Bob Poos of Soldier of Fortune writes that Moore and the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry was the ones who relived the Plie me camp,

Soldier of Fortune March 83 page 29-30 ARVN AMBUSH 3rd column last 2 paragraphs.

Plie Me did get relief- with a vengeance- from the 1st Cavalry Division.

Through a strange coincidance, the camp commander, Capt Harold Moore, Learned later that much of the relief force was commanded by a name sake, Lt. Col. Harold Moore commander of the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry.

When in fact it was my old unit the 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry.

Capt George Forrest when he spoke to the Old Guard said Lt. Col. Moore was there in the 11AAD in 1963.

So starts the myths about Lt. Col. Moore and the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry.

Moore idea would cost time becouse the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry would have to be to Columbus 4 hours, Then the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry would have to be flown to Albany another 4 hours. 8 hours to renforce Albany?

So why didn’t Kinnard send the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to reinforce ALBANY?

They were probally to drunk? they had spent the day of the 17 in the Bars of Pleiku

The most outrageous LIE Page 287 At Landing Zone Albany. There on the dying enemy soldier something shiny. A big battered old French army Bugle.

FACT: This Bugle was captured at Landing Zone X-Ray and brought into Landing Zone Albany by the reinforcements.

Leadership Principle 1
Be >Technicallytechnical secure LZthe reinforcement's ( Bco 2/7 ) flight time from Plei Me to X-Ray, flight routes,resuppy.
Moore couldnt plan the operation with out Avation present.

FM 57-35
Key personnel are distributed among the aircraft of the lift so the loss of one aircraft does not destroy the command structure.

Page 58
Moore and Crandall in the same Huey.

Page 59
The lift is flying at 110 knots.

FM 57-35
When diffrent types of aircraft fly in a single lift, cruising speed of the slower aircraft must be the controlling speed of the lift.

UH-1B's are Gunships fly at 80 knots

UH-1D's are Slicks 110 knots.

SAD PARTS
I ask Bco's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal, why didnt Moore lay on water for his men ( B co would be on the LZ for over 4 hours ) and why he said it was not the Aviations job to haul out Wounded Troops?

B co's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal "dont ask me I knew nothing about Airmobile tatics."

Page 106
Moore we needed water, medical supplies and ammo.

Page 107
Bco 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal by 3pm we ran out of water, the wounded kept begging for water.

Page 145
November 15, 1965 at 6:20am Jemison shared his last drops of water.

Page 112
November 14, 1965 While all day long the Battalion Supply Officer was riding in and out of X-Ray & Galloway came. 240# of water, medical, ammo not coming in, 1 Wounded troop not going out.

Page 106
Moore "hauling Wounded was not the slick crews job" ( Aviation )

Field Manual M 7-20 ( It is not meant to tell the story ) of each individual, ( or to capture the same kind of truth ) a documentary would.

I salute you.

Best regards,

Randall Wallace

Things wrong with the trailer

Why is Moore shown stepping out of the Huey on the right side at X-Ray? When he was on the left behind Crandall, who was in the co-pilots seat. Page 58 hardback, Page 67 paperback

Moore as they land at X-Ray. as Crandall flared the Huey to land I FIRED burst into the brush to the LEFT, toward the mountian. page 60 hardback, page 69 paperback

Why are there 5 Hueys flying in the formation, when there is supposed to be only 4, in the over head shot there are 6 Hueys.

As they land at X-Ray they are in some type of formation that dosent exist. Page 59 Hardback, Page 68 paperback

The Hueys as they fly to X-Ray are suppose to be in a Heavy left formation, But they are eather in a column, trail formation


Russell L. Ross - 4/3/2003

After seeing the movie, This is only seeing the 1st time there were more mistakes.

Moore, Galloway didnt get it right either, They werent even true to the Book.

Who am I?
lzalbany65@aol.com
Russell L. Ross
1741 Maysong ct. San Jose, Ca 95131-2727
ph 408 926-9336

Sept 1965-66
SP/4 Russell L. Ross RA17630469 D company 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry Recon Platoon ( LoneRanger call sign ) 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile An Khe Vietnam.

1964
B company 1st Battalion 511 Infantry ( Airborne ) 11 Air Assualt ( test ) FT. Benning, Georgia.

1965
B company 1/511 became B company 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry ( Airborne ) 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile FT. Benning, Georgia.

And in July 1965 I was sent to the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile.

MISTAKES from the movie
We Were Soldiers by Mel Gibson, Randall Wallace from the Book We Were Soldiers Once and Young by Harold G. Moore, Joseph L. Galloway

As many of you have already heard, we are preparing to make a film version of Hal Moore and Joe Galloway''s book WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE...AND YOUNG.

As you can imagine, this is an enormously ambitious undertaking.

As the prologue of Hal and Joe''s landmark book states,

"Hollywood has gotten the story of the Vietnam veteran wrong every damn time, whetting the knives of twisted politics on the bones of our dead brothers."

Well this time we mean to get it right.

I salute you.

Best regards,

Randall Wallace

They still didnt get it right even with Moore, Galloway, Crandall as consultants.
They werent even true to the book.

Moore and Galloway twist the knife in the back''''s of the reinforcements the 2/5, 2/7, 1/5 who were still on X-Ray after the 1/7 was lifted out.

The end of the movie show''''s the PAVN commander and his troops coming to X-Ray after the 1/7 leave and looking at an American Flag left on a pole. This Never Happend.

FICTION: Fabarication applies particulary to a false but carefully invented statement or a series of statements, in which some truth is sometimes interwoven, the whole usually intended to deceive.

"The Greatest Hero"
"People everywhere are smitten-
With a tale that is written.
Once a hero''s deeds are known-
They''re as good as etched in stone.
Every word, folks take to heart-
And think this makes them very smart.
Amazing how the very wise-
Never stop to realize-
That what they read may not be true. Groo

Moral: Even when the words are true the may not speak the truth Groo

Moore was not the Father of Airmobile tatics, There was the Howze Board, Nor was he one of the handpicked Officers by Kinnard when the 11 Air Assault started in 1963, Kinnard had been given the opportunity to had pick a few men he knew personally or by reputation, and he called in a dozen. Like Lt. Col. McDade.

What happend. It would appear Moore would be the first one chosen by Kinnard for the 11 AIr Assault test, When it started up in 1963 but he wasnt.

Even with all the experence Moore said he had.

1957 Moore "For 2 1/2 years I was in on the concept of Airmobility with Pentagon Reasearch and developement group. Moore "I was the 1st man in the Airborne Branch".

He had To write a letter to Major General Kinnard ( His Old Boss ) begging for a Infantry Battalion in the 11 Air Assault Division.

It wasent till 1964, 1 year after it started he got the call. He didnt get one with the 11 Air Assault but instead was given an attached Infantry Battalion from the 2 infantry Division the 2nd Battalion 23rd Infantry.

Moore Had never commanded a Infantry Battalion before.

1953 In Korea the Marines used helicopters, and should be the orginators of Airmobile tatics, But they give up the claim to those rights to the Army.

The first Battalion in the 11 Air Assault was the 3d Battalion 187th Infantry, The 2 Infantry Division wasnt attached till 1964.

The 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry was not an Air Cavalry Troop with an assinged Aviation unit, Crandall didnt know he would be supporting Moore like wise didnt know Crandall would be his supporting Aviation unit untill the orders came down from Brigade Hq.

When Gibson talks to his new troops from the 2 Infantry Division on the new Air Assault, They are wearing 11 Air Assault BADGES, An award given only to the 11 Air assault troops.

When do you get to wear an award before you do the training?

The 2nd Infantry Division attached to the 11 Air Assault was never issued, awarded this BADGE.

Kinnard wanted to give the Air Assault Badge after Air Assault 2, But didnt get to.

Moore didnt know he would be sent to the Valley of death Pleiku area ( Ia Drang Valley ), This TAOR ( Tatical area of responsibility ) belonged to the 1st Brigade, the 3rd Brigade 1/7 Moore , 2/7 McDade''s TAOR was Binh Dinh, Bon Son area.

Gibson ( Moore ) read the history of the French Mobile 100 from Street with out Joy, by Bernard Fall. The PAVN who attacked the French Mobile 100 was the 308th.

The French mobile 100 was never in the Ia Drang Valley. The were wiped out at
RT 19 at PK 15, 10 miles west of An Khe.

The PAVN pow said the PAVN who wiped out French Mobile 100 was on the mountain.

An the PAVN commander of the 66th, 33rd at X-Ray was the only one from the 308th, he wasnt part of the 308th when they wiped out the French Mobile 100, he was the commander of the 308th after the French left Vietnam.

An we were ready and waiting for the Americans to come.

Moore a set up for an ambush.

Gibson can only put 60 troops in the first lift, Book Moore 80 troops first lift.

1st Cavalry Division as the Division Commander Kinnard had to use the whole of the division resorces to keep Lt. Col. Moore from losing Landing Zone X-Ray.

Kinnard "I violated a lot of priniples about how hard you work your guy''s and how many hour''s you fly your helicopters."

"I literally flew the Blades off the choppers."

Base camp troops start to load, crewman in front of hueys, arms horzontal this signal is telling the pilot to hover??

Why is Gibson shown stepping out of the Huey on the right side at X-Ray?
When he was on the left behind Crandall, who was in the co-pilots seat.
Page 58 hardback, Page 67 paperback

Moore as they land at X-Ray. as Crandall flared the Huey to land I FIRED burst into the brush to the LEFT, toward the mountian.
page 60 hardback, page 69 paperback

Why are there 5 Hueys flying in the formation, when there is supposed to be only 4, in the over head shot there are 6 Hueys.

As they land at X-Ray they are in some type of formation that dosent exist.
Page 59 Hardback, Page 68 paperback

The Hueys as they fly to X-Ray are suppose to be in a Heavy left formation, But they are eather in a column, trail formation


Russell L. Ross - 3/31/2003

Crandall didnt fly Gunships.

As for the invented combat action, during the movie's climactic battle sequence Crandall's character is shown using a helicopter gunship to knock out North Vietnamese troops as Gibson's character charges toward them on the ground.

"That's not correct," Crandall said. "That was a surprise to me when it came on — I was John Wayne to the rescue. The truth is, the gunships were another unit."

Also, Crandall said, Gibson's character gets credit for some things that were actually done by others. "He did a lot of shooting and leading and firing," Crandall said. "Some of that was done by infantry company commanders who were leading that stuff."

Sunday, March 03, 2002 - 12:33 a.m. Pacific


Movies
He was a soldier, and 'We Were Soldiers' tells his story

By Eli Sanders
Seattle Times staff reporter

Bruce Crandall finds it hard to watch the new movie "We Were Soldiers," which takes some of the worst days of his life and turns them into a 140-minute Hollywood war film.

It's not that he thinks the movie is bad.

In fact, the 69-year-old Army veteran, who lives in Manchester on the Olympic Peninsula, says he considers "We Were Soldiers" valuable because he expects it will "bring back to the mind of the American people how bad combat really is — and remind the American people that in Vietnam we didn't do it right."

What Crandall finds hard about watching "We Were Soldiers," which stars Mel Gibson and opened Friday, is the stress of being transported back to Nov. 14, 1965, when, during the first major battle of the Vietnam War, he flew a helicopter in and out of the Ia Drang Valley 22 times, attempting to resupply and evacuate troops involved in a furious firefight with North Vietnamese soldiers.

It is this battle that "We Were Soldiers" re-creates, and in the movie, Crandall's role is played by Greg Kinnear ("Nurse Betty," "The Gift"). Gibson plays courageous Lt. Col. Harold Moore, who led American troops in the bloody fight, promising to be the first on the battlefield and to leave no man behind.

The movie is based on the book, "We Were Soldiers Once ... And Young," written by the real-life Moore and former reporter Joseph L. Galloway. Director Randall Wallace, who wrote the screenplay for "Braveheart," wrote this movie.

Crandall served as a consultant to the film, visiting the sets and giving advice on matters such as which Army insignias to use. But, he said, there are still quite a few Hollywood embellishments in "We Were Soldiers." For example, his character gets a slightly glammed-up nickname as well as some combat action that Crandall never actually saw.

In Vietnam, Crandall went by "Snake," he explained during an interview last week as he prepared to head for Washington, D.C., for a screening of the film with President Bush. But, he said, some people involved in making the movie (whom he describes as "humorous characters") decided to have a little fun with his radio call sign, adding an expletive to it in order to create a combination of words that provides the gory action film with one of its few moments of comic relief.

As for the invented combat action, during the movie's climactic battle sequence Crandall's character is shown using a helicopter gunship to knock out North Vietnamese troops as Gibson's character charges toward them on the ground.

"That's not correct," Crandall said. "That was a surprise to me when it came on — I was John Wayne to the rescue. The truth is, the gunships were another unit."

Also, Crandall said, Gibson's character gets credit for some things that were actually done by others. "He did a lot of shooting and leading and firing," Crandall said. "Some of that was done by infantry company commanders who were leading that stuff."

All this stretching of the truth is understandable, Crandall feels — part of what it takes to make a long, complicated battle fit into a relatively short Hollywood film. And generally, he said, the movie is "very realistic. Anyone who sees it is going to see the horrors of war."

Some of the most wrenching scenes in "We Were Soldiers" come when the wounded are shown being loaded onto helicopters that are frantically trying to evacuate them amid waves of hostile fire. Both the wounded and the helicopter crews were targets.

"By the fifth lift in, I had four people shot off my aircraft," Crandall recalled. "They shot my crew chief in the throat on one lift in. They shot my radio operator in the head — I don't think I've ever seen anything more graphic than that. My strongest memory of Vietnam was when we got back to Plei Me with that load."

That moment is recounted in the film, when buckets of water are used to wash bits of brain, blood and other ghastly detritus of war from a helicopter's cargo bay as it is prepared to fly again.

In another horrific moment, a wounded soldier is shown getting out of an evacuation helicopter to help load a more severely wounded man. As the still-mobile wounded soldier is lowering his immobile comrade into the helicopter, he is shot from behind.

"That was a young captain named Metzger," Crandall said. "He was helping the wounded guy get in, he was standing on the skid and they killed him."

Crandall still thinks about Vietnam and the soldiers in the helicopter company he commanded who have not come back.

"I still have a helicopter missing over there," he said. "The four guys who were in that helicopter have not been found. I think of them every day, probably will think about them for the rest of my life. I think of them every time I hear a helicopter. "

If there's a lesson to be learned from the movie, Crandall said, it's the same lesson most Americans associate with Vietnam: Don't send troops to fight an impossible war.

"It was a battle that we could not possibly win, and it just kept going and going and going," Crandall said. "We learned a lesson. And that lesson's in that movie, if people have forgotten it."

Eli Sanders: 206-748-5815 or esanders@seattletimes.com.



Copyright © 2003 The Seattle Times Company


Russell L. Ross - 3/19/2003

This is a PDF file and takes about a minute to load.

Web Page URAL

http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/history/aar-xray.pdf

His FARGO is that of an Infantry Officer using Helicopters as transport, Not that of an AirMobile commander showes he didnt know what he was doing.


Russell L Ross - 3/16/2003

http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/history/aar-xray.pdf

Col. Moores after action Report no mention of fixing Bayonets anywhere in it


Russell L. Ross - 2/26/2003

Late afternoon. At about 3:45, Moore ordered Nadal's and Herren's companies to pull back, to evacuate their wounded and dead and to prepare for an attack, preceded by air and artillery barrages, to rescue the Lost Platoon.


No Mention about fixing Bayonets"??

It began at 4:20. But the enemy had moved forward and dug shallow foxholes; snipers had climbed into the treetops.

"We stood up, got out of the trench and the whole world exploded," recalls Lt. Dennis Deal, one of Herren's platoon leaders.

"Men were dropping all over the place. The assault line first went to their knees, and then to a crawling position."

http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/soldiers/vietnam_901029.htm

Special Report: Cover Story (10/29/90) Vietnam story
The word was the Ia Drang would be a walk. The word was wrong By Joseph L. Galloway Day 1: Walking in Custer's footsteps
Day 2: Holding the thin green line
Day 3: Driving off the enemy
Day 4: Blundering into disaster
Day 5: Counting the cost
Epilogue: Delivering the sad news As the sun rose on Nov. 14, 1965, a clear, hot Sunday, four U.S. Army helicopters flew, as unobtrusively as such machines can, across the rugged Ia Drang Valley in South Vietnam's Central Highlands. Below them was a wild and desolate place that in normal times offered a living only to elephants, tigers and a few Montagnard tribesmen. Lt. Col. Harold G. Moore scanned the terrain intently, scribbling notes and marking his maps. He was about to lead the U.S. 7th Cavalry on its most audacious charge since Lt. Col. George A. Custer led his troopers to the Little Bighorn 89 years earlier. Like Custer, Hal Moore had no use for timidity or half measures. The lean, blond Kentuckian, a 43-year-old graduate of West Point, Class of '45, demanded the best from his men and gave the same in return. Behind his back, the 457 officers and men of the 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), sometimes called Moore by Custer's nickname, "Yellow Hair." It was a soldier's compliment, and Moore took it as such. Moore was hunting big game in the tangle of ravines, tall elephant grass and termite hills around the base of Chu Pong Massif, a 2,401-foot mountain whose forests stretched 5 miles into Cambodia. A month earlier, the 2,200-man 33rd People's Army Regiment–part of the first full North Vietnamese Army division to take the field since the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954–had attacked the camp at Plei Me, a vital listening post astride the road to Pleiku, the provincial capital. Saigon and Washington feared that if the North Vietnamese overran Pleiku, Route 19 to Qui Nhon on the coast would be wide open, and South Vietnam could be cut in two. But one of the North Vietnamese commanders, Maj. Gen. Huong Minh Phuong, told U.S. News in a recent interview that the attack on Plei Me was launched only to bait a trap for the inevitable South Vietnamese relief column. The ambush almost certainly would have succeeded but for one new and, for the North Vietnamese, very troubling development. For years, the U.S. Army had sought to free foot soldiers from the tyranny of terrain. Its solution was the helicopter, the ungainly bumblebee that had made a limited debut in Korea. Equipped with the durable UH-1D Huey and its cargo-carrying cousin, the Chinook, and bearing the colors of the 1st Cavalry Division, the first sky troopers had arrived in Vietnam from Fort Benning, Ga., in mid-September to make the battlefield a three-dimensional nightmare for the enemy. So when the South Vietnamese ventured out to relieve Plei Me, they had moved under an umbrella of howitzers lifted into position by the Chinooks. When the North Vietnamese sprang their ambush, the South Vietnamese had–uncharacteristically–fought like hell. The North's commander, Gen. Chu Huy Man, withdrew toward the Ia Drang, a sanctuary so far from any road that no enemy had ever dared penetrate it. But with the arrival of the air cavalry, no place was safe. It ferreted out North Vietnamese food caches, underground hospitals, even headquarters. "You jumped all over, even into our rear area," says General Phuong. "You created disorder among our troops. You made it very hard for our commanders to keep up with the plan. They were very anxious about the psychological effects of your helicopters and artillery leapfrogging among these green troops." Hal Moore and his boss, brigade commander Col. Thomas "Tim" Brown, had seen a red star marking Chu Pong Mountain, 17 miles northwest of Plei Me, on an intelligence map at division headquarters. "What's that?" they had asked. "A big enemy base camp," came the reply. Their eyes lit up. For four long days, their men had been beating the brush east of Plei Me and finding nothing but vicious red tree ants, thorny "wait a minute" vines and jungle so dense that, at times, a battalion was lucky to move 200 yards in an hour. They persuaded their bosses that it made more sense to go where the enemy was. Operating on what Brown later described as "strong instincts and flimsy intelligence," Moore was about to hit the jackpot. His battalion of 28 officers and 429 men–four officers and 199 men short of full strength–was about to attack two regiments of North Vietnamese regulars, or more than 3,000 very good soldiers. Moore's target area contained only three clearings where helicopters could land. One was so small that only two could land at a time; a second was filled with tree stumps. That left a big clearing that Moore designated Landing Zone X-Ray. It could take eight choppers, but it was located directly beneath Chu Pong Mountain. If the North Vietnamese were occupying the high ground, Landing Zone X-Ray could be a death trap. As the battalion assembled at pickup points around Plei Me Camp, the word was that X-Ray would be one more little walk in the sun and then home to base camp for hot food and cold showers. The word, as usual, was wrong. At 10:17, two batteries of 105-mm howitzers–12 guns that had been deposited by Chinooks in a clearing 6.2 miles east of X-Ray–began firing on X-Ray and, as a diversion, the two other clearings in the area. After 20 minutes, the barrage stopped and helicopter gunships poured .30-caliber machine-gun fire and 2.75-inch rockets into the woods nearby. At 10:48 the first eight Hueys landed at X-Ray. Moore jumped out of the first helicopter with Sgt. Maj. Basil Plumley, radio operator Specialist 4 Bob Oullette and a Vietnamese interpreter close behind. Plumley, a laconic West Virginian, was on his third war. He was what young paratroopers admiringly call "a four-jump bastard"–one of the few men who had survived all four World War II combat parachute jumps made by the 82nd Airborne Division. He had jumped again in Korea with the 187th Airborne. The lead elements of Capt. John Herren's 119-man Bravo Company ran toward the tree line, firing their rifles, while the second wave of choppers landed. Moore now had nearly 100 men on the ground, but it would be 35 minutes before any of the 16 Hueys assigned to him could return with more troops. If the landing zone came under attack, Herren was his most experienced company commander. He had run Bravo for 18 months, and he knew his men and his business. Moore already was rewriting the rules of helicopter assault landings. Rather than spread his men in a thin circle around the clearing, he kept most of Herren's troops concealed in a clump of trees near the center of the landing zone, ready to react to any threat, and he sent four six-man squads 100 yards in every direction. Within 30 minutes they captured a prisoner. The straggler said he was a deserter who had been hiding in the brush for five days. His next words were chilling: "There are three battalions on the mountain who want very much to kill Americans but haven't been able to find any." By now the rest of Herren's men and the first men from Capt. Ramon A. Nadal II's Alpha Company had landed. Tony Nadal was a West Point classmate of Herren's and an Army brat, the son of Col. Ramon A. Nadal, West Point '28. He had already served in Vietnam with the Special Forces, and when he had heard that the 1st Cavalry Division was headed over, he had driven to Fort Benning and pleaded for a job. Hal Moore made Nadal his intelligence officer, and on the voyage across the Pacific, Nadal had lectured the battalion on what was waiting for them. He got his company in October. Moore believed what the prisoner was saying. He told Herren to push his men toward the mountain, paying particular attention to a finger of high ground that jutted out toward the landing zone. He told Nadal to get ready to move his Alpha Company toward the mountain on Herren's left, just as soon as enough of Capt. Robert Edwards's Charlie Company were on the ground to guard the landing zone. ENGAGEMENT: Walking in Custer's footsteps Day 1: By 1:30, Capt. John Herren's men were under attack by about 250 troops, and he radioed that his 2nd Platoon, on the right, was in danger of being cut off. The platoon was commanded by Lt. Henry Herrick, a red-haired Californian fresh out of Officer Candidate School who had joined the division along with a gaggle of other green lieutenants a month before it sailed for Vietnam. In October, after a soldier drowned when Herrick ordered a river crossing without a safety rope, his platoon's senior man, Sgt. Carl Palmer, had complained to Herren: "Something has to be done about the lieutenant or he'll get us all killed." Herrick was, in the words of an OCS classmate, "a balls-to-the-wall kind of guy–a hard charger." This time, Herrick charged too hard. As his platoon trotted up the finger of land, the young lieutenant spotted a few enemy troops. The North Vietnamese fled and Herrick swung his 27 men in hot pursuit. Within minutes, they were more than 125 yards to the right of the rest of Bravo Company. Seconds later, they ran straight into 150 North Vietnamese headed down the mountain from the west. Herrick's platoon, which the headline writers would name "the Lost Platoon," was quickly surrounded. With help from one of Nadal's platoons led by Lt. W.J. "Joe" Marm, Herren pushed to within 75 yards of Herrick's position before being driven back. Americans were dropping, wounded and dead, in the dry grass all around. Below on X-Ray, Moore urgently called for air, artillery and helicopter-gunship strikes on the North Vietnamese attack routes down the mountain and sent the rest of Nadal's men up to reinforce Herren. As Nadal moved toward Herren's left flank, he ran into 100 to 150 North Vietnamese charging down a dry creek bed–a natural highway that led off the mountain straight to the heart of the landing zone. "They're PAVN (People's Army of Vietnam)," the Vietnam veteran yelled into his radio. These were no black-pajama guerrillas pouring off the mountain. They were North Vietnamese regulars in khaki battle dress, their pith helmets camouflaged with clumps of elephant grass. Most were armed with Soviet-made AK-47 rifles, and all carried big pouches full of wooden-handled "potato masher" hand grenades. They also had Maxim heavy machine guns and RPG-2 shoulder-fired rockets. Bill Beck, a 22-year-old machine gunner from Harrisburg, Pa., was in Nadal's company. "We were left of the dry creek bed, about 30 yards, and moving forward toward Chu Pong," he recalls. "I heard Bob Hazen, the radio operator, yelling about Lieutenant Taft being hit, that he was hit in the neck and bleeding to death. I could see Hazen leaning over Taft when a North Vietnamese blasted him from behind, and I saw his radio explode into pieces." A handsome 6-footer from Highland Park, Ill., 23-year-old Robert Taft was the first young lieutenant to die in the Ia Drang Valley. Out in the landing zone, the choppers were bringing in the first men of Bob Edwards's Charlie Company. A native of Trenton, N.J., Edwards had entered the Army straight from Lafayette College, where he had finished at the top of his ROTC class. He was, in Hal Moore's view, "a superb and very perceptive leader–aloof and strictly business." Moore was deeply worried about his left flank. Lieutenant Herrick's charge far to the right seemed to have confused the enemy commander; the North Vietnamese attacks were now shifting to the left, and Moore had to shift with them. He ran into the landing zone under heavy fire, grabbed Edwards at the helicopter door and "yelled at him to run his men toward the mountain, tie in with Nadal's company on the right and get ready to be attacked in strength." The young captain sped off in the direction Moore pointed, waving at his 106 men to follow. Within a few minutes, they had found cover or scraped shallow holes in the woods just off the landing zone. A minute or two later, a wave of more than 550 North Vietnamese slammed into the thin line of waiting American riflemen. Moore and Sergeant Major Plumley had been in constant motion on the battleground and the landing zone, shifting newly arriving troops to where they were needed most. When a new flight arrived, Moore stood in the open, guiding the helicopters to the safest landing spots. "After giving Edwards his orders, I was walking along the line by the creek bed when the firing around my head took on a distinctly different sound–like a hell of a lot of bees," Moore remembers. "I felt a firm hand on my shoulder. It was Sergeant Major Plumley, shouting above the noise of the guns: 'Sir, if you don't find some cover you're going to go down, and if you go down we all go down.' " Moore reluctantly moved to the waist of the figure-8 clearing and set up his command post behind a big termite hill. Landing Zone X-Ray was now, as the pilots put it, "very, very hot." Maj. Bruce Crandall was in charge of the 16 helicopters assigned to the mission. He and his 6-foot-6 sidekick, Capt. Ed "Too Tall to Fly" Freeman, along with their wingmen, brought reinforcements, ammunition and precious water, and they carried out the wounded. If Moore said it was O.K. to land, they landed. Crandall flew two choppers this day–his first was crippled when it hit a line of trees hauling wounded out of the battle. Crandall vividly recalls one flight: "I saw a North Vietnamese firing at us from just outside my rotor blades (20 feet away). After taking on wounded, I pulled pitch (lifted out) in a hurry. I had three dead and three wounded, including my crew chief, who was shot in the throat." Hanoi's Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap says his soldiers learned how to fight the U.S. helicopters in the Ia Drang, and perhaps they did. But they did not have the weapons on hand to apply those lessons–the Chinese-made heavy antiaircraft machine guns that, if they had been deployed on Chu Pong Mountain, could have closed Landing Zone X-Ray. With their rifles and light machine guns, the North Vietnamese took a toll of American aviators, but during three days of battle only two of Crandall's helicopters were disabled–and both were put back in service after the fight. Later in the war, however, the lessons the North Vietnamese learned at X-Ray would take a heavy toll. Up on the mountain, Henry Herrick's Lost Platoon was desperately clinging to a 25-yard circle atop a slight rise. The North Vietnamese overran one of the Americans' two M-60 machine guns. Sgt. Ernie Savage says, "I heard Sergeant Hurdle down there cursing, even over the noise of the firefight. He was famous for that. 'Motherf-----. Sonofabitch. Sonofabitch,' I heard him holler. And then they threw grenades in on him." Sgt. Paul Hurdle, the platoon's weapons-squad leader, had survived the retreat from the Chosin Reservoir in Korea and had blown the last bridge behind the retreating Marines, but he did not survive this day. The enemy turned Hurdle's machine gun around and began using it on the Americans. Herrick was mortally wounded. His last words to Savage were: "I'm glad I could give my life for my country." Command of the 2nd Platoon passed to Sgt. Carl Palmer. Specialist 4 Galen Bungum, who had left a dairy farm in Hayfield, Minn., for the Army, says that on the way up the mountain Sergeant Palmer said: "Bungum, I'll be 43 years old tomorrow, but I don't believe I'll live to see it." Within minutes of taking over, Palmer was shot in the head. Savage and the others laid him behind a log. Shortly afterward, an American hand grenade taken from the slain machine-gun crew sailed over the clearing and exploded beneath Palmer. He died instantly. The mortar forward observer, Sgt. Robert Stokes, assumed it was his turn to take charge, stood up and said: "We've got to get out of here." He was shot through the head and killed instantly. Command of the Lost Platoon fell to Ernie Savage. A 21-year-old buck sergeant from McCalla, Ala., he had been with the battalion more than two years and was field smart and cool under pressure. He grabbed Stokes's radio and called artillery fire down in a very tight circle. By then, eight of the Lost Platoon's 27 men were dead and 12 wounded. Midafternoon. Specialist 4 Vincent Cantu of Refugio, Tex., had only 10 days left in the Army when he landed in X-Ray. The local draft board had called him up the day before John Kennedy was assassinated, ending Cantu's fling as lead guitarist and vocalist for the Rockin' Dominoes, a local band whose theme song was "Born to Lose." Now an 81-mm mortar gunner, Cantu was riveted by the deadly drama around him. "We were so close our mortar tubes were pointing almost straight up. The pleas over the radio were desperate. We could all hear Sergeant Stokes, our forward observer, with the trapped platoon. By 2:30 or 3 p.m., it seemed like half the battalion was either dead or wounded. I remember rolling this dead soldier in a poncho. He was face down and when I turned him over I saw the lieutenant's bars on him. I snapped. I thought: These rounds don't have any regard." By now, Capt. Ray LeFebvre's Delta Company was arriving at Landing Zone X-Ray. LeFebvre had served an earlier tour and was fluent in Vietnamese. Because of that, he had been tapped for a staff job in civil affairs at division headquarters. Like Tony Nadal, he had turned up on Hal Moore's doorstep begging for a rifle company. "Something's going to happen," LeFebvre had said. "I want to be in on it." He got his wish. "I started to unhook my seat belt when I felt a round crease the back of my neck," LeFebvre remembers. "I turned to my right and saw that my radio operator had been hit in the left side of his head. I grabbed his radio and jumped out ... I fired two magazines of M-16 ammo at the enemy, then I was hit." LeFebvre was in action approximately 10 minutes; in that time, he and four men around him killed 25 North Vietnamese. Out near the dry creek bed, machine gunner Bill Beck was doing double duty while his best friend, Russell Adams, poured fire on the enemy. Beck alternated between patching up wounded Americans and firing at the North Vietnamese with a notoriously inaccurate .45-caliber automatic pistol. He spotted Captain LeFebvre, "moaning, his hand blown apart and his thigh equally bad." Beck bandaged him up and yelled for a medic. LeFebvre was hauled back to the landing zone, where the battalion intelligence officer, Capt. Tom Metsker, wounded in the shoulder, helped him onto a waiting helicopter. Metsker was hit again and killed at the chopper door. Back on the line, Beck heard someone scream, "Adams is hit." He ran forward to find his fellow Pennsylvanian lying beside his silent machine gun. "The side of his head was a mess. He was trying to talk to me but nothing was coming out. His helmet lay in front of me with a bullet hole in it, and I turned it over. It seemed like Adams's entire brain fell out in front of me. I was horrified. I screamed over and over for the medic." Beck took over his friend's machine gun. He was now holding the battalion's left flank, directly in the path of the enemy. Alone, mumbling every prayer he could remember, Beck stopped them. "They were shooting at me, bullets hitting the ground beside me and cracking above my head. I was firing as fast as I could in long bursts." Landing Zone X-Ray was shrouded in thick smoke and dust. "It was a bedlam of men yelling and screaming in English, Vietnamese and Spanish, a constant roar of rifle and machine-gun fire punctuated by the shocking explosions of bombs, artillery shells and rockets," Moore says. He was on the radio to the 3rd Brigade commander, Col. Tim Brown, asking for reinforcements. Brown had a company on alert. Late afternoon. At about 3:45, Moore ordered Nadal's and Herren's companies to pull back, to evacuate their wounded and dead and to prepare for an attack, preceded by air and artillery barrages, to rescue the Lost Platoon. It began at 4:20. But the enemy had moved forward and dug shallow foxholes; snipers had climbed into the treetops. "We stood up, got out of the trench and the whole world exploded," recalls Lt. Dennis Deal, one of Herren's platoon leaders. "Men were dropping all over the place. The assault line first went to their knees, and then to a crawling position." Deal's platoon was pinned down by machine-gun fire from a termite hill when suddenly Deal saw "someone get up and charge, just like in a John Wayne movie." Deal adds: "He ran 25 yards across the open ground while all of us were crawling–the firing was so intense. I saw him throw a grenade behind a termite hill, wait for it to go off, move around to the rear of the termite hill and empty his rifle. Then he fell to his knees. I said to myself: Please get up, whoever you are, don't be hurt." It was Lt. Joe Marm, another Pennsylvanian who was Nadal's favorite junior officer, another of the batch of green lieutenants who had joined the battalion that summer. Marm had first tried to take out the enemy machine gun with a shoulder-fired light antitank (LAW) rocket. Later, he said he charged the machine-gun nest simply "to get the job done and save time." He destroyed the gun and killed a dozen North Vietnamese operating and protecting it. As he mopped up the last of the enemy, a sniper round smashed into his face and out through his throat. The medics performed a battlefield tracheotomy. Marm survived to receive the Medal of Honor.


Russell L, Ross - 2/3/2003

Changing the Vietnam stereotype
By Jon Ward
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

As the two young women worked their way along the engraved panels of polished black granite, scanning the thousands of names etched, they talked about the film they had seen the night before, and the tales of courage and sacrifice that had moved them to pay their respects at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on an overcast Wednesday afternoon.

One scene in particular stood out: A bloodied, tired United Press International reporter putting his camera down to help an injured American soldier.

When Alicia Porter and Sarah Walls, both 21, mentioned the soldier's name — Jimmy Nakamura — a 60-year-old Falls Church resident standing nearby overheard the two, and offered help:

He knew exactly which panel included Nakamura's name.

The Big LIE>
"I carried him to the helicopter," Joseph Galloway told them.

That somber encounter at the Wall yesterday is one of the reasons Mr. Galloway is so proud of "We Were Soldiers," the hit film based on a 1992 best seller that the Virginian co-authored. The book is an account of a bloody four-day battle between U.S. forces and the North Vietnamese at la Drang Valley in November 1965.
The film and the book, he said, are helping change misrepresentative stereotypes about the conduct of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam.
Mr. Galloway, a UPI reporter at the time and the only journalist to witness the battle, co-wrote the account with Lt. Col. Hal Moore, the commander of the U.S. forces during the fight. Mr. Moore, now a retired general, is played by Mel Gibson in the film.
In an interview with The Washington Times this week, Mr. Galloway said the film offers a perspective on U.S. soldiers that is absent from earlier Vietnam War films like Oliver Stone's "Platoon" and Francis Ford Coppola's "Apocalypse Now."
For the vast majority of U.S. troops in Vietnam, he said, the war was not about "rampaging through the countryside, killing civilians, raping women, smoking dope and killing their own NCOs."
What sets "We Were Soldiers" apart, said Mr. Galloway, is that it is factual, whereas characters in "Platoon," for instance, were "all fictional pieces that have been grafted onto a Vietnam framework."
Mr. Galloway, who recently stepped down as a speechwriter for Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to work on another book project, said the reports of atrocities committed by Americans during the war have been blown "way out of proportion."
He, like many Americans, feels the war in Vietnam was a mistake. But, he said, the country's animosity toward the war itself was misdirected at its own soldiers.
"The country turned its back on the war, and unfortunately it turned its back on its warriors," he said. "Many of them came home to be jeered and spat upon by protesters. The experience [of the war] and of the return was searing to their souls."
Much of Mr. Galloway's life for the past 36 years has been spent trying to make known the true heroism of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam. He covered the war through its completion in 1975.
"I've been trying to tell the truth for a lot of years, primarily the truth about the soldiers who fought there: 19- or 20-year-old boys who didn't ask to be sent there, but tried to do their job once they got there."
A strong sense of camaraderie has sustained Mr. Galloway's decades-long quest. He was with the 450 men of the 7th Calvary in Ia Drang Valley when they were surrounded on all sides by 2,000 Vietnamese soldiers.
Mr. Galloway, whose career in journalism began at the Victoria Advocate in Victoria, Texas, moved on to UPI. He then badgered his bosses to send him to cover the war. Once in Vietnam, he wheedled his way into the thick of what was then thought of as the biggest battle of the war.
"If he's crazy enough to want to come in here, then let him come," said Col. Moore at the time.
Mr. Galloway quickly found he was a participant, not just an observer. The American forces were heavily outnumbered, and in great danger of being overrun. The Refugio, Texas, native was forced to put down his camera, pick up a gun and start shooting.
At one point, a can of napalm exploded nearby, igniting 22-year-old American soldier Jimmy Nakamura. Mr. Galloway carried the horribly burnt young husband and father to a helicopter. He died two days later.
It is the one scene in the movie Mr. Galloway cannot bear to watch. At the various premieres he has attended, he has walked out of the theater at that point, returning when the scene is over.
"That's my personal nightmare for 36 years," he said. "To have it up on the screen, in technicolor, is too much."
The decision to go to the scene of battle earned the young reporter a scoop over his press corps colleagues, but Mr. Galloway had always felt there was more to what happened in la Drang valley than could be told in a handful of short newspaper stories.
So, in 1982, he and Gen. Moore began work on the book, and when it was published in 1992, it became a best seller. With the film's success, the book has been reprinted and is back on the best-seller list.


Back to Metro


Russell L Ross - 2/3/2003

Hal Moore and I began our research for the book-to-be, We Were Soldiers Once and Young, in 1982.

It was a ten-year journey tofind and ultimately to
bring back together as many of those who fought in LZ Xray

Late one night a week later my phone rang at home in Los Angeles. On the other end was Sgt. George Nye, retired and living very quietly by choice in his home state of
Maine.

George began talking and it was almost stream of
consciousness. He had held it inside him for so long and now
someone wanted to know about it.

He described taking his small team of engineer demolitions men into XRay to blow down some trees and clear a safer landing zone for the helicopters.

Note >> NYE blew down the trees that Plumble in the movie does, another lie

Then he was talking about PFC Jimmy D. Nakayama, one of those engineer
soldiers, and how a misplaced napalm strike engulfed Nakayama in
the roaring flames.

How he ran out into the fire and screamed at another man to grab Jimmy’s feet and

help carry him to ( the aid station???) The LIE>Galloway I carried him to the helicopter.

My blood ran cold and the hair stood up on the back of my neck. I had been that man on the oher end of Nakayama.

NYE didnt know who helped him, Moore didnt see him do it, now Galloway said he did!!!

Honor Among Soldiers by Joe Galloway
Site Quality Checked
on 01 Febuary 03

Honor Among Soldiers

by Joe Gallaway
Co-Author of "We Were Soldiers Once and Young"

If you have fed from a steady diet of Hollywood movies
about Vietnam you probably believe that everyone who
wore a uniform in America’s long, sad involvement in war
in Vietnam is some sort of a clone of Lt. William
Calley---that all three million of them were drug-crazed
killers and rapists who rampaged across the pastoral
landscape. Those movies got it wrong, until now. There is
one more Hollywood film now playing called We Were Soldiers
and it gets it right. Ask any Vietnam veteran who has gone
to see the movie. In fact, ask any American who has gone to
see it. It is based on a book I wrote with my lifelong
friend Lt. Gen. (ret) Hal Moore; a book written precisely
because we believedthat a false impression of those soldiers
had taken root in the country which sent them to war and,
in the end, turned its back on both the war and the warriors.
I did four tours in Vietnam as a war correspondent for
United Press International---1965-66, 1971, 1973 and 1975.
In the first three of those tours at war I spent most of my
time in the field with the troops and I came to know and
respect them and even love them, though most folks might
find the words "war" and "love" in the same sentence
unsettling if not odd. In fact, I am far more comfortable
in the company of those once-young soldiers today than with
any other group except my own family. They are my comrades-
in-arms, the best friends of my life and if ever I were to
shout "help!" they would stampede to my aid in a heartbeat.
They come from all walks of life; they are black, white,
Hispanic, native American, Asian; they are fiercely loyal,
dead honest, entirely generous of their time and money.
They are my brothers and they did none of the things
Oliver Stone or Francis Ford Coppola would have you believe
all of them did. On the worst day of my life, in the middle
of the worst battle of the Vietnam War, in a place called
Landing Zone X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley of Vietnam, I was
walking around snapping some photographs when I caught a
movement out of the corner of my eye. It was a tall, lanky
GI who jumped out of a mortar pit and ran, zig-zagging under
fire, toward me. He dove under the little bush I was crouched
behind. "Joe! Joe Galloway! Don’t you know me, man? It’s Vince
Cantu from Refugio, Texas!" Vince Cantu andI had graduated
together from Refugio High School, Class of ’59, 55 boys and
girls. We embraced warmly. Then he shouted over the din of
gunfire: "Joe, you got to get down and stay down. It’s
dangerous out here. Men are dying all around." Vince told me
that he had only ten days left on his tour of duty as a draftee
soldier in the 1stBattalion 7th U.S. Cavalry, 1st Cavalry
Division (Airmobile). "If I live through this I will be home in
Refugio for Christmas." I asked Vince to please visit my mom and
dad, but not tell them too much about where we had met and under
what circumstances. I still have an old photograph from that
Christmas visit. Vince wearing one of those black satin Vietnam
jackets, with his daughter on his knee, sitting with my mom and
dad in their living room. Vince Cantu and I are still best friends.
When Iwalked out and got on a Huey helicopter leaving Landing Zone
X-Ray I leftknowing that 80 young Americans had laid down their
lives so that I and others might survive. Another 124 had been
terribly wounded and were on their way to hospitals in Japan or
the United States. I left with both a sense of my place, among
them, and an obligation to tell their stories to any who would
listen. I knew that I had been among men of honor and decency
and courage, and anyone who believes otherwise needs to look in
his own heart and weigh himself. Hal Moore and I began our
research for the book-to-be, We Were Soldiers Once and Young,
in 1982. It was a ten-year journey tofind and ultimately to
bring back together as many of those who fought in LZ Xray
and LZ Albany, a separate battle one day after ours only three
miles away in which another 155 young Americans died and another
130 were wounded. We had good addresses for perhaps no more than
a dozen veterans, but we mailed out a questionnaire to them to
begin the process. Late one night a week later my phone rang at
home in Los Angeles. On the other end was Sgt. George Nye,
retired and living very quietly by choice in his home state of
Maine. George began talking and it was almost stream of
consciousness. He had held it inside him for so long and now
someone wanted to know about it. He described taking his small
team of engineer demolitions men into XRay to blow down some
trees and clear a safer landing zone for the helicopters. Then
he was talking about PFC Jimmy D. Nakayama, one of those engineer
soldiers, and how a misplaced napalm strike engulfed Nakayama in
the roaring flames. How he ran out into the fire and screamed at
another man to grab Jimmy’s feet and help carry him to the aid
station. My blood rancold and the hair stood up on the back of
my neck. I had been that man on the oher end of Nakayama. I had
grabbed his ankles and felt the bootscrumble, the skin peel, and
those slick bones in my hands. Again I heardNakayama’s screams.
By then we were both weeping. I knew Nakayamahad died a day or
two later in an Army hospital. Nye told me that Jimmy’s wife had
given birth to a baby girl the day he died, and that when Nye
returned to base camp at An Khe he found a letter on his desk. He
had encouraged Nakayama to apply for a slot at Officer Candidate
School. The letter approved that application and contained orders
for Nakayama to return immediately to Ft. Benning, Ga., to enter
that course. George Nye is gone now. But I want you to know what
he did with the last months of his life. He lived in Bangor, Maine,
The year was 1991 and in the fall plane after plane loaded with
American soldiers headed home from the Persian Gulf War stopped
there to refuel. It was their first sight of home. George and
some other local volunteers organized a welcome at that desolate
airport. They provided coffee, snacks and the warm "Welcome home,
soldier" that no one ever offered George and the millions of other
Vietnam veterans. George had gone out to the airport to decorate a
Christmas tree for those soldiers on the day he died. When we think
of ourselves we think Shakespeare, Henry IV, Act IV, Scene 3:
"We few, we happy few, we band of brothers;
For he today that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother."

Honor and decency and uncommon courage were common among these soldiers
and all the soldiers who served in Vietnam. I think of how they were,
on patrol, moving through jungle or rice paddies. Nervous, on edge,
trying to watch right, left, ahead, behind, all at once. A friend once
described it as something like looking at a tree full of owls. They were
alert for sign, sound or smell of the enemy. But they also watched each
other closely. At the first sign of the oppressive heat and exhaustion
getting to someone the two or three guys around would relieve him of some
or all of the heavy burden that the Infantryman bears: 60 or 70 pounds of
stuff. Rifle and magazines. A claymore mine or two. A couple of radio
batteries. Cans of C-Rations. Spare socks. Maybe a book. All that rides
in the soldier’s pack. They would make it easier for him to keep going.
They took care of each other, because in this situation each other was
all they had. When I would pitch up to spend a day or two or three
with such an outfit I was, at first, an object of some curiosity.
Sooner or later a break would be called and everyone would flop down in
the shade, drink some water, break out a C-Ration or a cigarette. The GI
next to me would ask: What you doing out here? I would explain that I was
a reporter. "You mean you are a civilian? You don’t HAVE to be here?" Yes.
"Man, they must pay you loads of money to do this." And I would explain
that, no, unfortunately I worked for UPI, the cheapest news agency in the
world. "Then you are just plain crazy, man." Once I was pigeonholed, all
was all right. The grunts understood "crazy" like no one else I ever met.
The welcome was warm, friendly and open. I was probably the only civilian
they would ever see in the field; I was a sign that someone, anyone,
outside the Big Green Machine cared how theylived and how they died. It
didn’t take very long before I truly did come to care. They were, in my
view, the best of their entire generation. When their number came up in
the draft they didn’t run and hide in Canada. Theydidn’t turn up for
their physical wearing panthose or full of this chemical or that drug
which they hoped would fail them. Like their fathers before them they
raised their right hand and took the oath to protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States. It is not their fault that the war
they were sent to fight was not one that the political leadership in
Washington had any intention of winning. It is not their fault that
58,200 of them died, their lives squandered because Lyndon Johnson
and, later, Richard Nixon could not figure out some decent way to cut
our losses and leave the Vietnamese to sort the matter out among
themselves. As I have grown older, and so have they, and first the book
and now the movie have come to pass I am often asked: Doesn’t this close
the loop for you? Doesn’t this mean you can rest easier? The answer is no,
I can’t. To my dying day I WILL remember and honor those who died, some
in my arms. I WILL remember and honor those who lived and came home
carrying memories and scars that only their brothers can share and
understand. They were the best you had, America, and you turned your back
on them.


Russell L Ross - 2/3/2003

the wives wouldnt have been living on Fort Benning the would have had to find housing off base, as their husbands we no longer assinged to the base, and would hsve to move off Benning

NEWS: I’ve heard that in the movie, Madeleine Stowe, who portrays your wife, Julie, started delivering those telegrams.

Did that really happen?

MOORE: No, that’s a bit of Hollywood. When

news about this terrible battle hit the newspapers on the next day after the battle began, the army was just not prepared for those numbers of casualties. Julie lived in a little rented house in Columbus, Georgia, with our five small children, and she and about 400 other First Cav Division wives were living in that small town outside of Fort Benning, Georgia. The town went under a hell of a shock. Back in the early days of the war, the telegrams were delivered by taxicab. And when Julie heard about that first telegram being delivered by a taxicab driver, she went to the Army Post to the commander and told him that she wanted to know immediately which women were going to get the telegrams that day. And she literally followed the taxicab so she could be there when the telegram was delivered. Julie attended the funerals of 13, 14, 15 of my men that were buried in the Fort Benning cemetery. Of course, she never told me anything about this because she didn’t want to worry me.

An Interview with Hal Moore - from the Crested Butte Chronicle and Pilot newspaper:

Week of February 22, 2002

We Were Soldiers

An interview with Lt. Gen. Harold (Hal) G. Moore (Ret.)

by Aleesha Townes

Most Crested Butte residents agree that meeting Lt. Gen. Harold (Hal) Moore (Ret.) is a rare treat. "He’s such a nice man" and "he’s a great guy" are the unanimous responses after talking with the 24-year part-time Crested Butte resident. Through his book, We Were Soldiers Once … And Young, his ability to speak frankly and his warm personality shine through and over the years many locals recognize Moore as a community figure and a person with rare insight.

Through the eyes of Hollywood, the country and the world will have the opportunity next week to see a bit of Moore’s story with the opening of the film We Were Soldiers. The movie, starring Mel Gibson, is based on Moore’s experience as a lieutenant colonel in Vietnam. The film will open on March 1 in Crested Butte at the Majestic Theatre with a special screening to benefit the Crested Butte Reel Fest on Thursday, February 28, at 7:30 p.m.

Moore and his wife, Julie, have been busy touring the country promoting the new movie in cities like New York and Los Angeles. The News caught up with Moore at his home in Auburn, AL, earlier this week.



NEWS: How was your press tour?

MOORE: It was nonstop, unbelievably stressful. Four days of being interviewed by television and so forth from all over the world. I think what was most unusual was the first day and the third day. First day was the national media, television reporters, and they each had four minutes on video and they were lined up to talk to me, Joe Galloway, to my wife and to Madeleine Stowe.

NEWS: Did you meet some of the stars at the junket?

MOORE: Oh, Julie and I have been acquainted with the cast for well over a year. They came to Fort Benning in January last year, which is only 40 miles from our home here in Alabama. And Mel and the director and the set guy and a couple of Mel’s top people and others came to our home for dinner.

Actually Julie and Madeleine have become real close friends over the past year, and I as well with Madeleine and her husband, and we visited them at their ranch in Texas last summer. Those people are down-to-earth people, in very successful positions. They travel a lot, and they have very little time with their families.

I met Mel in October 2000, actually, at his place out in California. They flew me out there to talk with him, and we went to church together. He’s a Catholic; I’m a Catholic. We went to Catholic mass together at a private chapel… He was a server. And then we talked for two or three hours at a mom-and-pop barbecue joint back in the woods. And Mel is really a fine man. He’s got seven kids, same wife, and him and I share the same attitudes and morals. He’s a treat to be around, very quick-witted and sharp as hell.

NEWS: How do you feel about Gibson portraying you?

MOORE: Well, why would I not feel great? He’s a very empathetic and perceptive person. As I watched this filming progress—Julie and I saw about 3 or 4 percent of the total 100 percent of the filming. We really didn’t see much of the filming. We’ve seen the movie now four times at various screening places, and Mel comes across to me as an infantry battalion commander in Vietnam. He does not come across to me as a guy who’s playing Hal Moore. He does not come across to me as Mel Gibson. This guy is an infantry battalion commander in Vietnam in one hell of a fight.

NEWS: It seems that many men who served in Vietnam don’t want to talk about their experiences, but you have been very open and honest about what you saw there. What made you want to write this book?

MOORE: I knew that if I didn’t write this book to tell the world about my brave soldiers and what they did in that far field in Asia many years ago, that nobody would write it and get it right. I knew that I had to do this for my troops. I had this dream in mind ever since the battle, but I was still in the army and I had my duties to perform. After I retired from the army, I worked at the ski area for four years.

NEWS: I heard that just recently.

MOORE: Well everyone else does, right? I might as well work there too. But anyhow, I quit the job really to write the book.

I did about 10 years of research—written, telephone and reunions, and finally we got a contract with Random House. Joe Galloway, he was in the battle with me for a little over half of the fight, he came in the first night. He and I together wrote the book, and it’s done very well; it’s on the New York Times bestseller list. The troopers who have fought in Vietnam in that tragic war over all those years have written to us that it really does capture the experience of being in Vietnam in a tough war with a very tough enemy.

I was hoping that someday that it would be made into a film. I was sitting in my house in Crested Butte in about 1984 or ’85 writing a couple of chapters and I thought to myself, "Hey, this is going to make a hell of a movie someday." Now it will be on the streets next week. The reviews we get validate what we wanted to do. We wanted to write a book which was the real Vietnam. The movies on Vietnam depicting ground combat have all been nonsense.

NEWS: I was going to ask you what you thought about movies like Platoon and more recently The Thin Red Line?

MOORE: I have not seen The Thin Red Line yet, but I was told by one of my sons who has seen it that it was boring and more philosophical than anything.

The people who put together the movie Platoon took every bad incident that ever happened in Vietnam and lumped it all into one movie. Officers smoking dope with their troops, sergeants killing one another, burning villages, all that stuff. It was terrible. Apocalypse Now was really not about Vietnam, if you saw that. The only good movie I’ve seen on Vietnam is a comedy called Good Morning Vietnam with Robin Williams. That was fun, but of course it was truly a comedy. But he depicted a real-life guy who was a disc jockey out of Saigon, and I can still remember that guy hollering into the microphone, "Gooooood Morning, Vietnam!"

NEWS: How did the production of this movie come about?

MOORE: I believe in fate. I believe that fate put Joe Galloway and me together on that battlefield, years and years ago. And I believe that fate had Randall Wallace going through an airport pick up our book because of the title, We Were Soldiers Once … And Young, which is a different type of a grabber title. Randy has told us that he read that book on a couple of flights, and he said that he just had to make a movie on it. So he got a hold of us.

We’d been approached by several companies who wanted to make a movie, but we didn’t like any of them. But Randy came across to us as very, very professional, very sincere and very honest. Randy and his wife visited Julie and me in our home in Crested Butte in October three or four years ago. They visited us in our home down here in Alabama for a long weekend, and we got to know each other very well. He was determined to make this movie, but he was tied up with Braveheart. He wrote the screenplay for Braveheart, and he got Mel to do the lead and the directing, and of course it won the Oscar. Then he did Man in the Iron Mask, and then he was involved with a movie called Pearl Harbor for awhile. That took up some time, but then he could put full time into our movie, which he did. He’s just a hell of a nice guy. You should meet him some day. I’m a believer in fate, and I believe that kismet brought us all together, including Mel and Madeleine.

NEWS: Do you think that the movie is true to your book?

MOORE: The movie is superb. Although I was a consultant, Randall Wallace told me at the offset that "this is not another documentary. This is not the history channel. It’s a movie, and movies are emotional events." I previewed five written screenplays from 1995 on and made suggestions, some of which he accepted. But I was really a bit of a nuisance throughout because I kept drumming on him to emphasize the men down in the ranks, the riflemen, the sergeants, the second lieutenants, the men who win or lose the battles.

I insisted that the movie show that men in battle fight and kill and die for each other, not for what a president says on TV, or for the flag or for the country. Men in battle fight for the men beside them.

You look right there in Crested Butte. You’ve got Vietnam veterans just like I’m talking about. Like Jerry Heal, he and I were in the same division together in Vietnam—at different times, but he’s a First Cav Vietnam veteran—and Dave Lindsey, the mountain bike guru, those two guys are typical American draftees. They were conscripted during the war, they went to Vietnam and they fought and they made it through. I wanted the movie to clearly show guys like them, and it does. And I also wanted the film to show the respect that I had for the fighting ability for my enemy. I wanted to show the nonstop intensity of that three-day shootout. Another dimension that I wanted to be shown was the heartbreak back in America when those terrible "killed-in-action" telegrams started arriving and that awful knock at the door.

NEWS: I’ve heard that in the movie, Madeleine Stowe, who portrays your wife, Julie, started delivering those telegrams. Did that really happen?

MOORE: No, that’s a bit of Hollywood. When news about this terrible battle hit the newspapers on the next day after the battle began, the army was just not prepared for those numbers of casualties. Julie lived in a little rented house in Columbus, Georgia, with our five small children, and she and about 400 other First Cav Division wives were living in that small town outside of Fort Benning, Georgia.

The town went under a hell of a shock. Back in the early days of the war, the telegrams were delivered by taxicab. And when Julie heard about that first telegram being delivered by a taxicab driver, she went to the Army Post to the commander and told him that she wanted to know immediately which women were going to get the telegrams that day. And she literally followed the taxicab so she could be there when the telegram was delivered. Julie attended the funerals of 13, 14, 15 of my men that were buried in the Fort Benning cemetery. Of course, she never told me anything about this because she didn’t want to worry me.

NEWS: What’s something that you’d like audiences to keep in mind as they watch this film?

MOORE: The thrust of our book and the movie captures the thrust of the book very well on the screen—I’d like everyone that sees that movie to come out of the theater with this message: Hate war but love the American warrior.

NEWS: Are you attending the film’s premiere?

MOORE: I’ve seen the film about three or four times at special screenings. The premiere is next week, in Los Angeles. I think it’s on Monday. As far as I know, at this time, my wife and I will be invited to the premiere.

NEWS: We’ve talked about Mel Gibson portraying you. How do the other actors, like Sam Elliott, do portraying people that were close to you?

MOORE: Sam Elliott … well, Mel Gibson better watch out or Sam is going to steal the show. Sam Elliott is profoundly professional. He is the ultimate sergeant major in this movie. He is absolutely superb. And I’ve become pretty good friends with Sam. We communicate, and he’s a down-to-earth guy and he’s a total pro. The guy takes on a role and he is the ultimate. As you know, he’s a big Western star and he’s waiting now for the Western movies to start coming back, I think. In the meantime, he played Col. Beauford in Gettysburg, and he plays the sergeant major in this movie. When you see this movie, you’re going to love Sam Elliott.

NEWS: I already love Sam Elliott.

MOORE: I think my wife would run away from home for him.

NEWS: Who plays Joe Galloway?

MOORE: A guy named Barry Pepper, who played Roger Maris in 61 and he was in The Green Mile and he was the left-handed sniper in Saving Private Ryan. Barry Pepper may well get a Best Supporting Actor nomination, along with Sam Elliott. He was superb. He’s a Canadian. He’s such a nice guy.

Last Friday my co-author, Joe Galloway, and I were invited to Fort Hood, Texas, for a screening of the movie for the First Calvary Division, which is the division we were in in Vietnam. And Madeleine was there with her husband and Barry Pepper as well. And I tell you what, the troops just showered them with affection and with gratitude that they would come down and talk with them, and they were there all day long, into the night, with the troops.

By the way, the First Cav Division at the premiere is going to have horse platoon. They have an 1870s horse platoon, like in the Indian Wars—calvary uniforms, boots, breeches, horses, Conastoga wagon with a dog on the seat. And they’re going to have the First Cav Division Color Guard flags at the premiere. So that should be rather … showy. A little Hollywoody, probably. But frankly I’ll be glad when it’s all over with so I can get back my life. I should be out there skiing right now!

It’s been a very revealing learning experience, and it’s been a lot of fun. I’ve met some wonderful people.

NEWS: Are you appearing on talk shows or anything like that?

MOORE: The people that I want to see interviewed and get the credit are my troopers, the guys who fought the battle. I will probably be called up and interviewed of course, but I hope that it will be held to a minimum. I personally don’t like being in the spotlight. I just don’t like it. I want my troops to get the credit, not me.











Russell L. Ross - 1/31/2003

In a Bayonet charge you have no ammo to fire, and you are attacking a fortified position, his troops were only going to go get the lost platoon. some troops carried a bayonet on their rifles all the time, and some only in a defencive position, so why did he have to tell them to fix bayonets? How were the troops able to see over 25 feet becouse of 5 foot high elephate grass and trees?

and if you look at Peter Arnetts pictures you will se no enemy at all


Russell L Ross - 1/31/2003

MOORE DIDNT see Galloway rescue Nakayama!!
and the Bronze Star should be taken back.

Harold G. Moore, then the 1st Battalion commander, didn't learn about Galloway's actions until the two collaborated on ``We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young,'' a best-selling book about the history of the battle published in 1992.

Moore, who retired as a three-star general, put Galloway in for the award.

THE BIG LIE.

``There was grazing machine-gun fire going over our heads and he got up in that grazing fire and ran to that soldier to save him,'' Moore said. ``One of my medics got shot, but Joe kept going. When the battle was over . . . I never gave any thought to giving this award to a civilian.''

http://www.caller2.com/newsarch/news11571.html


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Thursday, Jun. 4, 1998
Refugio native awarded Bronze Star
Former UPI reporter tried to save a wounded soldier during the Vietnam War
By STEPHANIE L. JORDAN
Staff Writer

BAYSIDE -- For Refugio native Joe Galloway, reporting the Vietnam War meant getting away from press briefings, safe base camps and clean sheets. He saw the war as the grunts saw it, down in the dirt with the heat, death, blood, fear and valor.
And on Nov. 15, 1965, during the first large-scale battle between American troops and the North Vietnamese Army, Galloway stopped being a United Press International reporter and became a hero.
On May 1, 1998, Galloway -- now a senior writer for U.S. News and World Report -- was awarded a Bronze Star with a ``V'' device for valor for his actions during the battle. Galloway, who divides his time between homes in Bayside and Boston, is the first civilian to be given the award from the Army, said Maj. Gen. Joseph K. Kellogg, who presented him with the medal at Fort Bragg, N.C.
``At that time and that place he was a soldier,'' Kellogg said. ``He was a soldier in spirit, he was a soldier in actions and he was a soldier in deeds.''
Galloway was honored for trying to save a wounded soldier during one of the pivotal battles of the Vietnam War, a battle that left 234 Americans dead.
``I know that wasn't my job, but in those days everyone did what they could to survive and help everyone else make it out of there alive,'' Galloway said.
While with troops of the 7th Cavalry's 1st Battalion -- part of the First Cavalry Division -- fighting in the Central Highlands, Galloway was in the battalion command post when an American fighter mistakenly dropped napalm near the position.
Galloway, crouching down to avoid enemy fire, saw PFC Jimmy Nakayama and Spc.5 James Clark get caught by the flames. With the help of Sgt. George Nye, Galloway grabbed Nakayama's feet and carried him to safety.
Clark died and, two days later, so did Nakayama.
``When I grabbed his feet, his boots just fell off, and I remember my hands touching raw bones,'' Galloway said. ``We carried him away and he was screaming. I can still hear those screams.''
Harold G. Moore, then the 1st Battalion commander, didn't learn about Galloway's actions until the two collaborated on ``We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young,'' a best-selling book about the history of the battle published in 1992. Moore, who retired as a three-star general, put Galloway in for the award.
``There was grazing machine-gun fire going over our heads and he got up in that grazing fire and ran to that soldier to save him,'' Moore said. ``One of my medics got shot, but Joe kept going. When the battle was over . . . I never gave any thought to giving this award to a civilian.''
For the 17-year-old 1958 Refugio High graduate, just getting to the Ia Drang Valley was a battle.
Galloway, now 56, said he wasn't a great student in high school and was only interested in reading, writing and history. He attended Victoria Junior College for six weeks, but didn't like it because it was too much like high school.
``I was on my way to join the Army when my mom, God bless her, said `But what about your journalism?' '' Galloway said. ``We just so happened to be driving by the Victoria Advocate's office so I stopped in and asked if I could be a reporter.''
After 18 months at the Advocate, Galloway joined UPI. At age 19, he was named bureau chief of UPI's Topeka, Kan., bureau, the youngest bureau chief in the history of the wire service.
``I guess that's because I was a young man in a hurry,'' Galloway said.
During his three years in Topeka, from 1961 to 1964, Galloway began lobbying his bosses to send him to Tokyo, the UPI bureau that covered the growing war in Vietnam.
``I knew this was my generation's war,'' he said. ``Not to have gone would have been much harder to explain than going is.''
He was in Tokyo for six months before going to Vietnam to cover the Marines.
From his first days in-country, Galloway worked hard to get to a firsthand view of the war. Military leaders weren't always pleased to see him.
But his willingness to show up in the field, to live with the troops, won the respect of many soldiers.
One of his early converts was H. Norman Schwarzkopf, then a major, who went on to become a four-star general and command the multinational coalition force that won the Persian Gulf War in 1991. In Vietnam, Galloway hooked up with Schwarzkopf in August 1965 at the Du Co Special Forces camp. Schwarzkopf and his South Vietnamese troops had been under attack for two weeks, and Schwarzkopf had just found out the unit would have to walk out of the area.
Galloway showed up and asked to march out with the troops, Schwarzkopf said in a phone interview.
``I was hot, tired and dirty and had just found out that we had to walk out and the last person I wanted to have around was a fancy-pants reporter,'' Schwarzkopf said. ``But what's different about him is that he really knew how to be at the right place at the right time without being intrusive. He was a friend right away.''
Galloway, Schwarzkopf said, ``is absolutely the finest combat correspondent I've ever known.''
``He truly understands what ground combat is all about,'' he said. ``He wasn't like many of the other war correspondents who wrote their stories from the rear area, or in the bars in Da Nang and Saigon. He lived the life of the grunts.''
At least once, a commander put Galloway behind a weapon.
In October 1965, after hearing that the U.S. Special Forces camp at Plei Me was surrounded and under siege, Galloway finagled his way aboard a helicopter heading that way.
When Galloway arrived at the tiny Plei Me camp, its commander, Maj. Charles Beckwith -- who later founded the Army's Delta Force -- was less than pleased that a reporter had managed to fly in when his troops were in desperate need of food, ammunition and medical supplies.
``He was jumping up and down on his hat when I got there,'' Galloway said. ``He told me he needed everything in the world but a God damn reporter.''
What he did need was someone to man a machine gun, and appointed Galloway to the task. Beckwith's instructions were simple, Galloway said.
``Don't shoot the little brown men inside the wire because they're mine, but shoot all the little brown men outside the wire,'' said Galloway, repeating Beckwith's words.
For four days and nights Galloway stayed on the line with Beckwith's troops. As Galloway was leaving after the battle, Beckwith gave the reporter an M-16 Galloway carried until the war ended in 1975.
``I told (Beckwith) that I wasn't a combatant and he said, `Son, in these mountains there's no such thing,' '' Galloway said.
A few weeks later, and 14 miles away, Galloway would face many of the same North Vietnamese troops who had attacked Plei Me.
On Nov. 14, hours after the fighting in the Ia Drang Valley had begun, Galloway hopped on a helicopter bound for the fighting. He was kicked off because there wasn't enough room. He boarded another helicopter, but Moore ordered it away because it was too dangerous to land.
Galloway was grounded at the rear command post, itching to get to the action, he said.
He hid out overnight at the base camp while other reporters retreated to beds and warm meals. Galloway asked Capt. Gregory Dillon if he could fly with him to the battle.
``He was such a young guy, but was dedicated to covering the war from the bottom end up,'' said Dillon, who retired as a colonel. ``It was pretty hairy there the first couple of days. We used to have an awful lot of reporters come in after the fact, but he was willing to take the same risks as the soldiers.''
They arrived on the morning of the second day of the battle. Galloway had just spoken with Nakayama when an Air Force F-100 Super Sabre dropped the jellied gasoline on the soldiers.
Two days later, Galloway flew out to Pleiku to file his story. For the work he did in Ia Drang, UPI gave him a raise, from $135 per week to $150.
``I had an exclusive in the biggest battle of the war,'' Galloway said. ``All I had to do was survive.''
On his first tour of Vietnam for UPI, Galloway spent 16 months in-country. He would return three times, the last in 1975 as the North Vietnamese headed to their victory.
``A mentor of mine, Dickey Chapelle, who had covered World War II, once told me you can have the best story in the world, but you have to get out and live to file it,'' Galloway said.``War is a great story. There is always room for you on the front page and in many ways it's a simple story. Afterwards, you wonder if you can cover normal life. I mean you wake up one day, when you're 30, and realize you have more friends dead than alive.''
Galloway lived in Asia for a total of 12 years before transferring to UPI's Moscow bureau. Later, he moved to UPI's Los Angeles bureau as its chief. In 1982, Galloway went to work for U.S. News & World Report, eventually going to work for the magazine in Washington, D.C.
But in 1992, Galloway would go into battle again, this time with tanks and armor roaring across the Iraqi desert. As he did in Vietnam, Galloway reported the war from the sharp end.
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991, Galloway looked up his old friend H. Norman Schwarzkopf, now commanding the coalition forces. Galloway wanted to return to the First Cav, Schwarzkopf said, but the general knew where the real action would be.
``We argued about it because I wanted him to go on the 24th Mech (Infantry Division),'' Schwarzkopf said. ``I'm sure all the way there he was cursing me under his breath thinking that I wanted to give some press coverage to the 24th.''
But Galloway soon found out that the 24th was one of the armor units assigned to the charge across the desert in an end-run around heavily fortified Kuwait.
Since Galloway had been briefed on the plan, he was able to interview combat leaders before the battle, he said. The ground war started on a Monday, ended on Thursday, and Galloway's story was due on Friday.
Galloway had survived another war.
Joe Galloway still covers the military, but the men he met in Vietnam -- some of whom never returned home -- are never far from his mind. Galloway often gives talks on military bases, and reminds the men and women in uniform of the unspoken bond that unites a fighting force.
``I remind the soldiers that when they leave (the military) it will be the last day that the man on their left and the man on their right will die for them,'' Galloway said. ``Back when I started uncommon valor was a common virtue. It was during that time when I made some of the best and closest friends of my life.''


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Russell L Ross - 1/31/2003

Fiction We Were Soldiers Once and Young X-Ray part.

page references are from the hardback

The most outrageous LIE Page 287 At Landing Zone Albany. There on the dying enemy soldier something shiny. A big battered old French army Bugle.

FACT: This Bugle was captured at Landing Zone X-Ray and brought into Landing Zone Albany by the reinforcements.

FICTION: Fabarication applies particulary to a false but carefully invented statement or a series of statements, in which some truth is sometimes interwoven, the whole usually intended to deceive.

The Greatest Hero "People everywhere are smitten- With a tale that is written. Once a hero's deeds are known- They're as good as etched in stone. Every word, folks take to heart- And think this makes them very smart. Amazing how the very wise- Never stop to realize- That what they read may not be true.

Groo Moral: Even when the words are true the may not speak the truth. Groo

Can you make Col. Klink ( Moore ) and Rambo the Reporter (Galloway ) into hero's pages from the hardback Lt. Col. Moore was the Col. Klink of the war? He knew nothing, nothing Page 17 Moore's new concepts & techniques were written in the 1950's FM 57-35 Army Transport Avation-Combat Operations, 1963 FM 57-35 Airmobile Operations. by Officers he worked with? in 1957. Moore in 1957 "I was in on the concept of Airmobility with Gavin, Norton, Seneff Williams". With 2 1/2 years writing, 1 1/2 years training in Airmobile tatics in the 11Air Assault Division Test, for a total of 4 years and yet he retained nothing about Airmobile tatics.

The photographs offered are from the personal collection of Joe Galloway ( Rambo the Reporter ) and were taken at LZ X-Ray during and after the action in the Ia Drang Valley, November 14-16, 1965.

The images reflect the savagery of the combat, a feel for the emotions of the soldiers involved and a sense for the terrain in which the battle was fought. The photographs have never before been published and most have been seen only by a handful of participants in the action.

( Actually some pictures have been published and seen by over 26 million people )

These images will help put a real face on the people, places and events in the upcoming movie, "We Were Soldiers Once...And Young", starring Mel Gibson. A film based on the book of the same name by Lt. Gen. Hal Mooore and Joe. Ia Drang

Scholarship Fund.... As a lasting tribute to the men of the 1st of the 7th Cavalry who gave so much in the Ia Drang, a permanent scholarship fund was established for the children and grandchildren of those who died in action in this heroic event. To honor that commitment, 10% of the purchase price of every Joe Galloway at the Ia Drang photo will be donated to the fund.

Stories Part Fiction Galloway embelished for them.

U.S. NEWS and World Report Oct 29,1990 Pg 32 Fatal Victory Pg 36 Vietnam Story.

ARTICLES Galloway Plagarized.
U.S. News and World Report Oct 25, 93 Page 45 Step by Step into a Quagmire SOURCE: Stanley Karnows Vietnam a History Pages 479-485.

U.S. News and World Report Feb 4,1991 Page 49 "Who's Afraid of the truth" SOURCE: Soldier of Fortune Dec 84 Pg 104 Press Escorts by Fred Tucker. ( TUCKERS GORRILLAS ).

In the movie Gibson portray Galloway as a Reporter who pick's up a weapon only to protect the wounded. BUT!!! Galloway was the most heavely armed Reporter in Vietnam. Page 32 Joseph L. Galloway Had wrangled a ride in to the Plie Me camp while it was under siege, and becouse of the shortages of fighters found him self assigned to a .30 cal light machine gun. With two other reporters After the battle was over Major Charles Beckwith hands Galloway an M-16 rifle, Galloway told Beckwith, Strictly speaking, under the Geneva Convention he was "A civilian noncombatant."

As you see there is no logic. Galloway has just spent 3 days maning a .30 cal machine gun killing PAVN troops and after the battle is over decides he is a civilian noncombatant? The question is why didnt Galloway join the service? He was always to busy playing Soldier instead of being a Reporter. He wanted to be at any battle he could get to, to record it, But when he get's there at the battle. He start's to play Soldier. You cant write or record History, While you busy playing soldier. Of all the reporters in Vietnam, Galloway was the most danegerous to the Americian troops, in His Walter Mitty and Rambo persona. He had no idea what the soldier's job was, He as a reporter and could do what he wanted and go where he wanted to at any time. Joseph L. Galloway( Rambo the Reporter ) ROAMED all over VIETNAM, Killing as he pleased. Page 35 November 13,1965 Galloway hitched a ride from Pleiku to Catecha the 3 Brigade headquaters Galloway " I dug a foxhole out on the perimeter with B company 1/7, Under one of those $50.00 tea bushes, set out some spare! magazines ( M-16 ). Galloway playing Soldier, It would have been better if he said I set out some spare film rolls. to record events, his mind set is playing soldier. Page 32 Galloway writes: " At first lite I pinched of a small piece of C-4 explosive from the emergency supply in my pack and used it to boil up a canteen cup of water for coffee. Walter Mitty part: If you lit C-4 very carefully you could be drinking hot coffee in maybe 30 secounds. If you were careless it blew your arm off. If Galloway was so eager to receive the Bronze Star, Then he should be ready to pay the price for violating the UCMJ. Conspiring to take a 4 million dollar Helicopter and receiving Military equipement, 1 M16 Rifle, 1 Carl Gustaf, I had to sign for all my equipement as all soldiers did and had to turn it in when I left, Who did Galloway leave the M-16 with, Does he have papers saying he turned it in? The same with the Carl Gustaf, Where did he get it? Did he buy it, Pick it up on the Battlefield? Did he sell it when he left? If he turned it in, Does he have the paper work to show it? Galloway conspired with a friend ( A Huey Pilot )into flying into Plei Me camp. There were orders for all aircraft to stay out of the area, The friend went AWOL, He and Galloway took the Huey and flew into Plei Me, Beckwith needed, medical, and ammo. At Plei Me Major Charles Beckwith had put Galloway and 2 other Reporters on a machinegun. and had given Galloway an M-16 Rifle.

MYTH's: Page 156-157 Vincent Cantu and Galloway meet during fierce attack on D and C company's. Galloway was taking pictures. Vincent Cantu braved the fire and sprinted to where Galloway was.

TRUTH: Soldier of Fortune Sept 83 Page 28 Galloway writes "During a ( LULL!!)." I met Vincent Cantu this was before the(skyhawk) naplmed the Command post.

MYTH's: Page 35 Galloway The plantation billed the U.S. $50 for each tea bush and $250 for each rubber tree.

TRUTH: Soldier of Fortune Sept 83 Page 25 Galloway They billed U.S.$25 for each tea bush $125 for each rubber tree. Galloway only left the saftey of the Command Post During " LULL's " in the Battle, As soon as the firing started up, He would headed right back to the Command post.

Reviewer: Russell L. Ross lzalbany65@aol.com from San Jose, CA
anytime you or Moore and Galloway want to back up their story in a court of law let me know.

Who am I? lzalbany65@aol.com Russell L. Ross 1741 Maysong ct. San Jose, Ca 95131-2727 ph 408 926-9336

Sept 1965-66 SP/4 Russell L. Ross RA17630469 D company 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry Recon Platoon ( LoneRanger call sign ) 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile An Khe Vietnam.

1964 B company 1st Battalion 511 Infantry ( Airborne ) 11 Air Assualt ( test ) FT. Benning, Georgia.

1965 B company 1/511 became B company 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry ( Airborne ) 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile FT. Benning, Georgia.

And in July 1965 I was sent to the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry 1st Cavalry Division Airmobile.

JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY ( Rambo The Reporter ) IS NOW SELLING HIS COMBAT PICTURES FROM LANDING ZONE X-RAY. Joseph L. Galloway The Walter Mitty of the war, Rambo the Reporter, A Plagiarist, Fiction writer, and now add fraud.


Russell L Ross - 1/30/2003

Reviewer: Russell L. Ross lzalbany65@aol.com from San Jose, CA

Fiction We Were Soldiers Once and Young X-Ray part. page references are from the hardback.

FICTION: Fabarication applies particulary to a false but carefully invented statement or a series of statements, in which some truth is sometimes interwoven, the whole usually intended to deceive.

The Greatest Hero "People everywhere are smitten- With a tale that is written. Once a hero's deeds are known- They're as good as etched in stone. Every word, folks take to heart- And think this makes them very smart. Amazing how the very wise- Never stop to realize- That what they read may not be true.

Groo Moral: Even when the words are true the may not speak the truth Groo Can you make Col. Klink ( Moore ) and Rambo the Reporter (Galloway ) into hero's pages from the hardback Lt. Col. Moore was the Col. Klink of the war? He knew nothing, nothing Page 17 Moore's new concepts & techniques were written in the 1950's FM 57-35 Army Transport Avation-Combat Operations, 1963 FM 57-35 Airmobile Operations. by Officers he worked with? in 1957. Moore in 1957 "I was in on the concept of Airmobility with Gavin, Norton, Seneff Williams". With 2 1/2 years writing, 1 1/2 years training in Airmobile tatics in the 11Air Assault Division Test, for a total of 4 years and yet he retained nothing about Airmobile tatics. Page 37 Crandall "Moore wanted Aviation present, to be part of his Staff". Moore, Crandall or his ALO had to coordinate the flight time from Plei Me to X-Ray, flight routes, fire support, resuppy, Medevac Huey. Moore couldnt plan the operation with out Crandall ( aviation ) present. Page 60 As Crandall flared the huey to land at Landing Zone X-Ray Moore & his troops starts firing their weapons. FM 57-35 There is no firing from the helicopter during flight, landing or any other time. Pity the troop to their right a face full of hot brass, left ear drums ringing, brass on floor or getting caught in the Huey's controls Moore who had been listening to the battle of Landing Zone Albany on the radio voluntered for the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to go to Columbus to guard the artillary, So the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry could go and reinforce ALBANY. MYTHS of The Ia Drang Valley Some Officers even Kinnard stated that Moore voluntered to go into ALBANY but he didn’t. and from Persons in the book That Moore and Galloway write good about give in return and adds to the MYTHS about the 1/7 and Moore. One Reporter Bob Poos of Soldier of Fortune writes that Moore and the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry was the ones who relived the Plie me camp, Soldier of Fortune March 83 page 29-30 ARVN AMBUSH 3rd column last 2 paragraphs. Plie Me did get relief- with a vengeance- from the 1st Cavalry Division. Through a strange coincidance, the camp commander, Capt Harold Moore, Learned later that much of the relief force was commanded by a name sake, Lt. Col. Harold Moore commander of the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry. When in fact it was my old unit the 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry. Capt George Forrest when he spoke to the Old Guard said Lt. Col. Moore was there in the 11AAD in 1963. So starts the myths about Lt. Col. Moore and the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry. Moore idea would cost time becouse the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry would have to be to Columbus 4 hours, Then the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry would have to be flown to Albany another 4 hours. 8 hours to renforce Albany? So why didn’t Kinnard send the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to reinforce ALBANY? They were probally to drunk? they had spent the day of the 17 in the Bars of Pleiku The most outrageous LIE Page 287 At Landing Zone Albany. There on the dying enemy soldier something shiny. A big battered old French army Bugle. FACT: This Bugle was captured at Landing Zone X-Ray and brought into Landing Zone Albany by the reinforcements. Leadership Principle 1 Be Technically and Tactically Proficent To know you job thoroughly, you must posses not only specific knowledge of its details but also a broad general knowledge concerning its area of intrest. you should be competent in combat operations and training as well as in the technical and admimistrative aspects of your duties. If you demonstrate deficincies in these functions,your subordinates will lose confidance in you as a leader. Moore is under the delusion he has come up with a new Air Assault tatic for the 1st lift would doom his men. for the want of a nail, The 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry. As the Battle of Landing Zone X-Ray would grind up, The Troops, Helicopters and Artillary. Making them unavalible for other units. Leading to the walk to Landing Zone Albany by the 2/7. What happend. It would appear Moore would be the first one chosen by Kinnard for the 11 AIr Assault test, When it started up in 1963 but he wasnt. He had To write a letter to Major General Kinnard ( His Old Boss ) begging for a Infantry Battalion in the 11 air Assault Division. It wasent till 1964, 1 year after it started he got the call. He didnt get one with the 11 Air Assault but instead was given a Infantry Battalion in the 2 infantry Division. The 2nd Battalion 23rd Infantry. Moore Had never commanded a Infantry Battalion before. But one of the hand picked officers by Kinnard in 1963 was Lt. Col McDade, He was chosen for the G-1 spot, He would be given command of the 2nd Battilion 7th Cavalry around November 7,1965 aproximately 10 days before the battle of Landing Zone Albany. McDade Had never Commanded a Infantry Battalion before. THERE WAS ANOTHER FACTOR, MOORE AND MCDADE WERE HAVING A POWER STRUGGLE. Keep abreast of current military devolopements. Moore "I thought up a new technique for the inital lift." There are only two types of Air assaults. Moore under the delusion he had come up with a new technique. The ground Commander ( Moore ) must concider two general types of Airmobile assault when preparing the ground tatical plan. These types of assaults differ primarily in the proximity of the LZ to the assault objective The first and preferred type is the landing of the assault ehelons immediately on, or adjacent to, the objective The secound type of assault involves landing a distance from the objective in a secure LZ, and requires assembly, reorganization, and movement to an attack position prior to the assault on the objective. Some simulare characteristics of Moore and Custer. When no one wrote about them, They wrote their own Books. Both were considered too Flamboyent, by fellow officers. And not well liked. George Armstrong Custer ( His men called him yellow hair ) Commander of the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry at the battle of the Little Bighorn. The Indians would wipe the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry out to a man. Starting the Indian wars, The UNITED STATES would unite and almost wipe out all the Indians taking their lands and putting them on Reservations LT.Col. Harold G. Moore ( His men called him yellow hair ) Commander 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry at the battle of Landing Zone X-Ray November the 14,1965 Pleiku Provance of South Vietnam. Moore's men with help from the reinforcement's ( Bco 2/7 ) saves Landing Zone X-RAY. Starting the Vietnam war. Which almost tears the United States apart. Both Battles ( The Little Bighorn ) and ( Landing Zone X-Ray ) were fought by the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry. On a Sunday, In a Valley, By a River, In tall Grass and near a Large Mountian or Hill top. Both Commanders were told the size of the enemy troops. By their Scouts. But didnt belive them. Scout to Custer "There is a very very large Indian camp down there." Custer "Where I dont see any camp" Intelligence Lieutenant to Col. Moore "There is the possibiy of a PAVN Regiment near the Chu Pong mountain. Moore that didn't really bother me. Both the Commanders wanted to force the Enemy to stand and fight. As the enemy's tatics were hit and run. Custer in the lead charges into the valley his troops behind. to cut off the Indians, So they couldn't escape on to the plains. Moore in the lead Huey charges in to the Valley his troop behind would be the first one on Landing Zone X-Ray, hopeing the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong wouldn't excape in to the mountians and into Cambodia. Both would get their wish. The Indians and North Vietnamese would send 1,000 or more men out to meet the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry. The Commanders then realized that the size of the enemy forces was true. their scouts were right They were out numbered. Both battles were defensive. After the initial charge by the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry They would pull back, Circle the wagons and let the enemy throw them selves at their defense's. Custer didn't have renforcements, It would take weeks to get them, His supplies were miles behind him. The 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry was wiped out to the man. Moore didnt have that problem "I had something Custer didn't, Reinforcements with in Hours. Moore forgot to lay on supplies and water for his troops. Moore's Men with the help of the Reinforcements ( Bco 2/7 ) save Landing Zone X-Ray. starting the Vietrnam War.It would almost destroy the United States. The Troops FOUGHT VALIANTLY. What happend to Moore's H-hour. Moore Get's his H-hour confused with the Attack time in the mission order. H-hour in air assault terms is difined as the time the lead helicopter touches down on the Landing Zone. Moore puts the H-hour at H-1030. He then gets word the Artillary cant fire until H-1017. H-hour get delayed. 1 incremint? ( usually 15 minutes ). So that should make H-hour, H-1045. But Moore ( who is in the lead Huey ) dosent set foot on LZ X-Ray until H-1048, 3 minutes late. Lt. Col. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway's part.( the enlisted mens,Officers, Junior Officers and the 2/5, Bco 2/7 and 2/7 Battalion stories cannot be disputed.) Moore couldnt READ a MAP? Page 30 November 9, 1965 Moore "What does the RED STAR that is on the intelligence map mean?" The Red Star is not a military symbol its explanation should have been on the lower right side ( margin ) of the map. Moore " I had no doubt the 1/7 my Battalion would be chosen to mount the attack into the Ia Drang as the 2/7 had a new commander. Fact!! " the 1/7 was closer to the objective then the 2/7 " and had nothing to do with the readiness of the Battalions. (Gen.John J Tolson). Page 17 Moore's new concepts & techniques were written in the 1950's FM 57-35 Army Transport Avation-Combat Operations.1960's FM 57-35 Airmobile Operations. By Officers he worked with? Page 17 1957 Moore "I was in on the concept of Airmobility with Pentagon Reasearch and developement group. Moore "I was the 1st man in the Airborne Branch". 4 years writing and training in Airmobile tatics. Yet Moore retained nothing about Airmobile tatics. Page 41 Moore "I thought up a new technique for the inital lift". There are only 2 types of Air assaults This is the 2 one. Page 37 Crandall "Moore wanted Aviation to be present, to be part of his Staff" FM 57-35>Both the Ground Commander ( Moore ) and Aviation Commander ( Crandall ) or his ALO had to coordinate>flight time from Plei Me to X-Ray, flight routes,resuppy. Moore couldnt plan the operation with out Avation present. FM 57-35 Key personnel are distributed among the aircraft of the lift so the loss of one aircraft does not destroy the command structure. Page 58 Moore and Crandall in the same Huey. Page 59 The lift is flying at 110 knots. FM 57-35 When diffrent types of aircraft fly in a single lift, cruising speed of the slower aircraft must be the controlling speed of the lift. UH-1B's are Gunships fly at 80 knots UH-1D's are Slicks 110 knots. I ask Bco's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal, why didnt Moore lay on water for his men ( B co would be on the LZ for over 4 hours ) and why he said it was not the Aviations job to haul out Wounded Troops? B co's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal "dont ask me I knew nothing about Airmobile tatics." Page 106 Moore we needed water, medical supplies and ammo. Page 107 Bco 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal by 3pm we ran out of water, the wounded kept begging for water. Page 145 November 15, 1965 at 6:20am Jemison shared his last drops of water. Page 112 November 14, 1965 While all day long the Battalion Supply Officer was riding in and out of X-Ray & Galloway came. 240# of water, medical, ammo not coming in, 1 Wounded troop not going out. Page 106 Moore "hauling Wounded was not the slick crews job" ( Aviation ) FM 7-20 the Battalion Commanders hanbook, Hauling wounded is the secoundary mission of all military aircraft. Page 63 Moore used his command Huey to haul out a non wounded POW. Page 167 but none his wounded troops, Lt Franklin terribly wounded was set aside to die. FM 1-100 Army Aviation The Command and Control Huey is to be used for Command and Control ONLY it shouldnt be used for anyother purpose, like RESUPPLY. . a Medevac Huey was suppose to fly with the assault echelon ( 1st Lift ) Page 105 a wounded troop was stumbling toward the aid station, Galloway " stay away go back" what was this 17 year old's thoughts 50 feet from the aid station and treatment and told to stay away? FM 57-35 page 12 paragraph 24 supply 6 miscellaneous. a. probable water supply points are predesingnated. and comes in with the fowllowing echelon. FM 7-20 page 271 paragraph 313 returning aircraft may be used for the evacuation of casualities. Galloway had no military service. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY no one expects the battalion commander to act as a rifleman no matter how proficient he is. As he does so. who commands his battalion? Who gives guidance to his Company Commanders, he is taking responsibility away from his men and not meeting his own. Page 34 Moore "I went to school on the Division Commander, authority must be pushed down to the man on the spot. Page 40 Moore "I personally to influence the action would be in the 1st Huey to land on X-Ray." Page 60 Moore leading his command group clear a sector of X-Ray, on the way back to the LZ, meet the troops who were suppose to clear that sector. Page 73 Moore "I was tempted to join A co or C co's company's men" Page 108 Moore "My operations Officer`& the Avaition Liason Officer had controlled all flights into X-Ray, I then took control, every Huey coming to X-Ray must radio me for landing instructions. Page 109 Crandall Moore was now a signalman at the far end of the LZ was standing up, directing us where to land. Page 109 The Brigade Commander had given Moore pathfinders. Page 195 Moore "I personally lead the final counterattack to make certian that the Company Commander of Bco 2/7 & his men did a safe, clean, job & to look for my Missing Troops. Moore didnt bring in his execuitive Officer( 2nd in command ) to help run the battalion command post. Page 39 Moore "we had never maneuvered in combat as a battalion" Page 28 Moore the Battalion made 2 sweeps near An Khe. Page 31 nov 9 Moore "We shuttled the Battalion in 16 Hueys" Page 32 nov 9 Galloway "My first time out with Moores 1/7 Battalion" Original story Solider of Fortune November 83 Page 25 Nov 9 Galloway "before nitefall Moore waved his battalion across a stream" Each Huey could carry 10 Troops. 10 troops X 16 Hueys=160 Troops per lift. Page 30 a enemy base camp Page 55 a radio transmision intercepted, estamated a N V regiment was near X-Ray Page 57 commo wire was seen. Page 39 Moore puts only 80 men (5 per Huey) in the inital lift. Page 57 riflemen extra ammo all they could carry. Air Assault tatics emphasize maximum inital lift, to get maximum lift each huey carries minimum amount of fuel + 30 min reserve, with refueling & ammo Points near the Pickup Zone. Troops only basic load of ammo and web gear (intrenching tool, 2 canteens, bayonet and poncho and 1st aid pack ) Page 40 Moore "later lifts could carry more men 100 as fuel burned off". Page 198 Rear area Operation Officer Dick Merchant "the Huey could carry 10 men" Page 111 Winkle"I had a total of 16 men in my Huey". Fourner "it was left up to each pilot how many men he carried" on later lifts I was carring 9-12 troops. How it should have happend according to Air Assault Tatics FM 57-35 With only 16 Hueys weight is a factor, so the inital lift ( the assault echelon ) must contain sufficant Troops to secure the Landing Zone. The Alowable Cargo Load the ( ACL ) of each UH-1D for this mission should have been 3,000 pounds as its under 50 nautical miles ( only 14.3 miles to the objective ) using the Space method a space is defined as the weight of a fully combat equiped troop ( 240 pounds ) 10 Troops = 2,400 pounds per Huey. Page 39 B co 114 troops, A co 40 troops, Ground Commanders command group 6 for a total of 160 troops in the 1st lift. Moore was a Pilot? Page 58 Crandall ( The Aviation Commander ) is starting the Huey from the left seat the co-pilot seat, There is no starter on that side. Page 58 Moore as they load the Hueys "what is the flying time from Plei Me to Landing Zone X-Ray"? 14.3 miles. Page 37 Moore and Crandall plan an Air Assault. Page 40 with a time table & failed to put down the flying time from Plei Me to Landing Zone X-Ray, with out this information, How did they plan the Assault??? Page 58 Mills 13 min 15 sec. Page 59 Speed ( rate ) 110 knots this time will take them 25 miles away. The correct time is 8 min. Formula for Time is Distance X 60 divide by Rate ( Speed ) 14.3 X 60 = 858 divide by 110 = 7.8 min = 8 min time is rounded up to the nearest min. Formula for Distance is rate ( Speed ) X time divided by 60 110 X 8 = 880 divide by 60 = 14.6miles = 15miles miles is rounded up to the nearest 1/2 mile. using 7.8 min for time for the distance 110 X 7.8 = 858 divide by 60 = 14.3 miles The distance from Plei Me to Landing Zone X-Ray. Page 188 A blazing flare under an unopened parachute hit the ammo dump, the Sgt.Major grabbed it with his bare hands, it burns at 4,000 degrees, it needs the parachute to lite the candle. Letter from Randy Wallace, the Screenwriter and Director, about the film: The Wheelhouse 15464 Ventura Boulevard Sherman Oaks, CA 91403-3002 Randall Wallace 7 February 2001 To all men who fought in the Ia Drang Valley, November 1965, and their families. Gentlemen, As many of you have already heard, we are preparing to make a film version of Hal Moore and Joe Galloway's book WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE...AND YOUNG. As you can imagine, this is an enormously ambitious undertaking. As the prologue of Hal and Joe's landmark book states, "Hollywood has gotten the story of the Vietnam veteran wrong every damn time, whetting the knives of twisted politics on the bones of our dead brothers." Well this time we mean to get it right. This is not to say that any of us making the film are unconcerned with accuracy. The Disclamer> ( It is not meant to tell the story ) of each individual, ( or to capture the same kind of truth ) a documentary would. I salute you. Best regards, Randall Wallace 1st Cavalry Division as the Division Commander Kinnard had to use the whole of the division resorces to keep Lt. Col. Moore from losing Landing Zone X-Ray. Kinnard "I violated a lot of priniples about how hard you work your guy's and how many hour's you fly your helicopters." "I literally flew the Blades off the choppers." Things wrong with the trailer Why is Moore shown stepping out of the Huey on the right side at X-Ray? When he was on the left behind Crandall, who was in the co-pilots seat. Page 58 hardback, Page 67 paperback Moore as they land at X-Ray. as Crandall flared the Huey to land I FIRED burst into the brush to the LEFT, toward the mountian. page 60 hardback, page 69 paperback Why are there 5 Hueys flying in the formation, when there is supposed to be only 4, in the over head shot there are 6 Hueys. As they land at X-Ray they are in some type of formation that dosent exist. Page 59 Hardback, Page 68 paperback The Hueys as they fly to X-Ray are suppose to be in a Heavy left formation, But they are eather in a column, trail formation> http://www.biggolddog.com/photos.htm The photographs offered are from the personal collection of Joe Galloway ( Rambo the Reporter ) and were taken at LZ X-Ray during and after the action in the Ia Drang Valley, November 14-16, 1965. The images reflect the savagery of the combat, a feel for the emotions of the soldiers involved and a sense for the terrain in which the battle was fought. The photographs have never before been published and most have been seen only by a handful of participants in the action. ( Actually some pictures have been published and seen by over 26 million people ) These images will help put a real face on the people, places and events in the upcoming movie, "We Were Soldiers Once...And Young", starring Mel Gibson. A film based on the book of the same name by Lt. Gen. Hal Mooore and Joe. Ia Drang Scholarship Fund.... As a lasting tribute to the men of the 1st of the 7th Cavalry who gave so much in the Ia Drang, a permanent scholarship fund was established for the children and grandchildren of those who died in action in this heroic event. To honor that commitment, 10% of the purchase price of every Joe Galloway at the Ia Drang photo will be donated to the fund. Stories Part Fiction he embelished for them. U.S. NEWS and World Report Oct 29,1990 Pg 32 Fatal Victory Pg 36 Vietnam Story. ARTICLES Galloway Plagarized. U.S. News and World Report Oct 25, 93 Page 45 Step by Step into a Quagmire SOURCE: Stanley Karnows Vietnam a History Pages 479-485. U.S. News and World Report Feb 4,1991 Page 49 "Who's Afraid of the truth" SOURCE: Soldier of Fortune Dec 84 Pg 104 Press Escorts by Fred Tucker. ( TUCKERS GORRILLAS ). In the movie Gibson portray Galloway as a Reporter who pick's up a weapon only to protect the wounded. BUT!!! Galloway was the most heavely armed Reporter in Vietnam. Page 32 Joseph L. Galloway Had wrangled a ride in to the Plie Me camp while it was under siege, and becouse of the shortages of fighters found him self assigned to a .30 cal light machine gun. With two other reporters After the battle was over Major Charles Beckwith hands Galloway an M-16 rifle, Galloway told Beckwith, Strictly speaking, under the Geneva Convention he was "A civilian noncombatant." As you see there is no logic. Galloway has just spent 3 days maning a .30 cal machine gun killing PAVN troops and after the battle is over decides he is a civilian noncombatant? The question is why didnt Galloway join the service? He was always to busy playing Soldier instead of being a Reporter. He wanted to be at any battle he could get to, to record it, But when he get's there at the battle. He start's to play Soldier. You cant write or record History, While you busy playing soldier. Of all the reporters in Vietnam, Galloway was the most danegerous to the Americian troops, in His Walter Mitty and Rambo persona. He had no idea what the soldier's job was, He as a reporter and could do what he wanted and go where he wanted to at any time. Joseph L. Galloway( Rambo the Reporter ) ROAMED all over VIETNAM, Killing as he pleased. Page 35 November 13,1965 Galloway hitched a ride from Pleiku to Catecha the 3 Brigade headquaters Galloway " I dug a foxhole out on the perimeter with B company 1/7, Under one of those $50.00 tea bushes, set out some spare! magazines ( M-16 ). Galloway playing Soldier, It would have been better if he said I set out some spare film rolls. to record events, his mind set is playing soldier. Page 32 Galloway writes: " At first lite I pinched of a small piece of C-4 explosive from the emergency supply in my pack and used it to boil up a canteen cup of water for coffee. Walter Mitty part: If you lit C-4 very carefully you could be drinking hot coffee in maybe 30 secounds. If you were careless it blew your arm off. If Galloway was so eager to receive the Bronze Star, Then he should be ready to pay the price for violating the UCMJ. Conspiring to take a $500,000 Helicopter and receiving Military equipement, 1 M16 Rifle, 1 Carl Gustaf, I had to sign for all my equipement as all soldiers did and had to turn it in when I left, Who did Galloway leave the M-16 with, Does he have papers saying he turned it in? The same with the Carl Gustaf, Where did he get it? Did he buy it, Pick it up on the Battlefield? Did he sell it when he left? If he turned it in, Does he have the paper work to show it? Galloway conspired with a friend ( A Huey Pilot )into flying into Plei Me camp. There were orders for all aircraft to stay out of the area, The friend went AWOL, He and Galloway took the Huey and flew into Plei Me, Beckwith needed, medical, and ammo. At Plei Me Major Charles Beckwith had put Galloway and 2 other Reporters on a machinegun. and had given Galloway an M-16 Rifle. MYTH's: Page 156-157 Vincent Cantu and Galloway meet during fierce attack on D and C company's. Galloway was taking pictures. Vincent Cantu braved the fire and sprinted to where Galloway was. TRUTH: Soldier of Fortune Sept 83 Page 28 Galloway writes "During a ( LULL!!)." I met Vincent Cantu this was before the(skyhawk) naplmed the Command post. MYTH's: Page 35 Galloway The plantation billed the U.S. $50 for each tea bush and $250 for each rubber tree. TRUTH: Soldier of Fortune Sept 83 Page 25 Galloway They billed U.S.$25 for each tea bush $125 for each rubber tree. Galloway only left the saftey of the Command Post During " LULL's " in the Battle, As soon as the firing started up, He would headed right back to the Command post, HReviewer: Russell L. Ross lzalbany65@aol.com from San Jose, CA

Fiction We Were Soldiers Once and Young X-Ray part. page references are from the hardback.

FICTION: Fabarication applies particulary to a false but carefully invented statement or a series of statements, in which some truth is sometimes interwoven, the whole usually intended to deceive.

The Greatest Hero "People everywhere are smitten- With a tale that is written. Once a hero's deeds are known- They're as good as etched in stone. Every word, folks take to heart- And think this makes them very smart. Amazing how the very wise- Never stop to realize- That what they read may not be true.

Groo Moral: Even when the words are true the may not speak the truth Groo Can you make Col. Klink ( Moore ) and Rambo the Reporter (Galloway ) into hero's pages from the hardback Lt. Col. Moore was the Col. Klink of the war? He knew nothing, nothing Page 17 Moore's new concepts & techniques were written in the 1950's FM 57-35 Army Transport Avation-Combat Operations, 1963 FM 57-35 Airmobile Operations. by Officers he worked with? in 1957. Moore in 1957 "I was in on the concept of Airmobility with Gavin, Norton, Seneff Williams". With 2 1/2 years writing, 1 1/2 years training in Airmobile tatics in the 11Air Assault Division Test, for a total of 4 years and yet he retained nothing about Airmobile tatics. Page 37 Crandall "Moore wanted Aviation present, to be part of his Staff". Moore, Crandall or his ALO had to coordinate the flight time from Plei Me to X-Ray, flight routes, fire support, resuppy, Medevac Huey. Moore couldnt plan the operation with out Crandall ( aviation ) present. Page 60 As Crandall flared the huey to land at Landing Zone X-Ray Moore & his troops starts firing their weapons. FM 57-35 There is no firing from the helicopter during flight, landing or any other time. Pity the troop to their right a face full of hot brass, left ear drums ringing, brass on floor or getting caught in the Huey's controls Moore who had been listening to the battle of Landing Zone Albany on the radio voluntered for the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to go to Columbus to guard the artie only took pictures of the dead and wounded. Where are his action pictures?









Russell L. Ross - 1/30/2003

Reviewer: Russell L. Ross lzalbany65@aol.com from San Jose, CA

Fiction We Were Soldiers Once and Young X-Ray part. page references are from the hardback.

FICTION: Fabarication applies particulary to a false but carefully invented statement or a series of statements, in which some truth is sometimes interwoven, the whole usually intended to deceive.

The Greatest Hero "People everywhere are smitten- With a tale that is written. Once a hero's deeds are known- They're as good as etched in stone. Every word, folks take to heart- And think this makes them very smart. Amazing how the very wise- Never stop to realize- That what they read may not be true.

Groo Moral: Even when the words are true the may not speak the truth Groo Can you make Col. Klink ( Moore ) and Rambo the Reporter (Galloway ) into hero's pages from the hardback Lt. Col. Moore was the Col. Klink of the war? He knew nothing, nothing Page 17 Moore's new concepts & techniques were written in the 1950's FM 57-35 Army Transport Avation-Combat Operations, 1963 FM 57-35 Airmobile Operations. by Officers he worked with? in 1957. Moore in 1957 "I was in on the concept of Airmobility with Gavin, Norton, Seneff Williams". With 2 1/2 years writing, 1 1/2 years training in Airmobile tatics in the 11Air Assault Division Test, for a total of 4 years and yet he retained nothing about Airmobile tatics. Page 37 Crandall "Moore wanted Aviation present, to be part of his Staff". Moore, Crandall or his ALO had to coordinate the flight time from Plei Me to X-Ray, flight routes, fire support, resuppy, Medevac Huey. Moore couldnt plan the operation with out Crandall ( aviation ) present. Page 60 As Crandall flared the huey to land at Landing Zone X-Ray Moore & his troops starts firing their weapons. FM 57-35 There is no firing from the helicopter during flight, landing or any other time. Pity the troop to their right a face full of hot brass, left ear drums ringing, brass on floor or getting caught in the Huey's controls Moore who had been listening to the battle of Landing Zone Albany on the radio voluntered for the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to go to Columbus to guard the artillary, So the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry could go and reinforce ALBANY. MYTHS of The Ia Drang Valley Some Officers even Kinnard stated that Moore voluntered to go into ALBANY but he didn’t. and from Persons in the book That Moore and Galloway write good about give in return and adds to the MYTHS about the 1/7 and Moore. One Reporter Bob Poos of Soldier of Fortune writes that Moore and the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry was the ones who relived the Plie me camp, Soldier of Fortune March 83 page 29-30 ARVN AMBUSH 3rd column last 2 paragraphs. Plie Me did get relief- with a vengeance- from the 1st Cavalry Division. Through a strange coincidance, the camp commander, Capt Harold Moore, Learned later that much of the relief force was commanded by a name sake, Lt. Col. Harold Moore commander of the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry. When in fact it was my old unit the 2nd Battalion 8th Cavalry. Capt George Forrest when he spoke to the Old Guard said Lt. Col. Moore was there in the 11AAD in 1963. So starts the myths about Lt. Col. Moore and the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry. Moore idea would cost time becouse the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry would have to be to Columbus 4 hours, Then the 2nd Battalion 5th Cavalry would have to be flown to Albany another 4 hours. 8 hours to renforce Albany? So why didn’t Kinnard send the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to reinforce ALBANY? They were probally to drunk? they had spent the day of the 17 in the Bars of Pleiku The most outrageous LIE Page 287 At Landing Zone Albany. There on the dying enemy soldier something shiny. A big battered old French army Bugle. FACT: This Bugle was captured at Landing Zone X-Ray and brought into Landing Zone Albany by the reinforcements. Leadership Principle 1 Be Technically and Tactically Proficent To know you job thoroughly, you must posses not only specific knowledge of its details but also a broad general knowledge concerning its area of intrest. you should be competent in combat operations and training as well as in the technical and admimistrative aspects of your duties. If you demonstrate deficincies in these functions,your subordinates will lose confidance in you as a leader. Moore is under the delusion he has come up with a new Air Assault tatic for the 1st lift would doom his men. for the want of a nail, The 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry. As the Battle of Landing Zone X-Ray would grind up, The Troops, Helicopters and Artillary. Making them unavalible for other units. Leading to the walk to Landing Zone Albany by the 2/7. What happend. It would appear Moore would be the first one chosen by Kinnard for the 11 AIr Assault test, When it started up in 1963 but he wasnt. He had To write a letter to Major General Kinnard ( His Old Boss ) begging for a Infantry Battalion in the 11 air Assault Division. It wasent till 1964, 1 year after it started he got the call. He didnt get one with the 11 Air Assault but instead was given a Infantry Battalion in the 2 infantry Division. The 2nd Battalion 23rd Infantry. Moore Had never commanded a Infantry Battalion before. But one of the hand picked officers by Kinnard in 1963 was Lt. Col McDade, He was chosen for the G-1 spot, He would be given command of the 2nd Battilion 7th Cavalry around November 7,1965 aproximately 10 days before the battle of Landing Zone Albany. McDade Had never Commanded a Infantry Battalion before. THERE WAS ANOTHER FACTOR, MOORE AND MCDADE WERE HAVING A POWER STRUGGLE. Keep abreast of current military devolopements. Moore "I thought up a new technique for the inital lift." There are only two types of Air assaults. Moore under the delusion he had come up with a new technique. The ground Commander ( Moore ) must concider two general types of Airmobile assault when preparing the ground tatical plan. These types of assaults differ primarily in the proximity of the LZ to the assault objective The first and preferred type is the landing of the assault ehelons immediately on, or adjacent to, the objective The secound type of assault involves landing a distance from the objective in a secure LZ, and requires assembly, reorganization, and movement to an attack position prior to the assault on the objective. Some simulare characteristics of Moore and Custer. When no one wrote about them, They wrote their own Books. Both were considered too Flamboyent, by fellow officers. And not well liked. George Armstrong Custer ( His men called him yellow hair ) Commander of the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry at the battle of the Little Bighorn. The Indians would wipe the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry out to a man. Starting the Indian wars, The UNITED STATES would unite and almost wipe out all the Indians taking their lands and putting them on Reservations LT.Col. Harold G. Moore ( His men called him yellow hair ) Commander 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry at the battle of Landing Zone X-Ray November the 14,1965 Pleiku Provance of South Vietnam. Moore's men with help from the reinforcement's ( Bco 2/7 ) saves Landing Zone X-RAY. Starting the Vietnam war. Which almost tears the United States apart. Both Battles ( The Little Bighorn ) and ( Landing Zone X-Ray ) were fought by the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry. On a Sunday, In a Valley, By a River, In tall Grass and near a Large Mountian or Hill top. Both Commanders were told the size of the enemy troops. By their Scouts. But didnt belive them. Scout to Custer "There is a very very large Indian camp down there." Custer "Where I dont see any camp" Intelligence Lieutenant to Col. Moore "There is the possibiy of a PAVN Regiment near the Chu Pong mountain. Moore that didn't really bother me. Both the Commanders wanted to force the Enemy to stand and fight. As the enemy's tatics were hit and run. Custer in the lead charges into the valley his troops behind. to cut off the Indians, So they couldn't escape on to the plains. Moore in the lead Huey charges in to the Valley his troop behind would be the first one on Landing Zone X-Ray, hopeing the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong wouldn't excape in to the mountians and into Cambodia. Both would get their wish. The Indians and North Vietnamese would send 1,000 or more men out to meet the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry. The Commanders then realized that the size of the enemy forces was true. their scouts were right They were out numbered. Both battles were defensive. After the initial charge by the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry They would pull back, Circle the wagons and let the enemy throw them selves at their defense's. Custer didn't have renforcements, It would take weeks to get them, His supplies were miles behind him. The 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry was wiped out to the man. Moore didnt have that problem "I had something Custer didn't, Reinforcements with in Hours. Moore forgot to lay on supplies and water for his troops. Moore's Men with the help of the Reinforcements ( Bco 2/7 ) save Landing Zone X-Ray. starting the Vietrnam War.It would almost destroy the United States. The Troops FOUGHT VALIANTLY. What happend to Moore's H-hour. Moore Get's his H-hour confused with the Attack time in the mission order. H-hour in air assault terms is difined as the time the lead helicopter touches down on the Landing Zone. Moore puts the H-hour at H-1030. He then gets word the Artillary cant fire until H-1017. H-hour get delayed. 1 incremint? ( usually 15 minutes ). So that should make H-hour, H-1045. But Moore ( who is in the lead Huey ) dosent set foot on LZ X-Ray until H-1048, 3 minutes late. Lt. Col. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway's part.( the enlisted mens,Officers, Junior Officers and the 2/5, Bco 2/7 and 2/7 Battalion stories cannot be disputed.) Moore couldnt READ a MAP? Page 30 November 9, 1965 Moore "What does the RED STAR that is on the intelligence map mean?" The Red Star is not a military symbol its explanation should have been on the lower right side ( margin ) of the map. Moore " I had no doubt the 1/7 my Battalion would be chosen to mount the attack into the Ia Drang as the 2/7 had a new commander. Fact!! " the 1/7 was closer to the objective then the 2/7 " and had nothing to do with the readiness of the Battalions. (Gen.John J Tolson). Page 17 Moore's new concepts & techniques were written in the 1950's FM 57-35 Army Transport Avation-Combat Operations.1960's FM 57-35 Airmobile Operations. By Officers he worked with? Page 17 1957 Moore "I was in on the concept of Airmobility with Pentagon Reasearch and developement group. Moore "I was the 1st man in the Airborne Branch". 4 years writing and training in Airmobile tatics. Yet Moore retained nothing about Airmobile tatics. Page 41 Moore "I thought up a new technique for the inital lift". There are only 2 types of Air assaults This is the 2 one. Page 37 Crandall "Moore wanted Aviation to be present, to be part of his Staff" FM 57-35>Both the Ground Commander ( Moore ) and Aviation Commander ( Crandall ) or his ALO had to coordinate>flight time from Plei Me to X-Ray, flight routes,resuppy. Moore couldnt plan the operation with out Avation present. FM 57-35 Key personnel are distributed among the aircraft of the lift so the loss of one aircraft does not destroy the command structure. Page 58 Moore and Crandall in the same Huey. Page 59 The lift is flying at 110 knots. FM 57-35 When diffrent types of aircraft fly in a single lift, cruising speed of the slower aircraft must be the controlling speed of the lift. UH-1B's are Gunships fly at 80 knots UH-1D's are Slicks 110 knots. I ask Bco's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal, why didnt Moore lay on water for his men ( B co would be on the LZ for over 4 hours ) and why he said it was not the Aviations job to haul out Wounded Troops? B co's 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal "dont ask me I knew nothing about Airmobile tatics." Page 106 Moore we needed water, medical supplies and ammo. Page 107 Bco 1/7 3rd Platoon Leader Dennis Deal by 3pm we ran out of water, the wounded kept begging for water. Page 145 November 15, 1965 at 6:20am Jemison shared his last drops of water. Page 112 November 14, 1965 While all day long the Battalion Supply Officer was riding in and out of X-Ray & Galloway came. 240# of water, medical, ammo not coming in, 1 Wounded troop not going out. Page 106 Moore "hauling Wounded was not the slick crews job" ( Aviation ) FM 7-20 the Battalion Commanders hanbook, Hauling wounded is the secoundary mission of all military aircraft. Page 63 Moore used his command Huey to haul out a non wounded POW. Page 167 but none his wounded troops, Lt Franklin terribly wounded was set aside to die. FM 1-100 Army Aviation The Command and Control Huey is to be used for Command and Control ONLY it shouldnt be used for anyother purpose, like RESUPPLY. . a Medevac Huey was suppose to fly with the assault echelon ( 1st Lift ) Page 105 a wounded troop was stumbling toward the aid station, Galloway " stay away go back" what was this 17 year old's thoughts 50 feet from the aid station and treatment and told to stay away? FM 57-35 page 12 paragraph 24 supply 6 miscellaneous. a. probable water supply points are predesingnated. and comes in with the fowllowing echelon. FM 7-20 page 271 paragraph 313 returning aircraft may be used for the evacuation of casualities. Galloway had no military service. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY no one expects the battalion commander to act as a rifleman no matter how proficient he is. As he does so. who commands his battalion? Who gives guidance to his Company Commanders, he is taking responsibility away from his men and not meeting his own. Page 34 Moore "I went to school on the Division Commander, authority must be pushed down to the man on the spot. Page 40 Moore "I personally to influence the action would be in the 1st Huey to land on X-Ray." Page 60 Moore leading his command group clear a sector of X-Ray, on the way back to the LZ, meet the troops who were suppose to clear that sector. Page 73 Moore "I was tempted to join A co or C co's company's men" Page 108 Moore "My operations Officer`& the Avaition Liason Officer had controlled all flights into X-Ray, I then took control, every Huey coming to X-Ray must radio me for landing instructions. Page 109 Crandall Moore was now a signalman at the far end of the LZ was standing up, directing us where to land. Page 109 The Brigade Commander had given Moore pathfinders. Page 195 Moore "I personally lead the final counterattack to make certian that the Company Commander of Bco 2/7 & his men did a safe, clean, job & to look for my Missing Troops. Moore didnt bring in his execuitive Officer( 2nd in command ) to help run the battalion command post. Page 39 Moore "we had never maneuvered in combat as a battalion" Page 28 Moore the Battalion made 2 sweeps near An Khe. Page 31 nov 9 Moore "We shuttled the Battalion in 16 Hueys" Page 32 nov 9 Galloway "My first time out with Moores 1/7 Battalion" Original story Solider of Fortune November 83 Page 25 Nov 9 Galloway "before nitefall Moore waved his battalion across a stream" Each Huey could carry 10 Troops. 10 troops X 16 Hueys=160 Troops per lift. Page 30 a enemy base camp Page 55 a radio transmision intercepted, estamated a N V regiment was near X-Ray Page 57 commo wire was seen. Page 39 Moore puts only 80 men (5 per Huey) in the inital lift. Page 57 riflemen extra ammo all they could carry. Air Assault tatics emphasize maximum inital lift, to get maximum lift each huey carries minimum amount of fuel + 30 min reserve, with refueling & ammo Points near the Pickup Zone. Troops only basic load of ammo and web gear (intrenching tool, 2 canteens, bayonet and poncho and 1st aid pack ) Page 40 Moore "later lifts could carry more men 100 as fuel burned off". Page 198 Rear area Operation Officer Dick Merchant "the Huey could carry 10 men" Page 111 Winkle"I had a total of 16 men in my Huey". Fourner "it was left up to each pilot how many men he carried" on later lifts I was carring 9-12 troops. How it should have happend according to Air Assault Tatics FM 57-35 With only 16 Hueys weight is a factor, so the inital lift ( the assault echelon ) must contain sufficant Troops to secure the Landing Zone. The Alowable Cargo Load the ( ACL ) of each UH-1D for this mission should have been 3,000 pounds as its under 50 nautical miles ( only 14.3 miles to the objective ) using the Space method a space is defined as the weight of a fully combat equiped troop ( 240 pounds ) 10 Troops = 2,400 pounds per Huey. Page 39 B co 114 troops, A co 40 troops, Ground Commanders command group 6 for a total of 160 troops in the 1st lift. Moore was a Pilot? Page 58 Crandall ( The Aviation Commander ) is starting the Huey from the left seat the co-pilot seat, There is no starter on that side. Page 58 Moore as they load the Hueys "what is the flying time from Plei Me to Landing Zone X-Ray"? 14.3 miles. Page 37 Moore and Crandall plan an Air Assault. Page 40 with a time table & failed to put down the flying time from Plei Me to Landing Zone X-Ray, with out this information, How did they plan the Assault??? Page 58 Mills 13 min 15 sec. Page 59 Speed ( rate ) 110 knots this time will take them 25 miles away. The correct time is 8 min. Formula for Time is Distance X 60 divide by Rate ( Speed ) 14.3 X 60 = 858 divide by 110 = 7.8 min = 8 min time is rounded up to the nearest min. Formula for Distance is rate ( Speed ) X time divided by 60 110 X 8 = 880 divide by 60 = 14.6miles = 15miles miles is rounded up to the nearest 1/2 mile. using 7.8 min for time for the distance 110 X 7.8 = 858 divide by 60 = 14.3 miles The distance from Plei Me to Landing Zone X-Ray. Page 188 A blazing flare under an unopened parachute hit the ammo dump, the Sgt.Major grabbed it with his bare hands, it burns at 4,000 degrees, it needs the parachute to lite the candle. Letter from Randy Wallace, the Screenwriter and Director, about the film: The Wheelhouse 15464 Ventura Boulevard Sherman Oaks, CA 91403-3002 Randall Wallace 7 February 2001 To all men who fought in the Ia Drang Valley, November 1965, and their families. Gentlemen, As many of you have already heard, we are preparing to make a film version of Hal Moore and Joe Galloway's book WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE...AND YOUNG. As you can imagine, this is an enormously ambitious undertaking. As the prologue of Hal and Joe's landmark book states, "Hollywood has gotten the story of the Vietnam veteran wrong every damn time, whetting the knives of twisted politics on the bones of our dead brothers." Well this time we mean to get it right. This is not to say that any of us making the film are unconcerned with accuracy. The Disclamer> ( It is not meant to tell the story ) of each individual, ( or to capture the same kind of truth ) a documentary would. I salute you. Best regards, Randall Wallace 1st Cavalry Division as the Division Commander Kinnard had to use the whole of the division resorces to keep Lt. Col. Moore from losing Landing Zone X-Ray. Kinnard "I violated a lot of priniples about how hard you work your guy's and how many hour's you fly your helicopters." "I literally flew the Blades off the choppers." Things wrong with the trailer Why is Moore shown stepping out of the Huey on the right side at X-Ray? When he was on the left behind Crandall, who was in the co-pilots seat. Page 58 hardback, Page 67 paperback Moore as they land at X-Ray. as Crandall flared the Huey to land I FIRED burst into the brush to the LEFT, toward the mountian. page 60 hardback, page 69 paperback Why are there 5 Hueys flying in the formation, when there is supposed to be only 4, in the over head shot there are 6 Hueys. As they land at X-Ray they are in some type of formation that dosent exist. Page 59 Hardback, Page 68 paperback The Hueys as they fly to X-Ray are suppose to be in a Heavy left formation, But they are eather in a column, trail formation> http://www.biggolddog.com/photos.htm The photographs offered are from the personal collection of Joe Galloway ( Rambo the Reporter ) and were taken at LZ X-Ray during and after the action in the Ia Drang Valley, November 14-16, 1965. The images reflect the savagery of the combat, a feel for the emotions of the soldiers involved and a sense for the terrain in which the battle was fought. The photographs have never before been published and most have been seen only by a handful of participants in the action. ( Actually some pictures have been published and seen by over 26 million people ) These images will help put a real face on the people, places and events in the upcoming movie, "We Were Soldiers Once...And Young", starring Mel Gibson. A film based on the book of the same name by Lt. Gen. Hal Mooore and Joe. Ia Drang Scholarship Fund.... As a lasting tribute to the men of the 1st of the 7th Cavalry who gave so much in the Ia Drang, a permanent scholarship fund was established for the children and grandchildren of those who died in action in this heroic event. To honor that commitment, 10% of the purchase price of every Joe Galloway at the Ia Drang photo will be donated to the fund. Stories Part Fiction he embelished for them. U.S. NEWS and World Report Oct 29,1990 Pg 32 Fatal Victory Pg 36 Vietnam Story. ARTICLES Galloway Plagarized. U.S. News and World Report Oct 25, 93 Page 45 Step by Step into a Quagmire SOURCE: Stanley Karnows Vietnam a History Pages 479-485. U.S. News and World Report Feb 4,1991 Page 49 "Who's Afraid of the truth" SOURCE: Soldier of Fortune Dec 84 Pg 104 Press Escorts by Fred Tucker. ( TUCKERS GORRILLAS ). In the movie Gibson portray Galloway as a Reporter who pick's up a weapon only to protect the wounded. BUT!!! Galloway was the most heavely armed Reporter in Vietnam. Page 32 Joseph L. Galloway Had wrangled a ride in to the Plie Me camp while it was under siege, and becouse of the shortages of fighters found him self assigned to a .30 cal light machine gun. With two other reporters After the battle was over Major Charles Beckwith hands Galloway an M-16 rifle, Galloway told Beckwith, Strictly speaking, under the Geneva Convention he was "A civilian noncombatant." As you see there is no logic. Galloway has just spent 3 days maning a .30 cal machine gun killing PAVN troops and after the battle is over decides he is a civilian noncombatant? The question is why didnt Galloway join the service? He was always to busy playing Soldier instead of being a Reporter. He wanted to be at any battle he could get to, to record it, But when he get's there at the battle. He start's to play Soldier. You cant write or record History, While you busy playing soldier. Of all the reporters in Vietnam, Galloway was the most danegerous to the Americian troops, in His Walter Mitty and Rambo persona. He had no idea what the soldier's job was, He as a reporter and could do what he wanted and go where he wanted to at any time. Joseph L. Galloway( Rambo the Reporter ) ROAMED all over VIETNAM, Killing as he pleased. Page 35 November 13,1965 Galloway hitched a ride from Pleiku to Catecha the 3 Brigade headquaters Galloway " I dug a foxhole out on the perimeter with B company 1/7, Under one of those $50.00 tea bushes, set out some spare! magazines ( M-16 ). Galloway playing Soldier, It would have been better if he said I set out some spare film rolls. to record events, his mind set is playing soldier. Page 32 Galloway writes: " At first lite I pinched of a small piece of C-4 explosive from the emergency supply in my pack and used it to boil up a canteen cup of water for coffee. Walter Mitty part: If you lit C-4 very carefully you could be drinking hot coffee in maybe 30 secounds. If you were careless it blew your arm off. If Galloway was so eager to receive the Bronze Star, Then he should be ready to pay the price for violating the UCMJ. Conspiring to take a $500,000 Helicopter and receiving Military equipement, 1 M16 Rifle, 1 Carl Gustaf, I had to sign for all my equipement as all soldiers did and had to turn it in when I left, Who did Galloway leave the M-16 with, Does he have papers saying he turned it in? The same with the Carl Gustaf, Where did he get it? Did he buy it, Pick it up on the Battlefield? Did he sell it when he left? If he turned it in, Does he have the paper work to show it? Galloway conspired with a friend ( A Huey Pilot )into flying into Plei Me camp. There were orders for all aircraft to stay out of the area, The friend went AWOL, He and Galloway took the Huey and flew into Plei Me, Beckwith needed, medical, and ammo. At Plei Me Major Charles Beckwith had put Galloway and 2 other Reporters on a machinegun. and had given Galloway an M-16 Rifle. MYTH's: Page 156-157 Vincent Cantu and Galloway meet during fierce attack on D and C company's. Galloway was taking pictures. Vincent Cantu braved the fire and sprinted to where Galloway was. TRUTH: Soldier of Fortune Sept 83 Page 28 Galloway writes "During a ( LULL!!)." I met Vincent Cantu this was before the(skyhawk) naplmed the Command post. MYTH's: Page 35 Galloway The plantation billed the U.S. $50 for each tea bush and $250 for each rubber tree. TRUTH: Soldier of Fortune Sept 83 Page 25 Galloway They billed U.S.$25 for each tea bush $125 for each rubber tree. Galloway only left the saftey of the Command Post During " LULL's " in the Battle, As soon as the firing started up, He would headed right back to the Command post, HReviewer: Russell L. Ross lzalbany65@aol.com from San Jose, CA

Fiction We Were Soldiers Once and Young X-Ray part. page references are from the hardback.

FICTION: Fabarication applies particulary to a false but carefully invented statement or a series of statements, in which some truth is sometimes interwoven, the whole usually intended to deceive.

The Greatest Hero "People everywhere are smitten- With a tale that is written. Once a hero's deeds are known- They're as good as etched in stone. Every word, folks take to heart- And think this makes them very smart. Amazing how the very wise- Never stop to realize- That what they read may not be true.

Groo Moral: Even when the words are true the may not speak the truth Groo Can you make Col. Klink ( Moore ) and Rambo the Reporter (Galloway ) into hero's pages from the hardback Lt. Col. Moore was the Col. Klink of the war? He knew nothing, nothing Page 17 Moore's new concepts & techniques were written in the 1950's FM 57-35 Army Transport Avation-Combat Operations, 1963 FM 57-35 Airmobile Operations. by Officers he worked with? in 1957. Moore in 1957 "I was in on the concept of Airmobility with Gavin, Norton, Seneff Williams". With 2 1/2 years writing, 1 1/2 years training in Airmobile tatics in the 11Air Assault Division Test, for a total of 4 years and yet he retained nothing about Airmobile tatics. Page 37 Crandall "Moore wanted Aviation present, to be part of his Staff". Moore, Crandall or his ALO had to coordinate the flight time from Plei Me to X-Ray, flight routes, fire support, resuppy, Medevac Huey. Moore couldnt plan the operation with out Crandall ( aviation ) present. Page 60 As Crandall flared the huey to land at Landing Zone X-Ray Moore & his troops starts firing their weapons. FM 57-35 There is no firing from the helicopter during flight, landing or any other time. Pity the troop to their right a face full of hot brass, left ear drums ringing, brass on floor or getting caught in the Huey's controls Moore who had been listening to the battle of Landing Zone Albany on the radio voluntered for the 1st Battalion 7th Cavalry to go to Columbus to guard the artie only took pictures of the dead and wounded. Where are his action pictures?









Bob Markward - 1/21/2003

Harry Summers was a great man and will be sadly missed


Stephen Seymour - 9/22/2002

I saw the movie tonight for the first time. It was well done from the point of view of honoring the brave American soldiers that fought in Vietnam.

When I watched the film (and knowing what I do about the fighting in Vietnam) I was sure that the Vietnamese commander would pull out before losing all his men. It was his first battle with the Americansa nd it is logical that he would be studying our tactics and weapons. But it did not make sense for him to keep fighting in a pitched battle against an enemy that was hiting them with bombs from planes, helicopters, long range artilary, and dropping napalm from the air. Better to withdraw and return to the battlefield on his own terms. The ending in film did not ring true to me so I went on the internet to see what I could find. After reading your review I will need to check out the book and confirm your understanding of the movie ending.

Our attack using vastly superior weaponry reminded me of the spainish conquering mexico and south america 500 years ago. The analogy in the movie to Custers last stand reminded me of the the brave men in our calvery in the 1800's that were used to clear the west of Indians. It was interesting that the calvery was used a hundred years later in an invasion of vietnam.

The vietnam war was a tragic event not only because of the 58,000 americans killed but also because of the 2 million south east asians that died. Let us not repeat our mistakes of the past as we are about to do in Iraq. How many Iraqi's will die for no reason exceept for us to get their oil. That is imoral. We need to find another way. The movie showed a half burnt american soldier. How many burnt Iraqi children will there be when the bombs start dropping.

Our soldiers are brave. We need to send them to war on our behalf more sparingly and only when clearly justified. We should not use our vast military power so frequently and for such flimsy reasons.


Keith Rose - 9/10/2002

you're an asshole!


Keith Rose - 9/10/2002

Mr. Isserman. It is quite obvious that you are a bent liberal and never could you see the security of this film that Vietnam vets felt after seeing it. I myself flew recon. missions in Laos in mid 1978 with the U.S. Marines looking for POW's. Does you conscience allow you to believe that or are you a jew who hates America. I can ask that because I am a Jew! And proud to have served my country and my fellow brothers who aren't coming home. You're an ass!

Very Sincerly,

Keith Rose


Comment - 4/9/2002

If anyone is still interested in the question of whether the battle of the Ia Drang Valley culminated in a bayonet charge, as depicted in the film "We Were Soldiers," they can check out some reference works by US Army (Ret.) Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. Summers name is familiar to any serious student of the Vietnam War -- he is himself a veteran of the conflict (as well as of the Korean War), author of a study of the failure of US policy in Vietnam (On Strategy), author as well of the Vietnam War Almanac published by Facts on File, and senior military correspondent for US News and World Report. In another reference book he did for Facts on File, the Korean War Almanac, published in 1990, he includes this information under the heading "Bayonet": "The Korean War witnessed what may well prove to be the last bayonet charges in military history." He then goes on to tell the story of Captain Lewis L. Millett of the 27th Infantry who, in Summer's words,, is "credited with leading the last deliberate unit bayonet charge in American military history," an action which took place in February 1951. This corroborates what I was told over the telephone by a historian at the US Army Center on Military History at Fort McNair. In his Vietnam War Almanac, unlike his Korean War book, Col. Summers did not feel it necessary to include an entry on "Bayonets." And, in his lengthy entry on the Ia Drang Valley battle, he does not mention the words "bayonet" or "bayonet charge."


Bob Kilpatrick - 3/28/2002

Mr. Isserman--

#1 - I am not a Ia Drang vet.
#2 - I am, however, a Vietnam vet.
#3 - I do know some Ia Drang vets.

I think you've got as good a handle on the movie and on actual occurances as you could be expected to have, and it looks to me that you are going out of your way to be as objective as possible in your review.

The men who were there seem to be in agreement that the film is about 80% legit, 20% Hollywood. No question that the film version of the last day at X-Ray is mostly Hollywood.

But I've got a problem with your take on the "bayonet charge" thing. The Ia Drang guys I have talked with for years all speak of Rick Rescorla leading the only known bayonet charge since Korea. They were not promoting the idea for some cockamamie movie; they speak of it as a simple fact.

There in fact was a bayonet charge. It didn't happen as shown in the film. And it was not "recorded." Guess what? Most of that damned war was not recorded, and what was recorded was slanted or untrue. Whatever heroism, real or imagined, was portrayed by Mel Gibson, it cannot approach the real heroism that actually happened at LZ X-Ray.

Anyway Mr. Isserman, I think that "cynically manipulative" is a little strong. It's a hell of a movie that is even now doing a lot of good for veterans, their families, survivors, and friends. And it's helping many others separate a rotten war from the men who honorably went to fight it. The film's actual effect upon real people would make a fascinating column sometime soon.

Thanks,
Bob Kilpatrick
Hartford CT


John Muir - 3/25/2002

I think some of us are getting a little off the track and frankly a little too emotional with all this "Bayonet Charge" stuff. It is (or was in the case of Vietnam) considered normal to fix beyonets when engaged in the assault (or in this case the counter-assault). Simply put, it's impossible to carry enough ammuntion to keep up the rate of fire needed to suppress the enemy's reaction to your being out in the open, by the time you get to where they are there's a very good chance that you are just about out of ammo and need to get up close and personal when you reach their position. Additionally, you should keep at least one round in the chamber, in case the bayonet gets wedged into something hard (such as bone) and won't come out. You fix the problem by simply pulling the trigger and you get the enemy to "release" your bayonet.
I do have a problem with the citation "They" at the US Army Ctr on Military History at Ft. McNair. Sounds like some very, very rear eschelon "pogue" (one who is unlikely in the extreme to ever actually see combat due to their being miles or even continents away from any danger).
This rankles nearly as much as not knowing the diference between a Master Sergeant and a Sergeant Major (both in rank and as importantly in position). I consider this a more serious display of lack of knowledge of the situation which compromises the veracity of the writer.
I agree that the end of the picture was somewhat "Hollywood" in that the need to get the enemy, the troopers, and the helicopters all in the same shot made it seem as if they were all within spitting range of each other at the final climactic scene. This is forever going to be the problem in making a film about things that normally occur hundreds of meters apart. (As an example, the M-14 with which I was armed in Vietnam had a maximum effective range of 500 meters, or roughly a third of a mile.) It is after all just 35mm film.


Comment - 3/25/2002

Some of the reactions to my piece criticizing the ending of the Mel Gibson movie "We Were Soldiers" have been showing up on my e-mail. This is my response to one critic, who thought I owed General Moore and Joe Galloway "an apology" for the my criticisms of the movie, particularly on the question of the "bayonet charge" at the end:

It's not quite clear to me why I owe General Moore and Joe Galloway an apology, since in my commentary I refer to their "excellent" account of the events in the Ia Drang Valley -- and contrast it to the historically dishonest version offered in the Randall Wallace screenplay and film. Here is what I wrote about the Wallace version:

"In the film's climactic moment, the early morning of the third day of battle, Colonel Moore's men are exhausted, outnumbered and running out of ammunition. It's all too clear that one more determined enemy attack would crack the line. But Colonel Moore/Mel Gibson saves his men and wins the day by ordering the troopers to fix bayonets and charge into the teeth of the coming North Vietnamese assault. As the Americans swept aside their foes and charged to victory and glory, I could feel the elation in the theater."

In their book "We Were Soldiers Once and Young," in contrast, Moore and Galloway write that the last serious enemy attack on the third morning of the battle was broken off at 6:27 a.m. (p. 246 in the 2002 Harper Torch paperback). One hour later, Colonel Moore ordered a "cautious and very deliberate patrol" outside the US perimeter, conducted by troops on their "hands and knees" (p. 249). Sometime after 9:55 a.m. US troops met resistance (from what Moore and Galloway clearly indicate are rear-guard enemy troops), and Col. Moore "stopped all movement immediately" and ordered his troops to return to their foxholes. He then called in air strikes. Some time after that, with fixed bayonets, US troops move out to "push the perimeter out."(p. 252) In this last effort on the part of the first battalion, Seventh Cavalry, the authors note "it was no contest at all." (p. 252) So, from the Moore and Galloway account, we see that it is three-and-a-half to four hours after the last serious enemy effort that anything that might remotely be labeled a "bayonet charge" --and they do not label it as such -- took place, against rear-guard elements of a withdrawing enemy force.

I didn't have room to mention it in my original piece, but after watching "We Were Soldiers" I called up the US Army Center on Military History at Fort McNair, and asked if they had any records pertaining to US bayonet charges in the Vietnam War. They were the ones who pointed out that automatic weapons and hand grenades had rendered mass bayonet charges, such as the one depicted in the film version of "We Were Soldiers" obsolete. The last recorded instance of a bayonet assault by US troops that they knew about took place in the Korean War.

As I said in my original piece, Colonel Moore's troops won the battle by doing "what they were trained to do, which was to hug the terrain and rely upon mased firepower to turn back the enemy." If some readers of this website prefer more dramatic endings, then -- by all means -- indulge yourself in the fantasies dished up in "We Were Soldiers," "Pearl Harbor," and "The Patriot." Just don't confuse what you're seeing there with history.


Drew Keeling - 3/23/2002

RE: The original question: "Can't Hollywood Get Anything Right ?"

As a result of the postings to this page over past three days I must say the "persuasiveness" of the original review has faded in my mind. (For the record, I will also state that I have not (yet) read the book nor seen the movie, and I was a bit too young to be sent to Vietnam as a soldier). But I'll make a couple of further remarks anyway:

1. The apparent errors in Professor Isserman's review seem to me to underscore the advisability of having historical accuracy assessed by a regular panel of several historians rather than being done on occasional, and probably often rushed basis, by just one historian.

2. If this review contains errors, that does not mean that movies should not be checked against historical reality. Film-makers have an artistic right to deviate from historical facts for the sake of entertainment, but critics have an equally valid right to point this out, so that potential moviegoers can choose to buy tickets to films which are both entertaining and factually correct.


Ted Marks - 3/23/2002

Following is a series of messages between Mr. Isserman and myself: -0- ----- Original Message ----- From: Ted Marks To: Maurice Isserman Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2002 10:27 AM Subject: Re: We Were Soldiers My query was based on your premise that there were no bayonet charges at Ia Drang, when in fact Joe Galloway (with whom I worked in the Far East as a correspondent) says that there were several incidents where bayonets were used, in particular when they had to enlarge the perimeter to retrieve one of the wounded Americans. So if if the underlying premise of your review is incorrect, then I suggest that your all your conclusions are flawed. The purpose of my inquiry was to determine on what basis you concluded that there were no bayonets used. As a historian, I would think that your judgements should be based on facts, and I am interested to what degree you have studied the Vietnam war. Did you interview particpants? Have you visited Vietnam and travelled to the Ia Drang valley? What was your political position vis a vis the war in Vietnam, then and now? As to the movie, I've never been a big fan of Hollywood renditions of history as they invariably portray events to highlight the drama which is certainly the case in We Were Soldiers -- especially when you compare the book to the movie. That sort of criticism is justified. But you appear to have really missed the mark on the issue of the use of bayonets, and I would think that lapse would concern you. As a historian, of course. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Maurice Isserman" To: "Ted Marks" Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2002 10:27 AM Subject: Re: We Were Soldiers > Well, that's funny, because in the book that Joe Galloway cowrote with General Moore, he says nothing about a bayonet charge. Don't take my word for it -- go to the source (chapters 15 and 16 of "We Were Soldiers Once and Young"). Nor is there any mention of a bayonet charge in any of the histories of the war that I checked. Nor did the US Army Center on Military History have any record of a bayonet charge at the Ia Drang Valley when I called and asked them about it -- in fact, they had no record of a bayonet charge by US forces in the entire Vietnam War. The last one they knew about took place in the Korean War -- and as the very helpful Army historian I spoke with there pointed out to me, automatic weapons and hand grenades had made bayonet charges a very problematic tactic in the 20th century. Again, don't take my word for it -- you can call them up yourself and ask. -0- ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ted Marks" To: "Maurice Isserman" Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2002 4:11 PM Subject: Re: We Were Soldiers Well (and this is not funny, I have to say) Galloway cites at least two instances in the book where bayonets are used. 1. On Nov. 14, A and B Company assaulted across the dry creekbed in its second attempt to rescue Lt. Herrick's trapped platoon. Four pages into Chapter 10 (page 122 in my edition) Gen. Moore and Galloway wrote the following: "Tony Nadal had ordered his men to fix bayonets for the attack. Bill Beck, firing a burst from his M60 machine gun to his right front, was transfixed by what he saw. 'A tall thin sergeant bayoneting a North Vietnamese in the chest. It was just like practice against straw dummies; Forward, thrust, pull out, move on. One, two, three.'" You can't get much more graphic than that. 2. Three pages into Chapter 16 ( Page 194 in my edition), the specific use of bayonets is again cited: "I told Diduryk to order his men to fix bayonets and move out. Within 10 seconds we jumped into the black smoke of that last 500-pound bomb." I think you owe Mr. Galloway and Gen. Moore a formal, written apology -- in the same pages/web sites where you published your review. Perhaps this would also be a useful lesson for you to pass on to your history students. Ted Marks, '64.


Jim Heaton - 3/22/2002

John,

Wish I'd said that.

Jim


Jim Heaton - 3/22/2002

I have known Joe Galloway for several years. His integrity verges on fanaticism.

I was sitting between the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne (MG Kellogg) and a man who was awarded the Medal of Honor for actions depicted in We Were Soldiers (Col Joe Marm) as I witnessed Joseph L. Galloway receive the Bronze Star with "V" device (the "V" is for Valor). That was the ONLY such award that the Army issued to any civilian for the entire Vietnam War.

That said, I was thirteen years old when the Ia Drang Battle ocurred, so obviously I wasn't there. The hours upon hours I have spent with Mr Galloway and General Moore since I first met them have taught me that if I had to get into yet another gun fight I wouldn't want a better leader than Hal Moore or a better man at my side than Joe Galloway.

Question Hollywood all you like, but Moore and Galloway deserve all the respect they invariably get from those who know them.

Jim Heaton


John Muir - 3/22/2002

It's easy to see that Mr. Isserman has never participated in an assault of a fortified position. On the several occasions that I have engaged in this activity it was alway with bayonets fixed. Where he got the notion that this is a "wildly outmoded tactic" leaves us guessing as to his core knowledge about the subject at hand. (Besides which, why else would would they put a bayonet stud on the end of the damned rifle?) Yes, Virginia, we still form a line and assault the bad guys, and you better damned well have a boyonet fixed or you'll be up the creek when and if you finally get to where you're going.
When someone claims to know enough to criticize a film or book about the Vietnam war and shows that they don't know the difference between a "gravelly voiced master sergeant" and the Battalion Sergeant Major, they forteit credibility at the very least. My impression is that he was so taken with his stretching the connection (and a mightly stretch it was) between this film and "Gettysburg" that he simply couldn't let go.
If there is any shortcoming to this film it was simply with the timing. To my mind, it came roughly 32 years too late.


Butte Rat - 3/22/2002

Thanks R. Cross. A sane voice in the wilderness cries out!! Those critics of the film must be real joys to live with. "Let's go to the movie and be entertained." "Not me! I'm looking for historical accuracy!" How do you military experts feel about Lt. Col. Custer and the Battle of Greasy Grass??


Comment - 3/21/2002

If Mr. Isserman looks at the cover of We Were Soldiers Once...and Young he will see a Lt. Rescorla, with bayonet fixed, as he prepared to lead his men in a charge to push the XRay perimeter out 300 meters. In response to an order from LTC Moore. It was, in fact, the second time in those three days that LTC Moore ordered bayonets fixed. On the first afternoon, in the worst of the fighting, he passed that order. Machine gunner Bill Beck testifies that he saw Sgt. Rangel bayonet a North Vietnamdese soldier in the chest.
We find that the movie is about 85% reality and 15% Hollywood, the reverse of usual out there.
regards
Joseph L. Galloway


Drew Keeling - 3/21/2002

This is a persuasive review. But, given the artistic depths to which Hollywood has plunged in recent years, what the historically-literate really need (before risking time and money on another piece of cinematic garbage) is some kind of comparative rating system which grades films according to degree of historical accuracy. Professional historians would be reluctant to promote anything so unnuanced on their own, thus this would seem an ideal mission for a panel of HNN contributors. If, for instance, "We were soldiers" came in at, say hypothetically, a 6 out of 10, it might still be a tolerable choice if all the other historical movies currently showing were 2s and 3s. D. Keeling


Comment - 3/20/2002

Maurice Isserman's analysis of "We Were Soldiers" is excellent and
succinct. I would add that the U.S. Army cynically depicted the
engagements as unmitigated successes which Galloway challenged during a
post engagement press briefing.

Tom Zoumaras


R. Cross - 3/20/2002

First, "We Were Soldiers" is a MOVIE! It is not a documentary intended as a launch vehicle for an exercise in apologetics for U.S. involvement in Vietnam (I was involved in Vietnam - 1968-69, 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne, Phu Bai). It was made for two reasons: 1) to make money, 2) to entertain. You choose the order. If it doesn't entertain, it doesn't make money, and the purpose of making the movie to begin with is thwarted. Who cares if a bayonet charge was filmed. Want honest filming? How about M-16s constantly jamming? How about M-60's failing to function due to faulty gas-blowback mechanisms? How about constant friendly fire incidents, incompetant and (sometimes) cowardly officers? I could go on and on. The point is, well, you made it yourself when you said "I could feel the elation in the audience." The audience was entertained by this commercial motion picture venture. And, it did the only thing it was supposed to do. It made money. Get Real!

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