Henry Kissinger’s Lessons for George W. BushNews Abroad
During the middle of July 1971 Henry Kissinger, acting as President Richard Nixon’s special representative, secretly traveled to Beijing. Kissinger’s voyage provided the basis for a dramatic opening in relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China – two nations estranged from one another, and often on the brink of full-scale war, for more than twenty years. Convulsed by internal upheavals and surrounded by regional threats, Chinese leaders viewed relations with Washington as a possible anchor for stability. Beset by a deepening military quagmire in Vietnam, deteriorating relations with traditional allies, and pervasive protests at home, the White House was desperate for a new diplomatic overture that would show some political promise before the upcoming presidential election.
Thirty-six years later the historical parallels are striking. President George W. Bush confronts a civil war in Iraq with no end in sight, American standing abroad has plummeted by all measures, and domestic opposition to present policies is growing, even within the highest ranks of the Republican Party. America’s long-time adversary, Iran, similarly contends with a clash of generations and worldviews at home, as well as a large cast of external challengers – including the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Security Council. Leaders in Washington and Tehran need one another as never before. The time is ripe for the White House to pursue a “China opening” with Iran.
Although Kissinger’s insights from fighting the Vietnam War have not helped in Iraq, his maneuvers with China do provide a model for navigating relations with Iran. Here is a roadmap for President Bush and Kissinger’s closest contemporary counterpart, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, to begin their historic opening to Iran.
Open Multiple Channels of Communication. The most difficult impediment to new relations with old adversaries is history. The People’s Republic of China and the United States, like Tehran and Washington, spent more than twenty years trying to isolate one another. They had no institutional or interpersonal basis for initiating a constructive bilateral relationship. Nixon and Kissinger understood this. As a consequence, they took advantage of nearly every conceivable channel for communicating with Beijing. They enlisted diverse figures in Pakistan, Poland, Rumania, West Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the Vatican to pass messages to the Chinese leadership. Getting initial discussions started required consistent and determined efforts in the White House, with the president’s strong support. The repeated overtures by Nixon and Kissinger made their desire for improved relations credible to skeptical Chinese listeners.
Talk While Fighting. Opening a dialogue with an adversary does not preclude continued conflict, and even warfare. Kissinger understood this particularly well. He and the president never believed that by engaging the Chinese leadership they had to forsake their strategic responsibilities in Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, or South Vietnam. In fact, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to each of these governments – including South Vietnam – as Kissinger traveled to Beijing in July 1971. The point of negotiations with the Chinese was to make these commitments more secure by insuring greater mutual understanding and respect. Strategic rivalry without direct communication only exacerbated tensions in Asia, as in the Middle East today. Policy-makers generally assume the worst of their adversaries when they know little about them.
Emphasize Personal Relationships. Nixon and Kissinger understood that demonizing their Chinese adversaries diminished Washington’s leverage in Asia. The same is true for contemporary American approaches to Iran and the Middle East. Despite their monstrous deeds, the Chinese communist leaders were smart, effective, and pragmatic human beings. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai recognized the same qualities in the “running dogs of imperialism” who allegedly occupied the White House. The leaders of the two states worked to build respect despite their serious differences. Personal bonds forged during Nixon and Kissinger’s visits to Beijing created some degree of comfort between the regimes. They allowed for an early probing of possible points of limited compromise. International rivalries are, after all, human relationships. Strategy and ideology matter, but so do perceptions of men and women in the flesh. A little personal respect can go a long way.
Avoid “Total” Solutions. The records of the discussions between Nixon, Kissinger, Mao, and Zhou show that these men spent very little time talking about overarching strategic solutions. They remained deadlocked on the future of Taiwan, the civil war in Vietnam, and the division of the Korean peninsula, among other fundamental Cold War issues. Discussion would have broken down immediately if either side pursued a “total” solution for any of these conflicts. Instead, the leaders of the two states emphasized small steps toward better relations. These included student, athletic, and scientific exchanges; the transfer of prisoners; and new avenues for limited trade. Most of these agreements were more symbolic than substantive, but they created a foundation for significant discussions about security and economics in later years. Disputes over the big strategic issues made discussion of the smaller topics all the more important. This is the case in the Middle East today, as it was in Asia years before.
Normalize the Diplomatic Process. In the end, Nixon and Kissinger’s opening to China illustrated the importance of process. Despite continued conflict, relations between Washington and Beijing improved because both sides now felt a stake in maintaining a dialogue. They did not feel pressed to solve all of their problems at once, or deny that serious differences existed between them. Instead they committed themselves to continual discussions and efforts at mutual agreement on the margins of their hostile strategies. The China opening was not a panacea for Asia, but it was a realistic effort to build better relations, rather than accept inherited isolation and recrimination.
The present Iranian regime is as dangerous and violent as Communist China at its worst. Tehran’s nuclear weapons program threatens to unleash a string of new nuclear states in the Middle East. The government is deeply divided among diverse factions, some advocating belligerent domestic and international programs.
To call for an opening to this regime, on the model of Nixon and Kissinger’s opening to China, does not deny any of these facts. Isolation and recrimination, however, do not make for effective policy. The history of improved relations between Washington and Beijing since 1971 provides reason to believe that discussions are also possible between the United States and Iran. At the very least, an opening to Iran is worth a try. If it fails, as Nixon and Kissinger’s efforts might have failed, then the Bush administration will gain credibility for seeking to break out of the recurring cycle of violence in the Middle East. If it succeeds, even only at the margins, it will mark a rare moment of foreign policy achievement for the Bush administration. Setbacks in Iraq will continue to loom large, but like the legacy of the Vietnam War, they will be counterbalanced by the promise of progress next door.
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Peter K. Clarke - 10/9/2007
This "historical parallel" is a leap of ahistorical faith.
Rice is a far cry from Kissinger.
GW Bush is a far cry from Nixon.
Ahmandinejad is a far cry from Mao.
Nixon in 1971 was not a lame duck president in his final 18 months of office, troop withdrawals from the Vietnam quagmire (which he did NOT initiate, and lamely so, in an act of supreme arrogance and stupidity like his successor 3 decades later) were well underway, and he had not been obsessing early in his tenure on fiscally irresponsible tax cuts for the rich, and ignoring warnings which if heeded might have saved Lower Manhattan, New York, and the Pentagon from being blown up by kamikaze hijackers.
If there is now to be a new detente with Iran, or a new peace process in Palestine it will be in spite of the current US administration's ineptitude, not because of some magical last minute transformation of petty politicians into great leaders.
Peter K. Clarke - 10/9/2007
Who is talking about Kissinger's "peaceful intentions," his wanting to "instigate an economic boom in China," his devotion to "world peace and democracy" ?
Not me. Not then. Not here.
I agree with what seems to be your point that Kissinger wanted to play the "China card" against the USSR. That was what people were saying then, and I thought correctly, then and now.
I also think that the situation with Iran is quite a different one.
That is why I said in my comment above that the "historical parallel"
claimed by the author, might hold up by faith, but not by logic or history.
We can disagree about whether Condi Rice is going to ever achieve Kissinger's fame/infame, or indeed achieve much of anything. That does not mean we disagree about Kissinger's strategy, tactics, or the geopolitical configuration against which they were applied.
Peter K. Clarke - 10/9/2007
"nixon inherited problems [and did not deal effectively with some of them]. [g.w.] bush created them [and dealt effectively with almost nothing]"
Good point, with or without my slight amendment.
Wayne Coyne - 7/31/2007
The author's observations and discussion points are quite good but lacking in context. The Vietnam/Soviet/China comparison to Iraq today has no correlation or mutual benchmarks from which to draw parallels in history.
Today, communist Vietnam is a US trading partner, the Soviet Union long gone although, Russia is still a nuclear armed military dictatorship and communist China is at peace with the world selling Haier not to mention eyeing Taiwan. So there is hope for Iraq.
Iraq is center of a larger geographic area/ military front than Vietnam including Kissinger's expansion of the war zone through Laos/ Cambodia. The geography of Iraq crosses Europe/ East Africa west to China. Iran, unlike the global giant China even in 1972, is a regional player albeit, an important one in quelling the current level of violence in Iraq. Exactly what then would a dialogue between Iran and the US seek to achieve when fronted by Rice, an American Oil Association spokesperson and backed by defense contractor Cheney, a brash proponent of war with Iran?
What is most notable is the cast of characters resurfacing from the ooze. Although, Mr. Kissinger is no such creature he has been a vocal mouthpiece in support of Mushsarraf's al-Qaida incubating police state Pakistan and the core rotten client-state regime of the Saudi Arabian oligarchy. Mr. Kissinger is and always has been a gofer and stage door apologist for these two regimes. Toss those pesky Chile subpoenas' in the trash Mr. Kissinger. There are new worlds to exploit.
Mr. Kissinger's model for diplomacy is however to be studied very closely not the messy details and bloody results. Following this model the US needs to seek dialogue with all the players; Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Israel, Palestinian Authority and Pakistan who as a group may be able to better air grievances and drive fair solutions for all regional parties including those of EXXON.
douglas w jacobson - 7/31/2007
The author's comments are very valid and should be taken seriously by every American public servant involved in international relations. Always keep open the channels of communication. Sometimes it bears fruit (eg; Kissinger and China) sometimes it doesn't (eg; The British & French with Germany in 1938). Unfortunately our present American administration has shown an alrming tendancy to ignore history. Even history 101 - or we wouldn't be trying to forcefeed democracy in iraq.
Douglas W jacobson
steve laudig - 7/31/2007
"The present Iranian regime is as dangerous and violent as Communist China at its worst." As is the American regime. Bush isn't a realist but a fabulist incapable of either recognizing or telling the truth. certainly not capable of acting upon it. nixon inherited problems. bush created them.
Arnold Shcherban - 7/30/2007
I love this great country.
Arnold Shcherban - 7/30/2007
I would really like to know Peter what (if anything) you wrote on Kissinger's diplomacy towards China THEN.
Kissinger obviously did it not out of his political wisdom and peaceful
intentions, or to instigate economic boom in China, but to play out Chinese card against US archi-enemy -the Soviet Union.
There is no comparable enemy in the world now, and Iran is far less potentially dangerous and capable in military sense than China was then and is now, so even with Clinton in the WH the comparable steps towards Iran would not have been taken.
This country is used to do what makes its ruling elites happy, not just for the sake of world peace and democracy, in general.
daniel mintz - 7/30/2007
Yes, it is terribly important to engage a bellicose, irrational foe. Iran needs to know this even though others' efforts to negotiate have been met with violence so often from this particular foe. The fact that we have in the past ignored diplomacy and invaded so many small nations does not mean Iran should give up on diplomacy with us.
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