Tom Segev, Mona El-Farra and Norman Finkelstein: On the 6-Day War and Its 40-Year Legacy (debate)





AMY GOODMAN: As we continue our discussion of Israel and the Occupied Territories, we turn to the words of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Earlier this week he discussed the impact of the 1967 war on the Palestinians.

PRESIDENT MAHMOUD ABBAS: In June, the six-day war went down in history of marking the defeat of the Arabs by Israel. Our standing up to this defeat, in spite of the hardships, could make up for what we have lost in war. Perhaps we can even erase it from memory with a great achievement , putting and end to the occupation of Palestinian and Arab lands, creating our independent state, recovering Jerusalem, solving the refugee problem in a just and acceptable manner based on legitimate international resolutions.

AMY GOODMAN: On Wednesday Israel's Deputy Premier Shimon Peres claimed Israel did not intend to occupy the West Bank and Gaza in 1967.

DEPUTY PREMIER SHIMON PERES: It is a not a war we are seeking, we are forced into it. We didn’t intend to conquer any territories. This was a result of a false war upon us. On many occasions we tried to negotiate and settle the [inaudible] issues. And I didn't lose my hope. We wouldn't like to see the Palestinian suffering. We wouldn't like seeing the Palestinians occupied. We wouldn't like the Palestinians missing a chance of a flourishing and democratic economy. We are ready to negotiate, straight away, fully, sincerely and responsibly.

AMY GOODMAN: To talk more about the Six Day War of 1967, we are joined by three guests. Tom Segev is an Israeli historian and columnist for the Israeli newspaper, Haaretz. He is the author of the new book 1967: Israel, the War and the Year that Transformed the Middle East. The Palestinian doctor and human rights activist Mona El-Farra also joins us here in New York, director of the Gaza Projects for Middle East Children's Alliance, writes the blog From Gaza with Love. She's just begun her first US speaking tour. And,Norman Finkelstein joins us in Chicago, where he’s Professor of Political Science at DePaul University. His latest book is Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History. We welcome you all to "Democracy Now!".

Tom Segev, I’d like to begin with you. Um, go back 40 years. Tell us what happened this week 40 years ago?

TOM SEGEV: It all began when Palestinian terrorists started to penetrate Israel through Syria which caused tension along the Syrian border, that then spread to tension along the Egyptian border. Egypt made threats and threatening moves, and Israelis generally believed they were facing a second holocaust. There were very, very weak; their society was very weak. And so I think that war with Egypt, at that time, was inevitable for this reason, because Israelis were too weak not to strike at Egypt.

But, that was only one week of the three weeks fought that week. Um, there was also a war with Jordan and also a war with Syria. I think that taking the West Bank and East Jerusalem contradicted Israel's national interest. This is not something I’m saying in hindsight; this is something Israeli policymakers knew at the time, six months prior to the war. They had actually concluded it will not be in Israel's interest to take to West Bank. Then comes the day of June 5, 1967: Jordan attacks West Jerusalem, all reason is forgotten. And they take East Jerusalem and the West Bank, in contrast to Israel's national interest, as defined by them six months previously. So it’s a completely irrational thing. It is about religion, emotion, it’s about 2,000 years of longing for Zion. It is not about strategy or national interest.

AMY GOODMAN: The role of the United States and Britain at the time?

TOM SEGEV: Britain was not that important. United States tried to prevent the war. President Johnson, actually, was against military action. He, through the rest of his life, thought the Six-Day War was a mistake, and Israel eventually did not go to war until we received a green light from United States, a reluctant green light. The major problem for Johnson was the fear that the war wouldn't go so well, and Israel would turn to the United States and ask for military assistance and that would get them involved in addition to the war in Vietnam already. But he was convinced Israel could do it alone.

AMY GOODMAN: Abba Ibba went to Washington to plead with Johnson?

TOM SEGEV: That's right, they had two meetings with him, and, um, but that was not when he got the green light, actually. Johnson asked for a postponement and Israel agreed to a postponement the war. It was only later when head of Israeli Mossad, Mir Amit, went and had talks with the CIA, when the green light was actually given.

AMY GOODMAN: Norman Finkelstein, you too, have written extensively about what happened in 1967. Can you describe events as you’ve researched them? We will continue with Tom Segev, and then we'll link Norman Finkelstein up in just one minute. Um, so, then the war began. Explain what happened in those days.

TOM SEGEV: The war with Egypt was won within hours, really. Israel destroyed the Egyptian air force. That was actually part of what lead the Israeli government to decide to take the West Bank. Because, from a very, very great fear, they had moved very, very rapidly to great euphoria. It was that euphoria that actually contributed to the decision to take the West Bank. East Jerusalem was taken. The West Bank was taken. Eventually the Golan was also taken. So, by the end of the war um, Israel controlled vast amounts of Arab land and a very large Palestinian population. The problem at the beginning was that the Palestinians did not resist. They came to work in Israel. The Israelis went to the West Bank. Everything seemed as if it’s possible, and no one tried to force Israel to give these territories back. Of course, once taken, East Jerusalem could not be given back because of political reasons and because of religious reasons. So it was a very harmful decision to take it in the first place, and the West Bank, also.

AMY GOODMAN: Mona El-Farra, you are a physician in Gaza. Can you talk about what happened in Gaza for you? How you experienced 40 years ago? You were born in Gaza?

MONA EL-FARRA: Yes, I was born in [inaudible], in the south of the Gaza Strip. During the war I was only 13 years old, and it was sort of a shock for me. We stayed in the basement for about five or six days. And after that, after the war ended and I realized that the Israeli – and now I am face to face with the Israeli army, with the Israeli people – I did not see any Israeli before, so it was sort of shock for me. And, all my life has changed because of the occupation. As a teenager, I was in demonstrations protesting against the occupation, so I am surprised about what Tom just have said. The resistance to occupation started in the first few months of the occupation. For me, I experienced it as a teenager in the school, school student, actually.

AMY GOODMAN: You were 13 at the time?

MONA EL-FARRA: 13, yes. 13, but just a few months later it was organizing a demonstration against the occupation. And I was part of this. I considered this a sort of resistance.

TOM SEGEV: That’s right, that’s right.

MONA EL-FARRA: So the resistance to occupation was there for the first few minutes despite the fact that labor started to go to Israel, but it was sort of cheap labor. People wanted to continue with their life. It was sort of overwhelming incident for me, for all my upbringing, and for all of years, for my future years, because at that time I decided to go to medical school because of what I have seen during the war, the wounded people and the hospitals and how the lack of medical facilities were there during the wars. So, I say again, resistance to occupation started the first few months of the occupation

TOM SEGEV: That's of course true. There were also leaflets, strikes in Jerusalem; teacher strikes, lawyer strikes, that’s of course right. But it wasn’t strong enough, and it led to the Israeli illusion that everything is temporary and we have all the time in the world and all we need do is to wait. That is what I mean, because we all remember the hijackings of the plane and other very spectacular terrorist acts by the Palestinians in 1970's. So a few months is already a long time because uh, after a few months, until then, this illusion was already born that there is such a thing as -- you know the Israel term was Benevolent Occupation -- some Israeli invention, as if we can control you and you will take it. That lasted for a few years. I think, by looking back today, A: We are stuck in that illusion that everything can work, that everything is temporary; and B: I think looking back, Israel gained absolutely nothing from taking the Palestinian territories

AMY GOODMAN: I wanted to turn to Professor Norman Finkelstein now in Chicago, from DePaul University. Your take on Israel's reasons for going to war in 1967?

NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: Well, there are two aspects to the Israel-Palestine/Israel-Arab conflict. There's the relationship to the Arab world in general and there’s a relationship to the Palestinians. June 1967 was not really about the Palestinians; it was about Israel's relationship to the Arab world generally. The main purpose of the June ‘67 war, and Tom Segev is quite clear about in his book, was depending on who you quote, to crush Nasser, to deal a knock-out blow to Nasser, and to defeat Nasser. The Israelis, in particular, Ben-Gurian…

AMY GOODMAN: Nasser being the president of Egypt

NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: Excuse me?

AMY GOODMAN: Nasser being the president of Egypt

NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: Yes. The Israelis, in particular, David Ben-Guri, the first prime minister, feared from early on that an equivalent to Ataturk in Turkey would emerge in the Arab world, namely a secular nationalist leader who would modernize the Arab world. And so from early on the Israelis were dead-set on defeating Nasser and dealing a blow to him. Already by 1954, the Israelis were trying desperately to provoke a war with Nasser. Unfortunately for the Israelis Nasser didn't take the bait and in 1956 they launched an invasion with the British and the French. Now come 1967, through a concatenation of events, a new opportunity arose to knock out Nasser, and that was the chief aim in ‘67. A ancillary aim was to conquer various parts of various areas bordering Israel, mainly the West Bank, the Sinai, and the Golan, but that wasn’t the primary goal. The primary goal was to deal a deathblow to Arab nationalism, to Pan-Arabism.

AMY GOODMAN: Tom Segev, would you share that analysis?

TOM SEGEV: I don’t know what book Mr. Finkelstein has read; he has not read mine. That is not what it says in my book.

NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: I read your book several times.

TOM SEGEV: I distinguish three wars between Egypt and Jordan and between Syria, and these are three different stories. The war with Egypt broke out primarily out of weakness, Israeli weakness, Israeli fear of a second holocaust. One of the things I did for this book was to go to people who lived in this country and I told them to go down to the basement and up into the attic to look for letters which you received from Israelis in1966, 1967. I was able to collect about 500 such letters. These are not letters written to the New York Times or anything. These are letters written from a man to um, to his wife, from a woman to her daughter. And they reflect a genuine holocaust fear. So, it was weakness which led - no conspiracy, no geo-political plan to crush Nasser or anything like that. It was just fear that led to the war with Egypt. Therefore the war with Egypt was inevitable. That is not the case, as I said, with Jordan and with Syria; so talking about the Six Day War is really a misleading term. These are three different wars that were fought that week.

NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: May I reply to that?

AMY GOODMAN: Professor Norman Finkelstein

NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: When you’re looking at a conflict of this sort, as in any other country, you have to look at it at two levels, the level of what people, the population thinks and fears, and then you have to look at the leadership. Now, there's no question, as Tom Segev accurately states, that the Israeli people and American Jews as well, feared a catastrophe in June 1967. But there is equally no question, and I read Mr. Segev’s book very carefully, there is no question that the Israeli generals, as well as US Intelligence agencies, were fully confident that Israel would knock out Nasser quickly in the event of a war, as well as they were fully apprised that Nasser had no intention of attacking. Now, let's look at the record. As Segev clearly points out in his book, beginning the second week of May, many Israeli officials came to the United States saying exactly what Segev said, that we were on the verge of a second holocaust, that the Egyptians are going to attack. And on multiple occasions, US Intelligence agencies checked all the information, using Israeli assumptions and came to two conclusions: number one, there was no chance that Nasser would attack and number two, if he did attack, to quote Lyndon Johnson at the end of May, “you will whip the hell of out them.” Now, June 1st, Israel's Major General Amnit, the head of the Mossad, comes to the White House. He is also trying to feel out the Americans. And he states explicitly, we agree with all of your data and all of your projections. There was no fear whatsoever, at the level of the Israeli leadership and the Israeli Generals, that Israel faced a second holocaust in June 1967. That's mythology and I think Tom Segev's book, unlike what he's saying now, punctures that mythology.

AMY GOODMAN: Tom Segev.

TOM SEGEV: I’m always amazed by people who seem to know what the Egyptians really wanted, be it on the extreme left as Mr. Finkelstien, or the extreme right as Michael Loren. We really don't know what Egyptians wanted because we don't have Egyptian documents. And uh, it’s also not so important what they wanted, what is important is what the Israelis thought the Egyptians wanted. Um. the army, the Israeli army and the Israeli Generals, are coming out of my book as very hysteric people. They thought if we don't strike now, we may lose the war. And so they put very very heavy pressure on the government. It is in fact the civilian government that says to the generals, we need to wait we need to do everything we can to avoid the war. So, I think picture is much more composed you know, more complicated than just to say that the Israelis did this or that.

AMY GOODMAN: We are going to break. Then we'll come back to this discussion. We are talking to Tom Segev, the Israeli historian and journalist, his latest book is called 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East. Dr. Mona El-Farra is with us, Palestinian physician and human rights activist, living in Gaza, born in Gaza, does the blog From Gaza with Love. And, Professor Norman Finkelstein from DePaul University. His book is Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History. We'll come back to this discussion in a minute.

AMY GOODMAN: As we continue our discussion on this 40th and anniversary of the Arab-Israel war that took place this time, this week 40 years ago. Our guest Tom Segev, historian and columnist with the Israeli newspaper, Ha’aretz. His latest book, 1967: Israel, the War and the Year that Transformed the Middle East. Doctor Mona El-Farra, born in Gaza, lives in Gaza and writes from Gaza, the blog, From Gaza with Love. And Professor Finkelstein, author of a number of books, Professor of Political Science at DePaul University, joining us from Chicago - his latest, Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History.

Um, Tom Segev, you wrote a column in The New York Times on Tuesday, “What if Israel had Turned Back?”

TOM SEGEV: An Op-Ed.

AMY GOODMAN: An Op-Ed, yes. Now, we see, don't know if it appears in the Times but it’s appearing on their website, the Anti-Defamation League, saying

“To the Editor, Tom Segev’s look back at the Six Day War misses a larger point. Israel not only had no intention at the outset of conquering land, afterwards it offered the Arabs return of land in exchange for peace. In both the 1948 and 1956 wars, Israel won land in the Sinai but was forced by international pressure to relinquish it without getting any peace or guarantee of quiet in return. As a result, new wars occurred, first in ‘56 then in ’67. This time around, Israel was determined to hold on as leverage for peace. Israel's attitude resulted in U.N. Security council resolution 242, peace with Egypt and peace with Jordan. How was Israel to know, that even with the offer of returning land, as at Camp David, and the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, would not only not yield peace but would lead to further Palestinian extremism. The history is tragic not because of Israel’s victory in 1967, but because of Palestinian unwillingness to make critical decisions for peace and compromise.”
That's a letter written by the Anti-Defamation League. Your response.

TOM SEGEV: You’re giving me a hard time, really. You just made me defend myself against the extreme left, now I have to defend myself against the Anti-Defamation League. Um, I really think that looking back 40 years we gained absolutely nothing from taking the Palestinian territories, only misery for Palestinians and for Israelis. Uh, and uh, I think that we shouldn’t have done it. And now the question is, of course: Could the decision makers in 1967 know how harmful it was to take East Jerusalem and the West Bank? One of the amazing thing about the records from the cabinet meetings, which I have in the book, is that they never ever call in experts, not even legal experts, to brief them on the implications of what they are doing. Rationally, strategically, they know that it’s not in the interest of Israel to take these territories and yet they still do. So it’s really a moment where we do something which is wrong and that lasts for many, many years. Now, the Palestinians have made many many mistakes. I think they are still a making mistake today by shooting at this tiny little town called (inaudible). I think it is bad for them. Terrorism is proved to be very bad for the Palestinians. Oppression has to be - proved to be very bad for the Palestinians and the Israelis.

AMY GOODMAN: Would you call the Israeli state, what it is engaged in, terrorism as well?

TOM SEGEV: No I don’t, well…

AMY GOODMAN: When it kills Palestinians?

TOM SEGEV: Well…some of it, maybe. We really…let's not generalize. Ask me about a specific case and I will tell you. Yes, that’s uh, the definition of terrorism does usually not imply to states, but this is playing with words. I think that Israel made many, many wrong steps in the territories. And I think that um, today, it’s really about managing the conflict rather than looking for solutions to the conflict. I think there are many things to be done to make life more livable. And Mona coming from Gaza, she will be the first to agree, that it needs to be done to make life more livable.

AMY GOODMAN: Mona, over these 40 years, describe what it is like to live now in Gaza?

MONA EL FARRA: Yeah, but first I would like to comment on terrorism. I consider Israeli acts in Gaza and in the West Bank state terrorism. I consider it. I don't agree with hitting [inaudible] with rockets, despite the fact that I agree with the right of the Palestinian people to resist.

TOM SEGEV: Right.

MONA EL FARRA: But, I am against hitting any rockets against civilians, and this implies for both sides, the Israeli and Palestinian sides. But, what Israel is doing in the Gaza Strip is well-defined, known state terrorism. I’m coming from Gaza, the borders are closed, the economical situation is so much deteriorating. Human rights are violated every day and continuous violation of human rights. And, uh, right to health is violated, right to education, children - children's rights to live peacefully is violated. And when I talk about children, I always think of Palestinian and Israeli children. So more aggression, more acts against Palestinian, in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank will not bring peace or security for the Pal- for the Israeli children. What will bring peace and security is justice. And when we are talking about justice, justice doesn’t mean to end the occupation now, 40 years of occupation. These 40 years of occupation is - has been preceded by another 59 years of [Arabic], when Israel was founded on the ruins of Palestinian people. It is just the right time to let the world know that Israel should take some small responsibility regarding the refugees – the refugees that have been forced to leave Palestine, historical Palestine, Israel now. Those refugees, eh, big, large ethnic cleansing operation that happened in 1948. And when you are talking about 40 years of the war, the occupation, or the [Arabic] we should not forget other Palestinians who are living outside Palestine. So, if we are looking for strategic solutions for future solutions for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we should think of the whole picture as such and this piece of land should be, must be shared between both. Maybe it is not right now, to say this thing, but this is the future, the future for all to live in peace. This is my opinion

AMY GOODMAN: The conflict between Hamas and Fatah. How is that affecting this arrival at some kind of solution?

MONA EL FARRA: It is it has, affects all our lives in Gaza. And, but to start with, before talking about the conflict: What made this conflict? What are the underlying causes? When Israel left Gaza, almost two years ago now, it convinced the whole world that occupation is over in Gaza. The occupation has never been over in Gaza. Gaza was left – the, the settlers were forced to leave Gaza, and the disengagement plan, but Israel still controls Gaza. They can, they control the sea, the land, the border. They can come and go any time they want. So, and, uh, Gaza was left with 1.4 million population living in this very small piece of land, in a very dire general situation, economical, health, all situations are deteriorating and dire. And so, things are boiling inside Gaza, a lot of arms in Gaza, a lot of factions. And this is the start of the problem. To leave people in big pressure cooker, big prison called Gaza, clashes were inevitable, should happen. But, despite of this, I don’t give any excuses for Fatah or Hamas to go through this inter-clashes It affected our lives very much in Gaza. I blame both parties, and it made the situation more complicated. And from my point of view, I look at it from the humanitarian side. It made our lives difficult in Gaza, these inter-clashes.

AMY GOODMAN: Professor Norman Finkelstein, the role of the United States right now, and the role of this government plays in Israel and Palestine? NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: Well, the role is critical and it comes out, I think, quite clearly in Tom Segev’s book. The Israelis have always feared what the reaction of the United States would be in the event that they take any initiatives. In 1956, when Israeli invaded the Sinai, it was the United States that forced them back. In June 1967, the main fear of the Israeli leadership, as well as those who were out of leadership, like Ben Gorian – so Ben Gorian, the Prime Minister Levi Eshgul and others, the main fear was not the Arabs, not defeating Nasser, that was a done deal in their minds. The fear was the United States. Would the United States force them to leave unconditionally as it forced them to leave in 1956? That's what was holding up the war. The Israelis wanted already, the Generals wanted already to attack on May 25th, but the Israeli government kept saying, we have to take into account the Americans. We have to see what the Americans will say. And so, at every step along the way in June ‘67, it was the possibility of the American's interposing themselves and forcing the withdrawal that was upper – an unconditional withdrawal - that was uppermost in the minds of the Americans. And also, um, Segev accurately quotes Israelis, once the occupation began, the Israelis are concerned: How will the United States react in the event that this occupation begins to look like it’s going to be permanent? What’s going to happen if Israel decides to annex Jerusalem? And I think, uh, Tom Segev has very interesting account of how Israel was pretending only to extend administrative law to Jerusalem because they’re fearful of the American reaction. United States had huge leverage then and the United States continues to have huge leverage today, in determining what Israel does or doesn't do and not only with regard to the Palestinians, but regionally.

AMY GOODMAN: Mona Farra, you are traveling the country in a tour, speaking yesterday. You spoke at the United Nations. What is the main message you have to people here in this country and the United States?

MONA EL FARRA: The main message is that occupation, war, will never bring peace to the area. And only peace that is built on justice will bring peace to the area

AMY GOODMAN: Tom Segev, when you come to this country, what you think is the important message?

TOM SEGEV: I can agree with Mona. I think particularly, American friends of Israel should redefine their friendship for Israel. Friendship for Israel does not mean support the government at all times. And I think they should make a distinction between Israel and the government of Israel, just as they do that for their own country, why not do it for Israel? There are many, many Israelis who object to the occupation. Nothing you will say in your rally in Washington will be new to Israeli ears. In fact, the public debate in Israel is much more open than it is in this country regarding the future of the territories. And so I think it is very important that people realize that friendship to Israel does not mean supporting occupation of the territories. On the contrary.

AMY GOODMAN: We'll have it leave it there. I thank you all for being with us. Tom Segev author of 1967: Israel, the War and the Year that Transformed the Middle East. Doctor Mona El Farra on a tour around the United States, with the Middle East Children's Alliance. Writes the blog From Gaza With Love, has grown up in, and lives in Gaza. Norman Finkelstein, Professor of Political Science at DePaul University. His book is Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History, speaking to us from Chicago.



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omar ibrahim baker - 10/19/2007

The devil is in the details and these abound with every party digging and redigging in an exhausted field; all hoping to come up with something new, or hitherto overlooked, to say.

However the outstanding facts are to the overwhelming majority of Arabs and Moslems at least, and that is what really count, is that:

1- The outcome of the Six Days War was the inevitable output from Sykes-Picot in that the "nations” and their ruling” regimes", to which this Anglo/French dismemberment of the Levant, greater Syria in particular, gave birth and legitimacy failed, as expected and intended, to achieve and maintain the bare minimum of ability to protect themselves i.e. the ability to deter any infringement of their national security and territorial integrity.
These truncated "nations" were soundly defeated in the battle field and ended by having their lands totally, Palestine, or partially, Syria and Lebanon, occupied by an alien conqueror or by submitting to the will of the occupier, both Egypt and Jordan.
The Six Days war sounded their death knoll by demonstrating their utter non viability in the modern world and particularly in the Middle East.

2-The liberal, secular and Western style "democratic" aspirations of these regimes, both genuine and pretentious, proved not only incapable of achieving national security but were consequently totally discarded as the road to national security and to "modernization".

3-Any lingering doubts, once held by a few "westernized" politicians and "intellectuals" , about the true nature and intended reach of the Zionist colonialist project, whether it will stop in part or all of Palestine or is covetous of going beyond, were finally and irrevocably abandoned by all except an ever diminishing minority.
Zionist Israel is presently incontestably perceived as an alien expansionist nation/state to uproot or succumb to!

4-The religious motive force behind Zionism, “the promised land" to "God's chosen people" etc , finally gave birth to its true nemesis and genuine existential counter force, Islamist Jihad, and in as much as Zionism mobilized the Jews for a Zionist Israel, Islamism is mobilizing the Moslem world for Palestine.

What started with the promise of a "safe haven" for the Jews ended as an expansionist and racist nation/ state and far from achieving the longed for safety and security did, inevitably, launch the confrontation, in the present and future calamitous conflict, between the Arab/Moslem and the Judeo/Christian worlds with which we all will live and suffer for generations to come.
Whether Lord Balfour, and the imperialist West behind him, intended that is now immaterial!


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