Not Many Senators Have Found Themselves in Joe Lieberman's PredicamentNews at Home
It is very rare for incumbent senators to lose in their party's primary: since 1960, only 19 have so fallen. Five of these were special cases: Sheila Frahm (R-Kansas), Donald Stewart (D-Alabama), David Gambrell (D-Georgia), Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio, in 1974), and Ross Bass (D-Tennessee) were either interim appointments or had won special elections, and then failed to secure the nomination for a full term in the Senate. Advanced age (J. William Fulbright, D-Arkansas; B. Everett Jordan, D-North Carolina) or scandal (Edward Long, D-Missouri; A. Willis Robertson, D-Virginia) explained the defeats of four others.
A pattern of political weakness explained the primary defeats of three other senators. In 2002, New Hampshire Republicans ousted Robert Smith in large part because they believed, probably correctly, that he couldn't win in November; he had barely won re-election in 1996, in a race that TV networks prematurely called for his opponent, former congressman Dick Swett. Two other spurned incumbents, Democrats Mike Gravel of Alaska and Richard (Dick) Stone of Florida, had initially captured very tight primaries and never established firm party bases. Stone lost to the man who he had defeated in 1974, former congressman Bill Gunter; Gravel fell to Clark Gruening, the grandson of the senator he had ousted in 1968. Both Gunter and Gruening then lost the fall election to Republicans.
Ideology and changing party politics played a decisive role in the failed renomination bids of five senators. Three defeated Republican moderates (Jacob Javits, R-New York; Clifford Case, R-New Jersey; Thomas Kuchel, R-California) were victims of the GOP's shift to the right: the party that ousted them was very different ideologically than the party that initially nominated them. The conservatives who prevailed, however, were all flawed candidates. In 1968, Max Rafferty lost to Democrat Alan Cranston—and Kuchel's seat has remained in Democratic hands ever since. In 1978, Jeffrey Bell lost to Bill Bradley—and Case's seat has remained under Democratic control ever since. In 1980, Jacob Javits lost to Al D'Amato—who surely would have been defeated in November but for Javits' continued presence on the ballot, as the Liberal Party nominee. The incumbent senator siphoned a critical 11 percent of the vote away from Democrat Liz Holtzman, allowing D'Amato to prevail by one percentage point, 44-43.
On the Democratic side, the effects of the Vietnam War and their states' more general shift to the right contributed to the primary defeats of Ernest Gruening (D-Alaska) in 1968 and Ralph Yarborough (D-Texas) in 1970. Gruening, seeking a third term at age 81, came under attack for his increasingly extreme antiwar position (Gruening had voted against all defense appropriations after 1965) and his disinterest in bringing home federal projects to Alaska. Gruening's foreign policy radicalism and New Deal liberalism was out of place in a state transforming from a Democratic bastion (at time of statehood, 90 percent of Alaska's state legislature were Democrats) to the libertarian frontier it is today. Age and ideology also hurt the last of the Texas liberals, Ralph Yarborough, who was out-spent by conservative Lloyd Bentsen in the 1970 Democratic primary. Bentsen enjoyed covert support from LBJ, who remembered Yarborough's opposition to his administration's policy in Vietnam; the challenger also put together a devastating ad linking Yarborough to the riots at the 1968 Democratic convention.
The closest parallels to the situation Lieberman has faced this year came in Illinois in 1992 and Ohio in 1968. In Illinois, incumbent Alan Dixon had a profile remarkably similar to Lieberman's. He was a genial, two-term incumbent, with a moderate voting record, someone known for his ability to work with senators across the aisle. Like Lieberman, he had enjoyed smashing electoral success (taking an open-seat race in the bad Democratic year of 1980, securing two-thirds of the vote in 1986) but was sometimes overshadowed by his in-state colleague—Dodd in the case of Lieberman; for Dixon, Democrat Paul Simon. Also like Lieberman, Dixon departed from his Democratic colleagues on an emotionally charged issue: he was the only northern Democrat to support Clarence Thomas's confirmation to the Supreme Court in 1991.
In light of the Thomas vote, the bipartisan, moderate image that once was Dixon's greatest asset instead became a major liability. His vote prompted an immediate primary challenge from the up-and-coming Cook County Recorder of Deeds, Carol Moseley-Braun. Sensing an opportunity, personal injury lawyer Al Hofeld jumped into the race, launching a slashing negative campaign that (not inaccurately) portrayed Dixon as an ineffective backbencher. Dixon countered by attacking Hofeld, only to see Moseley-Braun slip by both to take the primary with just under 40 percent. Hofeld and Moseley-Braun in many ways represented a combined version of Ned Lamont in 2006: Hofeld had Lamont's personal wealth, Moseley-Braun his appeal to grassroots liberals. The first African-American woman ever to win election to the Senate, Moseley-Braun served a term before being unseated by Peter Fitzgerald in 1998.
Unlike the Illinois three-way 1992 primary, two-term Democrat Frank Lausche was unseated in a two-way contest in 1968. Ohio's governor before winning election to the Senate in 1956, Lausche drifted to the right after easily capturing a second term in 1962. One of the most passionate defenders of LBJ's Vietnam policy in the Senate, he regularly called into question the patriotism of dissenters on the Foreign Relations Committee. (He frequently complained of the torture of having to serve on the same committee as Franck Church.)
Throughout his career, Lausche had enjoyed bipartisan appeal in a state that leaned Republican, but as 1968 approached, it was clear he was vulnerable in the primary—as polls showed him (much like Lieberman in 2006) more popular among his state's Republicans than among Democrats. Former congressman (and future governor) John Gilligan, promising to support liberal policies at home and oppose the war abroad, unseated him in a bitter primary—only to see many Lausche supporters defect to Republican nominee William Saxbe, who prevailed in the fall.
Much like Lausche and Dixon, Lieberman seems to have crossed a threshold, where what once appeared to be commendable moderate instincts came to be seen by many Democrats as partisan apostasy. Unlike Lausche and Dixon, however, the Connecticut senator has promised to fight on even if he loses the primary. If he chose to pursue this course, he would hope to become the first person since John Warner in Virginia (1978) to be elected to the Senate after losing in his party's nominating process.
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Lawrence Brooks Hughes - 8/10/2006
You are correct, of course, but in practice the executive branch is harassed constantly by the media, which in turn is always stirring up the common people, whom the Lord must have loved because he made so many of them. If the SFRC had actually made foreign policy we would have been in the hands of dolts like Claiborne Pell, for God's sake, and probably would have lost the Cold War! (Actually, it was JFK, not Fulbright, who led us into Vietnam, and Jesse Helms did a wonderful job as its chairman, so perhaps the guidance from SFRC has not been uniformly awful). Foreign Relations also used to have another RINO turkey, Charles Mathias, who fought Reagan every step of the way. As a matter of fact, it would make no difference if they abolished the SFRC tomorrow. What a good idea! Replace it with some self-help formula for backward countries to qualify themselves for foreign aid, and quit the UN so the UN dues battles will cease.
Don Adams - 8/10/2006
I'm not sure I agree with your idea that the disposition, ideological or otherwise, of the Senate foreign relations committee affects the success of our foreign policy. Foreign policy is, for all intents and purposes, the exclusive domain of the executive branch. This has been true from the first President onward, and has only become more pronounced over time. Never mind the power of the purse, advise and consent, and other ostensible checks on the Executive's power to conduct foreign policy; Congress can do little more than react after a President has acted, which means the President gets what he wants. Even the War Powers Act, which was supposed to limit the President's ability to conduct war, has served only to enhance his freedom in this regard. Congress, now powerless to stop our entry into a confilict, is left to withhold funding and other support once a conflict has begun. That, of course, will never happen.
If, as you claim, we have made "many foreign policy mistakes" since Vietnam, blame lies with the actions of the executive branch, not the ideology of the legislative branch.
Lawrence Brooks Hughes - 8/7/2006
You have brought back many memories here for political junkies who watched most of those races avidly. When you say Clifford Case's seat "has remained under Democratic control since," you should somehow recognize this was a Lincoln Chafee situation, i.e., under Case the seat was just as liberal as under his Democratic followers... You also mention Frank Lauche's complaints about the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the Vietnam era. Our revisit to that committee in 2004 with the Kerry testimony on C-SPAN was much fun, and showed it then had Case, Javits, and Morse, and I think Percy; in fact, about the only conservative members were old Southern Democrats, virtually none of the Republicans. There is something about the Foreign Relations Committee which seems to attract the very most liberal Senators of both parties, even today. Why should Chairman Lugar have to contend with an 11-10 GOP majority now, including Lincoln Chfee, a de facto Democrat, and other fairly liberal Republicans like Voinovich, Hagel and Collins (I think Collins or Snowe), when the Senate is 55-45 for the GOP? It may be a throwback to the years when foreign policy differences "stopped at the water's edge," and a conscious effort was made at bipartisanship in selecting members for this committee. But ideological liberals drove a truck through that naivete by stacking themselves on Foreign Affairs, and this could well explain, in some part, the nation's many foreign policy mistakes from Vietnam to the present.